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THE ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

THE

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

BY
J. WELLHAUSEN

TRANSLATED &1

MARGARET GRAHAM WEIR, M.A.

PUBLISHED BY THE

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA
1927

PRINTED BY BHDPENDEA LAL BANERJI, AT THE CALCUTTA
UNIVEISITY PRESS, SENATE HOUSE, CALCUTTA.

At the request of the Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta
University I agreed to see the translation through the
Press, and sOggested some minor changes in translitera-
tion to make this important work more serviceable to
Indian students especially, and offered to compile an
Index. These proposals were accepted; the addition of
the Index has been approved by the Translator, and is
certain to commend itself to the reader.

A. H. HARLEY.
Calcutta

PREFACE

The old traditions of the times of the
Umaiyids are to be found in their most authentic
form (because as yet uncontaminated and open
to question) in Tabari, in the most brilliant
part of his work, Series II of the Leiden edition,
which has now been in print for almost two
decades. Above all he has preserved to us, in
very considerable fragments, the genuine Abu
Mikhnaf, and with him the oldest and best
Arab prosewriter we possess. Abti Mikhnaf
Ltit b. Yahy& b. Sa'id b. Mikhnaf belonged to
the Azd of Ktifa, and the long pedigree shows
that on his father's side he came of a family of
high standing. Probably Mikhnaf b. Sulaim,
the leader of the Azd at the battle of Siffin, was
his ancestor, and the sons of the latter, Muham-
mad and Abdurrahman, his granduncles. We
do not know the date of his birth ; at the rising
of Ibn Ash'ath, A. H. 82, he had already reached
man's estate. He was a friend of Muhammad b.
SSi'ib alKalbl (Tab., 2, 1075, 1096), and it is
to the latter's son, the well-known Ibn Kalbi,

viii PREFACE

that we are chiefly indebted for the transmission
of his writings and traditions : as a rule, Tabarl
quotes them from him. He lived to see the
fall of the Khalifate of Damascus.. His last
statements in Tabari refer to the year
132.

Abft Mikhnaf, quotes, in part, other tradi-
tionists, older or contemporary, as his authori-
ties, e.g.) 'Amir ash-Sha'bi, Abu 'IMukhftriq
arR&sibl, MujfUid b. Sa'Jd, Muhammad b. S&'ib
aiKalbi. But for the most part he did not take
over the material from predecessors in the same
line of study, but collected it himself ex vivo ore,
by enquiries in the most diverse directions, from
all possible people who could have first-hand
information or who had been present to see and
hear for themselves. The Isndd, the filiation of
the guarantors, is with him a reality and not
mere literary form. His list of witnesses is
always very short and through gradual approxi-
mation of events finally shrinks into nothing ;
they are constantly changing with the different
events and the separate traditions so that a
tremendous crowd of otherwise unknown names
is brought in. The witnesses cannot see the
wood for the trees ; they mention the most
trifling things, never leave anything anonymous,
place the characters acting and speaking in the
foreground, and in the main, keep continually
repeating the same thing with slight variations.

PREFACE ix

Progress is thus rendered exceedingly slow, but
the fulness of detail makes up for this disad-
vantage. The fresh impression of events and
the first report of them are arresting. The
vivacity of the narrative is increased by its
popular form ; it is all dialogue and staging. A
few illustrative examples are to be found in my
treatise upon the Chawarig and the Shia
(Gottingen, 1901, particularly p. 19ff. and
p. 61ff.).

Mommsen once said that to unlearned
persons there is no need of proof that stories
that begin by saying that the narrator had them
from the parties concerned in them, are, as a
rule, not true. Still, we must hope that un-
learned people will not make too extensive a
use of their sound common-sense. It would be
a loss to history if Ab& Mikhnaf had not
written, and how else was he to proceed than
he did ? Original sources did not yield him
much. He used them when they lay to his
hand, but without diligently seeking them out
and systematically using them as a foundation.
Most frequently he quotes songs and verses
to authenticate his narrative. His great
authority lies in his collecting a host of variants
of the same thing from reports of different
origin, so that we can compare them and judge
what is sure or what is uncertain in them. At
the same time he contrives that the side-issues,

as they only appear once, take a secondary place,
and the chief questions, heing everywhere re-
peated, keep constantly cropping up. Tradi-
tions that are not parallel he places in a suitable
sequence, so that the result is a progressive
connection. This mosaic work has not heen
done without some choice and selection. There
are no contradictions in important points. The
traditions show a general agreement. The
picture has assumed, as a whole, solidity and
unity, not only with respect to the facts, hut
in regard to the characters as well. Above the
seemingly chaotic material the plan of the
author and the complete perspective which he
formed for himself, are supremely evident. And
yet he does not cover any considerable period
of time, nor does he link it up pragmatically
and chronologically. He is deficient in sustained
chronology. He mentions only scattered dates,
frequently nothing but the days of the week,
without month or year. He does not string the
events upon a continuous thread, but describes
them singly and independently of each other,
widely apart and with no coherence. In the
Fihrist there are enumerated 22 monographs by
him with their titles.

It is characteristic of Abft Mikhnaf that he
does not start at the beginnings of Isl&m, not
indeed until the conquests, and in particular gives
accounts of a period in the midst of which he

PREFACE xi

stands himself, from the battle of Siffin onwards.
Also, his interest is limited to the place where
he lived himself, Ir&q and its capital K&fa.
Beyond these limits of time and place bis
information1 is not particularly good. Now, as
Kufa and Iraq were the seat of the opposition to
the imperial government, the latter affords the
principal theme of his narrative. The themes
which he pursues with particular zest and
exhaustiveness are the risings of the Kh&rijites
and Shiites under Mustaurid and Shabib, under
Hujr, Husain, Sulaiman and Mukht&r, and the
rising of the Iraqites under Ibn Ash'ath. He
hands down the tradition of Kufa; his sympathies
are on the side of Ir&q against Syria, for All
against the Umaiyids, Yet in this, there is not
much of a bias noticeable, at least not so much as
positively to falsify facts. Only on occasion does
he seem to hush up what it does not suit him to
state, e.g., that 'Aqil at Siffin fought against his
brother Ali.

In the treatise upon the opposition parties of
ancient Islam I have preferred to keep to AbA
Mikhnaf. On the other hand, for the history of
the Arabian Kingdom which forms the subject
of the present book, he does not afford so rich a
store. For this the Kftfa tradition is not the
best source, but the tradition of Medina, which
is the old main source. In its origin it goes
back further than that of KAfa, but the only

xii PEEFACE

authorities for it which are of any use to us
are younger than Abii Mikhnaf and do not
flourish until the time when the literary scholar-
ship began to emigrate from Medina to Baghdad.
The best-known are Ibn Ish&q, a freedman, Abu
Ma'shar, likewise a freedman, and Waqidi.
They no longer collect the raw material at first
hand. The traditions have reached them through
a learned medium, and are sifted, edited and
blended together by them. But they do bring
them into a closer connection, and subject them
at the same time to a thorough system of
chronology. Out of the disconnected narratives
of important events is formed a continuous
history. Ibn Ishaq must be considered its
creator. His writings and those of his successors

o

take the form of annals which is then the vogue.
Chronology presupposes scientific research and
comparison. In these the Medina scholars were
not found wanting and they produced results
which stand examination remarkably well. Here
and there they may perhaps have followed
records of Christian, especially of Syrian, divines,
e.g., in the dating of earthquakes and other
natural phenomena. We can trace the progress
of the attempt to capture events in the net of
time. In completeness of chronology Ibn Ish&q
is surpassed by his successors (W&qidi, p. 15 f.),
Abft Ma'shar seems to have had a mind for
nothing but dates, and even with W£qidi this

PREFACE xiii

interest obtrudes itself. For the relation
between these two see Tabari, II, 1172, 10 ;
1173, 6.

Medina was the kernel of the Islamic
community and the Arabian kingdom. The
importance of the town for the general historical
development which started from it gave its
stamp to the tradition which grew up there. It
naturally cherished first the memory of the
proud and sacred time at the beginning when
Islam was still an unbroken religious and
political unity, and seemed as if it were about
to embrace the whole world within itself. Its
chief theme, to which Ibn Ishaq appears to
have limited himself exclusively, was the Stra
with the Maghdzi, i.e., the life of Mahammad,
the foundation of the community through him,
and the foundation of the Kingdom through
him and his Khalifas in the period of the
conquests. But even when the centre of gravity
of the kingdom had been transferred to
Damascus it did not lose sight of the true centre
of the whole. It did not remove to Damascus
itself, but remained in Medina, and even under
the Umaiyids this town was i*ut only the seat
of the most prominent Arab society, but also
the spiritual centre of the Islamic culture until
Baghdad took its place. The course of the
secular history also of the kingdom arrested the
attention of the scholars of Medina, although

XIV

PREFACE

they were not in agreement with the government.
They were far more concerned about Syria than
about Ir&q or even about Khur&s&n. Certain
official statements, as one might say, are repeated
regularly in AbA Ma'sharand Waqidi, e.g., when
the rulers came into power and died ; when the
stattholders of the most important provinces
were installed and deposed ; who was commission-
ed by the Khalifa each year to lead the Haj j and
the summer campaign against the Romans.
These statements form the framework of the
Medina annals. The contents are fuller only at
certain crises and turning-points, but generally
they are meagre. The scholarly interest is
directed to dry facts ; we see little of pleasure in
detail, of intimate relations with the subject, of
sympathy with the- characters of the drama.
Sympathy with the TJmaiyids and Syrians was
not to be found in Medina ; we need not look for
more than an aloof interest.

Doubtless there was likewise a tradition in
Syria itself, i.e., among the Syrian Arabs, but it
is lost to us. Traces of it are found in Bal&dhurl,
perhaps also in the Kalbite 'Aw&na, who indeed
lived in K&fa, but through his tribe was
connected with Syria, and is often quoted in
Tabarl as the reporter of Syrian matters,
generally according to Ibn Kalbl. We are best
acquainted with the spirit of this Syrian tradi-
tion from Christian chronicles, particularly the

PREFACE xv

Oontinuatio of Isidor of Seville. The Umaiyids
there appear in a quite different, and very
much more favourable light than that in
which we are accustomed to see them. In
the case of the Arabs, their enemies had the
last word, and their history in consequence
suffered severely.

Mad&ini takes up a kind of middle position
beween Afofr Mikhnaf and the historians of
Medina. He is a scholarly historian but gives
very detailed accounts, and has a pronounced
local interest in Basra and Khurasan. Almost
all the accounts concerning Basra and Khurasan
in Tabari are taken from him. He takes up
altogether the Abbasid stand-point and from it
describes the fall of the Umaiyids and the
rise of the blessed dynasty.

Of the characterisation of these main
authorities of Tabari I say no more. Many
other traditionistSj not known to us through
their own works, give accounts in Tabari,
especially for certain particular parties. But I
do not propose here to make a complete
survey of the oldest Arab historical writing.
It seemed to me necessary merely to give
some idea of its origins, for which let this
suffice. Wiistenfeld's well-known statement
in Vols. 28 and 29 of the Abhandlungen of
the Gottingen Society will serve to complete
my account.

xvi PREFACE

My idea originally was to deal with the time
of the Umaiyids in the same manner and under
the same title (Prolegomena to the oldest history
of Islam) as I dealt with the time of the great
conquests in the 6th Part of my Skizzen und
Vorarbeiten. There I succeeded in comparing
the account of Saif b. ' Umar with the rest of
the collected tradition in Tabari, and proved it
to be a biassed touching-up of the latter. But
Saif stops with the Battle of the Camel, and
from that point historical criticism does not
proceed according to the same unvarying stand-
point. We are no longer guided by a literary
leading-string. We must pronounce judgment
from case to case from actual facts, enter into
the merits of the case, and follow rather an
eclectic or even a harmonising method. The
reporters are, indeed, constantly differing in
credibility, but they only part company now and
then, and not always on the same point.
Discussion then becomes more intricate and
more minute, where it is at all possible and
worth the trouble. But it is not always possible
because the material is not sufficient, and not
always necessary because the guarantors agree
or complement each other. Frequently positive
statement may and must take the place of
inquiry. Compared to the beginning it pre-
ponderates more as the book goes on. The
reproach of inconsistency of style I accept.

PREFACE xv

Heeard for the changing quality of the reports
was responsible for my change of procedure. I
have indeed heen impelled to many inquiries
less hy the material than by my own predeces-
sors. I felt bound sometimes to give other
answers to them than they did.

Gdttingen, July> 1902. WKLLHAUSKN.

CONTENTS

PAGE

Preface ... ... ... vii

Chapter I — Introduction ... ... 1

II— AH and the First Civil War 75

„ III — The Sutyanids and the Second

Civil War ... ... 113

„ IV— The First Marwanids ... 201

„ V— Umar II and the Hawaii ... 267

VI— The Later Marwanids ... 312

„ VII— Marwan and the Third Civil

War ... ... 370

„ VIII— The Arab Tribes in Khurasan 397

„ IX— The Fall of the Arab King-
dom ... ... 492

Index ... ... ... 567

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The political community of Islam grew
out of the religious community. Muhammad's
conversion and his call to be an apostle took
place about the same time. He began with
himself ; he was, to begin with, possessed with
the certainty of the all-powerful God and of the
last judgment, but the conviction that filled his
own heart was so great that it forced its way
out. He felt bound to show the light and the
way to the brethren who were groping in dark-
ness, and thereby save them from error.
Straightway he founded a little congregation
at Mecca.

This congregation was held closely together
by the belief in the One Invisible God, the
Creator of the world and the Judge of the soul,
and by the moral law arising thence, to serve
Him and no other lord, to gain one's own soul
and not the world, to seek righteousness and
mercy and not earthly possessions. In the
oldest chapters of the Qoran monotheism is as

a ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

emphatically moral as it is in Amos and in the
Sermon on the Mount. As in the Gospel, the
thought of the Creator immediately awakens the
thought of personal justification to Him after
death. He claims the soul absolutely for
Himself, — to do His will, not merely to submit
to it. The original Islam is not fatalism in the
usual sense of the word, and its God is not the
Absolute, i.e. a religious figure-head, but with
the Supreme Power morality and righteousness
are indissolubly bound up. Sometimes the one,
sometimes the other is emphasised according to
the feeling of the moment, without any attempt
to keep the balance, or any consciousness of
inconsistency. Muhammad was neither philo-
sopher nor dogmatist.

Externally the community was bound to-
gether by the common observances of religious
ceremonies; the oldest name which they had
among outsiders, the name Sdkians, can have its
origin only in these ceremonies. Even in the
earliest parts of the Qoran prayers, prostrations
and vigils are postulated ; they are only not yet
so strictly defined and regulated as they are
later.

Muhammad began by winning over indi-
viduals, friends, relatives and slaves, but these

he regarded only as first-fruits. From the
beginning his aim was to draw all Mecca to
himself, — his family, the H&ahim and the

INTRODUCTION 3

Muttalib, and his people, the Quraish. Ho was
an Arab, and as an Arab his feelings for the
family and the tribe (i.e. the people), were such
as we only understand for the narrower house-
hold. An order of things aloof from the com-
munity and acting independently with sovereign
power, was as yet unknown among the Arabs.
The state was not an institution and not a
territory, but a collective body. There was thus,
in reality, not a state, but only a people ; not an
artificial organisation, but simply a full-grown
organism ; no state officials, but only heads of
clans, families and tribes.1 The same bond, —
that of blood, held together the people and the
family ; the only difference was their size. The
commonwealth, free from any external constrain-
ing influence, was based upon the idea of a
blood-community and its sanctity. Relation-
ship, or the faith in relationship, — both came
practically to the same thing, — worked as a
religion, and this religion was the spirit which
made the race into one living whole. Along
with this there was also an outward cultus, but
no religion which laid upon them any other
claims, ties or obligations except only those of

1 Even yet the Beduin are disposed to think of the Daula, i.e.
the Turkish Empire, as a tribe, and to rate its strength by the number
of its camels (Doughty 1, 230). Even in the towns tne political
unit was not the city but the tribe, — thus, the Quraish in Mecca, the
Thaqlf in Taif. The Quraishites and Thaqtfites felt that they belonged
together politically even when they lived outside of Mecca or Taif.

4 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

blood. If Muhammad had founded a faith
whose professors did not take cover under the
bond of tribal relationship he would have broken
up the blood-related community there and then,
since it was too closely bound and knit together
to suffer the intrusion of a foreign agent. But
he did not want that, and, besides, he could per-
haps scarcely imagine a religious community in
any other setting than that of blood-relationship.
So his mission was not to gain adherents far and
near. He had to begin, of course, with
individuals, but his aim was to gain the whole.
His nation was to become his congregation ; he
was not content with an " ecclesiola pressa " in
Mecca.

Failing to win over his own people, the
Quraish, in Mecca, he tried to strike up a
connection with other tribes and towns, for
which he found opportunity in the markets
and fairs in the neighbourhood of Mecca. At
Tftif he approached the elders of the Thaqif
with regard to the admission of the common-
wealth as a whole into Islam. Finally he
gained a footing in Yathrib, i.e. Medina. His
emigration thither, the Hijra, was an event
that founded a new era, but the new erg
really meant no conscious break with the past
Muhammad did not deteriorate by his change
from preacher to ruler. His ideal had long
been to attract not only individuals but the

INTRODUCTION 5

whole commonwealth. He always considered the
prophet as the God-sent leader of His people,
and drew no distinction between a political and
a religious community. His desire to continue
to be in Medina the same as he had been in Mecca,
the Prophet and Messenger of God, was not
hypocrisy or the acting of a part. Only, in
Mecca his efforts were in vain ; in Medina he
succeeded ; there he was in the opposition, here he
attained his end. That made a great difference,
and not an external one only. It is a regular
occurrence for the opposition to change when it
comes into power, and theory differs vastly
from practice since the latter has got to reckon
with possibilities. A historical community
cannot altogether break with its existing founda-
tions, and might follow^ laws of its own in order
to maintain and extend its power. It is this
which explains why the Prophet as ruler became
different from the Prophet as pretender, and
why the theocracy in practice differed from
the theocracy in theory. The political element
became more prominent, the religious element
less so, but it must always be remembered that,
in principle, politics and religion flowed together,
though a distinction was made between divine
and secular politics, and alongside of them the
piety of the heart still kept its place.

2. In Medina the ground was prepared for
Muhammad by Judaism and Christianity. There

6 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

were many Jews there, and the town stood on
the boundary of that part of Arabia which
was under the Graeco-Uoman and Christian-
Armenian influence. The political conditions
were even more favourable for him. In Mecca
peace and order prevailed. The old principle of
a community acted smoothly. The new one that
the Prophet threatened to introduce, was felt to
be a disturbing element and rejected. But blood
did not, by any means, wield this power all over
Arabia. Its effect was not uniform in all the
degrees of relationship, but was stronger in the
narrower circles than in the wider ones ; in the
former it was spontaneous, in the latter more
a matter of duty. Consequently the uniting
element might also become the dissolvent if
the interests of the family became at variance
with the interests of the tribe or people. A
family was particularly unwilling to renounce
the blood-revenge incumbent upon them, even
towards families related to them, of the same
tribe. Then there would arise blood-feuds
between the clans, since there was no authority
in a dispute which could command peace and
punish a breach of it. This was the state of
things that prevailed in Medina. The community
was divided into two hostile camps — the Aus and
the Khazraj. Murder and manslaughter were
the order of the day ; nobody dared venture out
of his quarter without danger ; there reigned a

INTRODUCTION 7

tumult in which life was impossible. What was
wanted was a man tor step into the breach and
banish anarchy ; but he must be neutral and not
involved in the domestic rivalry. Then came the
Prophet from Mecca, as if God-sent. Blood, as
a bond of union, had failed ; he put faith in its
place. He brought with him a tribe of Believers,
the companions of his flight from Mecca, and
slowly, advancing steadily step by step, he
established the commonwealth of Medina on the
basis of religion as an Vnimat Allah, a
congregation of God. Even if he had wished he
could not have founded a church, for as yet
there was no state in existence there. What had
to be done was the elementary work, the
establishment of order, and the restoration of
peace and right. Since there was no other
authority, a religious authority took the lead, got
the power into its hands, and secured its position
by performing what was expected of it.
Muhammad displayed the gift of ability to deal
with affairs in the mass. Where he was in doubt
he knew the right man to ask, and he was fortunate
in finding reliable supporters in some of the emi-
grants who had come with him from Mecca, and
who formed his nearest circle of friends.

In the circumstances stated the power of
religion appeared chiefly as a political force. It
created a community, and over it an authority
which was obeyed. Allah was the personification

8 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

of the state supremacy. What with us is
done in the king's name was done in the name
of Allah ; the army and the public institu-
tions were called after Allah. The idea of
ruling authorities, till then absolutely foreign
to the Arabs, was introduced through Allah.
In this there was also the idea that no out-
ward or human power, but only a power
inwardly acknowledged and standing above
mankind, had the right to rule. The theo-
cracy is the negative of the Mulk, or earthly
kingdom. The privilege of ruling is not a
private possession for the enjoyment of the
holder of it ; the kingdom belongs to God, but
His plenipotentiary, who knows and carries out
His will, is the Prophet. He is not only the
harbinger of truth, but also the only lawful
ruler upon earth. Beside him no king has a
place, and also no other prophet. This concep-
tion of the " monarchic prophet " originates
with the later Jews ; it is typically portrayed in
the contrast between Samuel and Saul, as it
appears, for example, in I Samuel : 8 and 11. The
Prophet represents the rule of God upon earth ;
Allah and His Messenger are always bound up in
each other, and stand together in the Creed. The
theocracy may be defined as the commonwealth,
at the head of which stands, not the king and
the usurped or inherited power, but the Prophet
and the Law of God.

INTRODUCTION 9

In the idea of God justice, and not holiness,
predominated. His rule was the rule of justice,
and the theocracy was so far, a " dichaarchy,"
but by this we are not to understand a rule of
impersonal law. There was no law as yet ; Islam
was in existence before the Qoran. Nor did the
theocracy resemble a republic, notwithstanding
the idea that all the subjects of Allah stand in
equal relationship to Him. The chief character-
istic of the republic, election through the people,
was absent altogether. The supreme power rested
not with the people but with the Prophet. He
alone had a fixed, — even divine — office ; all
authorities had their origin in his supreme autho-
rity. But he did not appoint actual officials, but
only gave certain commissions, after the execution
of which the commissioners retired of themselves.
His advisers, too, were private individuals with
whom he was on terms of friendship, and whom
he gathered into the circle of his society.

Of a hierarchy there is no trace. The
Muslim theocracy was not marked by an organi-
sation of special sanctity ; in this respect it had
no resemblance to the Jewish theocracy after
the Exile.1 There was no order of priests, no
difference between clergy and laymen, between

1 The post-exilic hierocracy had foreign supremacy as a presup-
position, it had no political autonomy. It therefore differed from the
state even if not to the same extent as the Christian Church in its
initial stage, since it at loast took cover under the nation. The Papal
States cannot be compared to it at all, for there the church was not the

10 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

religious and secular callings. The power of
Allah pervaded every function and organ of the
state, and the administration of justice and war
were just as sacred offices as divine service. The
mosque was at one and the same time the forum
and the drill-ground ; the congregation was also
the army ; the leader in prayer (Imdm) was also
the commander.

Prom the idea of the rule of God there arose
no actual form of constitution. The new factor
which, through Muhammad, was cast into the
chaos, certainly effected a concentration of
elements hitherto unknown. It might seem as
if the old sacred ties of blood would be over-
whelmed by the community of the Faith, but
as a matter of fact, they continued unchanged,
even though the centre of gravity was trans-
ferred from them to the whole. The framework
of what had been the organisation up till then, —
the tribes, families and clans, was taken over into
the new commonwealth ; faith in Allah did not
provide anything else to put in their place. The
Muslims' right to political equality, arising out
of the idea of the theocracy, was not established
in such a way as to banish party differences.
The men of Mecca, the so-called Mnhdjira,
kept by themselves ; side by side with them were

state, but it owned a state (W. Sickel). The old Israelitish theocracy
alone shows a great similarity to the Arabian, though, of course, origi-
nally the idea that the lawful theocratic ruler was the Prophet and not
the King was not to be found in it.

INTRODUCTION 11

the indigenous tribes of Arabs of Medina, the
so-called Ansdr, and also the tribes of the
Jews of Medina. The settlers remained settlers
and the slaves remained slaves, even when
they accepted Islam.

From the early period after the Hijra, before
the battle of Badr, there is preserved to us a
decree of Muhammad in which appear some of
the chief points of the law of the state at first
current in Medina. It throws light upon how
far the old conditions were, or were not, altered
by the fact that Medina by this time has become
a united Umma. Umma is not the name for the
old Arab bond of relationship ; it merely signifies
" community.55 Generally it is the religious
community, not only since Islam but even
earlier (Nabigha, 17, 21). Even in our document
the Umma has something of a religious flavour ;l
it is the community of Allah established for
peace and protection. Allah rules over it, and
in His name, Muhammad, who, however, is
never called " prophet. '5 The bond of unity is
the Faith, the Faithful are its supporters. They
have the chief obligations and the chief privileges.
Still it is not only the Faithful who belong
to the Umma, but also all who ally themselves

1 The leader of the Umma is the Imam. Etymologically, however,
the two names are not directly connected, perhaps not connected at all.
Umma is derived from the root " Umm " (the mother) ; Imam, on the
other hand, from a verb-root which means " to precede.'*

14 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

with them and fight along with them, i. e.
all the inhabitants of Medina. The Umma
embraces a wide area, — the whole precincts of
Medina are to be a district of inviolable peace.
There are still heathen among the Ans&r, and
they are not excluded, but expressly included.
The Jews are also included, though they have
not so close a connection wit h the Umma as the
Muh&jira and the Ans&r, and have not exactly
the same rights and obligations. The degree of
communion is not precisely equal, — there still
persists an analogy with the old Arab distinction
between natives and settlers. It is significant
that the Umma includes both heathen and Jews,
and also that it consists in general not of indivi-
duals but of alliances. The individual belongs
to the Umma only through the medium of the
clan and the family. The families are enjoined
to remain as they are, and as such to become
members of the Umma. There is no notion of
the possibility of a new principle arising according
to which they might become members of the com-
munity. Even the heads of families remain and
are not replaced by, e.g., theocratic officials. As
regards the relation of the Umma with the fami-
lies and the defining of the mutual duties and
obligations, the families continue, as before, to
be liable for expenses which are not of a purely
private nature, namely, the payment of blood-
money and the ransom of prisoners. As yet

INTRODUCTION 13

there is no state-treasury. Client-ship, too, is a
clan and family affair, no one is allowed to take
away another man's client. Even the important
privilege of guaranteed protection, the Ijdra,
is not restricted; any individual may take a
stranger under his protection, and by so doing
puts the whole community under the same obliga-
tion. It is only for the Quraish of Mecca, the
declared foes of Muhammad, that the Ij&ra has
no protecting power.

To the Umma the family is obliged to yield
the right of civil feud, i. e. feud with the other
families of Medina, for the first aim of the
Umma is to prevent internal fighting. When,
disputes arise they must be brought to judg-
ment. "If you are in dispute about anything
whatsoever, it must be brought before God and
Muhammad." But if the internal peace is
broken by violence and mischief, then not only
the injured person or his tribe, but the whole
community, including the relatives of the crimi-
nal himself, are obliged to go in united strength
against him, and to deliver him up to the aven-
ger so that he may make the latter just amends.
The revenge for bloodshed can then no longer
resolve itself into a family feud. It is robbed of
the dangerous element that is a menace to the
general peace and softened down into the " Talio."
Indeed the Talio existed before Islam, though
it was not often exercised, because it was too like

14 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the parts and too dependent upon them to have
any coercive power whatever over them. It was
in Medina that the Talio was first strictly ap-
plied, because here God stood above blood, and, in
theory at least, possessed a real sovereignty. As
yet it does not amount to a proper punishment.
Its execution is still in the hands of the injured
party, and it rests with him to exact his right of
revenge, or renounce it and accept recompense in
money. It marks, however, the transition from
revenge to punishment. The duty of prosecu-
tion being taken from the individual and given
to the whole marks a very important step, mak-
ing revenge a duty of the state, and thus turning
it into punishment. It suffices to prevent inter-
nal feud. Inside the territory of Medina a
public peace, general and absolute, holds sway.
There are not so many alliances for protection as
there are families over which protection does not
extend, or at least is not properly effective.
There is only one general peace, that of the
Umma.

The other aim of the Umma is to unite the
families for defence against external foes. The
" Faithful " are mutually bound to help each
other against "men"; they are avengers of
each other, a mass against all outsiders. The
duty of revenge on a foe devolves not on a
brother for a brother, but on believer for believer.
As a matter of fact, war is by this means deprived

INTRODUCTION 15

of the idea of a blood-feud, with which it hefore
coincided ; it becomes a military affair. As war
with an outside people is common to the Faith-
ful, so also is peace common. No one can, on
his own account, conclude a peace which does
not serve for all.

Nevertheless, the right of the tribe or family
to carry on feud against outsiders is not alto-
gether abolished. This is open to the same
criticism as the corresponding inconsistency that
even the Ij&ra, which assures for a stranger the
right to a home in Medina, is not yet with-
drawn from the individual, although it is the
duty of the whole, and so it must have been a
privilege of the Umma and of its leader, the
Im&m.1 This line of demarcation between the
whole and its parts is not yet quite defined.
The Umma has not yet reached its full growth.
But the Faithful were the soul of it, with the
Prophet at their head ; they were the leaven,
the spiritually stronger and aspiring element
which instigated the movement and the propa-
ganda. In proportion as the Faith spread, the
Umma increased in strength.

The Quraish, from whom Muhammad and his
followers had fled from Mecca, appear as the

1 Similar inconsistencies have arisen until recently even with as.
Dr. Schnelle granted to the outlawed Hoffmann von Fallersleben the
right of a home at his manor of Buchholz in Mecklenburg, to which he
was entitled at the time of the German Confederation. Plainly such
a state of things had its advantages.

16 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

declared enemies of the Umma in the above-
mentioned arrangement of the community of
Medina. Out of petty feuds there arose an
obstinate war, and this war did a great deal to
increase the internal strength of the Umma.
The first considerable encounter, at Badr (Anno
Hijrae 2), resulted in an unexpected success for
Muhammad. This splendid victory was taken
as a divine sanction to the Faith, made a deep
impression, and had a very great moral effect.
In addition, it helped tremendously to extend
the influence of Muhammad, to break down the
opposition against him, to make Islam para-
mount in the Umma, and to amalgamate or to
break with the foreign constituent parts which
until then had been tolerated. Islam now no
longer remained tolerant, but acted like a
reign of terror within Medina. This change is
marked by the rise of the Mundfiqun, the doubt-
ers and hypocrites. The heathen dared not any
longer remain heathen within the Umma ; cir-
cumstances compelled them to embrace the
Faith, but they did so with mixed feelings, and
made no secret of their malicious joy whenever
fortune seemed to go against the Prophet. The
Jews were still worse. After the battle of Badr,
W&qidl states, the position of things changed,
much to their disadvantage. Muhammad took
exception to them, and represented that they
had broken their agreement. Under flimsy

INTRODUCTION 17

pretexts he drove out, and in tne course of a
few years annihilated, the whole of the commu-
nities of Jews in the oases of Medina, who were
there forming alliances similar to those of the
Arab tribes. He handed over their valuable
plantations of palms to the Muh&jira, who till
then possessed no land or territory, but were
delivered as Inquilines to the hospitality of the
Ans&r, or supported themselves by trading 3*
uobboiy. He thus made them independent of
the Ansftr, and they became settlers and pro-
prietors in Medina. In this way he strengthened
his own power as well, for the Muhajira were,
so to speak, his body-guard, and the still
smouldering discord between the two tribes of
the Ans&r, — the Aus and the Khazraj — gave
them a decided importance.

After their defeat at Badr, the Quraiah gather-
ed to make a campaign of revenge against
Muhammad, under the leadership of Abu Sufy&n,
and actually gained a victory over him at Mount
Uhud near Medina. They did not however
make full use of it, but were content with the
honour of it, and marched back home. So the
counter-stroke did not do the Prophet much
harm ; he was prepared for it and soon repaired
the damage. A second attack of the Quraish
on Medina, in which they had the assistance of
the heathen and Jews, came to naught. Smaller
tribes of the neighbourhood became allies of
3

18 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the struggling commonwealth, politically at first,
but afterwards in religion also. Islam fought
on and passed gradually from the defensive to
the offensive. Arabia looked on in suspense at
the great feud between heathendom and Allah
which was being fought out between Mecca
and Medina.

During this external struggle with Arabian
heathendom there came about in a remarkable
way a thorough Arabisation of Islam itself.
Muhammad started from the conviction that his
religion was exactly the same in substance as
the Judaic and Christian, and so expected that
the Jews in Medina would receive him with
open arms, but he was bitterly disappointed in
them. They did not recognise him as a prophet
nor his revelation as identical with theirs,
although at first, out of policy, they entered
into the Umma which he had founded. Since
they did not consider Judaism identical with
Islam, but rather opposed to it, he, on his part,
pitted Islam against Judaism and even against
Christianity. He so fixed the pass-words and
counter-signs of his religion, which to us appear
of little account, but which are really very
important, that they no longer expressed com-
mon points between it and the sister religions,
but emphasised the differences. Instead of
Sabbath or Sunday he fixed Friday as the chief
day of public worship ; he substituted the call

INTRODUCTION 19

of Adhdn for the trumpets and bells ; he
abolished the Fast of 'AsMrd, the great day of
atonement ; and for Lent he fixed the month of
Ramad&n. Whilst he more firmly established
Islam by carefully abolishing the Jewish and
Christian forms, he brought it, at the same time,
nearer to Arab ism. He always regarded him-
self as the prophet sent specially to the Arabs, —
the prophet who received and communicated in
the Arabic tongue the revelation which was con-
tained also in the Thora and in the Gospel.
Apparently he never had a natural sympathy for
the Ka'ba at Mecca and renounced the God of
the Ka'ba, but now circumstances impelled him
to take a much more decisive step. He changed
the Qibla and commanded that at prayer the
face should be turned not towards Jerusalem, but
towards Mecca. Mecca was declared to be the
Holy Place instead of Jerusalem,— the true seat of
Allah upon earth. The pilgrimage to the Ka'ba
and even the kissing of the Holy Stone were
sanctioned ; a centre of heathen worship and a
popular heathen festival were introduced into
Islam. As usual, history was called in to justify
this appropriation. It was said that the Holy
Place and the Oultus of Mecca were originally
monotheistic and founded by Abraham, and
had only in later times degenerated and become
heathen. Abraham, the Father of the Faith,
was filched from the Jews and made the founder

20 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

of a pre-Islamic Islam of the Arabs, with
Mecca as its seat, and so Islam was definitely
sundered from Judaism and changed into a
national Arab religion.

In this way Mecca was already spiritually
incorporated with Islam before the conquest
which followed, in the year 8 of the Flight. It
took the form of a capitulation arranged with
Abft Sufyan. The apprehension that the town
would, through Islam, lose its religious power
of attraction for the Arabs, — the power by
which it lived, was allayed beforehand. Indeed
it rather gained by the fact that it was the only
one of the holy places of the old heathen
worship which retained its sanctuary and the
festival in its neighbourhood, while all the other
holy places were abolished. The war with
Muhammad had caused heavy losses to the
Quraishites. He now tried his best to make
them realise how much they would benefit by
friendship with him, by making presents to
their chiefs and giving them abundant tokens
of his good- will. These methods of convincing
them of Islam he called " the winning of
hearts." He was moved also by a deep sym-
pathy with his native town, and went so far in
the endeavour to be reconciled with it that the
Ans&r were afraid he would make it the head-
quarters of his rule and forsake Yathrib. But
this fear was groundless ; Yathrib remained the

INTRODUCTION 21

Medina, i.e. the government town. Muham-
mad did not remove to Mecca, but the ambitious
Quraishites, who wanted to keep close to him
and to the government, emigrated to Medina,
Abu Sufy£n and the Umaiya at their head.
But this was no advantage to the Ansar; the
Muh&jira, not only from Mecca, but from all
Arabia continued to gather strength in their
town, for Medina offered a great attraction
to active spirits who wranted to make their
fortunes, and the Prophet received them without
question as a welcome addition to his power,
even though they might not have a very clean
record.

The Arab tribes had so far let things take
their course. After the capture of Mecca and
the overthrow of the Hawazin which followed
soon after, one after the other yielded to the
conqueror and came over to Islam. This was
not done by individual action, but the chiefs
acted for the people. . The representatives arid
elders capitulated to Muhammad and tried to
get the most favourable terms they could for
their folk as well as for themselves. If a tribe
was internally divided by a dispute about
the chieftainship, the one party tried to get
the upper hand of the other by means of
Islam. Such a favourable opportunity for
Muhammad occurred very frequently, and
so the transition was a political action, the

22 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

act of joining the commonwealth of Medina.
Only the forms and tokens of Islam were ac-
cepted, especially prayer, with the call to prayer
and the poor-tax. The missionaries did not
come into the country till after the transition
was completed, when they instituted the wor-
ship of God and taught the elements of religion
and law. Outward profession was all that was
required ; the faith, in point of fact, was " fides
implicita."

The incorporation of the whole of Arabia
into Islam was sealed by the Bard* a of the year
9 and the Hijjat-al-Wadd* of the year 10. The
worship in Mecca and the ceremonies in the
neighbourhood were declared to be exclusively
Islamic. The heathen dared no longer take
part in them. They were supplanted in their
own inheritance, a purely heathen one, and not
only so, but the whole of Arabia was claimed
for Islam. All Arabs who still remained
heathen were, eo ipso, outlawed, but the " Peace
of God " was open to those who came over to
the theocracy ; internal feud was to occur no
more. Islam cancelled the past and the ancient
grounds of feud; all demands and debts of
blood were to be "trampled under foot." It
was a " seisachthy " of quite another sort
from that of Solon, being very much more broad
and thorough. From the " cell " of Medina
the theocracy spread over the whole of Arabia.

INTRODUCTION 23

The tribes and their aristocracies still remained,
but in the legates of Muhammad received, in
various ways, a sort of supervision and were
altogether united in a state whose centre of
government was Medina. The foundation of
this state, — which, even if it were not a very
solid one, was still a defence against anarchy
and general dissolution,— was the cope-stone of
the Prophet's work. He did not die a martyr,
but at the height of success. It can hardly be
cast as a reproach at him that he built up the
Kingdom of God upon a given natural foundation,
for even if circumstances often compelled or
induced him to use unholy means and to hold
up Allah as a pretext, still he is not to be regard-
ed as a hypocrite.

4. The Arabian tribes thought that they hadl
sworn allegiance to the Prophet only, the general]
view being that the oath of allegiance bound
one only to the person to whom it was made.
After his death they fell away, — not so much
from Allah as from Medina. The situation was
also dubious within Medina, but the theocracy
got over the crisis caused by the change of ruler
and recalled Arabia to obedience. The best
means of mending the breach seemed to be ex-
pansion towards the outside, for this was the
direct method of quelling the interior tumult.
Through the Jihad, the holy war, the rebellious
tribes were drawn over to the interest of Islam

M ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

and reconciled with it. The propaganda of the
Faith was riot much more than the pretext of
the war. The challenge to the foes of Allah to
be converted was issued only as a matter of form
before the commencement of hostilities ; it was
not supposed that they would actually yield to
it. There was one rule for the Arabs and another
for the " outlanders." The Arabs had no choice ;
they had to accept Islam, and the tendency
spread to tolerate in the territory of the whole
peninsula no religion but that of Muhammad.1
The levelling of Islam and Arabism went so far
that no one could be a Muslim without belong-
ing to, or joining, an Arab family. On the
other hand the non- Arabs were not compelled
to come over ; the present supposition was that
they would abide by their old religion. Being
rion- Arabs, they did not belong to the native
citizenship of the theocracy ; they were not
meant to enter into it, but only to be put under
its sway ; that was the aim of the war.

Thus, out of the national state which Muham-
mad had founded there arose after his death a
kingdom, a rule of the theocracy over the world.
The kingdom had two classes of adherents,
who differed both in politics and in religion.
The masters in it were the Arabs, as Muslims
as well as warriors and conquerors. Muhammad's

1 The Taghlib, who were permitted to remain Christians, dwolfc
in Mesopotamia,

INTRODUCTION £5

congregation had been completely converted into
an army ; prayer and fasting and the other
pious exercises took a secondary place after the
Jih&d. In this form Islam became clear to the
Beduin also. It was the standard which led
them to victory and spoil, — or if the worst came
to the worst, to Paradise. In the captured provin-
ces the theocracy under the new conditions was
organised throughout as an army. Its citizen-
list was the army register, the tribes and fami-
lies forming the regiments and companies. All
Arabs were not included in it, but only the
active ones, the Muqdtila, i. e. the fighters and
defenders. In contra-distinction to those who
stayed at home, the Muq&tila were also called
the MuMjira, i.e. those who went out to the
great military centres from which the war was
directed and conducted. l\>r Hijra no longer
meant flight, but emigration (with wife and
children) to a military and political centre, in
order to serve there.1 Full citizen's rights could
only be enjoyed in the army, and in the capital
and garrison towns ; the Beduin who remained
inactive in their homesteads and with their
flocks were not recognised as citizens with full
rights, — scarcely even as adherents.2 The original

1 This is the meaning of Higra, e.g., in HamSsa, 792 v. 3; "Thou
hast not left home for the sake of Paradise, bat for the sake of the
bread and dates." Cf. Qutamt 4, 25.

* Yahya b. Adam, Kit&b al Kharaj, 5, 18 and 59, 15. Cf. my
treatise upon the Khawarij (fcflttinger Ges. der Wiss. 1901), p. 9.

4

26 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Ddr-al-Hijra or Ddr-al-Isldm was Medina,
whither at first went the influx of " active " men ;
later the provincial capitals (misr, pi. mwfir)
were added, and thither the Hijra could also
be made. In Syria older towns already in exis-
tence were chosen, and in other places new
military colonies were founded, such as Fust&t
in Egypt, Qairawan in Eoman Africa, and espe-
cially Basra and Kufa in Iraq.

From these points where they made their
headquarters the Arabs kept the provinces in
obedience ; it was absolute martial law. The
Emirs, under whose leadership a land was taken,
were the first " stattholders," and their successors
were, first and foremost, military commanders.
But just as the army was at the same time the
Umma, so the Emir was at the same time the
Im&m, the leader of the service in the mosque,
especially on Friday when he preached. He
was * ala ' lharb ivalsaldt ; warfare and worship
both came into his department. Along with
this he possessed naturally the executive power,
and consequently also the judicial supremacy in
which lies the power of commanding peace.
At first the Emir dispensed justice in person,
later he appointed a Qddi in the capital.1

On the whole he handed over the domestic rule
and to a certain degree the dispensing of

1 There was as yet no such official under Umar I. Presumably at
that time there were no disputes at all. We first hear of a QSdl in
Kufa at the time of Mu'awia or Yaztd I,

INTRODUCTION 2?

judgment also, to the circles most nearly con-
cerned, for even in the captured provinces the
Arabs kept up their ancient clan-system. But
pretty soon a difference crept in. In the Arabian
homeland a comparatively small band formed an
actual unity which shepherded their flocks and
wandered about in common. It reckoned itself,
together with other tribes, into groups ascending
in importance, but these had actually not much
say. This was changed by the great overflow
over the bounds of the desert. As a general
thing the whole tribe did not journey from home
to settle down " in corpore " at one and the
same spot, but fragments of the tribe were
scattered hither and thither, fragments which
could not exist of themselves. So, in order to
gain the necessary solidarity, they made a closer
alliance with fragments of related tribes belong-
ing to the similar higher group. This was all
the easier when there was no longer plenty of
room for emigrating, as there used to be before,
and when they were crowded together in colonies
and lived in the closest contact with each other ;
for example, Kufa was a pattern -paper of the
widely ramified ethnology of the desert. Thus
it can be understood that by a kind of integra-
tion the larger alliances attained an actual
importance which they had never had before,
and which they scarcely possessed even later in
Arabia proper. The combination of other

28 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

circumstances furthered this tendency to the
formation of groups, which became momentous
for the internal history of the Arabian Empire.

As distinguished from the Arabian military
nobility the non- Arabs were subjects,1 i. e.
those reduced to submission or dependence.
They formed the financial basis of the kingdom.
They had to provide for the support of their
lords by means of the tribute, the " subjects'
tax," which was far more oppressive than the
so-called " poor-tax " of the Muslims, and
became scandalous. As far as possible, the
Arabian Government took even less interest in
their internal affairs than in those of the tribes.
In the province formerly Roman, the bishops
often became the civic heads of the community
also ; in the Persian province the Dlhq&ns re-
mained so. These native chiefs were responsible
for the tax in their district ; the government
did not trouble itself except to see that the tax
came in all right. It was the business of the
" Stattholder " to keep the subjects sufficiently in
hand so that they paid the tribute. Later on
an independent finance official was often ap-
pointed along with him, which did riot exactly
meet with his approval, for then he had only to
hold the cow by the horns and make her stand
still while another person milked her.

1 I use the word " subjects " in this narrower sense as distin-
guished from the Arabs, the actual owners of the state.

INTRODUCTION 29

The old-Arabian right of plunder, in the
somewhat modified form sanctioned by Muham-
mad in the Qoran, formed the basis of the
taxation of the subjects and of the regulation
of their position in general. When a town or
district had surrendered to the Muslims without
fighting (sulhan], the inhabitants retained life,
freedom and property, but had to pay tribute for
the mercy and protection granted, in a lump
sum, or according to a contract fixed by the
capitulation.1 But if they were overcome by
force of arms ('anwatan) they came under the
law of war, i. e. they had forfeited every right ;
they and all they possessed were the spoil of
the conqueror. A fifth was laid aside for God,
i. e. the state, and even the crown lands and
the ground and properties forsaken by their
owners fell into the treasury.2 Everything else,
not movable property merely, but also land and
people, was to be divided according to law, and
not amongst the Muslims generally, but amongst
the warriors of that very army which had
effected the particular conquest. This, however,
could not go on. It was impossible that this
tremendous changing of possessions from hand
to hand should continue, not to mention the

1 In some cases they rendered military services on the frontier
and then they did not require to pay tribute, for it wns considered that
the tribute was payment for the freedom from military service and for
its being undertaken by the Arabs.

2 Yahya, p. 45.

30 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

hardships it entailed upon the lower classes who
only tilled the ground and did not own it. The
Arabs could not cast lots among themselves for
half the world to keep it from becoming desert.
Nor did they dare to distribute themselves over
the vast territory in order to manage it. If they
wanted to keep their ground their only way
was to concentrate themselves in a military
fashion. " The stability of my congregation,55 so
Muhammad is said to have asserted,1 " rests
upon the hoofs of their horses and the points
of their lances, so long as they do not work the
land ; whenever they begin to do that they
become like the rest of men.55 And besides
they had to think of the future. If everything
was divided straight away among the first and
actual conquerors the spoil was squandered
as fast as it was won. So the land was treated
as solid capital and handed over in fief to its
former owners, so that they had to pay interest
on it ; and this interest only came to the Arab
warriors and their heirs, — not the capital, but
the revenue.2 As a matter of fact the towns
and districts captured in this way by force of
arms were not much worse off than those which
had surrendered themselves, and the name of

1 Yahya, p. 59.

ft This is precisely the same as the tax in Genesis 47, which the
Egyptian peasants have to pay to Pharaoh, as a token that their land
really belongs to Pharaoh and that they are his bondsmen,

INTRODUCTION 31

the tribute was the same in both cases, ' only in
the case of the latter the tribute was legally
fixed and could not be arbitrarily altered.2

Thus arose the difference between Ghanima

and Fai in the period after Muhammad. The

Ghanlma was the spoil brought into the camp

in the shape of portable property and also

prisoners, which was divided, now as ever,

among the warriors. The Fai, on the other hand,

was the spoil as represented by estates and

the dwellers thereon which was not divided,

but was left to the former possessors on

consideration of tribute, so that the real owners,

(according to the law of war), only received the

rents of it. :i But the state collected the rents

through its officials, and did not pay the full

amount every year to the rightful Muqatila

or their heirs. They were paid only a fixed

pension, while the remainder went into the

public exchequer. § The organisation of the

1 Yahya, p. 11 : all the land in the Sawud, which is watered bj
canals, is Kharaj and. Cf. also pp. 13, 33, 35 ff.

2 In many cases also the others later on fabricated treaties of
capitulation, which was not a difficult matter considering the poor
knowledge of diplomacy and the historical obscurity which soon
enveloped the stormy times of the conquests.

3 " Fai " is borrowed from the Qoran (59, 6, 7), but the difference
between " Ghanlma " and " Fai " is not made there, but is illegal. The
word actually means " return " (Yahya, 33 ; B. Hisham 880, 7), but is
used not merely for the interest but for the capital which yields
it. The Muslim jurists naturally retain the distinction between
" Ghantma * and " Fai " as an original decree and do not acknowledge
that it only evolved itself by usage, contrary to the Qoran.

32 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

conquests thus limited itself pretty much to
a military occupation for the exploiting of the
subjects. There was little change from the
previous state of things. The ruling power
changed, but the position of the miser a contri-
buens plebs remained much as it had been before.
The administration of the Arabs was confined
to finance, its government office was a counting-
house. They retained the Greek and Persian
clerks, the only technical officials they had.
They also kept, in the main, the old names
and kinds of taxes, and did not make much
change either in regard to their rate and
collection. If the two men of Medina
who are said to have measured and
laid out Iraq had but half their wits they
made a very niggardly use of what they
had. In many cases the Khalifa sanctioned
only the provisional measures of his generals,
whose actions were regulated by the local
conditions.

Most of the conquests were made in the time
of the Khalifa Umar, and he is considered their
organiser. As we have seen, he was certainly not
the creator of any new system, but it is due to him
that the Arabian right of spoil was set aside, and
the state intervened between army and subjects.
To a certain extent he protected the subjects,
and through their capacity for taxation strength-
ened the state against the army.

INTRODUCTION 33

5. The development of political law did not
keep abreast with the development of political
power. No practical science of government was
to be found in the old-Arab tradition, and none
either in the idea of the theocracy. This want
was felt as soon as the momentous question arose
as to whom was due the leadership of the theo-
cracy.

As long as Muhammad lived this question
did not arise. The Prophet was the represen-
tative of God, the true theocratic ruler; the
theocracy was exactly suited to him. But the
supposition that with his death the hour of
the last judgment would immediately arrive,
wasliot realise Ji The world was not destroyed,
and he died without seeing to it that his flock
was not left shepherdless. He certainly
left behind the Qoran, and in addition the
Sunn a, i. e. the path he had trodden, the
road he had pointed out by his practice, but
m nor Sunna could it be dis-
Still less

was it to be understood from the Qoran and Sunna
that a successor was superfluous ; a personal
leader of the divine worship and of the govern-
ment seemed indispensable. There existed
neither a regular method of election nor a right
of inheritance to the Prophet. § The death of
Muhammad seemed to do away with the theocra-
cy, though there were pious folk who would
5

34 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

not believe that possible. The Arab tribes
defected, and there was a threatened schism
in Medina itself. Since no provision of any
kind had been made for the succession, a
prompt seizure of authority was the only thing
possible. Under Muhammad his oldest Meccan
followers and friends, few in number, had stood
closest to the chief power ; they were, so
to speak, the first-fruits of the Faith, the
nobility of the theocracy, a nobility of real
Islamic origin and character. They had
really no official place, but simply formed the
council of the Prophet and had a very great
influence over him, and now, when deprived
of his protection, they did not let the power
slip through their fingers, but firmly grasped the
reins of government when they fell from his
hands. The chief of these, in point of intellect,
was Umar b. Khatt&b, who may be regarded as
the founder of the second theocracy, the theo-
cracy without a prophet. He was tall, quick
in movement, loud of speech and strong in fight,
and is always represented with the whip in his
hand. He did not glide about and whisper
like the hypocrites, but was sincerely God-
fearing and never indiscreet. He first supported
Abti. Bakr, Muhammad's most trusted friend,
and it was not till after the latter's death, which
took place soon after, that he took over the
ruling power in name, AbA Bakr transferred

INTRODUCTION 35

it to him in his last will and testament,1 but that
was only a confirmation of what was already an
accepted thing. Abft Bakr was quite aware
that they had no legal title to the ruling power
but had u8UTpe3T~ll'% All they could do was
afterwards to legitimise their originally illegiti-
mate power by wielding it according to the
idea of the theocracy. Since Allah no longer
reigned through his living plenipotentiary,
they secured His reign by the fact of their
taking as their rule of conduct His Word, — the
Qoran, and the example of His Messenger, —
the Simna. They wished to be considered
only as temporary representatives of the One
and Only authorised Ruler of the theocracy, the
Prophet, and showed this by the official name
which they assumed, Khalifa, i.e. "vigar." Abu
Bakr called himself the Vicar of the Messenger of
God, and Umar the Vicar of the Vicar of the
Messenger of God, until this seemed too
ceremonious and "Khalifa," with the omission
of the genitive, became an independent title.
They also bore the additional title — Emir ofjbha.
Believers.

The influence of the oldest and most
eminent Companions of the Prophet, from whom

1 The will of the dying man is an old idea with the Arabs. In
war the Emir had the right and the duty to appoint, in the event of his
death, a lieutenant, and often also a lieutenant of that lieutenant, and
so on. The Muslims, however, thought of themselves as a host. Cf.
Die Contin. Isidori Hispana, ed. Mominsen, par. 98.

36 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

the first Khalifas were drawn, was shared in by
their tribal-connections, the Quraish, and not
only those who had emigrated to Medina in the
year of the Might, or at least before the taking
of Mecca, but also those who had embraced
Islam only when compelled to do so after its
conquest. Blood asserted its power by the
side of the Faith. Notwithstanding the fact
that they had resisted Islam as long as they
could, the whole Quraish felt that they were the
people with the right to rule in the theocracy,
because Muhammad was sprung from their
stock, and they found their claims supported by
him and his Companions. Even the Arabs, as a
general thing, considered it quite in order that
the ruling power should remain, if not within a
single family, still within the one tribe or stock,
to be regarded as its common possession, though
only one individual wielded it. Only the Ans&r
strove hard against the precedence of Quraish
in Islam. At first they had received them as
fugitives kindly, and granted them quarter,
maintenance and protection. Neither had they
at first objected to Muhammad's preferring
his Meccan followers in many ways, or to
themselves having the heaviest of the warfare
and the others (Quraish) the lion's share of the
spoil, e.g. at the division of the properties of
the expelled Jews. But in time the feeling
grew amongst them that the spirits whom they

INTRODUCTION 37

had summoned were becoming too much for
them, and they made attempts to show that they
would be masters in their own house and not be
content with the guests3 leavings. On frequent
occasions their indignation broke out. It was
excited especially by a former very influen-
tial leader of the tribe Khazraj, who thought
himself slighted by the Prophet. At once
the jealousy of the other tribe, the Aus,
was aroused against this man. The old danger-
ous schism had not yet disappeared, and the
third party who stood outside the quarrel bene-
fited by it. Under these circumstances it was
easy for Mohammad to keep the good-will of
the Ansar, but they were also indebted to him
for having saved them from self-destruction, and
when they came to think of it they recognised
that they could not do without him either.
They were much troubled by the thought that
he might forsake their town, and after the cap-
ture of Mecca go and settle there. So things
went on as they had begun ; the Quraish conti-
nued to gain a firmer footing in Medina, re-
inforced by numerous emigrants from other
tribes, who were likewise called Muh&jira. The
Ans&r still possessed a bare majority and fell
more and more into the background. On the
death of the Prophet they once more made a
strong effort to assert their right to the ruling
power in their town, or at least to their autonomy.

38 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

They forgot that Medina for long had been
no more their town but the Prophet's, and
he had made it something totally different, — the
centre of Arabia and of Islam. They were
taken by surprise by the prompt action of
TJmar and the other Companions, then divided
by their own old dissensions, and finally put into
the minority by the steady stream of Beduins
of the neighbourhood who sided with the
MuhAjira against them.

Fortunately just at that time the great rising
of the Arabian tribes against Medina took place,
and in face of the common external danger the
internal quarrel disappeared. In accordance
with their traditions the Ans&r were again fore-
most in fight against the foes ; they had also the
chief hand in the conquests — particularly in
that of Syria. They formed the backbone of the
Islamic forces, but they had no say in appointing
the leaders. Moreover they still remained in a
certain opposition to the rulers, but their oppo-
sition rose and fell along with the general
opposition of pious theocrats against the
existing power. Medina as the seat of
the opposition, of Islamic tradition and
of the suppressed Islamic aristocracy, makes
its appearance later, always as a whole ; it is
quite erroneous to think only of the Ans&r in
that connection. Even in the great rising which
ended in the Harra, they were united with the

INTRODUCTION 39

Muhajira against the Umaiya ; they followed
Quraishite pretenders and did not fight for their
own hand as a separate party.1 Except, per-
haps, by the Khaw&rij, the leadership of the
Quraish was recognised, if somewhat reluctantly,
by all sides. They took up a neutral position
with regard to the rivalry of the tribes, who, one
after another, yielded the ruling power to the
Quraish in preference to themselves, however
much they were at times exasperated by these
born share-holders in the state.

The Quraish, indeed, were not now very
closely united. Originally they were only the
followers of the Prophet and of his old Com-
panions ; it was only through them, being of the
same tribe and blood-relationship, they had risen
into importance in Islam. But now there
sprang up amongst them a dangerous combin-
ation of the real Islamic aristocracy of Com-
panions.

This happened after the death of the Khalifa
Umar, when the question of a successor again
arose. Umar did not leave a will in favour .of
All, who claimed as cousin and son-in-law of the

1 There is an idea that the Ansar had formed the nucleus of the
later opposition party of the Yemenites. I can find no reasons for this,
The Yemenites in Syria were the Kalb, in Kufa the Hamdan, Madhij
and Kinda, in Basra and Khur&san the Azd Uman,— the latter the
least important. The Ansar had no connection with any of these.
Neither had they much real concern with the Shia, though they
adhered to Alt as long as h e lived. That the Alids considered Medina
their native place and were held in respect there, is another question.

40 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

Prophet, and considered himself already slighted.
Umar preferred to leave to open election the
appointment of a Khalifa in his stead. But the
Shurd, the electing body, did not, by any means,
consist of the whole of the Muslims. The
provinces were not consulted ; Medina alone
was the " Polis," and in Medina the Ans&r in
general were of little account, as also were the
Quraish as a whole. The Shftra actually only
consisted of the six still surviving oldest
Companions of the Prophet, and they were sure
to agree, like a board of cardinals, in appointing
one of themselves. The rest of the people of
Medina had only the right or the duty to do
homage to the one chosen. The rendering of
homage was bound to follow upon an election,
and it had to be done in Medina.

The six, on their part, passed over All. They
were not willing to recognise that he had a prior
claim, and they chose to appoint the already
aged Uthm&n b. Aff&n of the house of Umaiya.
He was the most unassuming and least import-
ant, and just for that reason he commended him-
self to them, for they wanted a log for their
king and had no wish for another Umar. But
the result disappointed them, for the weakness
of Uthm&n did not benefit them but his own
house, to whose influence he yielded either
willing or carelessly. The Umaiya, like the kin
of the Prophet, belonged to the family of

INTRODUCTION 41

Abd Man&f, and were richer, and more important
and powerful than the Hashim and Muttalib.
After Badr they had taken the place of the
MakhzAm, whose power was broken by that
battle,1 and through their wise leader, Abti.
Sufyftn, gained the hegemony in Mecca and
were the chief figures in the long struggle of
the Quraish against Medina and Muhammad.
Though beaten in this struggle they did not on
that account lose their influential position, but
maintained it in the new commonwealth which
they were obliged to join. Muhammad made
the entrance to it easy for them, and was at
pains to show them that they suffered no dis-
grace in joining it. When Mecca lost its politi-
cal importance they emigrated to Medina and
soon took the helm of affairs there, and by
adapting themselves to the times and regulating
their faith according to circumstances, they
gained prominence through the very events
which had threatened their destruction. Al-
ready under Abu Bakr and Umar, Yazid, the
son of Abu Sut'yan, and after his death his bro-
ther Mu&wia, became very prominent in the pro-
vinces, if not in Medina. With Uthm&n the
Umaiyids actually attained to the Khalifate, for
his government was the government of his
house. He appointed his cousin Marw&n his

1 For the rivalry of the Makhzflm and Abd Manaf, cf. B. Hisham
203 f . ;' 429.
6

42 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

chancellor in Medina and left the rule to him,
and he filled up all the stattholderships with his
relatives. By so doing he incurred the dis-
pleasure of his peers, the other members of the
Shftr&. There were five of them, — Alt, Ibn
Auf, Talha, Zubair and Ibn Abi Waqqas. The
latter had no political ambition, and Ibn Auf
died before Uthm&n himself, but those two were
replaced by Ayesha, the young widow of the
Prophet, who had an equal place with them in
the high council of Islam and commanded great
respect. The eminent Companions found them-
selves threatened in the position they had held
till then by the coming of a dynasty; this was the
reason of their enmity to the Umaiya. Were
they, the genuine theocratic nobility which
had its roots in Islam, to suffer themselves to
be supplanted by an old heathen noble family
which had headed the Quraish in the struggle
against Islam? They first tried to divert
the Khalifa from his clique, as they called it,
and when they did not manage that they turned
against the Khalifa himself. In Medina they
did all they could to undermine his authority,
and encouraged the discontent of the Arabs in
the provinces.

6. Things were in a ferment, at any rate in
the provinces, i. e. in the towns in which the
Arabs dwelt. Times had changed through the
cessation of the great wars of conquest. Peace

INTRODUCTION 4*

had followed upon turmoil, sobriety upon debauch.
The Arab defenders were no longer kept going
by service in the field,— they had leisure to
reflect. So long as the Ghanima, the actual spoil,
had kept flowing in to them through the constant
campaigns, they had suffered the government to
claim the Fai, — the persons and immovable
estates of the conquered, as they did not then
know what to do with them. But now they
perceived that in the storm and stress of the
times they had unwittingly allowed themselves
to be done out of the more valuable share of the
spoil. If they had now received payment of, at
least, the full income of the Eai, i. e. the yearly
amount of the subject-tax, they would not have
minded, but, as we have seen, that was not the
case. The subject-tax, together with the rest of
the state revenues, swelled the treasury; the
government only gave the Arab warriors pensions
from it. It held the purse-strings, the contents
of which really belonged to the army. It became
independent of the army by the conquests which
the army had made, and which were, by right,
army spoil, since it did not divide up land and
people but annexed their taxation to itself. And
the army became dependent upon it through the
pensions which it had the power to bestow or
withdraw to whatever amount and extent it
pleased. The government used to be supported by
the army, now the army was supported by the

44 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

government. No wonder that the Muq&tila
thought themselves cheated by this villainous
state, whose backbone was the treasury by which
it exalted itself over them and held the whip
hand. They asserted that money collected as
tribute belonged to them and not to the state,—
that it was M&l al " luslimin and not Mai All&h
(Tab. 1, 2858 1). hey held to their claim that
the revenues of tl Fai ought to be divided ;
when they got the chance they plundered the
provincial treasuries and could not endure that
their surplus should be credited to the state
treasury. Their jealousy of the state was
naturally directed against its functionaries who
had the disposal of its power and its moneys.
They felt it an injustice that the latter should,
as it were, turn them out of their manger.1

As a matter of fact it was a protest against
Umar's system. For Umar it had been who had
wrested the Fai from the hand of the army and
passed it over to the state, in defiance of the
Qoran, though in accordance with a fiscal ten-
dency to a great extent already followed by
Muhammad.2 That the discontent arose and

1 The secular name for " rule," " superiority,'* " state" is Sultan,
the religious name, Allah.' Sultan is of Aramaic origin, and means

exactly efovtrm ; KvpiorriS, not KvptoS.

8 Muhammad had already claimed for the state the property
which he had won without a struggle. Even in the confiscation of
the old Ah ma (singular Hima), and in the marking out of the new
Ahma as pastures for the camels and horses in the state-depot,

INTRODUCTION 45

spread not under Umar, but under Uthman, can
be explained not only by the change in the times,
but also by the difference in the personality of
the ruler. Uthm&n rightly said that things
were said against him which no one would have
dared to say against Umar. He lacked the
imperious authority of his predecessor ; conse-
quently the despotism and self-seeking of the
stattholders and officials showed up more under
him than under Umar, of whom they were afraid,
and this looked all the worse since he was in the
habit of appointing them from among his own
relatives. The kingdom seemed to have altoge
ther become the domain of a few privileged per
sons who were permitted to fatten upon th<
provinces.

The eminent Companions of the Prophet met
in Medina with the provincials. They had the
great majority of the capital, especially the
Ansar, with All, Talha and Zubair at their head,
to support them in the hatred against Uthman's
clique,— hatred which in their case arose from a
very different motive. It was a simple matter
for them to give to their rivalry with the latter
the necessary religious emphasis, to claim to be
the true representatives of the old genuine
theocracy and the champions of Qoranand Sunna,

Muhammad had anticipated Umar, and had thus set an example for
the confiscation of domains. C/. Reste arabischen Heidenthums (18U7),
p. 107 f.

46 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

and to use the general discontent to their own
advantage. Audacious and undutiful as their
behaviour was towards Uthman, they did not
want to declare war against him openly with the
aid of the men of Medina. They preferred to
send into the fray the provinces, which, in a way,
possessed the military and financial power of the
kingdom, while in Medina was concentrated only
the moral authority of Islam. In the year 34
(A. D. 654-5), they wrote to the provincials : —
" If you wish to begin the holy war, the place for
it is now with us in Medina." This first found
a response in Kufa, the headquarters of the
opposition of the Muq&tila against the govern-
ment. At the end of the year 34 (June, 655),
when the stattholders during the Hajj were as
usual together in Mecca with the Khalifa, the
rebellion broke out there, led by M&lik al-Ashtar,
a prominent inhabitant of the Yemen and a
devoted friend of All. A thousand men of Kufa
took up their stand before their town and barred
the entrance to their stattholder Said when he
came home from Mecca. However, Uthm&n
deposed Said without further ado, gave the in-
surgents a stattholder after their own hearts, and
thus silenced them for the time being.

In place of the men of Kufa, the Egyptians
now set out for Medina. In Egypt, instead of
the conqueror Amr b. As, Uthm&n had appointed
his cousin Ibn Abi Sarh, although the latter was

INTRODUCTION 47

outlawed by Muhammad. Amr, a very dan]
gerous man, was consequently his foe, helped td
rouse up feeling against him in Medina, and
probably did not refrain from doing the same in
Egypt. Other revolutionaries there were Muham J
mad b. AM Hudhaifa, a foster-son of the
Khalifa, and Muhammad b. Abi Bakr, a jealous
partisan of All. In the great naval battle against
the Emperor Constantine on the Lycian coast,
they separated with their ship from the Arabian
fleet, saying that the true holy war was being
deserted. They made malicious accusations
against Uthm&n, reproaching him particularly
with placing his relatives in all the rich posts,
and thus sowed dangerous seed. This was in
A. H. 34*. In the following year, 500 Arabs from
Egypt obeyed the summons to the war sanc-
tioned by Grod against the internal foe. They
appeared before Medina about the tenth month of
the year 35 (April, 656), laid certain demands
before the Khalifa, and threatened violence if he
should refuse them. The men of Medina, with
few exceptions, took their side and backed them
up. As Uthman, the ruler of what was then
far the most powerful state on earth, had abso-
lutely no external forces at his disposal in his
residence, he condescended to treat with the
rabble. He managed to persuade the Egyptians
to return by promising them a redress of their
grievances, but as soon as they were away, he

48 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

again asserted his position, backed by Marw&n
and the Umaiyid kin. The next Friday he held
a pulpit harangue in the mosque, in which he
asserted that the Egyptians had perceived their
mistake and had therefore withdrawn. Then
the men of Medina, of whom th e worshippers
consisted, burst into a storm of wrath against
him, and, not content with reproaches only,
they stoned the old man so that he fell down
fainting and had to be carried to his house.
This was his last public appearance in the
mosque. The men of Medina now appeared
in groups before the Dar of Uthm&n,1 which
was close to the mosque, paying no heed to
requests to disperse. After a few days the
Egyptians also came suddenly upon the scene,
bringing with them a Uriah-letter of the Khalifa,
which they placed before him. He denied
having composed it and declared he knew no-
thing whatever about it. " Such a thing as
that can happen against your will ?" said they,
" then you are not Regent !" But he absolutely
refused to take the hint to abdicate, declaring
" I will not put off the robe with which God
invested me." Erom that time he was actually
besieged; his servants and clients and a few
relatives defending him in the Dar. The men
of Medina let the Egyptians alone ; if they had

1 D&r is an enclosed collection of houses or rooms (the Arabic
language does not distinguish between the two) with only one door,

INTRODUCTION 49

wished it would not have heeu a difficult matter
to be a match for the few hundred men. They
had begun the rising against the Khalifa and only
left the completion of it to the outside muti-
neers, and even in this they actually lent their
aid, especially some of the Ansar. The eminent
Companions, Alt, Talha and Zubair, who were
chiefly to blame for the outbreak of the fire,
made no effort to extinguish it. Their attitude
to the Khalifa was rather one of regret that they
could not help him because they were not free
agents, but they were only trying to keep up
appearances. In reality they did nothing to ,
stem the course of events, in the hope that
things would workout to their advantage in the |
end.

The decisive change for the Torse, the first
bloodshed, was caused by the defenders of the
D&r. One of them threw a stone at the head of
an old " Companion " who was standing outside
in the crowd, and killed him. TJthm&n refused
to deliver up the culprit. Then the besiegers
felt justified and in duty bound to cast aside all
considerations, and began the attack upon the
D&r; the Egyptian Ibn Udais, of the tribe Bali,
commanded, leaning against the mosque. At
the door the friends of TJthman fought for him,
and even after it was set on fire they tried to
keep the assaulters at bay. But a few of the
latter had meanwhile penetrated into the D&r

7 .

50 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

through a neighbouring building, and now
pressed into the very chamber of the Khalifa,
where he, untroubled by the uproar outside,
was praying with the Qoran before him.
Muhammad b. Abi Bakr, the son of his friend
and predecessor, was the first to lay violent
hands upon him ; Kinana b. Bishr al Tujibi dealt
the fatal blow, and a few others wreaked their
rage upon the corpse. After this scene there
was no more meaning in fighting, and the
surviving defenders were able to get into safety
without much difficulty. The day was Friday,
the 18th Dhulhijja, 35 (L7th June, 656). The
burial of the murdered Khalifa was delayed for a
considerable time, until, at the urgent request of
his widow, the Kalbite Nftila, a few faithful
ones ventured to accomplish it. The unwashed
body, stretched upon a door, against which the
head kept beating with the uneven steps of the
bearers, was hastily carried out in the gloom of
night, followed by stones and curses. It had to
be laid in tbe Jewish churchyard; the Ans&r
would not even give it interment in the usual
place ; it was no better than the burial of ait
animal in a knacker's yard.

7. The murder of Uthm&n was more epoch-
making than almost any other event of Islamic
history. From that time the question to whom
the leadership of the theocracy belonged was
fought out with the swordf The Janus-gate of

INTRODUCTION 51

civil war was opened and never again closed.1
The unity of Muhammad's congregation, repre-
sented by the Im&m at the head, could be, at
the most, outwardly maintained by force ; in
reality the Jamaa broke up, and split into
factions which always tried to break down each
other's policies, and to take up arms for their
Im&m against the Imam actually in power. It
was a painful dilemma for the pious/ If they
held back they ran against the command strong-
ly emphasised by Islam, to show their colours
and enlist by word and deed for the right, and
if they took a side they were disregarding the
fundamental hypothesis of the theocracy, that
the Believers must not spill their own blood, or
fight amongst themselves, but only against
infidels. The question, " What say you to the
murder of Uthman ? " distracted their minds.

The fruit of the fatal deed fell into All's lap.
After the deaths of Abu Bakr, Umar and Ibn
Auf, the son-in-law of the Prophet was indis-
putably the chief of the Companions, and com-
manded greater respect than Talha and Zubair.
Already, during the bombardment of the D&r,
he had acted as Im&m in the public worship and
also appointed the leader of the Hajj, and he
was generally regarded in Medina, especially

1 The murdered Khalifa is on that account called the " opened
gate."

» The Civil War is therefore called the Fitna, the " temptation."

52 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

among the Ans&r, as the fixed successor of
Uthman. The Egyptians likewise adhered to
him, — they worked for him and for no one else,
and in the confusion of the moment, turned the
scale. On the very day on which Uthm&n was
killed, he received public homage in the mosque
of Medina. After the first excitement, it is
true, a reaction set in ; their mood grew calmer ;
the men of Medina did not hail with acclama-
tion the new Khali C i who had received the power
out of such impure hands, nor did they strongly
support him. At this point it was almost a
stroke of good fortune for him that the tv o
other " triumviri," Talha and Zubair, turned
shamelessly against him, because he thus found
a real cause of quarrel with them. As long as
Uthm&n lived they had zealously agitated
against him, apparently in the interest of Ali,
whom they allowed to do as he pleased, but now
they came forward as competitors, and stigma-
tised him as the instigator of the murder which
had turned out to his advantage. They left
Medina and went to Mecca, where Ayesha, the
Mother of the Faithful, was. She had with-
drawn into holy seclusion, away from the rising
against Uthman, in which she likewise had taken
a considerable part, before it reached its climax,
so as to be able to wash her hands in innocence
of it and still retain her position after it was all
over. She could not endure All, and on hearing

INTRODUCTION 5S

that homage had been paid to him, she openly
declared Uthmari to be a saint and called for
vengeance for him upon the new Khalifa. A
number of fugitives, who at heart thought very
differently, rallied round her, while Talha and
Zubair came and took shelter behind her. The
three were the head and front of the movement
against Ali in Arabia, but from Mecca they
could not carry on hostilities with the far-distant
Medina, so they decided to leave Arabia and go
to Basra, where they had connections, and they
managed to get possession of the town and make
it their stronghold. In face of this, All did not
think it possible to remain in Medina. He
followed them into Ir&q, and indeed made for
Kufa, where the influential Yemenite, Malik
al Ashtar, prepared the way for him. With the
people of Kut'a he then attacked the people of
Basra, and conquered them near their town in
the Battle of the Camel, so-called because it
raged round the camel of Ayesha (9th Deer.,
656). Talha and Zubair fell ; Ayesha's game
was lost, and she retired from the stage. The
people of Basra made peace with Ali and all
Iraq recognised him, and he remained there,
choosing Kufa as his residence.

The immediate consequence, therefore, of the
murder of TJthman was that the old Khalifate
in the town of the Prophet ceased to exist, arid
the new one established itself outside Medina.

54 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

The sanctity of the Khalifate' was gone ; the
struggle for it depended upon strength, and the
strength lay in the provinces. The tribes had
mostly emigrated to the towns that were
garrisons; Arabia had lost its centre of gravity.
The men of Medina themselves put the finishing
touch to the situation by calling in the provincials,
and letting them do what they pleased in their
town, thereby renouncing their hegemony. The
eminent Companions, in particular, committed
political suicide, for they destroyed the moral
authority upon which their security depended ;
if it came to he a question of force, then others
were superior to them. Erom that time Arabia,
devastated by the general Hijra, sank far below
the level upon which it had stood before Islam ;
we hear pitiful complaints about this in old songs.1
Medina ceased to be the centre of the kingdom,
and all attempts to gain back the lost position
were in vain. It remained only the site of
Islamic tradition, which there developed into a
regular study, and was the cave of Adullam of
the displaced members of the Islamic aristocracy
so favoured by Muhammad, who, from there,
occasionally sought to make their claims heard.

1 The Hudhailifce Buraiq complains that where once there dwelt
a concourse of men he now is ieft alone, an old man with a few
women and children. So Mso do Abu Khirash and others. The Khalifa
Umar found himself compelled to impress upon a young man who
applied for admission into the army that filial duty to his parent was
a closer obligation thaii the Hijra,— quite in the upirit of Mark, vii, 10 ff.

INTRODUCTION 55

It possessed, however, a natural attraction for
people who could live where they chose, who had
played out their political rdle or withdrawn from
active life for other reasons. Thus the town of
the Faithful became also the town of the rich
and prominent Arab society which wanted to be
amused, the town of pleasure, music and song,
frivolity and dissoluteness.

From Kufa Alt ruled over the whole Arabian
kingdom, but not over Syria. This province
occupied an isolated position. The Arabs there
had mostly come through the Hijra, and had
other traditions than those of Kufa and Basra.
They had for long been under Graeco- Roman
influence, and even before Islam had belonged
to a kingdom, that of the Ghassanids, so they
were, in some degree, accustomed to order and
obedience. They did not rebel against their
stattholder, even though he was an Umaiyid.
Mu&wia b. AM Sufyan had for 20 years held
the stattholdership of Syria to the general satis-
faction, and it did riot occur to him to vacate it
now and to recognise All. His position towards
All was different from that of Zubair and Talha,
and more favourable. He was not a pretender
and made no claim to the Khalifate. He took
his stand upon the province which he governed,
did not see that his office was rendered vacant
by the murder of Uthm&n, but retained it in
opposition to the revolution, He was able to

56 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

inscribe upon his standard faithfulness and obe-
dience to the legitimate rule, as opposed to
mutiny, which was nevertheless mutiny, even
though it was raised by the Faithful in the
name of Islam. It was in his favour that he, as
cousin of the murdered Khalifa, had, before other
relatives, the right and duty of avenging him,
because he alone had the means at his command,
for in Syria he possessed a regular standing
army.

Soon after the Battle of the Camel, Alt and
the men of Iraq marched against the Syrians,
and came upon their army at the Euphrates
boundary. The fierce battle at Siffin turned
finally in his favour, but when the Syrians were
in danger of being cut to pieces, they stuck
Qorans upon their lance-points. The men of
Iraq understood what was meant by this, — " You
are spilling the blood of Muslims, who follow,
like yourselves, the standard of the Word of
God," and it made an impression upon them.
Their championship of the right in the theocracy
had driven them into the struggle against
Uthm&n, then against Ayesha arid the people
of Basra, and now against Muavvia and the
Syrians. The Jamba, the unity of Muhammad's
congregation, was thus going to pieces. Was
this right ? At a moment of deep emotion
this antinomy was sharply borne in upon them
and they were bewildered. The Faithful who

INTRODUCTION 57

were foremost in the fight and acted as an
example to the others, first laid down their
weapons before the Qoran, and the rest followed
their lead. They also compelled All to stop
the fighting and to have the question of the
succession to the Khalifate decided, not by the
sword, but by the Qoran, i. e. by arbitrators
who should be guided by reasons taken from
the Qoran, and when he objected they threat-
ened him with the fate of Uthm&n. But
when the return march from Siffin to Kufa
was begun, it began to dawn upon the whole
of All's army that they had been done out of
the victory by a miserable artifice, and those
who had been the first to fall into the trap and
lead the others with them now regretted it most
bitterly. They blamed themselves grievously
fo& having allowed their conscience to be
confused and for having, for one instant,
wavered in their conviction of the divine justice
of the revolution against Uthm&n, but they
also reproached All for consenting to the
decision by arbitration, thus virtually making
the goodness of the cause for which they were
fighting a matter of question. They demanded
that he should immediately cancel the act to
which they themselves had forced him against
his will, and break the treaty just concluded
with the Syrians. When he could not comply,
and dance to whatever tune they piped, they

58 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

renounced him and occupied a separate camp
at Harftra, near Kufa. They therefore got
the name of Harurites, but more commonly
Khawarij (seceders or rebels),

This time they did not draw the crowd
with them. The men of Iraq, amongst the
foremost of whom are always to be understood
the men of Kufa, held fast, as a whole, to All.
But his relations to them were different from
those of Muawia to the Syrians, and not so
kindly. Mu&wia was not risen from the ranks,
but held the authority of a superior over them ;
he did not owe his position to his inferiors, but
was independent of them, — when he ordered
they obeyed. They were also, of course, con-
vinced that he had right on his side in fighting
against the murder of U thin an, but in any
circumstances they would have made his cause
;heir own. They had long known and respected
iim, and besides, from earlier times, they had
)een used to a certain military atmosphere.
Dn the other hand, men could not forget that
Ul owed his power to a revolution, and he had
leither the time nor the means to make up for
this detraction by exceptional personal
qualities. The men of Iraq did not forget
that it was they who had advanced him ; they
were too undisciplined, or perhaps too devout,
to follow their Khalifa where he led them.
They certainly regretted when it was too late

INTRODUCTION 59

that they had lost him the game at Siffin, but
they did not make good their error by now
strongly assisting him against the Syrians, after
the decision by arbitration had passed as a jest
and hostilities were renewed. He could not rouse
them to a fresh campaign, for they rendered
him no obligatory service urgently, as he
required it, but allowed Muftwia to conquer
Egypt, and to harass Iraq by flying squadrons
which made inroads as far as Kufa. When they
at last gathered together and were ready for
a sortie, All was killed, and his son and suc-
cessor, Hasan, felt unequal to the position and
sold his claims to Hu^wia. The latter was
now able to make a formal entry into Kufa,
and the men of Iraq had to pay him homage.
This ended the civil war.

8. The Urnaiyids had won the Khalifate, but
it was only in Syria (with Mesopotamia and
Egypt) that they had a firm seat. Everywhere
else they encountered opposition both secret
and open. They could only maintain their
position by force, and were almost always
occupied in preventing or stamping out a revolu-
tion, the centre-point of these revolutions being,
as before, Iraq, especially the town of Kufa.

In the contest with the Syrians the men of
Iraq were overcome, at least they had lost the
game. Consequently the Khalifate, and with it
the chief treasury, migrated from Kufa to

60 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Damascus. This they felt bitterly when it was
too late. They had been possessors of the king-
dom, and now they had sunk to a mere province.
The revenue of the land they had conquered
was lost to them, and they had to be content
with the crumbs of pensions which fell from
their masters' tables. They were held in check
by means of the dole which they could not do
without, and which might at will be curtailed
or withdrawn. No wonder they thought the
rule of the Syrians a heavy yoke, and were ready
to shake it off whenever they found a favour-
able opportunity. The strongest rising against
the Umaiyids originated in Iraq and was made,
not by one particular faction, but by the whole of
th,e Arabs of that place, who were at one in
their rancour over the loss of their former auto-
cuaey, and in hatred of those who had inherited
it. Specially powerful officials were always
required to keep the difficult province peaceful
and obedient, but finally it could only be manag-
ed by the suppression of the native military and
the introduction of Syrian garrisons, by the
establishment of an actual military government,
which had its headquarters no longer in the old
capital of the country, but in a newly erected
fortified town.

The cause of the province became also the
cause of Islam. God and the right took the
field agiainst force ; the opposition united with

INTRODUCTION 61

*^»

the Faith. It is the duty of the Muslim to
further the good by word and deed, and to pro-
hibit the sinful ; he must not only do the will
of Allah himself, but also do his best to make it
paramount in the community. Quietism is not
tolerated ; the Faith makes the individual take
a share in public life by making him personally
responsible for the whole. Its testing-ground is
politics, — that is the very idea of the theocracy.1
In itself the religion had now the power to act
as a support to the existing order of things, and
to teach men that their duty was to obey their
superiors and to do nothing which would cause
schism in the community, but in point of fact
it used its power chiefly to regulate the opposi-
tion. The idea of the theocracy was in critical
opposition to the form of the community as it
had come to be. It refused to allow that history
possesses a legitimising power, that the state
follows its own raison d'titre, the maintaining and
increasing of its power, and that the existing
government is hardly to be distinguished from
it. It was a lasting reproach against the
Umaiyids that they had been, root and branch,
the most dangerous foes of the Prophet, had
only, under compulsion, embraced Islam at the

1 Thanks to the disastrous results, an evangelical tendency as-
serted itself in Islam, as it were, which kept its distance from politics
as a Fitna (temptation) and distrusted its religious motives. High-
born representatives of this tendency were Said b. al-Musaiyab in
Medina, and Hasan al-Basri.

6i ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

eleventh hour, and then had contrived to divert
to themselves the fruits of its government,
first by the weakness of Uthman, and then by
the clever manipulation of the results of his
murder. Their origin disqualified them for
the leadership of Muhammad's congregation ; it
was a disgrace to the theocracy that they should
appear as its chief representatives ; they were,
and remained, usurpers. Their strength was in
their standing army, in Syria, but their might
could never become right. The hatred against
the Umaiyids was increased by the old
grievances against the " SuMn," which were
now become grievances against them as its
present possessors. It was always the same
points which were insisted upon, — that the
officials abused their power, that the moneys
of the state went into the pockets of the few
while the many received nothing, that
adultery, fornication, gambling and drinking
had become the chief pleasures and went
unpunished.1 The leaders of the chorus of the
Faithful were the Fuqah£ and the Qurr£, the
authorities upon religious law and the repeaters
of the Qoran. They opposed the Umaiyids just

1 Zulm, Isti'thar (in the Fai), Ta'tJl al-Hudtid. It was also re-
quired that the officials be held responsible and should give satisfaction
(Qawad) for the injustice which they had committed in office to those
who had suffered from it. The Khalifas did not concede this. Their
demand of an account of stewardship from the retiring stattholders
was limited to the extortion from them of as much money as possible.

INTRODUCTION 63

in the same way as the Judaean Scribes and
Pharisees opposed the Hasmonaeans. The law
which they opposed to the ruling power was
likewise an absolutely positive law, written and
traditional ; it was to be found in the Qoran and
the Sunna. They interpreted it from the Qoran
and manipulated it into the Sunna. which was
still in an extremely fluid state, getting the
political questions of later times decided by the
Prophet in their sense, often, indeed, in a some-
what contradictory fashion.

The most thorough-going representatives of
the theocratic opposition, the most pious of the
pious, were the Khawarij. With them the
divine right became a thoroughly revolutionary
principle. They prided themselves upon the
initial act of the revolution, the murder of
Uthm&n ; unlike those who were ashamed of the
deed after it was done, they made an open
acknowledgment of it their shibboleth. With the
rest of the men of Iraq, they first maintained
the revolution against Mu&wia, who did not
recognise it, but they continued it also against
All when he made terms in the affairs of God,
and thus separated from his adherents. Although
they had helped to assert his claim they were
still not willing to be his party in the sense that
the Syrians were the party of Mu£wia. The Din
(the religion) was to them neither Din Mu&wia
Dior Din All, but Din AIM only, and whoever

64 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

sacrificed to the regent, on any point whatever,
his own religious and political conviction,
whoever placed obedience to him before obedience
to God, made him an idol ; and idolaters were
idolaters, and not Muslims. The Khaw&rij
considered that they alone were Muslims, and
even claimed the name for themselves alone.
Thus they shamelessly spilled the blood of the
Other Muslims, for it was against them and them
only that they waged the holy war. The reproach
that they were thus breaking up the Jam&a did
not affect them ; they protested against the
miserable catholicity which did not separate the
wheat from the chaff ; they alone, the heretics,
formed the true Jam&a. Islam was concentrated
in their camp ; thither they emigrated from the
false Jam&a, after the example of the Hijra of
the Prophet. Although their ideas were quite
anti-dynastic, still, as representatives of the
unity of the congregation of Believers, even they
had their Khalifa or Im£m, who led the worship
and commanded the army. But they watched
his actions, took him to task as soou as they
thought he made a false step, and renounced him
as an unbeliever if he did not reform. Over
the question of the rightful Im&m, therefore,
they quarrelled not only with the other Muslims,
but among themselves as well. Differences of
opinion on smaller points caused division
amongst them. They laid such stress upon the

INTRODUCTION 05

theocratic principle, and made it out to be so
much a matter of belief and conscience, that
they practically reduced it to absurdity, while
it proved absolutely useless or positively
destructive to the stability of the community.
All their energy was directed towards an un-
attainable goal ; religion brought them to an
active, but absolutely impolitic and desperate
polity. They were not unconscious of this
themselves. They renounced success ; their only
wish was to save their souls. They were content
to meet death on the battlefield, and with it
pardon in the sight of God ; they sold their lives
for the price of Paradise. In spite of this,
perhaps just because of it, they often overcame
great armies, and for a time were the terror of
the Muslim world, and although they always
were only a small sect, still they could not be
extirpated. They seemed to spring up again out
of the ground, their principles possessed such an
unconquerable recruiting-power, The opposition
in other places to the existing government, pious
as it claimed to be, was still always animated by
worldly interests, and so had a different aspect;
it was often made use of by ambitious men who
were only striving after power. In the confused
concert the Khaw&rij kept steadily to the key ,
given by the tuning-fork of Islam. They strove
most openly and decisively for the Kingdom of
God, and also most fiercely for a pitiless Utopia.
9

66 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Though likewise sprung from the revolution
against Uthm&n, the Shlites had very different
aims from the Khawarij. They hated the
Umaiyids still more bitterly than the Khaw&dj,
not because they rejected a dynasty in the
theocracy in general, but because they set up
the just and lawful dynasty in opposition to the
false one, namely, the house of the Prophet,
the head of which after his death was his cousin
and son-in-law All. The name Shia is con-
tracted from Shiat All, which means the " party
of All.5' The Shiat All were first the men of
Iraq specially, as distinguished from the
Syrians, the Shiat Mu&wia. Even after his
death All remained for the men of Iraq the
symbol of their lost autocracy. Their Shlitism
was no more than the expression of the feeling
of hatred of the subdued province, especially
tile degraded capital, Kufa, against the
Umaiyids. The heads of the tribes and families of
Kufa originally shared this feeling with the rest,
but their responsible position compelled them
to be circumspect. They did not take aught to
do with aimless risings, but restrained the
crowd when they let themselves be carried
away, and in the name of peace and order placed
their influence at the service of the government
so as not to endanger their own position. In
this way they became more and more strangers
and foes to the more open and positive Shlites,

INTRODUCTION 67

whose attachment to the heirs of the Prophet
was not lessened hut increased by the failure of
romantic declarations. The Shla itself was
narrowed and intensified by the opposition to
the leading aristocracy of the tribes, and broke
off from the majority of the Arabs. In these
circumstances a sect rose into prominence in
Kufa which till then had remained out of sight ;
it bore the name of the Saba'ites, These
Saba'ites changed the character of Islam com-
pletely by setting beside and above the imper-
sonal law (in Qoran and Sunna), which for the
others after Muhammad's death was sufficient,
and, for the Khawarij especially, was the only
authority excluding all human service and all
human deification, the personal Prophet, who,
in their opinion, had not died with Muhammad,
but continued to live successively in his heirs.
They started upon the idea of metempsychosis,
and introduced into it the special idea that even
the spirit of God animating the prophets, after
the death of one passed over to another, that,
in particular, the prophetic spirit of Muhammad
had passed to Alt and continued in his family.
Ali was thus in their eyes not merely the
legitimate successor of the Khalifas before
him ; he was not on the same level as Abft
Bakr and Umar, who had pushed in as usurpers
between him and Muhammad, but he was the
incarnation of the divine spirit, the heir of the

68 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

prophecy and therefore, after Muhammad's
death, the only possible ruler of the theocracy,
which must have, as its leader, a living represen-
tative of the Godhead.1 The Sabaites are said to
derive their name from a Jew of the Yemen,
Ibn Saba. They originated in a few Arabian
tribes of Kufa, but they spread abroad, parti-
cularly among the numerous Persian freedmen
of that place who had received Islam, i.e.
among non-Arabs. They attained political
importance through the famous Thaqitite,
Mukht&r, who made them his body-guard. He
even won over to himself the old Shlites, and
took the opportunity, when anarchy and schism
were again rife, to overthrow the Arabian aris-
tocracy in Kufa and to set up there a govern-
ment with himself at its head, in which Shiitism
was to wipe out the difference between Arabs
and Persians, masters and subjects. But his
success was short-lived. His Shia was sup-
pressed, but he had paved the way for its
success later on.

9. fJhis religious, or speciously religious,
opposition could, however, hardly have been
so dangerous to the Umaiyids if it had not been
for the rivalry of the Arab tribes, a rivalry
which had nothing to do with the theocracy but

1 They certainly allowed the name of the Prophet to Muhammad
only, but in point of fact they made his heirs equal to him, ascribed
to them divine authority and regarded them as infallible (ma 'sum).

INTRODUCTION 69

had its origin entirely in " Arabism," and
indeed through the Imperium to which the
Arabs had attained by the conquests, had risen
to a far greater height than it had done in
pre-Islamic heathendom. The stattholders
excited it still more. They had only at
their immediate disposal a small Shurta, or
gendarme ie ; for the rest their troops consisted
of the Muq&tila of the province, i.e. the
militia, the defending force of the tribes. By
clever manipulation they were able to play off
the tribes against each other and maintain
their position over them. But this was only
successful in the case of a few, and only in the
beginning of the Umaiyid period. It mostly
happened that the stattholder relied upon one
tribe against the others, generally upon his own,
which he often brought with him to begin with.
Now the tribe which he raised to be his house-
hold troops shared with him in the government
and the privileges which the disposal of the
offices and moneys put into their hands. But
with a new stattholder another tribe came into
power, with the result that the displaced tribe
became the bitter foes of the tribe now in
power. So the ethnical distinctions were
tainted with politics and disputes over the politi-
cal spoil. In this respect the province of
Khur&s&n belonging to Basra was the worst.
There, through Ibn Kh&zim the Qais reached

70 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

great power, and through Muhallab the Azd
Um&n. In place of the old quarrel between
Bakr and Tamim, there broke out first discord
between Qais and Tamim, then between Azd
and Qais, and finally between Azd-Rabia and
Qais-Tamim. In Syria and Mesopotamia the
Qais and the Kalb took different sides in the
dispute about the Khalifate between Ibn Zubair
and the Umaiyids, and thus began a fierce
struggle which caused the hostile relations to
remain after the original political reason for
them had long vanished. The differences
became more dangerous because of the tendency
which already existed to the formation of large
tribal-groups.1 In Syria as well as in Khur&s&n
the Qais played a prominent part in politics.
They were scattered everywhere, and were
strongly represented in the high offices by the
Thaqif who belonged to them. They held
closely together, and were the first to form
a real clique throughout the whole kingdom,
shamelessly striving to gain the ruling power.
In the same great group as the Qais were
also reckoned the Tamim, who were most
numerous in Basra and Khuras&n, but they,
to their credit, were distinguished by a
lofty pride in their clan, nor did they strive
so eagerly after posts, nor take so much to do
with high politics. They were not originally

1 Of. above, pp. 27 f.

INTRODUCTION 71

on good terms with the Qais, but latterly united
with them in the great confederacy of Mudar.
On the other side, the A zd Um&n, in Basra and
Khur&s&n, were the most venomous foes of the
Qais and Tamlm. They joined with the rest of
the Yemenites, who in Khur&s£n included the
Rabla (Bakr), and lastly the Syrian Qud&a
(Kalb) were also drawn into the circle. They
passed as Yemenites, but whether they were so
is doubtful. In reality they were driven into
the arms of the Yemenite party only by enmity
towards the Qais.1 So the dangerous cleavage
went on increasing,2 the Quraish and the
Umaiya themselves could not hold their ground
above the dualism which was splitting the whole
Arab world into two camps.

The non-Arabs pressed into the cteft. They
came over to Islam in great numbers, especially
the crowds of Iranian prisoners of war in Kufa
and Basra, thus gaining their personal freedom,3'
but not full civil and military rights with their

i Of. Qntarat (ed. Barfch), 29, 56, 93 ff.

8 The cleavage, however, was not strict j it might vary with {Kiss-
ing motives in the individual. One tribe backed this or that party
of its connection so as to prove its adherence to some powerful one or
other whose favour was of importance to them. The poets in parti-
cular had a weakness for claiming kinship with those in high places.

3 It was, of course, only a custom and not a duty to set free the
prisoners of war if they accepted Islam. The conclusion was never
drawn that a Muslim in the sight of God and the law cannot bo the
slave of a Muslim j on the contrary it was understood that slaves
followed the religion of their master, especially those born in their
master's house,

72 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

material advantages; they became Maw&ll,
clients of some Arabian family. Only thus, as
subordinate adherents of Arab families, were
they received into the theocracy ; Islam alone
was not sufficient, for the theocracy was, in fact,
a specifically Arab state, an Imperium of the
Arabs over the conquered peoples. This was
contrary to the idea of the theocracy, which was
not to be an Imperium (Mulk), nor even allowed
to have one, and especially so when it was a case
of Arabs ruling over non-Arab Muslims. Faith
in Allah and the acknowledgment of His
supreme power utterly excluded national
differences. Thus Islam was used as a suitable
means of gaining for the Maw&li their share
in the theocracy, so as to snatch the privilege
; afterwards from the Arabs. The pious Arabs
themselves favoured the claims of the Mawali ;
the parties of the opposition, in particular,
sought in them allies against the Umaiyids, who
actually represented the ruling power of the
Arabian nation, and not of Islam. The Khawa-
rij led the way by admitting the Mawali with
equal rights into their community and army.
The Shlites followed suit with much greater
effect. As we saw, a Shiite sect in Kufa allied
itself with the Maw&li there, and so at once
advanced itself and the Iranians. In Kufa it-
self it was certainly soon suppressed again by
the Arabs and sank into oblivion, but it later

INTRODUCTION 73

transplanted itself from Kufa to genuine Iranian
soil, namely, to Khur&s&n, and spread there
among the native population that had embraced
Islam. Under the standard of Islam, i.e. of
Shlitism, the Khur&s&nites first drove the Arabs
out of their own land, and then made a complete
end of the Arabian rule, and set up the Abb&sids
in the place of the Umaiyids.

10. The usual conceptions of Orientalism
are much in need of correction, and in the
history of Islam, at any rate, must be disregard-
ed, so long as the Arabs were the ruling nation.
Politics, and not forsooth the work of civilisa-
tion, here stand in the foreground and com-
pletely absorb the interest. Politics do not
mean Fate in the form of an absolute despotism,
but the sacred affairs of all Muslims, in which
they take part, body and soul, even if it be
without understanding of the nature and
limits of a human commonwealth. They
are swayed by universal tendencies, reli-
gious, national and social. The amalgamation
of these tendencies and their contest with the
existing order of things, which was seldom
represented by long reigns and men of years,1
results in a great confusion, and the review is

1 Most of the Khalifas and stattholders were young, and did not
live to be old men, except Muftwia and Nasr b. Saiyar. They general-
ly also ruled only a short time, though the stattholdership changed
hands with even more frequency than the Khalifate,

10

74 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

not rendered easier by the fact that the scene
comprises the nations and lands extending
from the Indian to the Atlantic Ocean. This
introductory chapter seemed necessary as a pre-
paration and guide so that the reader might
grasp and retain the thread of the following
account, and also to prevent the mistake of
supposing that the following researches into
the history of the oldest Islam are exhaustive.
Their main subject is the Umaiyids, and the
struggle of the sway which represents Arabian
government with the opposing powers, and its
final subjection in face of the revolution which
continues from the end of the Khalifate of
Medina. There is no room here for a thorough
treatment of the parties and provinces each in
its particular point of view, although that would
be just as important for the proper comprehen-
sion of Islam. In a separate chapter I have
collected a few notes upon the specially interest-
ing province of Khur&san. With regard to the
Khaw&rij and the Shia, and also the wars
against the Romans at this period, I refer
readers to the lectures printed in the Nachricht-
en der philosophisch-historischen Klasse der
Oottinger Gesellschaft der JFissenschaften, 1901.

CHAPTER II.
AL! AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR.

According to Madaini, on the authority of
AM Mikhnaf (Agh. 15, 71), Naila, wife
of the murdered Khalifa Uthm&n, sent his bloody
shirt to Muawia, with an account of the circum-
stances of the murder, in which she quoted the
prophetic verse, Sura 49, 9. The latest account
from Saif which is preserved in Tabari (1, 3255)
says that Nu'man b. Bashir brought Uthm&n's
bloody garment and Naila's amputated fingers
to Damascus. The fingers are added, so N&ila
herself does not fit in. According to a further
statement of Saif, Mu&wia displayed the gory
relics in the mosque in order to stir up his
Syrians. This exhibition lasted a whole year,
because there was just a year between the death
of Uthman .and the encounter at Siffin.
MadMni, quoting 'Aw&na (Tab. 1, 3254 f. ; cf.
K^mil, 183 f. ; Dlnawarl, 166 f.) only relates
that, in front of Jarir, who was sent by Ali to
demand his allegiance, Mu&wia stirred up
the vengefulness of the Syrians, and by doing
so also created the desired impression. Thus
the affair was only a mockery to make Ali
afraid of attacking him. According to Waqidl
in Tab. 1, 3252 ff., Muawia did not incite others

t6 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

against All so much as they did him. In verses
which are still preserved, his cousin Walid b.
Uqba reproached him with exchanging letters
with All and not bestirring himself, as a relative,
to fulfil his duty of revenge. He was by nature
a diplomatist, and was all the less eager for
the struggle with the people of Iraq because
he was threatened at the same time by the
Romans, and also by the Egyptians who were
on All's side. He did not aim at the Khalifate ;
his first ambition, at least, was only to hold
fast to his province of Syria and get possession
of Egypt, which he dared not leave to his
opponents if he wanted to protect himself in the
rear. Amr b. As also urged him to do this, for
he regarded the mutiny against Uthm&n as a
means to an end, and did all he could to get back
his former province, and after the old Khalifa's
death made an honourable but shrewd compact
with Mu&wia in order to compass this (3253 f .
qf. Dlnaw., 167 ff.)- So Mu&wia and Amr first
marched against Egypt and succeeded in trick-
ing All's stattholder there, Muhammad Ibn Abl
Hudhaifa, and taking him prisoner (3252 f .,
3407 ff.), but they had then to turn back in
order to meet All himself. All was the aggres-
sor ; he was making claims upon the Khalifate
and the rule of the whole kingdom. After
making sure of Iraq and completing his prepara-
tions, he left the general camp in Nukhaila,

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR )1

near Kufa,1 at the end of the year 36 (Spring,
657 A.D.), and made for the west where a
number of Basraites had made their appearance.
Mu&wia and Amr awaited him on the Syrian
border in the plain of Siffin on the Euphrates,
not far from Raqqa.2

The account of the battle of Siffin in Tabari
is almost exclusively that of Abft Mikhnaf . All
with the main body took the usual army route
by the Tigris, and then through Mesopotamia.
Near Qarqisi& he was met by his vanguard,
which really ought to have been marching on
the right bank of the Euphrates. After cross-
ing the Euphrates near Raqqa they were met
near the Roman wall by the Syrian vanguard,
which withdrew without engaging. When they
were going to pitch their camp, it turned out
that the Syrians had occupied the approach to
the water, i.e. to the Euphrates, and as fair
words were of no avail, the Syrians were driven
back by force, but not cut off from the water
(3259-69). Eor two months, Dhulhijja, 36 and
Muharram, 37, the armies encamped opposite

1 To the west or north of Kufa on the road to Syria (I, 3345)
Buwaib was situated there. The battle of Buwaib is also called the
Battle of Nukhaila.

8 Between Barbalissus and Caesarium (Theoph., A.M. 6148)
Barbalissus is Balis (Baladh., 150 f. Assem., B,0M 2, 332), Thcophanes
A.M. 6151, calls the name Sapphin j in the Syrian inscri tion of Han as!
(Journ. As., 1900, II, 285 ff.) under Sel. 968 it is called Sapphe o.
Sepphe in the stat. emph., likewise in the Cosmographer oi
Ravenna, where Sephe and Barbaliseion occur Bide by side.

td ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

each other. At last on Wednesday, the 8th Safar,
37,1 a general battle began, which was continued
on Thursday morning with greater energy. The
Syrians were better equipped, and had a far
more soldierly appearance than the men of
Iraq (3322). Before their choice troops the
Yemenites of Kufa on Alt's right wing began to
waver, notwithstanding the desperate courage
of their readers. But towards evening M&lik
al-Ashtar rallied them and forced the enemy
step by step back to their camp. The battle
lasted through the night till morning ; this is
the real " Night of Clangour/5 and not that of
Q&disla.2 Mu&wia was meditating flight, and
victory was on the point of falling to Ashtar,
when he had to let it slip out of his grasp and
put up his sword at the repeated command of
All. The Syrians had actually fastened copies
of the Qoran upon their lance-points so as to
appeal from the decision of arms, which threaten-
ed to result unfavourably for them, to the
decision of the Word of God. The men of
Iraq let themselves be tricked and forced Alt,
with threats of personal violence, to stop the
battle and treat with Muawia. On the proposal

1 Wednesday, 26th July, 657 A. D. = 6148 A.M., 968 Sel. Cf. the
previous note.

* Tab., 1,3027, Kfixnil, 753. It must have been Thursday night,
but according to Tabarl, 2, 727 the battle of Siffin is on Wednesday
night, and likewise in the tradition of Abft Mikhnaf, Cf. Anon. Ahlw,,
849.3,

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAB 79

of the latter, two trusty men were chosen to
decide according to the Qoran to whom the
ruling power was due, — Amr from the Syrians,
Abu MAs& from the Iraqites. The decision was
to be pronounced in the month of Ramadfm at
a place situated between Syria and Iraq.§
Abft Mikhnafs narrative of the battle of
Siffin is very long, after the style of the narra-
tives of the battles of Qaclisla and Nih&wand.
The history of events before the real engage-
ment began occupies a good deal of space, and
yet Muharram is empty of events, only the
preceding and following months are filled up, —
both, indeed, in the same way, — firstly, by a
disposition to make overtures of peace, and
secondly, after the failure of these overtures, by
single combats in which he has the opportunity
of introducing the prominent partisans both of
Mu&wia and Ali. Though the names of the
persons concerned vary the second time, this
does not alter the similarity of the material, so
wemighb conclude that the prelude in Dhulhijja
really coincides with that in Safar, and is not
separated from the actual battle by the whole
length of Muharram.1 In this way the time of
delay before the battle would be considerably

1 Dlnawari mentions the single combats only once, and that in
the second place, so that they come in as the prelude to the general
engagement. Moreover, he has a much more exact knowledge of the
whole thing than Abu Mikhnaf, especially of the minutiae. The first
Qoran held up by the Syrians was the beautiful copy of Damascus,

80 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

shortened. There can be no doubt that on both
sides a certain aversion to continuing the decision
by the sword had arisen (Dinaw., 192, 5 ; 195, 9 ;
201, 15). They were in no hurry to begin.
Perhaps also the old traditional scruple against
shedding blood in Muharram had to do with it.
A verse quoted in Din., 182, and Masftdi, 4, 350,
alludes to this ; — " Only a few days of Muhar-
ram remain, and then the dice fall."§ We have
no clear picture of the course of the actual
battle ; it is described with just as great confu-
sion as it was fought. We certainly find over
and over again systematic accounts of the
distribution, arrangement and leadership of the
troops, but they do not agree with each other,
and so have hardly any practical value for the
real course of the battle. The description is a
mass of one-sided traditions dealing with epi-
sodes, and the attempt of the editor to mate a
mosaic unity of it is a failure. There is a lack
of inward connection ; you cannot see the wood
for the trees. Every witness is inclined to
regard the station of his own tribe as the
centre-point, and to ascribe the chief glory
to the heroes of his tribe. It is only the issue
that shows plainly that M&lik-al-Ashtar was
the real hero of the day, but as such he

and was fastened to five lances and borne by five men (201, 20). This
is exactly as it ia in Saif, with whom Dinawarf is in line. Still, the
verses which he reports are valuable,

ALT AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 81

is openly praised only in the verses of the
poet Naj&shl (Din., 198), who himself took
part in the battle. " The Syrians pressed
forward incessantly; then we called up
against them the battering-ram of Iraq, and
Ashtar drove them back." But for this he is
on a level with many others whose deeds are
just as fully celebrated.1 Besides the tribe-
leaders, All himself receives special prominence
along with his cousin Ibn Abb£s. Great stress
is laid upon the fact that the readers held their
ground when the others fled before the Syrians,
and that they went to their death for All ; they
become martyrs for him and furnish the
strongest proof of his just claim. As leaders
are mentioned Ibn Budail, H&shim b. Utba and
especially the old Ammiir b. Yasir, of whom the
Prophet is reported to have said that he would
fall in battle against a godless race (B. Hish&m,
337). Ashtar is put in the shade by this.
The later traditionists have a dislike to him,
perhaps because, like Saif, they regard him as
a revolutionary. Masudi and Yaqftbi will have
nothing to say to him and ascribe all the merit
to the supreme corrmand of All. Tabarl does
the same (3321 f.), but Abu Mikhnaf does not
go so far. He describes sympathetically the

1 Amongst them also some whoa oem not to have been present
at all, as Qais b, Sa'd. Cf. below, p. 96. What the pious Abul, Darda
would have done is invented by Dinawart, 181,
11

82 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

brilliant military appearance of the Yemenite
hero (3297) and recognises the effect of his
strong personality. He did not stand where
All placed him, but at the head of his tribe,
the Nakha'; his enthusiasm and initiative made
him leader both of the Hamd&n and the Madhhij,
and with them he wrested the victory from
the Syrians. Also, he was the only sensible
man when the others let themselves be cheated
out of the glory of the battle, — a genuine Arab
nobleman as opposed to the pious bigots and the
lukewarm or cunning politicians.

An account of the Syrian side has not been
preserved to us. It would make different
reading from that of Abft Mikhnaf, though it
would scarcely be more credible, as we see from
Theophanes, A.M. 6148 : "Muawia's side gained
the mastery and took possession of the water ;
All's men deserted because of thirst ; still
Mu&wia did not wish to fight but won the
victory easily.5' Of course AbA Mikbnaf sides
with the Iraqites and All against the Syrians
and Mu&wia. All has the better cause and the
more pious followers. The fact that his own
brother Aqtt fought against him is passed over
in silence,1 but there is no concealment of the
fact that the Syrians had sons of the Khalifas

1 Bukbftrl (ed. Bulaq, 1289), 2, 67 f., 139, 145, 3. 11. Deutsche
Morgenl. Ztschr. (DMZ.), 1884, 93,

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 83

AM B#kr and Umar on their side besides 4,000
readers, who thus were not solely on the side of
All, and that they were just as convinced of the
justice of their cause as the Iraqites. The
latter, indeed, were by no means all firmly
convinced of the right of Ali, but kept asking
each other for proofs, and held discussions
amongst themselves and with their opponents, —
discussions which continued long after Siffin
and were interminable.1 They were not eager
for the struggle with their brothers in faith and
race, and appeared quite willing to put a stop
to it. The party-opposition was weak to begin
with, and only gained strength later on.

2. Abft Mikhnaf's report of the succeeding
events is as follows. On the return march
which was made by the shortest road on the
right bank of the Euphrates, the Iraqites
thought matters over. They upbraided each
other and Ali as well, though he had only
stopped the battle under compulsion, and when
he marched into Kufa twelve thousand men
separated from him and camped in Harftra.

1 There appeared in a dream to the Nakha'ite Alqama his
brother who had fallen at Siffin. He said that the slain Iraqites and
Syrians had quarrelled in heaven as to which cause was the just one,
and God had decided for the Iraqites. Hudhaifa of Madain referred
two men who were doubtful which side to take in the dilemma to the
decision of the Prophet that the slayers of Amm&r were the godless
Bide. Verses of Ka'b b. Ju'ail and other poets in Dinaw,, 199 ff., 206,
testify to the justice of the Syrians' claim.

&t AEAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

They are called Khawarij or Har Mtes l ; their
watchword was a protest against the decision
by arbitration : — " The decision belongs to God
alone ! " Their leaders were Shabath b. Rib'l
al Ri£hi, Abdullah b. Kauwa al Yashkuri and
Yazld b. Qais al Arhabi, the most prominent
men of the great tribes Tamim, Bakr and
Hamd&n in Kufa. All indeed succeeded in
winning back these leaders to his side. To one
of them he promised and granted the statt-
holdership of Ispahan and Rai. The Harurites
now returned to Kufa and joined him, but they
expected, and asserted that he had promised
them, that he would lead them at once against
the Syrians. When he did not do so, but in
Ramadan, 37, arranged for the court of arbitra-
tion at Duma, they held that he had broken
his word, broke away from him again and set
up in opposition to him their own Khalifa, the
Azdite Abdullah b. Wahb al R&sibi, to whom
they paid homage on the 10th Shauwal, 37
(21st March, 658). Then, one after the other,
they left Kufa and gathered in Nahraw&n on
the other side of the Tigris.2 Thither also they
summoned their confederates from Basra, who

1 Cf. the Abh. der Gottinger Societat, Band V, No. 2 (190L)
upon the religious and political opposition parties in old Islam.

* Nahrawan (NopjSay) is the name of the well-known canal in the
district of JAkha belonging to Madam (Tab., 2, 900), and also the name
of a place near it which is more precisely called Nahrawansbridge
(Dlnaw., 217). For the district of Jukha, see Tab., 3,275 j 385 ; 406.

All AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 85

joined them to the number of 500 men under
Mis'ar b. Fadaki of TarnSm.

After the farce of the arbitration court was
over All thought himself justified in reopening
the hostilities against the Syrians. He gathered
his army in the camp of Nukhaila and
summoned the Khaw&rij also to join him. But
they did not come ; they demanded that he
should publicly acknowledge and express regret
for his defection, — so they termed his reluctant
yielding at Siffin. Ali was now going to march
against the Syrians without them, but his army
insisted upon an expedition against the
Khawarij because the latter, on the way from
Basra to Nahrawan, had slaughtered Abdullah
b. Khabb&b b. Aratt, the son of the oldest adher-
ent of the Prophet (B. Hish&m, 234), along with
his wife, and All had to yield to their urgency.
In vain he tried to induce the Khaw&rij to
deliver up the murderers of their own accord.
In vain he tried to persuade them that, as a
matter of fact, his point of view was the same
as theirs, and that he was willing to let the
sword decide against the common foe. They
replied, — " To-morrow you will again do just as
you did at Siffin." They could come to no
agreement and prepared for a mortal struggle.

According to AbA Mikhnaf, the battle of
Nahraw&n took place in A. H. 37, — towards the
end of the year indeed, for the Khaw&rij had

36 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

not left Kufa till Shauwal, the third-last month.
Their leaders of Harura had forsaken them ;
Shabath took an eager part in the struggle
against them, and likewise Ash'ath who had
before been reckoned as one of their confede-
rates. In addition, they were not so numerous
as in the camp of Harura, being only 4,000 strong.
Many of these yet slunk back to Kufa, about 100
openly went over to All, and 500 horsemen
under Farwa b. Naufal wheeled round towards
Daskara ; the rest were cut down except eight.

With the annihilation of the Khaw&rij,
however, the men of Kufa were satisfied ; they
}no longer wanted war with the Syrians, and All
had to yield to their wishes. He had soon to
deal with other rebels whose pretext was like-
wise the arbitration court, though they used it
very differently from the Khaw&rij. After the
battle of the Camel Khirrit b. R&shid of the
Mjia had followed All to Kufa with 300 men
and fought for him at Siffin and also at
Nahraw&n. But when Alt did not recognise
the decision of the court of arbitration, he
broke away from him and made his way by
Madh&r to Ahw&z. Besides Kufaites and other
Arabs who shared his political views, there
joined him many non-Arabs who objected to
paying the taxes. Overcome at R&mhurmuz
by a Kufaite army under Ma'qil b. Qais
al-Tamiml, he withdrew to Bahrain, his

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 87

native place, and there not only incited
the N&jia, who had withheld the tax since
A. H. 37, but also the Abdulqais. He told
the people what they wanted to hear. With
regard to the Khaw&rij, he blamed All for let-
ting men decide in the affairs of God; otherwise
he stuck to his original opinion that All ought
to have accepted the sentence of the arbitration
court. He justified those who refused to pay
the taxes by saying that the tax (Sadaqa) ought
to benefit the poor of its own land and not the
treasury. He even won over to himself those
Muslims who had fallen back upon Christianity
when they saw the deadly strife within the
congregation of Muhammad, by showing them
that they would have nothing to expect from
All but execution for their defection. But
Ma'qil b. Qais, who had driven him out of
Ahwaz, did not let him alone in Bahrain either
and a bloody encounter took place. Three times
the N&jia withstood the attack of the superior
force, but when Khirrlt and 170 men with him
had fallen, the rest scattered and all was over.

Such is the account of Abft Mikhnaf in
Tabarl, 1, 3345-86, 3418-43.1 According to
Yaqftbi and the K&mil or Dlnawarl his account
cannot be improved on, but it is open to some
obje ctions, especially as regards the chronology.

1 There is a blank in Tabarl's MS. filled in, in the Leiden edition
(3364.68), from B. Athlr.

88 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

After it has been first stated that the Khaw&rij
had not chosen a Khalifa till a month after the
arbitration court, and that then they had be-
taken themselves to Nahraw&n, it is here pre-
supposed that they were already there when All
got word of the result of the sentence, and
straightway gathered in Nukhaila against the
Syrians ; therefore thay must have already
left Kufa before the arbitration court. And if
Khirrit was still fighting for All at Nahrawan,
but became incensed at him because of the
arbitration court, then actually the battle of
Nahrawan took place before the arbitration
court.1 By these alterations in the sequence of
events the whole pragmatism in Abft Mikhnaf
is now upset. All could not think of waging
war with the Syrians till after the court of ar-
bitration. If, then, Nahrawan falls earlier,
the gathering of the troops in Nukhaila cannot
have been concerned with the Syrians but only
with the Khaw&rij. Then it is a matter of no
importance that the Kufaites had compelled All
against his will to lead them against the Khaw&-
rij instead of against the Syrians.

In Abft Mikhnaf not merely the relative, but
also the absolute dating of Nahraw&n is in-
correct. He places it in one of the two last

. * More precisely before the news of the result of the arbitration
court reached Kufa. The decision itself may have been simultaneous
with Nahrawan, or indeed even earlier. Here the point at issue is
only when Alt received information concerning the decision.

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 89

months of the year 37. Tabarl has already
rightly protested against this (1, 3387-89). We
now know the exact date from the Ans&b of
BalMhuri (DMZ., 1884, 393) ; the battle took
place on the 9th Safar, 38 (17th July, 658).

According to this the arbitration court did
not rise in Ramadan, 37, and not till the year
38. W&qidi in Tab., 1, 3407, makes it Sha' ban,
38, — a little late if Mu&wia again took up arms
against Egypt in Safar, 38 (but not before the
arbitration court ; of. Tab., 3450, 16), as Waqidl
(3406 f.) reports. But even if the court was
not held till the beginning of 38, then it is
surprising that there is a whole year between
the agreement at Siffin and its execution. Ac-
cording to Zuhrt, a very old traditionist of
Medina, the original time-limit was extended.
It was decided that the judges should meet in
Duma, or if anything came in the way, in the
following year at Adhruh (1, 3341). They did
meet at Adhruh (2, 8),1 and so it was in the year
after Siffin, i.e., A.H. 38. Waqidi (1, 3353 f.,
3407) and Ab& Ma'shar (2, 198) as well as
Zuhrl, mention Adhruh. Abfl Mikhnaf leaves
the place unfixed in the document of agreement ;
it was to be one chosen lying midway between
Kufa and Damascus (1, 3337). He afterwards

1 The place, situated in ancient Edom, might have been chosen out
of consideration for the men of Medina, who by right had also some-
thing to say in the matter.

90 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

mentions the usual place, DAma, but in 3354,
10 f. (if the text is in order) he names DArna
and Adhruh asyndetically, side by side.

In this uncertain way are the time and place
of one of the most important events of the
oldest history of Islam reported. Still more
unsatisfactory is our information regarding the
substance of this event, the proceedings and the
issue of the arbitration court. Abu Mikhnaf
gives two versions of it (3354 ff.). The one comes
from Sha'bi, and runs thus : — Besides Abft
Mfts& there appeared, for AH, Shuraih b. H&ni
at the arbitration court with 4()0 men, and Ibn
Abb&s as prayer- leader. Mu&wia sent Amr
with 400 men. As suitors with the nearest
claim to the Khalifate appeared the heirs of the
Islamic aristocracy, who once had formed the
circle and council of Muhammad, — Ibn Umar,
Ibn Zubair and others, but not the old Ibn Ab!
Waqq&s. Amr proved Mu&wia's right to rule
from the right of revenge according to Sura 17,
35, and amplified the argument by promises with
which he tried to tempt Ab& Mftsft, whose candi-
date was Ibn Umar. But Abft Mfts& was not
to be caught. Here Sha'bi's account breaks
off ; there is nothing else reported among other
isndds but a few of the pretexts brought forward
by Amr against Ibn Umar. Then there follows
in Abft Mikhnaf another version by Ab& Jan&b
l, which is the only one that reports the

AL.1 AJND T.H.JS FlttST UlVlli WAK 91

result of the negotiations. Amr and AbA MAs&
met in Duma. AbA MAs&'s method was always
to speak his mind first ; he did not want to hear
anything about Muawia and the son of Amr, and
he proposed to set aside All and Mu&wia, and to
leave the decision as to who should rule to a
ShAr&, i.e., not a plebiscite but an electoral
assembly of the aristocracy of Islam, after the
pattern of that which was once summoned by
TJmar and agreed upon TJthm&n. Amr declared
himself favourable. In spite of the warning
of Ibn Abbas, Abu MAs& as usual took the
first word before the Corona and declared he
had come to an agreement with Amr to set
aside All and Mu&wia, and to call a ShAr&. Then
Amr rose and said he also set aside All but
adhered to Mu&wia as the heir and avenger of
Uthm&n. Abu MAs& cursed him, and he mocked
AbA Mus& ; a disorderly scene ensued and AbA
MAs& fled from the Syrians to Mecca. Amr
and the Syrians returned to Mu&wia to greet
him as Khalifa ; Ibn Abb&s went to do the same
to All. All straightway cursed Mu&wia and his
clique in the church service, and Mu&wia paid
him back in his own coin.

From this we might get the idea that AbA
MAs& had allowed himself to be duped, but Amr
simply breaks his word, an artifice which even
the wisest will succumb to. If there is dupery
in it, it is on Amr's side, and Amr was no

$2 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

trickster. This story of the arbitration court
is incredible, even though taken for granted by
W&qidl (2, 84) as it seems to be.1 Sha'bi
probably had a different version of it, but unfor-
tunately his ending is awanting. We are
enabled to make corrections by means of the
already quoted narrative of AbA Mikhnaf about
Khirrit b. R&shid. Khirrit reproached Alt for
not being willing to abide by the dictum of Abft
MAs&, according to which the choice of a ruler
was to be left to a Shfir&.2 The reproach implies
that the proposal of a ShftrS, was accepted by
the Syrians, since, otherwise, it could not have
been binding upon All. Mu&wia did not lose
much by it for he was not as yet Khalifa, and
was, in fact, not hailed as such till 40 A.H. in
Jerusalem, but All could not give up the position
he had assumed, and could not make his claim
dependent upon a Shur&. It was easy to
foresee that, and Amr made a pretty clever
move in concurring with Ab& MAs&; he did get
the better of him at all events so far, since
Mu&wia was not removable in the same sense
as All, and the refusal to recognise his right

1 Abu 'Ubaida gives later a somewhat similar account of Basra, in
Tabari 2, 446 f . Cf. 444.

* Thus Tab., 3434, 1 ; 3427, 2. In opposition to this, Khirrit appears
(3419, 1) as a thorough Kharijite. This is contradicted by the whole
train of events, but is easy to understand from Abu Mikhnaf 's re-
presentation of the proceedings of the arbitration court.

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 93

affected the latter only. After All had made
the first mistake, the only way to correct it was
hy a breach of his word. The Iraqite tradition
does its best to try to gloss this over as excus-
able, and lays all the blame upon Amr and Abu
Mfts&, the pernicious Hakamdn (arbiters), (Tab.,
2, 710 ; 6, 929, 1).

3. Egypt was conquered by Amr at the
beginning of 38, apparently soon after the
arbitration court. A first attempt had already
been made in 36 A. EL, to which I have referred
before, but I return to it at this point of the con-
text in order to clear up many doubtful points.

According to Abu Mikhnaf (Tab., 1, 3234 f. ;
3243 ff. ; 3392 ff.) Ibn Abl Sarh, Uthm&n's
stattholder who had fled from Egypt, was await-
ing on the borders of Palestine the result of the
rising in Medina, when along with the news of
the death of Utbm&n he received the tidings
that All had set over Egypt Qais b. Sa'd b.
TJb&da, the most prominent man of the Ans&r.
Qais arrived with no army but only seven
followers, bringing with him a letter dated
Safar, 36. All's adherents had the mastery in
Egypt, though there were also some there who
took the side of Uthm&n,1 and who had gathered

1 They were not by any means on Muawia's side from the begin-
ning. UthmAnid does not simply mean Umaiyid. In Kufa, too, there
were those of the Uthmanid persuasion who still did not belong to the
Syrian party, but took up a kind of neutral position, something like
Abft MAsa. Cf. Tab,, 2. 659. Maqdist, 293, 19.

94 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

in KharbM in the Delta under the Kin&nite
Yazid b. H&rith. But Qais concluded with
Yazld a treaty of neutrality, and another with
hi$ tribal confederate Maslama b. Mukhallad
Al-Ans&ri, who was likewise on Uthm&n's side.
Therefore Mu&wia could make no headway in
Egypt much as he desired to do so. He tried to
win over Qais himself by promises of vast
wealth if he would join him, and though unsuc-
cessful in this, he diligently spread the story
that Qais was agreed with him, with the object
of making All distrustful of him, which he
contrived to do. In order to test his loyalty,
Ali required Qais to use severity against the
neutral powers in Egypt, and when the latter
raised objections, he deposed him and put
Muhammad b. AM Bakr in his place ; along
with this there were intrigues of his circle
against the Ans&rite, whose father Ibn Ubada
had once disputed the Khalifate with Abu Bakr.
Qais was surprised by the arrival of his successor,
but did not waver in his loyalty ; after a short
stay in Medina he went to Ali at Kufa, and
fought along with him at Siffin (in the begin-
ning of the year 37). Muhammad b. Abl Bakr,
whose commission was dated Ramadan, 36,
challenged the neutrals a month after either to
yield him full obedience or to vacate the district.
Eor a while they prudently restrained them-
selves, but after Siffin they repeatedly repelled

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 95

the attacks of the stattholder. Encouraged by
their success, they made a revolt under Mu&wia
b. Hudaij as-Sak&ni to avenge the blood of
Uthm&n, and became more than a match for
Muhammad. All had to make up his mind to
send M&lik al- Ash tar, the conqueror of Siffin,
to Egypt. Malik was at that time stationed in
Nisibis, on the borders of Mesopotamia, belonging
to Syria. He, too, came without an army, but
he was poisoned at Qulzum. Mu&wia, at whose
instigation this took place, triumphantly announ-
ced his death in the pulpit at Damascus.
At the entreaties of Alt the deeply mortified
Muhammad remained at his dangerous post.

But this account of Abii Mikhnaf, which is the
basis of the modern versions of Islamic history,
is corrected by more exact accounts. Qais b.
Sa'd was not the first of All's stattholders in
Egypt ; he succeeded Muhammad Ibn Abl
Hudhaifa.1 The latter had remained in Egypt
when the mutineers from there had marched to
Medina against Uthm&n, and had driven out Ibn
Abi Sarh and taken possession of the province
for Alt (Tab., 1, 2968). But as early as A. H.
36 Mu&wia and Amr managed to entice the
young man out to Arlsh on the borders of
Palestine. They did not penetrate any farther
into Egypt (in spite of 3407, 17), for the followers

1 Waqidl in Tab., 1, 3252 ff.j 3407 ; and in Balddh., 227 f. ; in agree-
ment with these Tab., 1, 3233, without Isn&d,

96 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

of Tlthm&n did not make common cause with
them. In Arish he was surrounded and taken
prisoner, and afterwards murdered. The ac-
counts of the time and manner of the murder
are not quite agreed. The Syrian of Noldeke
(DMZ., 1875, 89) says that his nephew Hudhaif a
was slain by Mu&wia's order in A. 969 Seleuc.
(A.H. 38-39).1 This date is confirmed by Ibn
Kalbl in Tabari, 1, 3408; but he says that Mu&-
wia had meant to let him escape when he had
fled from prison (cf. Tab., 2, 230 ; Dlnaw., 167,
15), and that against his will a Khath'amite had
slain him, when he, — wild asses having drawn
his attention to him, — discovered him in a cave
of the Hauran. W&qidf, again (3233, 7 ; 3407,
15) places the murder in the same year as the
imprisonment, A.H. 36, which is probably wrong.
After Ibn Abi Hudhaif a was taken prisoner
Qais b. Sa'd succeeded him, so he can hardly
have again relinquished his province so soon as
Ramad&n, 36, and taken part in the battle of
Siffln, as Abfl. Mikhnaf asserts. According to
Zuhrl (3241 f . ; 3246; 3391 f.) he was not de-
posed till after that battle, and even then did
not go straight to All at Kufa without a grudge,
but wanted to stay in Medina. But he was

1 He calls him Hudhaifa although, according to him, his father
was not called the father of Hudhaifa ; and the nephew of Mu&wia,
although he was actually not his, but his mother's nephew. (B.
Hisham, 165, 208.)

AL1 AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 97

frightened away from there by Marwan b. Hakam
and other Umaiyids, to the great annoyance
of Mu&wia. His immediate successor was Ashtar,
and it was not till the latter was poisoned on his
entry into the province that Muhammad b.
Abi Bakr came. In opposition to this Ibn
Kalbi actually relates that Ashtar (3212) was
only sent to Egypt after the fall of Muhammad
b. Abi Bakr, but that, at any rate, is quite false.
Muawia and Amr repeated the attack upon
Egypt given up in A. H 36, with greater success
in A. H. 38 against Muhammad b. Abi Bakr.
About this, too, the traditions in Tabari are con-
tradictory. According to Abu Mikhnaf (3396 ff.),
Mu&wia after the arbitration court turned
his eyes again towards Egypt. He made an
alliance with Maslama b. Mukhallad arid Mua-
wia b. Hudaij, who joined him though formerly
they would have nothing to do with him. Amr
came in with 6,000 men, and he and Mu&wia
wrote threatening letters to Muhammad b.
Abi Bakr to compel him to vacate the land.
The latter sent the letters to Ali and begged for
support, but got none and was left to his own
resources. At his summons 2,000 men gathered
around him, the best and trustiest among them,
and specially recommended by Ali (3402, 11),
was the Tujibite Kinana, the murderer of
TJthm&n.1 The latter, after a fierce struggle,

1 We may compare with this the criticism of this man in Saif.
13

98 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

had to yield to the superior force ; the others dis-
persed, and Muhammad b. Abl Bakr fled
without any following and took hiding in a ruin.
There he was discovered by Ibn Hudaij, drag-
ged forth and killed without resistance. After-
wards he was wrapped in an ass's skin and
burnt. From that time his sister Aisha could
never eat roasted flesh. Cf. Tab., 3, 368.

W&qidi (8406 f.) has another version. Amr
marched out with 4,000 men, amongst them
Mu&wia b. Hudaij, — who, therefore, was not
then in Egypt — and Abu'l A* war. In the battle
near the dam1 Kin&na and Muhammad fled
and took refuge with Jabaia b. Masrftq. His
hiding-place was betrayed ; Ibn Hudaij spotted
it. He came out and fought till he fell. This
was in Safar, 38.

The end of Muhammad is more romantic in
AbA Mikhnaf than in W&qidt ; it has a slight
resemblance to the fate of the other Muhmamad
(b. Abt Hudhaifa), who according to Maqrizi 2
was killed like an ass, and at his death also,
according to Ibn Kalbl, asses play a part. We
need not decide between them ; we can again see
how unreliable is the tradition about this period.

4. Since Siffln, Alfs position had not im-
proved. In Iraq the opposition of the Khaw&rij

1 Musannat. Ma&ftdi, 4, 422 calls the place Kum Sharlk. This is
a confusion, cf. YaqAt, 4330.

* Vloten, Keoherches, p. 68 (in the Verhandl, der Amsterdam.
Akadeinie, 1894, I^etterkunde 1, 3).

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 99

against him was increasing. With few excep-
tions, such as Abu'l Aswad ad Du'ilS, the Basrians
were luke-warm. The Kufaites certainly stood
by him in spirit, but not with all their strength ;
there were amongst them many neutrals or
followers of UthmAn, some of whom went over
to Mu&wia. The weakness of his position in the
centre naturally had its effect upon the peri-
phery. As early as the year 37, even before
Khirrlt's rebellion, the Arabs in Bahrain had kept
the tax for themselves and many had returned to
Christianity. The Iranian provinces were dis-
contented and lax in their adherence.1 It is
almost surprising that they did not then contrive
to throw off the foreign yoke and expel the
Arabian garrisons altogether. After Malik al
Ashtar's death All's twobest men were Qais b. Sa'd
and Zi&d b. Abihi ; Ibn Abbfts, to whom he had
entrusted Basia, proved useless and unreliable.

All rightly felt his worst loss to be the tak-
ing of Egypt by Amr. This left Mu&wia's
hands free. He at once made himself secure
from the Romans by purchasing a truce from
Constantine at the price of a yearly tri-
bute. Arab tradition only mentions this inci-
dentally.2 We learn from Theophanes that it

1 Khuras&n, Baladh.,408 f. Tab., 1, 3249f., 3389f. ; Adharbaijan and
Kai, 3254 ; Fars, 3245, 3393, 3429, 3449 ; Ahwaz, 3429.

• Baladh., 159, 1 ; 160, 8. DMZ., 1875, p. 96. Of. the anecdote in Tab.,
2, 211 ; Dinaw., 168, which, however, in MasAd!, 6, 224 is told of Abdul-
malik.

100 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

took place A.M. 6150 (Sel. 969= A.H. 38-39).1
But Muawia did not risk an organised attack
upon Ali ; he contented himself with harassing
him here and there. In A.H. 38 he sent Ibn
Hadrami to Basra to rouse the Tamlm to rebel-
lion, but Ziad b. Abihi, at that time deputy
prefect for Ibn Abbas, sought the protection of
the Azd, and they stamped out the fire and
killed Ibn Hadrami, who was abandoned by the
majority of the 1 amim. Such is the account of
MadMni in Tab., 15 3414 ff. He also tells in
Tab., 3444 ff., according to 'Awana, about expedi-
tions undertaken by the Syrians in the year 39
against the Iraqites, viz., those of Nu'm&n b.
Bashir to Ain Tamr, Sufyan b. Auf to Hit and
Anb&r, Abdullah b. Mas'ada al-Eazari to Taima,
and Dahhak b. Qais to Qutqutana.2 They were
apparently merely roving expeditions, in which
the Syrians made off with the spoil and were
pursued, arid once in a while overtaken, by the
Kufaites.

In Agh., 15, 45 f. ; Yaqubi, 2, 231 the well-
known expedition of Busr b. Art&t into the Hij&z
and the Yemen is connected with these raids.
BakkM, also, in Tab., 1, 3450 (quoting 'Awana)
places it at the end of the time of Ali, stating

1 I have dealt with the connection of the years of the world with
the Syrian Seleucid years in the Gottinger Nachrichten, 1901, pp. 414 ff,

9 Of. Yaqubt, 2, 228, 6. 229, 3. 230, 9. Agh. 15, 45 f.— Aba Ma'shar
and Wilqidt in Tabari, 1, 3447 say that even Mu&wia himself went out
in A.H. 39, but only went as far as the Tigris and then turned back.

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 101

that Jaria b. Qud&ma on his march against
Busr heard of the murder of Ali, According
to Wi\qidi in Tab., 2, 22 this expedition did not
take place till A.H. 42, after All's death,

In Tab., I, 3453, according to Ibn Ishftq,1
BakkM reports a truce which was agreed upon
between Ali and Mu&wia in A.H. 40, after a some-
what lengthy correspondence, but this truce can
only have been of short duration, for at the
beginning of 40 Muawia assumed in Jerusalem
the title of Khalifa, and made the Syrians pay
homage to him. This was a fresh challenge to
Ali, who ans \vered it by preparing a great cam-
paign against the Syrians, but the undertaking
was prevented by his murder. The homage paid
to Muawia in Jerusalem is attested through
Noldeke's Syrian. He places after each other
two independent narratives of the same event.
"In the year 971 Sel. many Arabs gathered in
Jerusalem and made Muawia king ; he went up
to Golgotha, sat down there and prayed, then
proceeded to Gethsemane, and then went down
to the grave of Saint Mary, where he prayed

again.53 "In the month of July, 971, the

Emirs and many Arabs gathered and paid
homage to Mu&wia. The command went forth
that in all parts of his territory he should be

1 So it is to be read here for Abti Ishfiq, for in the biography of the
Prophet Bakka! is tho intermediate between Ibn Hisham and Ibn
Ishaq.

102 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

proclaimed king.1 He wore no crown, as did
the kings of the world heretofore, but he es-
tablished his throne in Damascus and would
not go to the residence of Milhammad
(Medina.)3' July, 971 Sel. (660 A.D.) begins on
the 16th Safar, 40 A.H. According to Masrftql
also, in Tab., 2, 4 f. (cf. 1, 3456) the Syrians did
homage to Mu&wia in Jerusalem in A.H. 40 ;
but it is false to say that that did not take place
till after All's death. It is remarkable that
Muawia waited so long before laying claim to the
Khalifate, According to the Continuatio Isidori
Byz. Arab., par. 25 (ed. Mommsen) he lived
five years " civiliter" i.e., as a " civis" namely,
from 36 to 40, and then 20 years more as ruler.

The Syrian also asserts that All, before his
death, had meant to march once more against
Mu&wia. The information is put under a wrong
year (969 instead of 971 or 972 Sel.), but is
in itself correct. Yaqftbi, 2, 235, 15 ; 238, 20,
says the same. General tradition has it that All,
at the time of his death, had at his disposal an
army of 40,000 men which was eager to march
against the Syrians, — who else could have
equipped it, and to what end, if not against
the Syrians ?

The murderous assault upon All took place

1 The word not understood by Ndldeke beside Qvvas is
whence probably is derived the Sjrian "qalles " (to acclaim).

A

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 103

on Friday, 15th Ramad&n, 40, in the mosque of

Kufa (K&mil, 553, 9). He died on the following

Sunday, 24th January, 661. These dates of

W&qidi in Tab., 1, 3469 ; 2, 18, are confirmed by

the specified days of the week, and the varying

ones refuted. The murderer, Ibn Muljam, of

Murftd, or more precisely of Taj Ah (Kamil, 553,

17), was a Kh&rijite. The Khaw&rij proudly call

him, in Tab., 2, 18, "our brother of Murad."

Verses of his tribal companion, Ibn Maiyas in

Tab., 1, 3466, testify that he was incited to the

murder by a woman, Qatam, who made it the

condition of his winning her as his bride that he

should take vengeance upon All for Nahraw&n.

This rules out the account which can only

artificially be made to harmonise, viz., that he

was one of those Kh&rijites who had committed

the murder under an oath taken in Mecca to rid

the congregation of Muhammad in one day of

the three tyrants, Ali, Muawia and Amr. A

private oath taken thus by three persons is not

even in keeping with the usages of the oldest

Khaw&rij, as Ibn Athir has already remarked.1

Abu Jl Aswad's insinuation that Mu&wia hired

the murderer has never found the slightest

credence even with his foes, though undoubtedly

the murder was to his advantage, for by that

1 Ifc is not to be denied that outrages took place even against
Muftwia and Amr, but the combination is arbitrary, as if the outrages
were committed by agreement a tempo.

104 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

#

alone he won the kingdom. In Tab., 2, 3 Hasan
b. All reproaches the Kufaites with having killed
his father, and the Khalifa Mansftr expresses
himself similarly in Tab., 3, 431. From this it
appears that Ibn Muljam and Qat&m were at
home in Kufa. Of. Tab., 1, 3456 ff. ; 3465 fl. ;
Yaqftbl, 2, 251 f . ; Kft.mil, 546 ff. ; 583.

5. Mu&wia, on his part, now became the
aggressor (Yaqftbl, 2, 255). He advanced
against Iraq by the usual army route through
Mesopotamia, and pitched his camp near Maskin
on the Tigris boundary of Mosul towards the
Saw&d, .but he did not arrive there till some
time after All's death. Meantime turbulent
movements were taking place against Hasan,
All's son and successor. He had no wish for
war although he had at his back 40,000 men
eager to fight, and after six months took the
opportunity of abdicating the sovereignty and
becoming reconciled with Mu&wia. This general
summary is authenticated, but the exact course
of affairs after All's murder is related with
confusion and incompleteness.

The following is Zuhri's version. All had
entrusted Qais b. Sa'd with the leadership of the
army, and promised him as a reward the province
of Adharbaij&n, from which Ash'ath was to be
deposed, and Qais zealously carried on the
campaign. But Hasan wanted to make the
best terms he could with Mu&wia. He deposed

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 105

Qais because he opposed him *in this, and ptit
Abdullah Ibn Abb&s in his place (Tab., 2, 1. Of.
1, 3392). He had already made the Kufaites
suspicious by his ambiguous behaviour at the
paying of homage, and they decided that he
was not the man for them. Not long after he
had a proof of their feelings towards him by a
lance- thrust which he received on an occasion
not very closely specified. Thereupon he began
negotiations with Mu&wia, renounced the rule
for a large sum of money, and was sorry after-
wards that he had not demanded twice as much
(2, 55). Even before him, Ibn Abb&s was also
treating with Mu&wia and left the army in the
lurch. Thereupon the army again chose Qais
as their leader, with the commission to carry
on the war until the adherents of All were
guaranteed amnesty and security for their
belongings and their life. This he easily gained
from Mu&wia to whom it meant a good deal to
win him over ; but he did not take the money
that was offered to himself, and made no
dealings for his own hand.

Bakk&i, from 'Aw&na,1 in Tab., 2, 2-4 has a
different version. Qais had not the command
of the whole army, but only of the vanguard or
shurta of 12,000 men, which he retained even

1 The beginning of 'Anna's report is omitted and replaced by
another, which is, however, said to agree with fchat of 'Awana,

14

106 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

after Alt's death. Hasan himself, with the main
army, advanced to Mad&in and sent on Qais
with the vanguard to meet Mu&wia (in Maskin).
Suddenly in the camp of Mad&in the cry arose,
" Qais has fallen, flee from hence ! " There-
upon Hasan's tent was plundered and he took
refuge in the white castle, from which, in spite
of the protests of his brother, Husain, he opened
communications with Mu&wia and got from
him what he demanded, — all the money in the
treasury of Kufa, the year's revenue of Dftr&b-
jard, and the promise that his father All should
not he reviled from the pulpit in his presence.1

Yaqftbi, 2, 254 f. gives still another account.
Hasan sent Ubaidull&h b. Abb&s with 12,000
men against Mu&wia, and along with him he
sent, as an adviser, Qais, by whose council he
was to be guided. Mu&wia tried in vain to bribe
Qais, but only succeeded by a bribe of a million
in gaining over Ubaidull&h, who went over to
him with 8,000 men. Hasan was with the main
army in Mad&in, and MMwia sent Mughtra
and other mediators to him. These, on leaving
him, spread the story abroad in the camp that
he had declared himself ready for peace, where-
upon his own warriors fell upon him and

1 In some places in Tabari alterations are found in these two
veraions. Thus in 1, 8 f. and 7, 16 : the 40,000 men are not the Shurta
bnfc the whole army. According to Zuhrl, Qais as well as Ibn Abba's
has command of the whole.

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 107

plundered his tents. He fled on horse-back to
the castle in SftMt, but was roughly handled by
Jarr&h b. Sin&n (alias b. Qabisa) al Asadl and
wounded by a lance-thrust. Exhausted by loss
of blood, he was brought back to Mad&in and
lay there a considerable time seriously ill.
Meanwhile his adherents deserted him, and
Mu&wia seized Iraq, and in the end nothing was
left to him but to abdicate. Dlnawart's account
is similar, with a few differences (230 f). He says
the Yemen and Rabia of Kufa had saved
Hasan in Sab&t out of the hands of the Mudar
of Kufa.

On the whole 'Aw&na and Yaqftbl are agreed
against Zuhrl, whose pragmatism is not clear.
A few variations which occur cannot be explain-
ed. The lance-thrust, for example, is partly
separate from the plundering of the tent in
time and place, and partly connected with it.
Tendency is responsible for other variations.
In Yaqftbt and Dlnawari also there is the
attempt to palliate Hasan at the expense of the
Kufaites (Din., 242, 15) ; Zuhri shows him in
the most unfavourable light, but the greatest
difference due to tendency is A propos of the
behaviour of Abdull&h b. Abb&s, the ancestor
of the Abbasid dynasty. Under the Abbasid
sway it was dangerous to speak tne truth about
this holy man ; the temptation at least was
either to gloss over the part he played or to

108 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS

leave him out altogether.1 According to
Zuhri, the oldest traditionist, who died before
the time of the Abbasids, Abdullah b. Abb&s
got an inkling of Hasan's intention to make
peace, anticipated him and from Mu&wia secured
for himself the moneys which he had seized
•upon. He then left the Iraqite army in the
lurch, and betook himself secretly under an
escort to the Syrian camp. 'Aw&na says nothing

1 According to Saif (Skizzen, 6, 144) the confidant of All in Medina
had already been Abdullah Ibn Abbas, who always gave him the right
counsel but did not always get it carried oat. He then became statt-
holder of Basra, and as such brought reinforcements to AU (Tab., 1,
3256. 3370). According to Abu Mikhnaf he distinguished himself at
Sifftn and commanded the left wing of the army of Iraq (3285. 89).
Alt wanted him to be a delegate to the arbitration court (3233), and
in spite of being thwarted in this, sent him to Duma and corresponded
with him only (3354), while he ignored Abu Musa. But according to
Abu Ma'shar (3273, 16) and Yaqubt (2, 254, 3) he led the Hajj in
A.H. 36 (as in A.H. 35) and so could certainly not take part in the battle
of Siffln. This leading of the festival does not suit Madaint, and he
prefers to assert (3448) that according to Abu Ma'shar. Abdullah never
made the pilgrimage in Alt's life-time. In A.H. 38 he betook himself
from Basra to Alt at Kufa, to console his dear friend by his presence
for the', loss of Egypt, Not till he was compelled by disorders in
Fare did he return to Basra, and send Ziad to Fars. This is Mad lint's
account in Tab., 1, 3414. 30. 43. Abu Mikhnaf a account in Tab., 3412.
49 differs. According to him Abdullah consoled Alt in a letter from
Basra and it was Alt, and not he, who sent Ziad to Fars. He comes
on the scene again when Muawia wanted to force the chiefs of the
aristocracy of Medina to do homage to his son, YazCd. According to
Madaint (Tab., 2, 175) five men refused to do homage, amongst whom
was Abdullah Ibn Abbas. But this heroic opposition to the tyrant
produced no result. He must have felt it bitterly that Muawia and
Taztd utterly ignored him. In the same way, too, most of the tradi-
tionisfcs on this occasion ignore him.

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 109

about this. Instead of the famous Abdullah,
Yaq&bl makes it UbaiduMh b. Abb&s, his
younger brother.

Mad&inl is already acquainted with the dis-
pute of the traditionists as to whether it is
AbduMh or Ubaidullah who went over to
Muawia under Hasan (Tab., 1, 3456. Of. 3453),
so it is not merely a question of variants of
the copyists.1 He decides for Ubaidullah, as
also do Umar b. Shabba (1, 3453 fit.) and Bal&-
dhurl (DMZ., 1884, 392 f.). Now Ubaidull&h
was stattholder of the Yemen when Busr b.
Art&t undertook his expedition thither. His
two boys fell into the hands of Busr and were
slaughtered, which caused their mother to lose
her reason. According to W&qidi this expedi-
tion took place in the year 42. At that time
Ubaidullah was still in the Yemen at war with
Mu&wia, and so could not have gone over to him
a year or two before. W&qidi, in any case,
can certainly not have known of any such
submission. 'Aw&na has it that the expedition
took place in the second half of the year 40,
but it is incredible that Ubaidullah should have
been in such a hurry to make terms with
the murderer of his sons. Besides, it is far
easier to find a motive for Ubaidull&h's being

1 This is the opinion of de Goeje, DMZ., 1884, 393, who on the basis
of this supposition wishes to read Ubaidulldh instead of AbdullAh in
Tab., 2, 2 j 7} 11. C/. van Vloten, Opkomst der Abbasiden, p. 12, n. 1.

110 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

substituted for Abdull&h than for the opposite
procedure. The founder of the dynasty under
which Mad&inl lived and to which he was
devoted, must not suffer the disgrace of being
said to have been the first to make a compact
with the godless Umaiy ids; his brother Ubaidul-
l&h, on the other hand, might be sacrificed.

Moreover, even so, Abdullah is only partial-
ly cleared by substituting his brother. The
moneys which, according to Zuhrl, he seized
and which Mu&wia let him have, were moneys
out of the state-treasury of Basra, — just as the
5 million granted to Hasan were the contents
of the state-treasury of Kufa. This is con-
firmed by Ab& Ubaida in Tab., 1, 3456. He
agrees with Zuhrl that after All's death Abdul-
l&h went from Basra to Hasan and on that occa-
sion took with him money from the state-
treasury. The palliation is certainly extended
that it was no more than he could claim for his
salary, but it is remarkable that Mad&inl, Umar
b. Shabba and Bal&dhurl do not deny either
that Abdullah made off with the state-treasure
of Basra. They only mention that he did so
under All, soon after the battle of Nahraw&n
(DMZ., 1884, 392), and that it had no connec-
tion with his going over to Mu&wia.1 This makes

1 The " rescue " of the state-moneys was not considered so bad,
since it was quite the custom (Tab., 2, 752; 872), but on the other hand
the treating with Ma&wia was unpardonable.

ALI AND THE FIRST CIVIL WAR 111

the treason twofold. Sons of Abb&s with very
similar names twice, in close succession, shame*
fully forsook their post, and on this occasion
helped themselves to large sums of money.
Still it is more probable that it only happened
once; so Zuhri is still right in saying that
Abdullah, and not Ubaidull&h, was the confidant
of Hasan, as he was before of All, and that he
let himself be bought over by Mu&wia even
before Hasan did. Even in Mad&inl we find
him with Ali in the year 39, but after the
peace-terms we find him at once in the circle
of Mu&wia (Tab., 2, 11). § The Jam&a under
Mu&wia,5 i.e., the uniting of the congregation
of Muhammad under one sceptre, took place
in the first half of the year 41, in the summer
of 661 A. D. Accounts vary concerning the
exact date. According to Elias Nisibenus, Hasan
abdicated in favour of Mu&wia on Monday,
21 Rabl I, 41, i.e., Monday 26th July, 661.
W&qidi says in Tab., 2, 9 that Mu&wia marched
into Kufa, in R/abt II, 41 (August, 661). An
unknown tradition states (Tab., 2, 9) that the
peace was concluded in Rabi II, but Mu&wia
did not enter Kufa till the beginning of Jum&-
d& I. Mad&int reports that he made his en-
trance either on the 25th Rabl I or the 25th
Jum&d& I (2, 7) but was still in Kufa in
Rajab, since he corresponded from there with
Busr in Basra, and Busr came there in Rajab

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

and stayed six months (2, 12). But in Jutn&d£
I, 41, he had already established Mughlra b.
Shu'ba as his stattholder in Kufa (2, 111 ; 114).

CHAPTER III.

THE SUFYANIDS AND THE SECOND ClVIL WAR.

During his whole reign Mu&wia b. Abl
Sufyan carried on the war against the Romans
both on sea and land more zealously and con-
tinuously than any of his successors, and twice
he stretched out his hand against the enemy's
capital itself.1 On the other hand he left the
task of establishing his authority in conquered
Iraq to his Stattholders in Kufa and Basra.
The tradition preserved to us turns most
attention to them and relates more of Mughira
and Zi&d than of Mu&wia himself, just as it
makes Mu&wia's alter ego Abdulmalik retire into
the background in favour of Hajj&j. These
three famous Stattholders were, all of them,
Thaqidtes from T&if, the high and beautifully
situated sister-city of Mecca, which through
Islam rose into importance alongside of Mecca
and Medina, and as a town occupied a certain
privileged position over the tribes, as was already
apparent on the occasion of the Eidda in A.H.
11. Unlike the Ans&r, the Thaqlf had a firm and

1 For this cf. the GSttinger Nachrichten, 1901, pp.414 ff., whore
the attempts of the Umaiyids against the Romans are collected

15

1U ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

long-standing alliance with the ruling Quraish,
especially the Umaiya who had close relations
with TMf and owned property there. They had
the reputation of being very clever, l a reputa-
tion which they preserved, and in the time of
the Umaiyids they supplied a superb galaxy of
talented men. Mukht&r and Muhammad b.
Q&sim belonged to them, and many other promi-
nent men besides.

Mughira b. Shu'ba, whom Mu&wia set over
Kufa in A.H. 41 (Tab., 2, lit ; 111 ; 11*), had
already experienced a turbulent life. Tradi-
tion sketches a vivid picture of the much-
tempted, unscrupulous man. He was of tall,
powerful build ; he lacked one eye and his front
teeth ; he had a large head, projecting lips and
reddish hair, afterwards dyed black, which
stood up in four stiff " horns." 2 On account
of a base murder committed upon a sleeping
comrade, he was, as a young man, expelled to
Medina before the year 8. Even to criminals
like this Islam opened a career and blotted out
their past. Circumstances having made a new
man of him, he retained his old profitable traits,

1 When Muhammad besieged Taif in A.E. 8 the Fazarite Uyaina
joined his army, hoping when the town was taken that he would win
a prisoner of war for his wife, so as to have a clever son, for he him-
self could not transmit any cleverness.

9 The beginning of the article upon him in the Kit&b al Agh&nt
is missing in the Bulaq edition, but is to be found in a Munich MS.,
from which I have had it printed in the DMZ., 1896,

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 115

and approached the Prophet, who was able to
make use of him. In the year 9 he was com-
missioned to destroy the heathen sanctuary in
his native town, on which occasion he also
removed the rich contents of the treasury-cellar.
He had an exact knowledge of the place, for
he belonged to the family who had the office of
guardian at the temple. At the Prophet's burial
he threw his ring into the grave shortly before
it was closed, or at least so he asserted, in order
to found upon this the claim that he had been
last in contact with the holy man. From that
time onwards he continued his shameless pursuit
of power, and tried to make it appear that he
belonged to the leading aristocracy of Islam.
Uninvited, he thrust himself into important
affairs of state, as, for instance, into the Shftr&
of Umar and the arbitration-court of Duma,
and though turned out he always came calmly
back the next time. Bold and God-fearing as
he was, he understood excellently well how to
flaunt Islam before the great men of Persia.
The r61e he preferred as being most congenial to
him was that of messenger and mediator, and
for this his knowledge of Persian stood him in
good stead (Tab., 1, 2560). He first attained
the office he sought in Basra. He had come
there with the first Stattholder, Utba b. Ghaz-
w&n, whose wife came from T&if, and after his
death he succeeded him. He is said to have

116 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

established the Diwdn (tax-court) in Basra, and
with it to have set the pattern to all the others.
He is said, also, to have slain the Failk&n of
Izqubadh * and to have conquered Mais£n and
even Ahw&z. His insatiable inclination for
women led to his fall. He was deposed for
shameless adultery in A.H. 17, although, by the
interposition of Umar, so strict in other matters,
the sentence of punishment resolved itself into
a comedy. Still, his day was not yet over. He
distinguished himself at Nihawand, and imme-
diately after, in A.H. 21, he came to Kufa as the
successor of Ammar b. Yaslr. It was under his
Stattholdership at that time that the Kufaite
conquests in Media and Adharbaij&n were
made. His slave, Abu Lulua, whom he sent to
Medina and caused to work there as a mechanic,
was the murderer of the Khalifa Umar. Under
Uthm&n he fell into the back-ground ; he belong-
ed neither to the Umaiyids, who now got all
the official posts, nor to the intimates of the
Prophet who formed the opposition. He took
no part in the revolution against Uthm&n, but
as a result of it he came into prominence again.
He is said to have advised All to recognise
Mu&wia as Stattholder of Syria, and when the
latter did not follow his advice, he left him and
joined Mu&wia. In the latter's name he forged

1 Marquart, Eranschahr, p. 41, thinks this the proper pronuncia-
tion of Abarquk&dh or Abaaqu'bddh.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 117

a commission for himself to lead the Hajj of
the year 40. Muawia knew the value of such
a colleague, and soon after the conquest of Iraq
bestowed upon him once more his old post in
Kufa.

Now, as an aged man, he had, after a some-
what trouhlous past, reached the haven in -vhich
he thought to remain. His endeavour was, as
Stattholder, not to give offence either to those
above or to those below him. His attitude to-
wards Muawia was as distant as towards the
fluctuations of the Kufaite parties, and he made
no secret of it either (Tab., 2, 38). Such at
least is Abu Mikhnaf's description of him in his
narratives about Mustaurid and Hujr b. Adi,
which is certainly a true one.1 His whole
policy was to keep himself in his post, and he
succeeded. By stratagem he managed to anti-
cipate occasional impulses of the ruler to depose
him (2, 7lf.; I73f, ; 208f.). He was easily a
match for the Khaw&rij under Mustaurid, as the
Kufaites themselves lost no time in relieving
him of them, but the Khaw&rij were not of
much importance in Kufa. The overwhelming
majority of the Kufaites adhered to All as the
champion of the political independence of Iraq,
and in this sense they were of the same mind as
the Shlites. Nor did they make any secret of

1 Chawarig (Abhh. der Qottinger Societat, 1901, V, 2) pp. 19 ff.
Shia (in the same Vol.), pp. 56 f.

118 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

it, and some were bold enough to utter provok-
ing speeches in public, but Mughira let them
alone. Instead of combating the beginnings of
the evil he had a certain satisfaction in fore-
seeing their consequences, since it was certain
that be would not live to experience them. His
idea was to save his soul, and to shift on to his
successors the odium of doing what was part of
his office.1 The Kufaites were naturally quite
pleased with this ; they found afterwards that
they never again had such a good Stattholder
(2, 112). He made his way by lying and reaped
the benefits of it till his end. As to the date of
his death accounts vary between the years 49
and 51 ; of. Tab., 2, 86 f. ; 114; Agh., 14, 148.
When Iraq had submitted to him, Mu&wia
sent first the commander-in-chief Busr b. Abi
Art&t to Basra to quell the rising of Humr&n
b. Ab&n. After restoring peace he went off
with his army and, according to W&qidi (2, 22),
only then marched into the Hijaz and the
Yemen. The first real Stattholder whom Muawia
appointed in Basra (at the end of 41) was the
Umaiyid AbduMh Ibn Amir, who had held the
office already for several years under Uthm&n.
In Basra it was the tribes and not the authorities
who had the power in their hands, and as they

1 This disposition he shared with many other Stattholders of this
period, Ibn 'Amir, 2, 67 ; Waltd b. Utba, 2, 219 : Nu'man b. Bashtr,
2, 289 : and Babba, 3, 451 ; 465 f.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 119

were not united and always intent upon never
foregoing any advantage, we can imagine the
consequences. In Kufa the public safety suffered
little under the political and religious party
agitation ; in Basra robbery and murder on the
streets were common. This was the inheritance
left by Ibn Abbas, but Ibn 'Amir did not want
to take vigorous measures. Like old Mughlra
he thought he would not sacrifice his soul's
salvation merely to establish the government.
He disliked cutting off any robber's hand:
" How could I look his father or brother in the
face P " he would say . At last this was too
much for Muawia and he begged him, in all
friendship, to give up his office, allowing him,
in return, to keep what he had annexed of the
state-moneys, and giving him his daughter to
wife, so that he was at the same time his son-in-law
and his father-in-law.1 Ibn 'Amir's successor was
an Azdite, but he was destined only to prepare the
way for Ziad, who was at that time already select-
ed for the office, and he had to leave again after
four months. This is the account according to
Madaini in Tabarl, 2,11 ff. ; 15 f. ; 67 f . ; 69 ff.

In Tabarl most of the information about
Ziad is supplied by Mad&ini also. Like Mughira,
whose protege he was, he belonged to the Thaqi-
fites who had settled in Basra just at the

* Jbn Amir was the father-in-law of MuSwia'a gon Yazld.

120 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

foundation of the town, and in fact to the
family Ab&bakra, which was there prosperous
and highly esteemed, being extensive land-owners
(Tab., 2,12). 1 Of humble origin, he was called
after his mother Sumaiya because his father was
unknown. Islam opened the world to him also.
At the age of 14 he became divider of the spoil or
account-keeper for the army of Basra, because he
was able to write, for in order to count, one had to
be able to write. Even then the Khalifa Umar is
said to have taken notice of his unusual worth,
and under Alt he was a prominent personality
in Basra, As the representative of the absent
Stallholder he had there to deal with the rising
of the Tarnim instigated by Mu&wia. The Azd
assisted him and he was always grateful to them
(2,80). He was next sent by All to Ears to
keep the doubtful province in order and obedience,
a task which he performed brilliantly and
without using violence. After All's death he
established himself in his stronghold at Istakhr,
and of all the officials of All he defied Muawia
longest. Busr had to threaten him with the
murder of his three boys who had been left in
Basra if he did not appear. He refused, but
the children were snatched from the executioner
at the last moment by a counter-order of
Mu&wia, which Abftbakra, after a wild ride to

1 For the character of this family, cf. the spiteful account of
Tab., 2,801, and also B, gisham, $74, 17 Schoiioji.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 121

Kufa and back, managed to gain and to deliver
just in time.1 Mughtra was commissioned to
seize the treasures of Zi&d which were deposited
in Basra, but, naturally, he could not find them,
for one Thaqifite would not peck out the eyes
of another. He interposed, however, to induce
Zi&d to cease his opposition and give in. This
was in the year 42. Mu&wia winked at the fact
that at the division of the state-moneys of Ears
which they effected between them, he was
cheated, though he saw through the deceit.
It was a deal between brothers who after all
had a mutual understanding, and both profited
considerably from it.

Mu&wia put the finishing touch to the
situation by legitimising the son of Sumaiya
and recognising him as the son of his own
father, Abu Sufy&n, so as to bind him in this
way absolutely to himself and to his family.
It was a great scandal, which Tabarl does not
relate, and dates it only as a supposititious event,
( 2,69 f. Of. 3, 477 f. ). The other Umaiyids and
Mu&wia's own son Yazld were not much edified
by it and for a considerable time stood in strain-
ed relations with the bastard, who perhaps was
not even that. The well-known and often-quoted
satirical verses on his adoption do not originate

1 The story is indeed a legend, but it does not need to be improved
upon in A. M tiller's account ( Islam, 1, 337 ), that the «ons of Ziad
had raised a rebellion in Basra and were arrested for that? reason ;
they were too young for that.

16

122 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

from the strolling singer Ibn Mufarrigh, though
he too was the author of some, but from an
Umaiyid, Abdurrahman, the brother of the
succeeding Khalifa, Marw&n b. Hakam (2,19i).
Mu&wia had first assigned Kufa to Zi&d as a
place of residence, where he was under the
mild supervision of Mughira, who adopted a
fatherly role towards him, and he frequented
the latter's house and paid court to his young wife.
Then Mu&wia sent for him to Damascus and
there, apparently, promoted him to be his
brother. When Ziad returned from there to
Kufa, Mughira was seized with the apprehension
that in him (Zi&d) he bad been rearing his own
successor, but very soon a commission came
from Damacus appointing Zi&d Stattholder of
Basra and the provinces of the East belonging
to it. At the end of llabi II, or the beginning
of JumM& I, of the year 45 he came to Basra
and inducted himself with a celebrated pulpit
speech in which he started at once upon his
programme without beating about the bush.
Hence the speech was called " the one without
a preface." '* Ye are putting relationship before
religion," he said ; " Ye are excusing and
sheltering your criminals, and tearing down the
protecting laws sanctified by Islam. Beware of
prowling by night ; I will kill every one who is
found at night in the streets. Beware of the
arbitrary summons of relationship ; I will cut

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 12&

out the tongue of every one who raises the cry.
Whoever pushes anyone into the water, whoever
sets fire to another's house, whoever breaks into
a house, whoever opens a grave, him will I
punish for it. I make every family responsible
for those belonging to it. Hatred towards
myself I do not punish, but only crime. Many
who are terrified at my coming will be glad of
my presence, and many who are building their
hopes upon it will be undeceived. I rule you
with the authority of God and care for your
maintenance out of the wealth of God.1 From
you I demand obedience, and ye can demand
from me justice. In whatsoever I fall short,
three things there are in which I shall not be
lacking : at any time I shall be ready to listen
to anyone ; I shall pay you your pension at the
proper time, and I shall not send you to war
too far away or keep you in the field overlong.
Do not let yourselves be carriedr away by your
hatred and wrath against me ; it would go ill
with you if ye did. Many heads do I see
tottering ; let each man see to it that his own
remains on his shoulders ! "

By a few examples of relentless severity
made at the very beginning, he commanded
their respect, and he succeeded in re-establish-
ing a security never known before, not only in
Basra itself but also in the Iranian provinces,

1 " God " mean e" State " in the theocracy.

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

and even in the Arabian desert. Marvellous
tales are told of this. Even the Khaw&rij in
Basra bowed before him. Except in name part
of them were no better than common robbers
and deserved to be treated as such.1

When Mughira died in A. H. 50 or 51 Zi&d
got his Stattholdership also, and retained his own
post at Basra. In Kufa he had to put in order
the evil inheritance left by Mughira. The Shiites
there, with Hujr b. Adi of Kinda at their head,
stoned his standing representative, Amr b.
Huraith, as he was conducting the public service
in the mosque. He then hastened from Basra to
interfere. Hujr played into his hands by offer-
ing armed resistance along with his adherents
when he was to be arrested, and thereby banning
himself. Ziad mastered him without much
difficulty, and when the matter became serious
the Kufaites themselves helped the representative
of state authority whom they hated, against
their adherents with whom their sympathies
lay, and even signed the indictment against the
imprisoned ringleader. This document was sent
to the Khalifa at Damascus, and six of them were
executed for sedition under arms since they
refused to renounce Ali. But that was not the
end of the matter. The execution of such
prominent men affected them deeplyr- The
tribes considered it a disgrace that they had not

1 Ohawarig, pp. 24 f.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 125

managed to snatch their fellows from the
authority of the state, and the Shiites regarded
Hujr and his companions in suffering as
martyrs.1

Tradition gives a report of some of Zi&d's
measures of administration. He undertook a
great rebuilding of the mosque of Kufa (Tab.,
1, 2492), on which occasion he removed the
gravel from the floor and replaced it by a solid
pavement. According to Baladh., 277, this was
done so as to prevent the flinging of gravel from
the hand after the performance of the prostra-
tions in the service from becoming a custom,
but one should rather imagine that it was done
to prevent the critical observations of the pulpit
speaker from being interrupted by showers of
stones. Another measure was more important,
namely the division of the garrison of Kufa into
four groups, whereby the most different tribes
were united in one group, having at their head
not a tribal chief but a chief elected by the
government.2 In the analogous arrangement
of the Basraites into five groups the tribal
principle, again, is more apparent. We may
perhaps trace a political move in the fact that
he sent a great number of Kufaite and Basraite
families to Khur&s&n and settled them there
(Tab., ?, 81 ; 156; BalMh., 410).

1 Shia, pp. 66 ff.
» Shia, p. 58, n. 1

126 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

He died on Tuesday, 4th Ramadan (23rd
August, 673) aged about 53. As illustrative of his
character there are two anecdotes which have
some value. When, in A.H. 38 or 39, he sought
the protection of the Azd and sounded their
leader as to whether he would he willing to
defend him against an attack of theTamtm, the
decided answer which he received l so delighted
him because of its nawetS that he had the
greatest difficulty in restraining the laughter
which at that moment might have been very
dangerous to him. He told old Mughira's
beautiful young wife, whom he liked very much
and afterwards married, that she might boldly
show herself before him as a harmless relative,
for he was actually Mughira's father, — since one
of his sons bore the same name as the Stattholder
of Kufa. So he does not seem to have been a
man of gloomy sternness. But in his capacity of
regent he allowed no jesting. Still, he was a
tyrant only according to Arab ideas, which
regard any powerful rule as tyranny, especially
when it uses the sword against mutinous subjects.
As to his manner of dealing with the Shia in Kufa
we have the detailed and exact account of AbA
Mikhnaf, who was himself of Shiite persuasion.

1 Tab., 1, 3415. From the Leiden text one cannot make out what
is said to be laughable in the deliverance of Sabira b. Shaiman. The
Qentilic names are there distorted. They may be improved from 3418,
1, and B. Duraid, 150 ; 154,

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 127

His proceedings against them stopped with the
punishment of a few ringleaders who had taken
up arms against him. This makes us regard
with just suspicion occasional vague accounts
of his barbarous persecution of the Shlites in
general (Tab., 2/266; 624). In Basra especially
they had not much to complain of and were
pretty comfortable. Their chief, Sharik b. A'war
al Harithl, held with Ziad, and later with his
son, a position of trust, which shortly before his
death he basely abused (2,248). The Khaw&rij
were more dangerous there. They were of
different species, some of them honourable, pious
people, and some unscrupulous seceders with
murderous instincts, but it was not against the
feelings of the former, but against the crimes
of the latter that Ziad took action. He only
executed a few agitators and malefactors and did
not cause wholesale massacres. Abu Bilal, the
most esteemed man among theKhawarij of Basra,
approved his conduct, while he execrated those
who disgraced the name of the party by indiscri-
minate bloodshed. Contrary accounts must be
regarded as calumniations caused by tendency.

Samura b. Jundab figures as the willing
instrument of Zi&d's alleged cruelty in Basra,
according to Madaini and his pupil Umar b.
Shabba. He was the captain of the Shurta, a
kind of body-guard, and Ziad is said to have
greatly reinforced this standing army in order

128 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

to be able to use it as a basis for his tyranny.
But in Kufa he suppressed the rising of the Shia
not by means of the Shurta, but by calling up
the tribes themselves. As in Fars, so in Iraq
he contrived to be a match for them without
extraordinary means. In the evenings, accord-
ing to old custom, he gathered round him a
circle of notables, upon whom an honorary salary
was settled, and in easy conversation deliberated
with them upon the public concerns. He made
the chiefs of the tribes responsible for the good
conduct of their tribesmen, while the jealousy of
the clans made it possible for him to play them
off against each other. Above all he had the
state-moneys at his disposal, and the control over
the purse which supplied the pensions. He had
also a Shurta at his disposal, but not out of
proportion in strength to those of his predeces-
sors. Besides, every other Stallholder had
command of the same means as he had, only he
knew how to use them to better purpose. He
possessed all the marks of being a regent by the
grace of God ; nothing ever miscarried with him.
The mosque, the forum of Islam, was the chief
scene of his activity and of his success. He told
the people what they were thinking and they
felt convicted ; he announced his measures to
them, and they had no doubt that he would keep
his word. He had the faculty of ruling with
the tongue, and he knew his Arabs, From of

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 129

old they had ever a fine perception of, and an
involuntary respect for, superiority of intellect
when it expressed itself by insight into the
hearts and affairs of men, and by decisive action.
An independent Tamimite noble, H&ritha b.
Badr, paid the most laudatory testimony in
verses to the great Wezir.1 That the poet
Farazdaq h ad the terror of a foolish youth for
him does not detract from him.

In Basra, as in Kufa, the simple task which
had to be performed was the establishment of
the Sultdn, i.e.> the State, the supremacy of the
government. In Basra it was necessary to put
an end to the despotism of the tribes and clans,
whose first principle, in all cases, was to take
the side of their clansmen, and even of their
criminals, not merely against other clans but
also against the government. Here more than
anywhere else the clique-system due to blood-
relationship had gained ground, and this in a
thickly populated town was bound to have
consequences far more insupportable than in
the desert. The regulation of justice and the
peace of the community through which Muham-
mad had freed the Arabs from anarchy, were
called in question. In Kufa the opposition
was more tinged with theocracy ; it was directed
not against the state-supremacy in itself, but

1 78, 10 ; 146, 15. As far aa I know the appellation is firft found
here.

17

180 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

against the right of the existing, i.e. the
Umaiyid, rule. To Zi&d, however, the difference
mattered little. Having once made his peace
with the reigning house, he recognised no
superior other than the one which actually held
the power, and on this basis he stood for the
public order and well-being and for the citizens'
duty of obedience. Even if, according to the
prevailing custom, he did not forget himself,
and laid up for himself large sums of money,
still he did not use his power solely as a means
to plunder the provinces entrusted to him for his
own private ends. He stood above the parties
and clans, had the conscience to feel that he was
the official of the state, and was zealous in the
performance of the duties thereby incumbent
upon him, regardless of the welfare of his
soul and of the Qoran, in which each read
the policy that suited him. Further his
fidelity was acknowledged and requited to his
sons, of whom Ubaidullah b. Zi&d was the most
important.

Other Stattholders in Iraq in Mu£wia's time
were, according to Ab& Ma'sharand Wdqidi, the
following :— over Kufa, Abdullah b. Kh&lid b.
Asld from A.H. 53 ; Dahh£k b. Qais al Fihri
from A.H. 55 ; Abdurrahman b. Umm Hakamatb
Thaqafl A.H. 58 ; and Nu'mfcn b. Bashir al-
Ansfitrl from A.H. 59. Over Basra Samura b.
Jundab alFaz&ri, A.H. 53 ; Abdullah b. Amr b.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 1S1

Ghailan A.H. 54, and Ubaidullah b. ZiM from
A.H. 55. Ubaidullah took severer measures
against the Khaw&rij in Basra than his father,
and even brought upon himself the opposition
of the more moderate. It is from his time that
we have the martyr stories of the party.1

Of the Syrians whom Muawia governed
himself we hear comparatively little. The
common interest in the government united them
to him, for Syria was the ruling land, a fact
which was made evident by its possession of the
central exchequer and by the amount of the
pensions.2 But internally also it differed from
Iraq. Kufa and Basra had no other traditions
but the desert and Islam. Arab armies,
confusedly mustered from different tribes, were
cast up thither through war and had settled as
military colonies. They found themselves
suddenly transferred from primitive conditions
into culture, and into the centre of a great
kingdom, and it is not surprising that they did
not all at once change from Beduin into
rational citizens of a state. It was into Syria
also, in consequence of the Islamic conquest,
that many Arabs now emigrated, especially
Qaisites into the north of the province. But

1 Chawarifc, pp. 25 ff.

* "TVIuiwia moved the chief state treasury (from Kufa) to
Damascus, and raised the pay of the Syrians and lowered that of the
Iraqites." Theoph., A. M. 6151, 6152.

1ft* ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

in the centre the Kalb and the other Qud&a had
the majority, along with some tribes reckoned
as belonging to Azd Sar&t, which had made
their home there for centuries, and had not
comd only through Islam.1 The influence of
the Graeco-Aramaic culture, the Christian
church, and the Roman kingdom under which
they had come had not failed to leave traces
upon them. A regulated state government and
military and political discipline were not new
ideas to them ; they had an old line of princes,
which they had long obeyed, and they transfer-
red their wonted obedience to Mu&wia as the
rightful successor of their former dynasty ; the
right of the Sultan did not require to be
first beaten into them. They recognised the
legitimacy of the existing rule of man and
did not test it by the measure of the Koran and
the theocracy. They followed their Emir where
he led them, because they at heart cared just as
little for Islam as he did. In military affairs
they showed themselves far superior to all the
>ther Arabs, and all the more so because they
were never out of practice, and were systemat-
ically trained by the constant wars against
the Romans. Mu&wia was prudent enough to
keep their right side, although in blood he was

1 They boasted that they were not recent incomers into Syria like
the Umaiya (Hamasa, 059, v, 5).

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 13$

more nearly connected with the Qaisites. The
difference of the tribal groups at that time had
not yet come to mean a venomous opposition of
political parties. He lived in Damascus in the
sphere of the Kalb, not far from the residence
of their former kings. From amongst them he
married a lady of consequence, and intended
that her son Yazid should inherit the kingdom.
According to Arab ideas this was a political
alliance, and so it proved to be. All the Kalb-
ites felt themselves, as it were, brothers-in-law
of the Khalifa and uncles of his successor.1 There
was no question at all of the Arabs in Syria,
their relations, being made inferior to the con-
querors who had pressed in. Besides, their
acceptance of Islam followed very soon and
was half spontaneous, even though it only meant
a transition to the victorious standard of Arab-
ism. It may be presumed that the alliance into
which Mu&wia as Stattholder already entered
with them had also a reflex effect upon his
standing with the non-Arab Syrians who remain-
ed Christians. The opposition between masters
and subjects seems not to have been so harsh in
Syria as it was at first in Iraq. The Muslims
there did not live apart in colonies founded
especially for them, but together with the

1 Nlila, too, was a Kalbite, and possibly the revenge for
had the effect of driving the Kalb into the arms of Muawia.

134 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

children of the land in the old towns of
Damascus, Emessa, Qinnesrin, etc. They even
sometimes went shares in the use of a place of
worship, which then became half church and
half mosque. The Christian traditions of
Palestine and Syria (Nabigha, 1, 21, Ahlw.) were
also held in high esteem by the Muslims ; Syria
was for them, too, the Holy Land, Mu&wia had
himself proclaimed Khalifa in Jerusalem ; after-
wards he prayed at Golgotha and at the grave
of St. Mary. Of course one need not draw too
many conclusions from these facts. He showed
how supercilious and superior he stood in rela-
tion to dogma when the Jacobites and Maronites
brought their religious dispute to be decided by
him. From the Jacobites, who were worsted
in the dispute, he got a fine of 20,000 dinars
and advised them to be at peace. But he had
no deep relation to Islam either, and as a poli-
tician he was tolerant towards his Christian
subjects, and earned their grateful sympathies.
Under his rule they felt at least as well-off as
under the sway of the Romans, as we can see
from the feeling of the traditions originating
from them. Theophanes (A. M. 6170) speaks
of his (TTTovS'ty Twv xPt'crTLava)v, which he showed
by rebuilding for the Edessaites their church
which had been destroyed by an earthquake.
One of his most influential counsellors, Sarjftn
b. Mansftr, whom he also passed on to his

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 185

successors, was a Christian,1 but it is fictitious
that he actually made a Christian Stattholder in
Emessa.2 It is a pity that, instead of becoming
Khalifa, he did not confine himself to Syria and
found there a national kingdom which would
have been more firmly established than the
" nationless " universal rule in the East in
which the Arabs perished. He may possibly
have had that idea but have found the execution
of it impossible, for then he would have had to
renounce Islam and come over to the church,
for at that time Islam did not yet tolerate any
separate kingdoms.

Kevenge for Uthm&n was the title upon
which Mu&wia founded his right of inheritance.
In what sense he undertook it is plain from the
fact that to that end he made an alliance with
Amr b. As, who had made the most venomous
incitations against TJthm&n. Piety was not his
motive, neither did he follow the traditions of
his murdered predecessor. He certainly accept-
ed the general result of the latter's reign, the
rule of the Umaiya, but he did not by any
means, bestow all the rich offices upon the
Umaiyids. He made trials of them, to be sure,

1 Tab., 2,205; 228 j 239. Tanblh (Bibl. Qeogr. Arab., VIII) 306f,,

<• /% * . ^

312. In Theophanes, A.M. 6183, Zcpyios o rov Mayffovp arrjp WMIWI-

is first mentioned under Abdulmalik; of. Tab., 2,837.
Yaqubt, 2,265.

136 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

but generally was not long in deposing them.
Damascus did not become their headquarters,
but Medina continued to be. This town,
hitherto the centre-point of the kingdom, found
itself forced into the reserve, and likewise the
aristocracy who still continued to live there.
As a general thing, Mu&wia left the Stattholder-
ship itself to the TImaiyids, but of what
consequence was Marw&n, formerly the all-
powerful imperial chancellor of Uthm&n, now
as Emir of Medina ! No wonder that he cast
envious looks at his cousin of Damascus who
had so far outstripped him, and that in general
the relations in Medina frowned upon him !
Their sentiments found expression particularly
in the jealousy against Zi&d, as they were afraid
that Mu&wia would, through him, strengthen his
house against the whole family and eventually
give him the succession. He, on his part, tried
to rouse up the different branches of the family
in Medina against each other, and so to sap
their strength (Tab,, 2, 164). His understanding
with the Quraish, too, left in general something
to be desired. He complained, indeed, that it
was because they had deserted him that he
passed them over. Moreover, he stood in
strained relations with the Makhzftm. They had
long been envious of the Umaiya because by
them they were pushed out of the first place,
they had taken in Mecca up till the

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 187

battle of Balr, and he gave them in addition a
special ground for hatred. Abdurrahman, son
of the great Makhzftmid, KMlid b. Walid, and
himself likewise a deserving and highly-esteemed
man, held at Emessa, in central Syria, such an
independent and important position that he
seemed dangerous to the Khalifa. A Christian
physician poisoned him, it was believed, at the
instigation of Mu&wia, and one can imagine
the effect upon the Makhz&m. His relation
to the spiritual nobility of Islam, to the
house of the Prophet, and to the families
of the oldest Companions, as well as to the
Ans&r was naturally one of distrust and
enmity.

IJis prominent Stattholders in the most
important provinces were not Umaiyids, and
with one exception not even Quraishites. He
kept a watch upon those whom he might need
and placed them in his service. He had the
faculty of winning over and retaining those
whom it was expedient for him to have, and
even of making those whom he distrusted work
for him, — as Amr in Egypt, who felt more like
his ally than his official (Dinaw., 236). His
servants and confidants are frequently enumera-
ted ; * they seem to have been mostly homines novi.
With them as his crvp,/3ov\oi he took counsel as

1 Tab., 1, 3272 ; 8860. 2,130 ; 19f ; 206. Agh., 1, 12.

18

188 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

; an example is to be found in
Tab., 2, 136 ft'. They were allowed to presume a
little with him, and in fact did so (2, 144; 185).
Still he did not let the reins slip from his hands,
but he knew how to break them in without
letting them feel the curb. Rude and passionate
scenes never affected him ; he bore himself like
an old Arab Saiyid. God had not granted him
the gift of personal courage, although he unre-
mittingly sent his Syrians into the field against
the Romans, but in all the greater degree
did he possess other qualities of the Saiyid,
the prudent mildness by which he disarmed and
shamed the opposition, slowness to anger, and
the most absolute self-command. As a pattern
of these qualities he figures in innumerable
stories, along with the Tamimite Ahnaf, his
contemporary, whom he highly esteemed. He
was essentially a diplomat and politician, allow-
ing matters to ripen of themselves, and only
now and then assisting their progress, it might
he by the use of a little poison. He made no
denial of his bourgeois origin. He disliked to
have recourse to compulsion, and he did not so

/ \ « / > ^ / i

1 Mat/my Kat 01 <run&ov\ot avrov, Theoph., A.M. 6169; Mavias o rtav

f /

lapctKrjvuv trpuroavn&ov\ost A.M. 6171. Later on this designation

was transmitted, after it had long lost its propriety, even to
the Abbasid Khalifas. In A. M. 6165 appears a strange title,

* •

offctyos. The major- damns of the King of the Kabataei

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 139

much conquer Iraq as buy its submission. If
he could reach his goal by means of money, he
spent it lavishly, but he never spent it in vain,
and it amused hirn to disappoint those who
were counting upon his indiscriminate liberal-
ity, or thought they could cheat him. One of
the oldest traditionists, Sha'bi, heard it told of
him that lie was the most amiable companion,
but his secret thoughts could never be distin-
guished from what he said openly. When listen-
ing to any one he would lean back, cross his
legs and half-shut one eye. In spite of his
corpulence he seemed to the Arabs on public
occasions to command reverence when he had
assumed his black turban and daubed his eyes
with antimony. According to W&qidi, he died
on Thursday in the middle of Rajab, 60, which
would be Thursday, 18th April, 680. Accord-
ing to Elias Nisibenus, the accession of his
successor took place on Friday, 15th Rajab,
but according to AbA Mikhnaf (2,216) on the
1st Rajab. Abft Ma'shar gives the length of his
reign as 19 years and three months : W&qidt
adds on 27 days more. He was buried beside
the small gate of Damascus and his grave,
over which there stood a building, was visited

was called his brother and certain high officials Of the Seleucids were
called their cousins. If there were more than one such brother, the»
there might arise a rank-succession.

HO ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

for centuries. Access to it was given on
Mondays and Thursdays.1

2. The change of government threatened
to cause difficulties, as it always did, but unlike
his predecessors, Mu&wia tried to settle them
in advance. As the only hold he had over
the prominent Arabs was the homage which
they in person paid to him in person, he wanted,
during his life-time, to yoke them with the
^ame obligation towards his son Yazid, as his
successor, but they, naturally without regard
to the Syrians, had hoped to shake off this
yoke at his death. They pretended he was com-
mitting an unheard-of innovation in wishing to
introduce a succession from father to son, such
as existed with the Sasanids and the Byzantines.
According to Arab law the ruling power certain-
ly was passed on as an inheritance within one
tribe or clan, but not directly within one house
from father to son ; according to Islam it was
not a human possession at all to which men
could assert their right as heirs, but in spite of
that the excitement was out of proportion to
the reason alleged for it.2 The privilege of the
Emir to arrange the succession before his death,
held, and even if the son had no right to it, still

1 Masftdt, 6, 14. The poet Kumait fled from the wrath of the
Khalifa Hisham to the grave of Mu&wia. (Agh., 15, 115 ; 117 ; 121.)

* The verses in Maeftdi, 5, 71 recall those of Hutaia against Ah&
Bakr.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 141

he was in no way debarred from it, only, there
apparently had never been a paying of homage
in advance. But they were at the beginnings,
and there was no tradition at all in regard to
this, and no rule of succession.

The common account of Mu&wia's proce-
dure which appears in the version of Weil
and A. Miiller, runs in B. Athlr as follows, —
the first movement to gain the succession for
Yazid was made by Mughlra, precisely with
the malicious intention of enticing Mu&\via into
a trap. He was commissioned to pave the way
in Kufa, and soon after there appeared in
Damascus deputies from Kufa, whom he
had won over by a small bribe, to urge the pay-
ing of homage to Yazld. But Muawia was
cautious, and first enquired of Zi&d in Basra.
The latter was persuaded by Ubaid b. Ka'b
anNumairl to make no opposition, but advised
Yazid, out of regard for public opinion to
moderate a little his penchant for heathen
sport, — an advice which was well received and
also followed. But it was not till after Zi&d's
death that Muawia openly came forward with
his design. First he examined the ground in
Medina, the old capital, which was still regarded
as the proper place for homage-paying, be-
cause there dwelt the grandees of Islam, by
whom it was most desirable that it should be
rendered. The men of Medina approved of

142 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

his idea of providing for the succession, but
when he let it be known to them through
Marw&n that he had chosen his son as successor,
there were disorderly scenes in the mosque.
Protests were made, in particular, by the sons
of the most prominent Companions, Husain b.
All, Abdullah b. Umar, Abdurrahman b. AbA-
bakr, and Abdullah b. Zubair, but Mu&wia did
not care. He sent for men of consequence
from all the provincial capitals to come to
Damascus, and delivered an oration before them
about the rights of rulers and the duty of
subjects in general, and about Yazid's good
qualities in particular. Dahh&k b. Qais alFihrl
and other speakers appointed for the purpose
applauded him, and drew the conclusion which
he refrained from by demanding homage for
Yaztd. Ahnaf of Basra alone voiced far-sighted
scruples, but their effect was paralysed by gold,
and Yazid received the homage of the depu-
tations. Now only the Hij&z remained. Thither
Mu&wia went in person with 1,000 horsemen.
On reaching Medina he began by giving so
great offence to the above-mentioned import-
ant objectors, whose homage was specially
desirable, that they fled to Mecca. He marched
there after them and next tried to win them
over by exceptional friendliness. Not till the
very end, when he was about to set out on his
return home, did he divulge his wishes. He

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 143

tried to explain to them that he was not de-
manding much from them, that Yazid would be
ruler only in name, and that, under his name, it
would, in fact, be they who would have the
real usufruct of the government. For a long
time they were silent, and at last Ibn
Zubair spoke and in the name of all repu-
diated the suggestion of the Khalifa. Thereupon
he said : "At other times, when I speak in the
pulpit, I permit everyone to say against my
speech what he will ; but him who contradicts
me to-day a sword shall silence/' and imme-
diately in their hearing he gave the correspond-
ing command to his servants. Then he entered
the mosque of Mecca and declared : " These
four men, without whom no decision about
the succession can be made, have paid homage
to Yazid ; so do ye also pay homage ! " There-
upon all did so, and the four keeping silence
from fear, thus acquiesced in the falsehood.
Muawia made his way back by Medina and
there also received the homage for Yazid.

This is a clever piece of composition.
Mad&ini also relates that Mughira set on foot
the idea of the homage to Yazid, and Zi&d, upon
the persuasion of Ubaid b. Ka'b, did not oppose
it. In Tab., 2,173 ff. it is put in the same
year as with B. Athir. On the other hand there
is nothing in Tabari about a summoning of
delegates from all the provinces to Mu&wia

H4 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

for the paying of homage to Yazid ; he mentions
(2,196) only one deputation which came from
Basra to pay homage, under the leadership of
Ubaidull&h b. Zi&d, but does not place it
until the year 60, in which Mu&wia died.
This deputation from Basra is afterwards general-
ised and antedated. A transition to it is found
already in Mas&di.1 In the old tradition (and
also in Masftdt) the fact of greatest interest in
which Ibn Athlr's narrative culminates, —
namely, the drastic personal interference of
Mu&wia in the Hij&z, is quite unknown. Only
in Tab., 2,175 (Mad&int) it says that after
Zi&d's death Mu&wia read aloud a document the
purport of which was that in case of his death
he appointed Tazld as his successor, and that all
agreed to it except five men.2 The place,
presumably Damascus, is not mentioned, and
even the time is not precisely stated, for " after
Zi&d's death " is only a formula of transition.
Further, it says in Tabarl, 2,196 that in the year
60 Mu&wia received the homage for Yazld from
the deputies from Basra, and ordered certain
measures to be taken after his death against the
recalcitrant Quraishites. According to 'Aw&na,
he charged Dahh&k b. Qais al-Fihrl and Muslim

1 5, 69. But there the date is not till A.H. 59. For Ans&r read
Ams&r.

* Ibn Abbas is added as the fifth, as he of course could not
possibly be left out ; Mad&int is a loyal adherent of the blessed dynasty

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 146

b. Uqba alMurrl with the execution of these
measures, as Yazid was absent. We may thus
take it that Mu&wia had his plan in his mind a
considerable time and towards the end of his
life tried to carry it through, but in vain as far
as concerned the persons whose assent was the
most important, because according to Islamic
ideas it was they who had the nearest claims to
the Khalifate. There is no mention of any more
than this. It seems not in keeping with the
character of the old man that he should have
put himself at the head of 1,000 horsemen in
time of peace in order first to hustle the four
Quraishites in the Hij&z, then to pamper them,
and lastly to force them and yet, after all, to
make nothing of it, for those who were chiefly
concerned certainly did not take the oath. That
he rode into Mecca with an armed force, and
there, and not in Medina, bad the chief act of
homage performed is extremely unlikely, and
the dramatic speeches and scenes with which the
narrative is adorned do not add to its credi-
bility. The whole thing seems to be a forecast
shadow of the events at the beginning of Yazid's
reign, to which we now proceed.

After Yazid had entered upon the govern-
ment on the 1st Rajab, 60,— so AbA Mikhnaf
relates in Tabarl, 2,216 ff.— he informed the
Stattholder of Medina, Walld b. Utba b. Sufy&n,
by letter of his father's death, adding upon a

146 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

leaf no larger than a mouse's ear the comnmnd
that he was to compel homage from Husain,
Ibn Umar and Ibn Zubair, — these three only
are named. Walld took council with Marw&n
although he was not on very good terms with
him, and the latter recommended him to arrest
at least Husain and Ibn Zubair at once, before
they should hear of the death of Mu&wia. But
Walld did not do so immediately, and the two
managed to escape to Mecca at the end of
Rajab, 60 (beginning of May, 680). Ibn Umar
was not considered dangerous ; it was said of
him that he would only accept the Khalifate if
it were presented to him on a salver. Moreover,
according to W&qidi, 2,222 f., he was at that
time not in Medina at all, and when he returned
he paid homage after he had learnt that every-
body else was doing so. Ibn Abbas did like-
wise; it was the standpoint of the correct
Catholicism. Walid was, of course, soon deposed,
and in his stead there came another Umaiyid
'Amr b. Said b. As, who till then had been in
Mecca. According to W&qidl this happened
in Ramadan, 60 ; in other accounts not till
Dhulqada (Tab., 2,226).

Husain let himself be lured out of his retreat
in Mecca. He was besieged by the Kufaites
begging him to come to them and accept their
homage. Their first messages reached him on
the 10th Ramad&n, and he sent his cousin

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 147

Muslim b. Aqil on in advance to prepare the
way for him. The latter found many adherents
in Kufa, but finding himself compelled to make
a premature attack upon the newly-elected
Stattholder Ubaidull&h b. Zi£d, he was left by
them in the lurch and came to a lamentable end
on the 8th or 9th Dhulhijja. At the same
time, on the 8th Dhulhijja, Husain with his
followers left Mecca, encouraged by Muslim's
first favourable report. He learned, it is true,
on the way about the latter's sad death, but
either could not or would not turn back, and
fell in battle against Kufaite troops at Karbala
on the Euphrates on the 10th Muharram, 61
(LOth October, 680). The attempt at revolution
flickered miserably out, but the martyrdom of
Husain had a great ideal significance and a deep
after-effect upon the Shia.1

Ibn Zubair proved far more dangerous than
Husain. The former was glad to be rid of the
rival whom he could not attack. Yazid was chary
of attacking him in earnest because he kept in
hiding in the holy city of Mecca where fighting
and bloodshed were banned, but the reports of his
conduct towards him are inadequate and varying.

Concerning the year 61 (beginning on 1st
October, 680) in which Amr b. Said was Statt-
holder of Medina,2 Abft Mikhnaf in Tab., 2,395 ff.,

1 Shia, par. 2, pp 61-71.

* The accounts of Abu Mikhnaf, whose chronology is not by any
means his strong point, cannot have more weight than the fixed datee

US ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

relates the following. Ibn Zubair used the fall
of Husain to over-reach the Kufaites as well as
the government and also, in secret, Yazld. His
adherents insisted that he should have homage
paid to him, but he permitted that only in
secret ; in public he figured as the fugitive in
the temple. When Yazid heard of his doings
he vowed he would throw him into chains, but
on second thoughts sent him a silver chain to
put on. When the courier passed through
Medina with it, Marw&n quoted a verse to show
that to accept the chain was a humiliation. Ibn
Zubair heard of this and refused the chain.
His importance in Mecca increased ; even the
people of Medina wrote to him, and after
Husain's death he was regarded as the next
claimant to the ruling power.

According to a tradition traced back to
Zuhrl in Tab., 2,397 f., the chain which was
composed of silver coins strung together, was
delivered by four messengers, amongst whom
were Ibn 'Id&h and Mas'ada. Upon their
father's orders, Marw&n's sons, Abdulmalik and
Abdulaztz went with them from Medina to
Mecca and recited verses before Ibn Zubair
which were to warn him not to comply. He
understood, and being fore-warned answered
with corresponding verses,

of W&qidt, 2,223 ff. and AbA Ma'shar, 2,395. Quatremere is right in
differing from Weil (1,326). All the same, Amr b. Satd m*y not have
immediately followed Walld b. Utba (Dinaw., 243, 2, 3).

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 149

The two messengers mentioned here appear
also in Agh., 1,12, in an account of Wahb b.
Jarir. We may thus conclude that the same
event is in question although it is related quite
differently, and the silver chain, in particular,
is not mentioned at all. Yazid sent Nu'm&n b.
Bashlr al-Ans&rt to Ibn Zubair with ten other
men whose names are given.1 Nu'm&n was to
deal liberally with Ibn Zubair separately. Ibn
'Id&h was annoyed at this collusion of the
Ans&rite and the Muh&jirite,2 and said to Ibn
Zubair that Nu'm&n was indeed their leader,
but that he had no special commission but only
the same one that they all had. Ibn Zubair
replied : " What have I to do with thee ? I am
but a dove of the doves of the sanctuary ; wilt
thou kill such a dove ? " Thereupon the other
bent his bow and aimed at a dove, saying to it :
" Dove, does Yazid drink wine ? Say ' Yes/ and
I will shoot ! " And turning to Ibn Zubair he
continued : " By God, if you do not pay homage,
the horsemen of the Ash'ar will appear, and pay
no heed to the holiness of the place ; not
through them is it desecrated, but through
him who uses it as a cover for his sedition."
The story with the dove in it has not been

1 In 12, 5 read alJudh&mt and asSakfint for alHiz&mt and asSaltilt.

2 He himself and the others were simple Arabs of Bedouin tribes ;
Ansar and Muhajira, the old inhabitants and the Quraishite emigrants
in Medina, are the two classes of the Islamic nobility,

150 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

without its effect upon modern historians. It
is, however, an anecdote, and the motive is
repeated in another form in Tab., 2,430.x Even
the great number of names mentioned offers no
guarantee ; in particular, the name of the leader
of the mission seems to be false. Barely a year
before, Nu'man was sent to Mecca by the
Khalifa on the same mission as he had to dis-:
Charge in Medina a year later, but if one must
choose, the preference should be given to the
tradition of Abft Mikhnaf (2,404) that the
Ansarite was sent to Medina to the Ans&r.

The series may be concluded by W&qidfs
version. It comes, in Tabari, 2,223 ff., under the
year 60, but before Husain's death in the
beginning of 61. Ibn Zubair had not put in an
appearance. After Yazld had spent his patience
in repeated negotiations, he vowed he would
not rest till Ibn Zubair stood before him in
chains, and when the latter actually obstructed
the Emir of Mecca in the leading of the service,
he ordered the Stattholder of Medina, Amr b.
Said, to send an army against him, headed, at
his own wish, by a hostile brother of Ibn Zubair,
Amr by name. After Amr with his somewhat
mixed troop had pushed his way without

1 The Syrian Husaiu had been having a conference with Ibn
Zubair in the sanctuary, and when the doves flew near his horse he
took care that it should not trample on one of them. Then said Ibn
Zubair, " Thou art unwilling to harm a dove, but art willing enough
to slay Muslims."

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 151

opposition up to Mecca and had entered it,
he spoke to his brother saying he was to
appear before the Khalifa with a silver
chain round his neck, which he might
wear underneath his clothes, that the Khalifa's
oath might be fulfilled. Ibn Zubair did not
accede, but suddenly caused Amr's bodyguard
to be surprised, then seized Amr himself ag well
and caused him to be cruelly put to death in
the prison of 'Arim. The ill-fated expedition of
Amr is authenticated by Agh., 13,39 f., and by
the verses communicated there, and is doubtless
historical. But the introduction of the silver
chain is not an episode which fits in there ; it is
only artificially placed in this connection and
rather belongs to the attempts at a peaceable
agreement which preceded the violent passages.
In this the other traditionists will be right as
against W&qjdl.

Towards the end of 61 Amr b. Said was
deposed from Medina in consequence of an
intrigue in the heart of the TJmaiyid family.
He went to Damascus and justified himself
before the Khalifa, and in his place his predeces-
sor Utba b. Walid returned. According to
unanimous tradition he led the Hajj of the
year 61 and remained in office during the year
62, for the greater part of the year at least.
According to Abft Mikhnaf in Tab., 2,402, Ibn
Zubair, by the sending of a letter, contrived that

152 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

instead of him Uthm&n b. Muhammad b. Abi
Sufy&n was installed, a young man, inexperienced
and conceited. According to Tab., 2,405, and
apparently also to AbA Mikhnaf (401 f.) he did
not enter upon office till after the Hajj of
62, but according to 399,18 that seems to be
disputed. In any case the change took place at
the end of 62 or the beginning of 63.

The year 63 (which begins 10th September,
682) is, unlike the two preceding years, full of
the most important events. As Abft Mikhnaf
relates,1 the new Stattholder sent a deputation
from Medina to Yazid, men of standing from
the Ans&r as well as from the Muh&jira. They
were influential leaders of public opinion, which
in Medina was certainly not decisively in favour
of Ibn Zubair, but at any rate was anti-TJmaiyid.
He hoped that Yazld would use the convinci ig
power of money to win them over. Yazld did
give them rich presents,2 but that did not deter
them, on their return, from relating the most
terrible things of him, — that he amused himself
with hunting-hounds,3 sought out the worst
company, drank wine to the accompaniment of
music and song : in short, he had no religion.
It is a mistake that the deputation consisted

1 In Tab., 2,402f. Wahb b. Jarlr (2,422 f.) has a parallel dated
very vaguely, viz., " after Muftwia's death.11

* Tab., 2, 419 f. differs.

• Agh., 20, 106 says "apes,"

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 158

only of Ans&rvand of contemporaries of Muham-
mad. A. Miiller (1,367) speaks of queer old
fellows of the company of the Prophet who
were utter strangers to Yazid. He forms notions
of his own about them and the Khalifa, who was
naturally quite au fait with everything in
Medina, the foremost town of Islam, and like
all Arabs of high position knew personally a
very large number of people. Abft Mikhnaf
tells of one more last attempt made by Yazid
to conciliate the minds in Medina. He would
not willingly use force against the town because
it was the seat of his own tribe, so he sent
thither the best-qualified apostle of peace,
Nu'm&n b. Bashir, who, however, to his grief,
preached to deaf ears.

The prelude to the revolt of the people of
Medina was, according to Agh.,. 1, 13 (Mad£int)
a dramatic scene in the mosque. Seized by
a sudden fury, they renounced their obedience
to Yazld by each taking off his mantle, turban
or shoe, — the customary token of the dissolution
of relations, — and throwing it before him, so that
soon a great heap of them lay on the ground.
Nothing of this is in Tabarl. Ab(i Mikhnaf
(2,405 ff.) marks the beginning of the rising by
the fact that the people of Medina did homage
to Abdullah b. Hanzala as their leader, in the
struggle against Yazid and the Umaiyid rule.
Ibn Hanzala had taken part in the deputation
20

154 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

to Damascus; he was an Ans&rite, celebrated
from his birth as the posthumous son of the
martyr of Uhud who was washed by the angels.
The next act of the rebels was to attack the
Umaiyids in Medina. To the number of 1,000
men they fled to the quarter of Marw&n, the
oldest and most esteemed head of the family.
Marw&n sent word of their plight to the Khalifa :
" We are being pelted with berries and have no
good water to drink. Help ! Help 1 " Although
he made light of the lamentation, Yazld decided
to send an army at once. Amr b. Said was to
lead it, but as he had no wish to spill the blood
of the Quraish (of Medina) on the open field
he suggested that the command be given to a
non-Quraishite, whereupon Yazid turned to an
old and trusty servant of his father, Muslim
b. Uqba alMurrl. His opinion was that 1,000
men who could not defend themselves for a
while were not worth helping, but was ready to
go all the same, since Yazid explained that he
could not leave his relations in difficulties.
Troops were now recruited, and for the full pay,
with an additional sum of 100 dinars to be paid
down at once, 12,000 Syrians were mustered.1
Meanwhile those besieged in Medina had
obtained a free retreat and had set out for
Syria, but Marw&n's wife had gone to Taif under

1 They were indeed, as usual, mostly Kalbites ; the leader of the
Qftis, Zufar b. H&rith, fought against them on the side of Ibn Zubair,
Cf. besides Chawarig, p. 54,

THE SECOND CIVIL WAE 156

the protection of the one son of Husain who
had been saved at Karbala, and who belonged
to the few Quraishites who had not taken part
in the rising. Muslim, on his march to Medina,
met the fleeing Umaiyids in W&dilqura. He
was furious against them as ifc was, and was not
sorry now to make short work of their chiefs,
because they, being bound by an oath, would
give him no answer to his questions. Fortu-
nately Abdulmalik, the son of Marw&n, managed
to avert his anger ; he was delighted by Abdul-
malik's expert counsels and followed them. In
Dhulhijja, 63, he reached Medina and encamped
in the Harra to the N. E. of the town. He gave
the insurgents three days' time for reflection, say-
ing that he wished to be able to withdraw from
them and set out against the hypocrites in Mecca,
for he was unwilling to shed their blood, as they
were the roots (of Islam and the kingdom).
Even after the time of grace had elapsed he
made still another attempt with fair words,
which were answered by abuse. The people of
Medina had protected the exposed north corner
of their town by a rampart and ditch. Their
army consisted of four groups, commanded by
two Quraishites, an Ashja'ite and the Ans&rite
Ibn Hanzala, who at the same time had the
supreme command.

Prom this point onwards Abft Mikhnaf s
report in Tabarl is complemented by traditions of

166 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

'Aw&na and others, which do not always
altogether agree with it. The men of Medina
inarched against the Syrians on the Harra and
pressed on to the station of Muslim himself, who
according to one account was seated on
horseback ; according to another he was borne
in a litter. But finally they were overcome,
and a great number of noble Ansarites and
Quraishites fell, amongst them Ibn Hanzala
with eight sons. The defeat, according to Wahb
b. Jarir (Tab., 2,423) and Samhfidi (Skizzen,
4,26) was decided by the treason of the Band
H&ritha, through whose quarter a Syrian division
penetrated into the town and attacked the
defenders in the rear. WAqidi gives as the
date (2,422) Wednesday, 26th or 27th Dhul-
hijja, 63 « Wed., 26th August, 683. The town
of the Prophet was for three days given up to
the Syrian warriors and they revelled there to
their hearts' content. So say Abft Mikhnaf
(2,418) and Samhudi, but 'Awana differs.
According to him on the day after the battle
Muslim compelled the prominent people of
Medina to do homage in Qubft, and on this
occasion executed some ring-leaders, including,
notwithstanding the protest of Marw&n, a few
Quraishites and also the Ashja'ite Ma'qil b.
Sin&n.1 This orderly behaviour on the day

1 Ma'qil was, like him, from Ghatafan, and had a long-standing
friendship with him, but he was angered against him, " Thou mettest

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 157

after the battle does not agree with the three
days' ravaging of the town. It is hardly to he
confirmed hy the thousand illegitimate children
who, according to Samhftdi, were said to be born
in consequence. Wahb b. Jarlr (423, 15f.)
makes no mention of it either.

After mastering Medina, Muslim proceeded
to Mecca, but only got as far as Mushallal,
where he died with a calm conscience, convinced
that he had done a work well-pleasing to God.
He made over his property not to his sons but
to his tribe and his wife. The command he left,
much against his will, to the Sakiinite Husain
b. Numair, because the Khalifa had so ordained
it. He impressed upon him never to lend an
ear to a Quraishite. 'Aw&na's report in Tabari,
2,424 ff., agrees with Abft Mikhnaf s as far as it,
goes. Abft Mikhnaf puts the death of Muslim
at the end of Muharram, 64, but according to
'Aw&oa and W&qidi, Husain was already
encamped before Mecca in Muharram.

The statements of the later writers are in
strange contrast with the picture here sketched
of Muslim b. Uqba. "Perhaps there was

me in Tiberias when them earnest back from Yazid, and saidsfc, 'We
have been travelling a whole month and now have come back empty-
handed j when we get home we will renounce this wicked man arid
do homage to one of the sons of the Muhajira.' What hare Ghatafan
and Ash j a' to do with the choosing1 and deposing of Khalifas! I have
sworn, if I meet thee in war and have the power, to cut off thy head."
The/lma,..min 420, 3 does not deserve a question-mark.

158 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

no one who represented the old time and the
heathen principle so much as he did. In him
there was not even a vestige of Muhammadan
faith, nothing of all that was sacred to the
Muslims was sacred to him. He held all the
more firmly to heathen superstition, believing in
the prophetic dreams, in the mysterious words
which issued from the Gharqad-bushes, as was
seen when he offered his services to Yaztd. He
told him that through liim alone could Medina
be brought to subjection, for he had heard in a
dream the voice from a Gharqad-bush say,
' through Muslim.5 " Thus Dozy (Histoire des
Musulmans d* Espagne, I9 <97/.), and similarly A.
Miiller, 1,367 : " Muslim b. Uqba was inspired by
the same hatred towards Islam, especially against
the orthodox, as had made Shamir the destroyer
of Husain. Old and ill as he was, the welcome
prospect of the long but vainly sought chastise-
ment of these deadly foes of the whole heathen
system reinvigorated him for a while. In case
he did not live to see the end of the campaign,
there was sent with him as his successor, Husain
b. Numair, who shortly before had been Ubaidul-
l&h's right hand in Kufa,1 and who felt for the
mosque of the Prophet and for the Ka'ba about
the same respect as for two empty shells."

1 Here the Syrian Husain b. Nnmair as Sakftni is confused with the
Kufaite Husain b. Tamtm at Tamimi, and thereby the account of the
former is still more heavily charged. For Shamir, cf. Shia, p. 70.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 169

Because of the Gharqad-bush, which accord-
ing to Agh., 1,14, he perhaps did not really
consult, but only saw in a dream,1 Muslim b.
TJqba has become a heathen incarnate. Inspired
by deep hatred of the people of Medina, he
in spite of age and sickness, eagerly sought and
seized the opportunity to massacre them. The
old tradition knows nothing of all this. Accord-
ing to Tabari, 2,425, he testified on his death-bed
that what he laid most value upon was faith in
All&h and His Messenger. He was not eager
for the task which Yazid entrusted him with ;
he was not even very willing to undertake it.
He had no wish to wreak his vengeance upon
the town of the Prophet, but tried to spare it
up to the very last moment. It is even doubtful
whether he decreed a three-days' pillage after
the victory. He compelled it to do homage, but
not in an unusually disgraceful manner.2 He
was a faithful servant to his master and subdued
the rebels for him. " What has Ghataf&n to do
with the question as to who is the rightful
Khalifa ? " He was glad that for him as a
Ghatafanite the question did not exist, and he
left political aspirations to the strivers and in-
triguers who were lurking in both the holy towns.
His opinion was that they misused the sanctuary
and so cancelled its power of inviolability,

1 Hajjaj if analogous. Tab., 2, 829, 15.

* As Dozy, 1, 10? takes ifc. Cf. OD the other hand Tab., II, 418, 18.

160 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

and he acted accordingly with the decision of
conviction. As time went on, the more shocking
was the sacrilege on his part considered, and
thus he became the heathen scarecrow which
Dozy and Miiller make him out to he.

Dozy, 1,108, spins the thread which he started
at the Gharqad-bush still further. "The Syrian
Arabs had settled their account with the sons
of the fanatic sectaries who had deluged Arabia
with the blood of their fathers. The old nobility
had annihilated the new. Yazld, as representa-
tive of the old aristocracy of Mecca, had avenged
the murder of the Khalifa Uthm&n as well as the
defeat which his grandfather, Ab& Sufy£n, had
suffered at the hands of the people of Medina
under Muhammad's standard. The reaction of
the heathen principle against the Muslim was
cruel and relentless. The Ans&r never recover-
ed from this blow ; their strength was broken
for ever. Their almost desolate town was for a
time given up to the dogs, and the country to
the wild beasts, for most of the inhabitants
sought a new home for themselves far afield, and
went to the African army. The others were
much to be pitied, for the Umaiyids took every
opportunity of letting them feel their hatred and
their scorn, of mortifying them and making their
lives a burden " Miiller, 1,368 f., adapts himself
to these conceptions, which are altogether
distorted and for the most part quite erroneous.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR Iftl

Medina had suffered its worst blow when the
old lawful Khalif ate ceased with the murder of
Uthm&n and the new one was transferred to the
provinces ; the present blow did not bring about
any essential changes. Medina did not become
desolate, the expelled Umaiyids soon returned,
to be again expelled later on. It remained, as
before, a gay town, the seat not merely of pious
tradition, but also of the most eminent and refined
Arab society, and therefore preferred by those
who wanted to retire from business and live at
ease, the rendezvous of singers, musicians and
parasites. All the pertinent articles of the Kitdb
al-Aghdni give proofs of this. The one about AbA
Qatifa and that about Ash'ab are perhaps speci-
ally to be noted, and above all the one about
Sukaina, the wanton and witty great-grand-
daughter of the Prophet. Besides, the represen-
tation is misleading, as if the Ans&r only were
severely affected by the consequences of the
battle on the Harra. The Ans&r must not be
simply identified with the people of Medina.
Medina had long ceased to be their town. They
dwelt there together with the Muh&jira, who
were equal to them in numbers and superior
in strength. Amongst the latter the Quraish
took first place; since the year 8 they had
immigrated in great crowds, and the capital of
the kingdom became their real home. They
took part in the rising against Yazid just as
21

162 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

well as the Ans&r. The distinction between
Islamic and pre-Islamic nobility which certainly
existed among* them was not taken much into
consideration. ' Yazid had not a party among
them at all. He was not the representative of
their old aristocracy even although he belonged
to it, and in the Hij&z they turned completely
against him as they had already done against
his father. The eminent Makhz&m, for example,
were thorough-going Zubairites. Even the
Umaiyids of Medina were not on the best of
terms with Yazld ; they did not want to fall
out with the rebels and they coquetted with
Ibn Zubair, and Muslim b. Uqba had reason
enough to be angry with them. Yazld had only
the Syrians on his side, and from them he raised
an army of a few thousand men, but for an
unusually high pay. Just as he himself was
not filled with a desire for vengeance against
the rebels, but rather sought to win them over
by kindness and showed them great leniency,
so his Syrians were not burning for battle
either. They would have been surprised to
learn that it was their deep hatred " towards
the fanatic sectaries who had flooded Arabia
with the blood of their fathers55 which had
provoked them to take up arms. If this was
the reason, the Iraqites who sprang from the
Ahl arBidda would have been far more justified
in hatred of the men of Medina; or was it

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 163

indeed the case that the Syrians, perhaps the
Kalb, had suffered most? Dozy rather gives
rein to his fancy and rhetoric, and by so doing
has also confused the minds of his successors.
The plain fact is that the Syrian Arabs, like
all the rest, had had to adapt themselves to
Islam, which was indeed far less a matter of
a religious change than of a political one.
Even thus the transition might perhaps have
been at first unpleasant to them, but that was
soon got over for they derived the greatest
advantages from it. Islam allowed them to
participate in its government and laid the world
at their feet : without Islam they would never
have reached the position they now assumed.
Thus they could not always continue to feel
deeply embittered against those who had helped
them to their present prosperity. Least of all
can we speak of their deep hatred against the
" orthodox/' as A. Muller calls the people of
Medina. In the teaching of the faith and the
law and in the customs of public and private
worship they were absolutely at one with the
people of Medina, who certainly applied them-
selves more zealously to religious duties and
especially spoke more about them, but in
general were far from being dismal old fellows
and fanatical sectaries. The modern expression
"Orthodox" may lead to a very perverted
conception of the relations of the hostile parties.

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

According to our non- theocratic ideas, the con-
trast was simply a political one, dealing with
the question, — who had the right to the Khali-
fate? The members of the Islamic nobility, the
sons of the six oldest and most prominent Com-
panions of the Prophet, like Husain and Ibn
Zubair, claimed it for themselves and had also
public opinion and the majority of the Quraish
on their side. Even the Ans&r, just as at the
mutiny against Uthm&,n, must have worked
for them, from the point of view that it was a
question of winning back for the old capital
of the kingdom the dominating position which
it had lost. There are clues which show that
the rising in Medina was instigated by Ibn
Zubair, and Muslim b. Uqba thought it was.
The Sufy&nids in Damascus were regarded
as usurpers; only the Syrians, to defend the
primacy of their province, held fast to the
government which had the power, and did not
bother about the question of right. This ques-
tion, which for us is purely political, was for
theocratic Islam really part of the religion, and
the claims of the pretenders were supported on
religious grounds. It was on religious grounds
that Yazid was declared unworthy of the Khali-
fate, but in the mouths of the leaders of the
movement these grounds were only pretexts;
their real motive was ambition, and greed of
power. They wanted to depose Yazld, not

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 165

because he drank wine and amused himself,
but because they hoped for his place. The
Syrians were so far right in that the question
of right only seemed to them a hypocritical
glossing-over of the question of might. Also,
the reproach of hypocrisy brought by them
refers to this and this only, a reproach met by
the opposite party by the taunt of profanity.

For the siege of Mecca in A.H. 64, 'Aw&na in
Tab., 2, 424 ff. is the chief authority. After the
battle on the Harra " all Medina " came to
Mecca ; only a few Quraishites are named (404,
20 ; 426, 10 ; 528, 12). Before this the Khawft-
rij of Yam&ma, under Najda b. 'Amir, had
already hastened to the help of the Holy House
against the attack of the Syrians.1 Husain b.
Numair arrived before the town in Muharram,
64, with the Syrians, and a first battle resulted
unfortunately for the defenders. On Sunday,
3rd Rabl I, 64, i.e. Sunday, 31st Octr., 683, the
Syrians, according to 'Aw&na, set fire to the
Ka'ba.

This latter account of 'Aw&na is incorrect.
The Ka'ba certainly did go on fire at that time,
and the Holy Stone burst and became black,
hut it was not the Syrians who caused it. Abft
Mikhnaf (528, 17; 529, 4) uses the passive
and keeps the matter quiet. According to

1 Abft Mikhnaf'i date in Tab., 401 f., is put too early. Cf. Ohawarig/
29,Shia, 75. Hamasa, 319, 22. < •-•..:

166 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

W&qidi (427) one of Ibn Zubair's people had
been fetching fire on the point of his lance and
the wind wafted it towards the Ka'ba. Accord-
ing to Mad&inl (Agh., 3, 84) Ibn Zubair himself
was the unhappy man to whom this happened.
The verse upon which 'Aw£na supports his
statement does not mention fire, and according
to Ham&sa, 319, refers to another occasion,
namely, the siege of Mecca under Hajj&j (Tab.,
2, 844 ff. ; 1542, 3) at which the Syrians did really
aim at the Ka'ba, but only with stones. 'Aw&na
thus seems to have made an exchange, with
which, indeed, tendency has something to do.

The siege lasted till the tidings of Yazld's
death, which took place on the 14th Rabl I,
reached Mecca ; according to W&qidl this was
Tuesday, 1st Rabi II, 64, 27 days 1 after the
burning of the Ka'ba. On the other hand Ab&
Mikhnaf (529, 7) says it did not take place till
the 15th Rabi II, and according to 'Aw&na (429,
18) it even continued 40 days after Yazid's
death. The shortest account is the best. Accord-
ing to 'Aw&na, Ibn Zubair received the news
first, and the Syrians at first would not believe
it until they had it confirmed from another
quarter. Husain now negotiated with Ibn Zubair.
He was willing to recognise him as Khalifa,

1 Tab., 427, 8. The day of the week does not agree with the day

of the month. For 29 should be read 27, since the burning of the

Ka'ba, according to unanimous tradition, had occurred on the 3rd
Eabt I.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 167

faute de mieux> if he would,annul the bloodshed
in Medina and Mecca and go with him to Syria,
so that the seat of government should remain
there. In the end Ibn Zubair complied with
the first condition, but did not agree to the
second, nor could he without ruining himself.
So the negotiations broke off and Husain
withdrew. His soldiers seemed to be dishearten-
ed because, since Yazid's death, they had no
longer an Tm&m, and no longer knew for
whom they were fighting, — so very personal did
the paying of homage make the conditions of
the political situation. The Umaiyids of Medina
are said to have gone with them to Syria
because they no longer felt secure in the Hij&z,
but 'Aw&na himself contradicts this (469, 3),
as well as W&qidl (467, 10) and Abft Mikhnaf
(481, 10). The Umaiyids did not go of their
own accord, but only when they were driven
out of Medina by Tbn Zubair. The Continuatio
Byz. Ar., par. 29, also says so : " Marwan insi-
diose ab ipso Abdella ab Almedinae finibus cum
omnibus liberis vel (=et) suis propinquis
pellitur. "

3. According to Abti Ma'shar, W&qidi and
Elias Nisibenus, Yazld died at Huw&rin (near
Damascus) on Tuesday, the 14th Rabl 1, 64, i.e.
Tuesday, llth November, 683.1 As the wrongful

1 Tab., 428, 8 ; 488, 14. The varying accounts 437, 3, and 506, 7
are erroneous, and the year 63 (468, 15, cf. 412, 0) is a slip. His

168 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

heir of the Khalifate, guilty of the murder
of Husain and the desecration of the holy towns,
his memory is a bitter one to the Muslims, but,
in reality, he was not a despot ; he kept the
sword sheathed as long as ever he dared. He
brought to an end the long-drawn-out war
against the Romans. What he may be re-
proached with is lack of energy and of interest
in public affairs. As a prince, especially, he
was extremely indifferent to them, and so made
the struggle to secure to him the succession a
difficult matter for his father. He took part in
the great campaign against Constantinople l in
A.. H. 49 only under compulsion. Later on,
indeed, as Khalifa, he seems to have pulled him-
self together, although he did not give up his
Did predilections, — wine, music, the chase and
)ther sport. In the Continuatio, par. 27, it says
of him ; " Jucundissimus et cunctis nationibus
regni ejus subditis vir gratissime habitus, qui
nullam unquam, ut omnibus moris est, sibi
regalis fastigii causa gloriam appetivit, sed
communis cum omnibus civiliter vixit." No
other is awarded such eulogy ; it comes from
the heart.

" You Banl Umaiya, the last of your rulers
is a corpse in Huw&rin, there at rest for ever.

age is given by Zahrt and Waqidl at 38 or 89, and by Ibn Kalbt at 85
years. Cf. Kttldeke, DMZ,, 1901, pp. 683 f.

1 Qdttinger Xachrichten, 1901, p. 423. Once he was in the field he
proved brave and capable (Agh.f 16, 33), *

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 169

Fate overtook Yazld with a beaker by his pillow
and a brimming wine-flagon." So sang Ibn
Ar&da in Khur&s&n (Tab., 2, 488). With the
death of Yazld the power of his house seemed
to collapse everywhere. Even the Stattholders
did not support it ; Salm b. Zi&d in Khur&s&n
and TJbaidull&h b. Zi&d in Basra had homage
paid to themselves, though only provisionally.
In Syria, indeed, at least in Damascus, the
successor designated by Yazld was recognised, —
his very youthful son Mu&wia II. On his
accession he remitted to " all the provinces of his
realm " one-third of the tribute,1 but he died
after a short reign. According to 'Awana in
Tab., 2, 468 and Bal&dh., 229, 3, he is said even
to have abdicated before his death, but W&qidl
in Tab., 577, 1, says nothing about this. The
story is probably connected with the attempt to
veil the fact that the older branch of the Umai-
yid dynasty, the Sufy&nids, was wrongfully
supplanted by the younger, the Marw&nids.
This attempt also explains how in several old
records Mu&wia II is not included in the list as
Khalifa at all, but Marw&n follows directly after
Yazld, just as in the Bible Chronicle the reign
of Ishbosheth is suppressed and David is placed
immediately after Saul.2

1 Con*. Byz. Ar., par. 27. It was customary at an accession to have

»/
such a a</>«<m,

2 Cf. Naldeke in the Epimetrum to Mommsen's edition of the
Cont. Isidor., and in the DMZ., 1901, pp. 683 ff.

22

170 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Apparently even in Mu&wia IFs lifetime
there began the Syrian disturbances to which
we now proceed. They originated with the
Qafe, who dwelt chiefly in the north of the
province and in Mesopotamia on both sides of
the Euphrates (Tab., 708. 4), in Qinnesrtn, Qar-
qisi& and Harr&n. These alone of all the
Syrians are said to have refused homage to
Mu&wia II. They were enraged at the prefer-
ence given to the Kalb through Yazid and his
son, both of whom had aKalbite mother (Ham&sa,
319, 2 ; 4). Yazid's maternal uncle, Hass&n h.
M&lik b. Bahdal al Kalbl, had a powerful place
in the kingdom and was the main pillar of
Mu&wia II, while his brother Said was Statt-
holder of Qinnesrin. To be ruled in their own
town by a Kalbite was beyond the endurance
of the Qais and they began by expelling him.
This took place under the leadership of Zufar
b. H&rith alKil&bl (Agh., 17, 111), who had
previously fought for Ibn Zubair against
Yazid's army (Ham., 319, 22). Thus he was a
Zubairite, and the Qais followed him after Ibn
Zubair was recognised also in the neighbouring
Iraq, but Ibn Zubair's party was also making
progress elsewhere in Syria. Ibn Bahdal alone, —
this is the usual contraction for Hass&n b. M&lik
b. Bahdal-— adhered even after Mu&wia li's death
to the descendants of his sister. In order to be
nearer to Damascus, he moved from Palestine,

THfi SECOND CIVIL WAR lM

which he administered, to the Urdunn. On the
other hand, the Stattholder of Emessa, the well-
known Nu'm&n b. Basblr alAns&rt, recognised
Ibn Zubair, and likewise also N&til b. Qais
alJudh&mi, who took possession of Palestine
after Ibn Bahdal had left it. In the imperial
capital Dahls&k b. Qais alFihri had hilt in hand.
His conduct wafl wavering and ambiguous, but
as he was in danger of falling between two
stools, he was at last compelled to declare
decisively for the side of Ibn Zubair.

Reports vary concerning the progress of
events up till the bloody decision at Marj KAhit.
According to 'Aw&na in Tab., 2, 468 ff. the
Umaiyids who had been expelled from Medina,
and also the Stattholder Ubaidul&h b. Zi&d
who had fled from Basra, had betaken them-
selves to Damascus, apparently after the death
of Mu&wia II. Dahh&k, who ruled there, con-
cealed his real views, for in reality he inclined
to Ibn Zubair, but Ibn Bahdal, the head of the
Kalb and Yemen of the Umaiyid persuasion,
drove the fox from his lair. He sent him a
letter to be read aloud in the mosque, in which
be recalled the merits of the Umaiyids, and gave
warning agaiott the hypocritical Ibn Zubair.
Dabh&k did not make the letter public, but the
messenger, a Kalbite named N&ghida, bad, in
case of this, brought with him a second copy,
which he now read aloud himself at the weekly

172 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

service. Then followed a scene which is called
" the day of Jairftn." l The Qais and the Kalb
rose against each other in the mosque. The
Umaiyids themselves were on different sides;
Walid b. Utba b. Abl Sufy&n approved of the
contents of the letter ; Amr b. Yazid b. Hakam
disapproved. At the close of the service the
Kalb beat the latter soundly, but Dahh&k, on
the other hand, imprisoned the brawlers who
had expressed themselves against Ibn Zubair,
but they were immediately liberated by the
Kalb ; Walid b. Utba only had to wait, because
he had no tribe, till Kh£lid and Abdullah,
two younger brothers of Mu&wia II, at last
induced the Kalb to set him free also. The
next day Dahh&k regretted his action, made
excuses to the Umaiyids, and agreed to
go together with them to J&bia and there to
treat with Ibn Bahdal concerning the choice
of one of them as Khalifa. And yet at the last
moment he turned round again, upon the re-
monstrances of the Qaisite Thaur b. Ma'n
as-Sulami, and with his followers occupied
a camp in Marj RAhit near Damascus. He
now openly declared for Ibn Zubair, and the
majority of the people of Damascus, — and also

1 The first "day of JairAn" is not the proper term, for what is
represented as the second (471, 13-19) is only a variant. Jairun was a
large old building where probably the brawl after the service
took place. One exit of the chief mosque is called the gate of Jairun.
Cf. Hamasa, 664, v. 4.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 173

of the Yemenites amongst them — followed him.
At his demand the Emirs of Emessa, Qinnesrin
and Palestine who were in favour of Zubair sent
him reinforcements. The Umaiyids betook
themselves to Ibn Bahdal at J&bia. They were
divided 1 ; against the family of the Sufy&nids,
which till then was the ruling family, stood
the rest of the very numerous tribe, which, as
a whole, took the side of its old chief, Marw&n
b. Hakam. Ibn Bahdal, the agent of the
minor sons of Yazld, finally let himself be won
over and declared he had cast in his lot with
Marwan, but after him were to follow KMlid b.
Yazld, and then Amr b. Said, whose family then
also raised claims and had to be paid off.
Marw&n now marched to Marj RAhit with the
Kalb of Urdunn, the Sak&sik and Sakftn and
the Ghass&n. While the hostile armies stood
facing each other, the Ghass&nid Ibn AM Nims
took possession of the town of Damascus and
assisted Marw&n with money and weapons.
The battle at Marj R&hit lasted 20 days; final-
ly the Qais fled with terrible loss. Dahh&k
fell, and with him 80 nobles who wore a robe

1 The Umaiya have a collateral branch, the ' Abalat They them-
selves break up into the Anabis and the A'yas. The Sufy&nids belong
to the Anabis ; most of the other families to the A'yas. Marwan b.
Hakam and his cousin Uthman b. Affan are descended from Abu 1'ls
Amr b. Said is descended from al'As. The same names with unimpor-
tant differences recur in Umaiya and Abd Umaiya, al'As and Abu
1'As, C/. Agh,, 1, 8 f . (84, 10) ; 10, 103 f. ; 7, 62 ; Tab., 1, 2535.

'174 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS

of honour (the Qatifa) and drew a pension
of 2,000 dirhems.

Beside this account of 'Aw&na stands that
of Mad&ini5 Agh., 17, 111. Mad&ini says nothing
of the " day of Jairftn " and gives rather a
different version about Marw&n, but in conclu-
sion is completely in agreement with 'Awftna.
When Marw&n with the Umaiyids of Medina
came to Damascus, he was at first won over
by DahMk for Ibu Zubair and consented to
convey to him in person the homage of the
Syrians, but Amr b. Said, Ubaidull&h b. Zi&d,
and the two Sakftnites, M&lik b. Hubaira and
Husain b. Numair,1 prevailed upon him to
decide to have homage paid to himself.
When Dahh&k heard of this, he turned coat,
excused himself to the Umaiya and proposed
to come into J&bia together with Ibn Bahdal
and in company with him to set about the
election of a Khalifa. Ibn Bahdal came with
the people of the Urdunn to J&bia ; DahMk
and the Umaiya, with the people of Damascus,
set out on the road thither likewise. At the
last moment, however, Dahh&k was besought
by the Qaisites : " Thou hast summoned us
to do homage to Ibn Zubair, the Khalifa recog- *
nised everywhere else, and wilt thou now
follow this Kalbite to do homage to his

1 'Aw&na's account in Tab,, 2, 474 is somewhat different, Of. also
487.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 175

nephew ?" l This had the effect of making him
tmm round and openly declare for Ibn Zuhair,
and he encamped in Marj R&hit. Ibn Bahdal
and Marw&n advanced to Damascus, where the
Yemen went over to them, and then continued
their march to Marj EAhit. They had 7,000
men, Dahh&k 30,000 ; a battle ensued and
Bahh&kand the nobles of Qais fell. Zufar b.
H&rith fled to Qarqisia ; and after the battle
at the Khftzir he was joined by Umair b. Hub&b
as-Sulami, who till then had remained faithful
to Marw&n.

Very different, again, is the version of Abfi.
Mikhnaf in Tab., 2,479 ff. Marwftn and the
Uinaiyids who had been expelled from Medina
by Ibn Zubair did not go to Damascus, because
there Dahh&k was ruling in name of Ibn Zubair,
but to Tadmor (Palmyra), the capital and
headquarters of the Kalb ; but Marw&n was in
two minds whether to go in person to Ibn Zubair
and beg for favourable terms, when Ubaidull&h
b. Zi&d from Basra appeared in Tad m or. The
latter called upon Marw&n to have homage
paid to himself, while Amr b. Said urged the
same thing and at the same time advised
Marw&n to marry the widow of Yazld. So it fell
out that Marw&n had homage paid to himself
in Tadmor, and then with 6,000 men marched

1 This does not qnite agree with the premises. Th« nephew of
Ibn Bahdal who is meant is Khdlid b. Yaztd,

176 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

against Dahh&k. The latter advanced to meet
him at Mar] B&hit, and thither also came
Zufar b. H&rith and other adherents of Ihn
Zubair. In the battle Dahh&k fell and his
army scattered ; Zufar was saved by two youths
who sacrificed themselves for him,1 and after-
wards established himself in Qarqisia. N&til b.
Qais fled to Mecca. When Nu'm&n b. Bashlr
got the tidings of Marj BAhit he fled by night
with wife and child from Emessa, but was pur-
sued and slain by the Emessaites themselves.
After this success Marw&n was recognised all
through Syria.

W&qidl takes up a sort of intermediate posi-
tion between Abft Mikhnaf and 'Aw&na-Mad&inl,
and his scattered accounts in Tabari may be
collected somewhat as follows. As Mu&wia at
his death had not wished to name any succes-
sor (677, 1) homage was paid provisionally in
Damascus to Dahh&k, until a definite agreement
of Muhammad's congregation should be arrived
at (468). Dahh&k aimed at getting the rule for
himself, but was forced by the Quraish to do
homage to Ibn Zubair (473 f.), and Marw£n
became subordinate to him. On the advice of
Husain b. Numair he was about to betake him-
self to Ibn Zubair before the latter should
penetrate into Syria (467 f.)* when, fortunately,

1 This is testified through his own verses and is doubtless correct,
Of. Anon. Ahlw. 253 f.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 177

Ubaidull&h b. Zi&d came to Damascus and rein-
forced the Umaiyids (468). Marw&n now went
to J&bia to ally himself with Ibn Bahdal and
the Yemenites, and there he accepted homage
for himself as the oldest of the Umaiya, for the
Syrians would not do homage to a child, and
then marched with the Yemenites against
Damascus. The Qais were defeated at Marj
R&hit at the end of the year 64, suffering greater
losses than any army ever did before (473, 1).

The chief points on which these versions
differ are the following. — Only in 'Aw&na and
no one else does the " day of JairAn " occur,
the day on which the excitement in Damascus
first broke out. The Hamasa establishes it
without doubt (656, v. 4). The circumstance is
there given wrongly by the Scholion (actually
under Muawia I). Cf. on the other hand 657,
v. 3. Abti Mikhnaf is the only one who says
the Umaiyids who were driven out of Medina
went to Tadmor and were there met by Ubaid-
ull&h, as opposed to all the others who give
Damascus as the place.1 Now certainly the
drama of Jairftn at any rate was played in
Damascus, and there were some Umaiyids pre-
sent, but it does not appear from the description
that the bulk of the Medinan family were there.
Marw&n and Amr b. Said are not mentioned and
do not appear where one expects them, In

1 So also Cont. Byz. Ar., par, 29.

83

178 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

spite of this AM Mikhnaf s account has never-
theless been erroneously made the general one.
For With him Tadmor takes the place not merely
of Damascus but of J&bia also. He makes the
paying of homage to Marw&n, which without
doubt took place at Jabia, happen in Tadmor,
perhaps because Tadmor, and not J&bia, was the
capital of the Kalb.

In particular, the sudden change of Marw&n
is not mentioned by 'Aw&na ; only Ab& Mikhnaf
and W&qidi say that he was affected by
the arrival of Ubaidull&h, but these two
deserve the greater credence since in Tab.,
2,459, Mad&ini also agrees with them.

According to 'Aw&na and Madainl, Dahh&k
was inclined to the side of Zubair from the
beginning, even if he did not show it openly ;
AbA Mikhnaf says he was simply Ibn Zubair's
Emir over Damascus, but his descendants de-
clared to W&qidi (473 f.) that this was a false-
hood, saying that he had preferred to remain
neutral in order to get to the head of affairs
himself, and only did homage to Ibn Zubair
under external pressure, and we may believe
them. Dahh&k, like Muslim b. Uqba, probably
also maintained under Yazld the position
which he took up under the old Mu&wia, whose
right hand he was. After the throne fell
vacant he became the provisional regent in
Damascus, but he was not able to maintain

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR

his position above the parties, and after long
hesitation he finally joined the side of the Qais
and Ibn Zubair. He was forced from his neu-
tral position especially by his old rival, now an
opponent all the more dangerous, Hass&n b.
M&lik Ibn Bahdal, who had the Kalb behind
him. The latter for a while alone held aloft
the Umaiyid standard, particularly by champion-
ing the rights of the family of Yazld, who
were related to him by marriage. The Umai-
yids of Medina did not join him in this, nor
did they at first put forward any claimant from
their midst, as they believed that they would
have to make their peace with Ibn Zubair upon
any terms, good or bad. It was only through
Ubaidull&h. that they changed their mind, and
now when the latter pointed out to Marw£n
that he had not merely the choice between
the sons of Yazid, who were under age, and
Ibn Zubair, but ought to have a try for the
ruling power himself, the only means towards
that end was to come to an understanding
with Ibn Bahdal, for he was the only man
who had command over extensive forces (Tab.,
708, 4). It was for this purpose that the
conference at J&bia took place, at which
Dahh&k may even have promised to appear,
and it brought them to their goal after lengthy
negotiations. It is certainly historical, even
though AbA Mikhnaf does not mention it, for

180 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

without Ibn Bahdal simply nothing could be
done. For 40 days he was the leader in
prayer at J&bia, and he was also the real
conqueror of Marj R&hit.1 Theophanes, in

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The later writers, especially Dozy, speak
of a radical hostility between the Kalb and
the Qais, which is said to have existed since
time immemorial and cannot be traced to its
source, but in pre-Islamic tradition there is
nothing of this to be found. The fact is, the
hostility did not exist before the capture of
Syria by the Muslims and the immigration
thither of the Qais.2 The genealogical distinc-
tion between the Qudaa and the Qais certainly
was of old standing, but it was only now that
it began to have any rancour. Eirst of all
the contrast was intensified by the fact that

1 C/, Ham., 319, 7 j ' The men are cither of the party of Bahdal
or of that of Zubair.' But especially cf. Ham., 658, v. 2 : ' If it had not
been for Jabia in Jaulan and Ibn Bahdal, Mar wan and Abdulmalik
would have been of no account.'

8 Goldziher (Muh. Studien, 1, 78) rightly says the rivalry between
the Arabs of the north and south first arose in Islam.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 181

the latter were old inhabitants of Syria and
the former had newly immigrated there, and
then more than ever by the fact that by ties
of marriage the Kalb were closely connected
with the ruling house. Consequently the Qais
were filled with envy towards them because
they thought themselves put into the back-
ground. It was they who were the origina-
tors of the mischief. After Yazid's death, when
Ibn Zubair came into prominence, they joined his
side, while the Kalb kept loyal to the Umaiya.
Thus the tribal difference was amalgamated with
high politics ; the ethnic groups were substanti-
ally, if not altogether, overshadowed by
the political parties which originally were in-
dependent of them. At Marj R&hit, according
to old songs on the theme, there fought under
Dahhak for Ibn Zubair, the Sulaim, the Amir
(Hawazin) and the Dhubi&n (Ghataf&n), — none
but tribes belonging to the group of the Qais.
For Marw&n, under Ibn Bahdal, there fought the
Kalb and the Ghassan, the Sakun and the Sak-
sak, the TanAkh, the Taiyi and the Q;ain. This
group whose nucleus was formed by the Kalb,1
the chief tribe of Qud&a, was rather more mixed;
it is occasionally designated by the collective

1 The Saktin (of Kinda) were reckoned as belonging to them (Tab ,
475, 2) ; the Tanukh and Taiyi also were closely related to them (484,
12) ; the Ghassan (of Azd) were the old ruling tribe of the Syrian
Arabs. In Ham,, 71, v. 3, the Kalb are called Taghlib, if the Scholion is
correct.

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

name of the Yemen, but the subordination of
the Qud&a under the Yemen is not old, and the
Yemen in Syria had not all joined with the
Kalb. The battle of Marj R&hit decided for the
Kalb against the Qais, who were twice or thrice
as strong, but it did not put an end to the strife
between Qais and Kalb, since the Qais had to
take vengeance for their many slain. It was
only now that the deep and enduring bitterness
crept in, which Dozy, quite unhistorically, con-
siders an original phenomenon and traces back
to time immemorial. Every time it was calmed
down, the blood-hatred broke out again, and
kept the hostility active long after the political
motives were vanished and forgotten. The
battle of Marj BAhit is to blame for it ; there
its fatal significance is to be found. It brought
victory to the Umaiyids, and at the same time
shattered the foundations of their power.

Marwan received homage in J&bia on "Wed-
nesday, 3rd Dhulqa'da, 64= Wednesday, 22nd
June, 684. After the battle of Marj R&hit (at
the end of 61) there followed a second homage
of a more general and ceremonious character at
Damascus in Muharram, 65== July or August,

Without merit or will of his own, Marw&n,
by his expulsion from Medina, reached the
throne in Damascus. This has justly seemed
astonishing to the Continuator Byz. Arab,.:—

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 183

"Marwan (insidiose ab Almidina pulsus) post
modica temporis intervalla aliquantis deexercitu
consentientibus deo conivente provehitur ad
regnum." The family of the Umaiya kept the
power, but the Sufy&nids were supplanted by
the Marw&nids.1 The marriage of Marw&n with
T£khita, the widow of Yazid,2 betokened not so
much an alliance as the seizure of an inheritance*
By it he injured Kh&lid b. Yazid,3 now his step-
son, and in other ways also wilfully and publicly
humiliated him, finally even withdrawing froni
him the promise of the succession to the govern-
ment which was made to him at J&bia, and
having homage paid to his own sons Abdulmalik
and Abdulaziz, so that the latter should suc-
ceed the former.4 Ibn Bahdal did not oppose the
breach of faith, perhaps because Amr b. Said
also was set aside by it. According to Arab
opinion, at any rate, KMlid, upon the prospec-
tive death of the already aged Khalifa, was still
too young for the ruling power, which would
then have passed to Amr, who thought himself
secure, but F&khita avenged the false treatment
of her son upon her husband, and smothered him
in bed. Thus W&qidl in Tab., 2, 576 f.

1 O/. above pp. 169 ; 179.

9 She was not a proud Beduin (A, Muller, 1, 375), but a Quraishite
lady.

8 O/. the verse BAthtr, 4, 275, and along with it 296, 8.
* For time and place, Anon, Ahlw., 151 j 164 f.

184 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

4. According to Tabarl, 577, 17, Marw&n
died in Ramad&n, the actual date, according to
576, 16, being the 1st of the month ; according
to Elias Nis. on Sunday, 27th Ramad&n,
65(=Sunday, 7th May, 685). In Tab., 577 f., his
age is given as anything between 61 and 81.
Theophanes says he reigned nine months ; Tabari
says nine or ten months. In the Contin. Byz.
Ar., par. 29, it says he died after a year full of
struggles. I add these struggles to those of
his son and successor Abdulmalik, as they are
only the beginning and it is not everywhere easy
to draw an exact dividing line.1

The great struggle was against Ibn Zubair,
at least against the provinces which had recog-
nised him and in which his officials ruled.2 The
situation then was just as it had been after the
murder of Uthm&n ; Syria alone stood opposed
to the whole of the rest of the Islamic world, only
the ruler of Syria was not quite so sure of this
province as Mu&wia was then. After Marj
R&hit, Palestine and Emessa went over to the
winning side without more ado, and Qinnesrin
also surrendered, but on the Euphrates the Qais
held out defiantly, their leader being Zufar b.
H&rith in Qarqisia. In spite of this, Marw&n
and Abdulmalik appear from the beginning as

1 In Tab., 558, 14 ; 578, 9 j 708, 4, the dividing line is drawn
decisively, but wrongly.

• For Khuras&n cf. Tab., 806 j 831 ff., and Chap. 8.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 185

assailants of Ibn Zubair, who indeed was possibly
more concerned with internal dispeace, especially
in Iraq.1

It was in Marw&n's time that Egypt was
taken, and an attack of Ibn Zubair's younger
brother, Mus'ab, on Palestine repulsed 2 ; also an
attempt to gain Medina was made, but failed.3
Marw&n sent Ubaidull&h b. Zi&d to Mesopotamia
in order to be the first to advance over this
stepping-stone towards Iraq, which was torn by
religious and political factions. He is said to
have promised him the Stattholdership over all
the land he was to seize, and to have sanctioned
a three-days' pillage of Kufa (Tab., 578 ; 642).
At the beginning of this campaign, when Ubaid-
ull&h was still stationed at the Euphrates bridge
of Manbij, there took place the massacre of
the Shtites of Kufa under Sulaim&n b. Surad
at Eesaina, through Husain b. Nurnair, next
in command to Ubaidull&h, on Friday, 24th
Jumad&I,65=Friday, 6th January, 685 (Tab., 569,
4.20). Ubaidull&h was then held up for nearly
a year by struggles with Zufar and the Qais.4

1 Of. for subsequent events Chawarig, pp. 32 ff. ; Shia, pp. 72 ff.

• Waqidi, 467, 10 ; Abu Mishnaf, 481 ; 'Awana, 576. This was effect-
od by Amr b. Satd before Marwari had had homage paid to his Bon,
according to Anon. Ahlw,, 18<, 17.

8 'Awana, 578 f, ; 642; Anon. Ahlw. , 155, 2; 180, 2. According to
BQutaiba, 201, Hajjaj's father. was concerned in it.

* Tab , 643. Van Gelder (Muchtar, p. 96, 152) declares this to be
' false, without sufficient grounds.

24

186 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Thereafter he advanced against Mosul on the
usual army route into Iraq, just when Mukht&r
had already seized the government of Kufa,
whose Stattholder retired from Mosul to Takrit
(Tab., 643). He then, after a hard fight, slaughter-
ed the first army sent against him by Mukhtar on
the 10th and llth Dhulhijja, 66=9th and 10th
July, 686 (Tab., 646 ff.)» but soon after was defeat-
ed by a second army of the Shiites under Ibra-
him b. al-Ashtar at the battle on the Khazir l at
the beginning of 67 ; he himself fell and also
Husain b. Numair (Tab., 714, 1). Naturally the
Qais now also raised their heads again in Qarqi-
sia, and were reinforced by tribal companions
u,nder TJmair b. HuMb, who till then had
been serving in the Syrian army, but defected
at, or after, the battle on the Kh&zir. The
work upon which UbaiduMh had spent almost
two years had been in vain, and had to be
done all over again. It was fortunate for
Abdulmalik that Mus'ab b. Zubair, now his
brother's Stattholder in Iraq, was so harassed in
his own house by Shiites and Kh&rijites that
he could not think of undertaking any outside
offensive.

It was a long time before Abdulmalik again
took up the task over which Ubaidull&h had
come to grief, namely, the subjection of Iraq,

1 August, 686. De Goeje has drawn my attention to the exact date
in_the Tanbth, 312, 17.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 187

where Mus'ab held the command pretty much
independently of his brother. He had plenty
to do at home, for Natil b. Qais seems to have
again raised a rebellion j1 but above all, the
Romans broke the peace and stirred up the
Mardaites in Amanus against the Arabs. 2
Mus'ab did not fall till A.H. 72, and in A.H. 73
the Civil War was at an end. Of the interval
from A.H. 67, when Ubaidullah had fallen, till
A.H. 72 the reports are meagre. It is mainly
a matter of fixing the chronology, which is still
a very vexed question. In doin g so we must
keep in mind that the turn of the year, according
to the Muslim era, then fell in the summer-time,
and the activities which as a rule ceased in
the winter (Tab., 797, 10), were thus divided
over two years of the Hijra, whilst almost
always only one year is given.

That Abdulmalik in the year 67 did not
interfere with Mus'ab's attack upon Mukht&r
and did not disturb the Iraqites in their occu-
pation of tearing each other to pieces, is under-
standable, for, according to Tab., 2,765 and Elias,
there was in the year 68 a great famine in
Syria, on account of which no campaign could
be undertaken. Theophanes also speaks of it
in A.M. 6179 (Sel. 998 ; A.H. 68). But

1 Yaqubt 2, 321 j Mastidi, 5, 225. Bufc perhaps it only provsea a
chronological error.

a Qitttinger Nachrichten, 1901, pp. 428 ff,

188 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

Mad&inl, again, does not agree (Agh. 17, 161,
26), but puts it considerably later.

The time at which Abdulmalik first took the
field against Mus'ab was, according to 'the Arabs
and Elias,1 the summer of 689 A.D. or 69/70
A.H. His camp, the mustering ground of his
army and the starting-point of his operations,
was Butnan Hablb in the district of Qinnesrln,
in this as well as the following years.2 The
corresponding camp of Mus'ab was B&jumaira
near Takrit.3 These were boundary stations
on the great road from Syria to Iraq. Meso-
potamia was an intervening region, but more
in the power of Mus'ab than of Abdulmalik,
for even the Qais on the Euphrates adhered
toMuscab. In order that the Romans should
leave him in peace, Abdulmalik had agreed to

1 In Theophanes tho order of the Arab events in these years is
so fearfully confused that we can only mako use of his accounts of
Ziad (Ibn Z.) Mukht&r, Said (Ibn S.) and Mus'ab, after divesting them
of the chronology.

* The account that Abdalmalik was in Butnan with the army as
early as A.H. 67 contradicts the preceding account that that year he did
not go into the field because of a famine. Butiian is only mentioned
here as a peg upon which to hang the anecdote that at that time in the
army the name Muddy Butnan arose on account of the rain which fell
after the drought. The reason for the appellation must have been
chronic rather than acute, as in the case of Dreck-Harburg in the
bailiff dom of Liineburg,

3 According to Yaqut, 1, 664, Abdulmulik used to spend the
winter in Butndn, Mua'ab in Maskin. Maskin has about the same
importance from a geographical and military point of view as
Bajumaira. Of. Balidb., 149, 8.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 189

make them great concessions,1 but now he
was threatened in the rear by Amr b. Said,
who rose up in Damascus to establish his claim to
the Khalifate, which had been acknowledged at
the treaty of Jabia and then cancelled by a
breach of faith. Abdulmalik was compelled to
turn round and deal with this danger. He
let the sword have full play and slew his
enemies (Tab., 805) — Amr, indeed, was slain by
his own hand, in a treacherous and horribly cruel
manner. Tradition (Tab., 783 f., 796. Anon.
Ahlw., 250) places these events partly in the
year 69, partly in 70, but we must not therefore
make the mistake of thinking they belong
together and fall into the same summer.
Tradition is also uncertain as to how far Abdul-
malik had already got on his march to the
north-east. According to W&qidi in Tab., 783,
and according to Elias, he turned back again
from Ain Warda, i. e., Resaina ; but according
to W&qidl in Tab., 796, he had not yet proceeded
past Butn&n Hablb. 'Aw&na seems to take
the latter view also (Tab., 783 f.) According
to him, Abdulmalik was on the march against
Zufar b. H&rith in Qarqisi&,2 but had to
abandon it because Amr b. Said, who had
accompanied him as far as Butn&n, had decamped

1 Gdttinger Nachrichten, 1901, p, 428.

8 In Hamasa, 658, v. 6, it is mentioned as an attack of the Qaii
upon Butn&n, the repnlse of which was due to the Kalb.

190 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

secretly by night with some others to Damascus,
and had taken possession of the town. Yaqubi,
2, 321 f. has a similar account.

The next year 70/71, i.e. summes of 690, the
campaign was repeated. The two great anta-
gonists did not reach each other this time either.
Abdulmalik instigated a rising of the Bakr or
Rabla, the so-called Jufriya, in Basra, while
Mus'ab kept the fteld (Tab., 798-803). Two
partisans took part, each on his own account,
in the feud against Mus'ab and Zufar, not so
much from love of Abdulmalik as out of hatred
to the latter, — the noble Ubaidull&h b. Hurr
al- Ju'fi of Kuf a (Tab., 305. 388 ff. 765 ff.) and the
fierce Ubaidullah b. Zi&d b. Zaby&n alBakri
of Basra (Tab., 800, 807-10. BAthir, 4,255, 268.
Agh., 11,62),

The result was nil. "Abdulmalik marched
against Mus'ab, who was encamped in B&jumaira,
as far as Butn&n, — at a very respectful distance
— and then the winter came on and both turned
back home" (Tab., 797). One might be dubious
as to whether this were not an erroneous repeti-
tion of what already happened in the year 69/70.
The rising of the Jufriya which Tabari mentions
under A.H. 71 (of. 813, 1 1 f .) is said to have already
taken place, according to 798, 5 in A. H. 70.
W&qidt, in Tab., 805, seems to place it at the
same time as the rising of Amr b. Said in
Damascus ; in any case he makes the campaign

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 191

in 70/71 (Tab., 813) not an intermediate one but
the last and decisive one.

Thus there would be altogether only two cam-
paigns to be accepted, but that is not sufficient.
This is the result, as we shall see, of reckoning
backwards, but it is also the result of direct evi-
dences. Mus'ab, in a contemporary verse (Agh.,
17, 162 ; MasMi, 5, 241), is addressed as follows :
Cl Year after year thou art in Bajumaira ; thou
marches! with us into the field and dost nothing."
In another verse (Tab,, 1038, 4) mention is made
of B&jumair&t in the plural, i.e., the plural of the
time, not of the place. Mad&int (Agh., 17, 161 f.)
speaks expressly of three campaigns in three
successive years. According to him Abdulmalik
was advised to give himself now a year's rest,
after being two years in the field, and in fact
to content himself with Syria and leave the
accursed Iraq to Mus'ab, but he did not do so,
and the third year decided in his favour.

It was the summer of 691, A.H. 71/72.
Abdulmalik spent it mostly in the subjection of
Mesopotamia. After a lengthy siege Zufar b.
Harith capitulated in Qarqisia, and his son
Hud hail had to render forced military service.1
An exhaustive report of this is found in BAthfr,
4,?75 ff., where there is mention also of an
earlier indecisive battle of Ab&n b. Uqba b.

1 Anon. Ahlw,, 24, 17 ff. BAthtr, 4, 265. In Theophanos, A.M.
6178 the taking of Circesium is put in a wrong connection.

192 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Muait, Statth older of Emessa, against Qarqisia.
According to it, Zufar was not humbled before
the army of the Kalb and Qud&a, but joined
the Khalifa entirely of his own accord. This is,
of course, a boastful flight of the Qaisites, by
which they sought also to mitigate their own
humiliation. Besides Qarqisia, however, there
was also Resairia to subdue, where Umair b.
Hubftb was maintaining opposition,1 and after
that Nisibis, where the so-called " cudgel-
bearers," — a remnant of Mukht&r's adherents
l>ad till then held out. They surrendered and
were enrolled in the army.2

The season was already far advanced when
at last a decisive encounter took place between
Abdulmalik and Mus'ab. The place was the
monastery of the Catholieus, between Maskin,
where Abdulmalik encamped as Mu&\via had once
done, and BSjumaira, the headquarters of Mus'ab
(Tab., 805). The month was the first or second
Jum&d&, but it is doubtful whether the year
is A.H. 71 or I'l (Anon. Ahlw., 8. Tab., 813).
Waqidi and Elias say 71, and the others 7'V and
the latter date, regarded from the point of view

1 Barhebr., ed. Bedjan, 111 : " Hnhab is, of course, Ibn Hubab."
Cf. BAthtr, 4, 254.

a MaRudi, 5, 241. Of. Agh., 5, 155. 8, 33. 11, 47 ; and Shia, p. 80
n.l j 84 n. 3.

8 Thus Madainl, in Tab , 813 (1466,9) and Agh., 17, 161 ; Ibn
Kalbt from his grandfather and Abft Mikhuaf in Anon., 26, and
Masftdt, 5, 242.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 193

of what has been already said, is proved correct
from the fact that Abdulmalik's victory in Iraq
was followed by the sending of Hajj&j to the Hij&z,
which without any doubt falls in the year 72/73.1
About the course of the battle there
are several reports, or more properly com-
pilations of reports, whose relation to each
other has given rise to an unusual amount
of discussion. Ahlwardt has compared the
report of the historical work published by him
—a part of Bal&dhuri's Kitdb aUshrdf—with
that of Ibn Athir (4,263 ff.) and found that the
latter has borrowed large portions from the former.
Noldeke has contradicted him, perhaps with the
idea that here, as in other cases, we shall get the
best result with Tabari as the source of Ibn
Athlr. Brockelmann proved that this is not
possible, but after the appearance of the relative
series of Tabari, which Noldeke was not yet
acquainted with.2 By it, however, the question

1 In support of 71 we can of course refer to the account of
Madam* in Tab., 813, that the battle was on Tuesday, 13fch Jumada I or
II. Madaint names also the year 72, but in that year the 13th Jumadft
I or II did not fall on a Tuesday, but on the other hand the 13th
Jumada II of the year 71 was a Tuesday. In spite of this it seems to
me impossible and in contradiction to the well-authenticated facts to
reduce the three Iraqice campaigns to two, and then to allow two
whole years to intervene between the taking of Kufa, which was the
result of the battle at the monastery, and the taking of Mecca, t shall
return to this point.

9 Anon. Ahlw.t Vorrede, pp. xii ff. j Gottinger Gel. Anz.t 1883.
p. 1102 ; Brockelmann's Dissertation uler das Verhdltnis v*n Ibn al Athir
*u Tabari (Strassb., 1890), pp. 44 f.

26

194 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

is only partly decided in favour of Ahlwardt.
It is necessary, in fact, to take into considera-
tion a further report, which Ahlwardt, Noldeke
and Brockelmann have overlooked, — that of
Agh., 17, 161 ff., which in its contents stands
very near to that of the Anonymous Writer, but
yet is not dependent upon it, and is compiled
by Zubair b. Bakkar. The following is then
obvious, — Ibn Athir does not follow Tabarl
exclusively, but had just as little knowledge of
the Anonymous Work as of the Article of the
Kitdb alAghdni. In the points which he has in
common with those two, he agrees now more
with the one, and again more with the other,
but always with such formal variations as
exclude a direct borrowing. Sometimes (not
considering of course the part borrowed from
Tabari), he has even an item extra in the
contents over both, for example in the story
of the ground of hostility of Ibn Zaby&n
towards Mus'ab. He appears, therefore, to have
used another compilation which indeed went
back mostly to the same sources.1 The authors
quoted are, in the Anonymous Work and in the
Kitdb alAghdni, partly the same as in Tabari,
but he still cites W&qidi and owes to him his

1 A complete proof cannot be given here, since the matter has
only a literary and not a historical interest. To determine the
connection of Compilations with each other is always somewhat
ptriloup,

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 195

main report, which with slight interruptions
continues from 804, 15 to 808,2.

Historically important differences do not
frequently occur. The time before the battle,
while the armies lay opposite each other a short
distance away in Maskin and B&jumaira, was
employed by Abdulmalik in ente ring into corres-
pondence with the enemies' camp, just as in a
similar situation Mu&wia had done before from
the same spot. The men of Iraq had no desire
for battle, as the verse quoted on page 19 L shows.
They had never been used to discipline and
obedience, and the frightful party-struggles of
the last years had not improved them. Political
and military loyalty were absolutely unknown
to them ; they would have liked to change their
Emir every day, as a girl her suitors (Agh., 162,
17. BAthir, 265,23). It was represented to
them that they were fighting not merely for Ibn
Zubair and his brother, but for the indepen-
dence of Iraq, and that they must not let the
hungry Syrians get into their rich and luxuriant
land, but that was of no avail (Tab., 806. BA.,
265 f. Anon., 34). His best troops, under
Muhallab, had been obliged to forsake Mus'ab
in order to protect Basra from the Khaw&rij.1
Amongst the men of Basra whom he had with
him, there were the more than doubtful Eabla,
whose rising he had had to quell the year before

* Tabart, 806, BA., 265 f. Anon., 14. Chawing, pp. 36 ff.

196 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

(Tab., 807 f. Agh., 162). The greater part of his
army he had brought with him from Kufa,
whence he had started (Tab., 804 ; 807. BA.,
264 f.). The sympathies of the men of Kufa
were not on his side, and on his own part he
was only summoned of necessity by the noble
party to help them against Mukht&r; while
many hated him because he had freely spilt the
blood of Mukht&r's adherents. Thus Abdul-
malik had an easy game to play. He applied
his lever to the Kufaites. Contemporary verses
(Anon., 11 f.) which are preserved to us express
apprehension of the perfidy of the men of Kufa,
and the leaders of the army who were worked
upon by him, so far as they are mentioned by
name, were Kufaites only (An., 13, 21-23 ; 27, 14).
The district of Ispahan which he promised to
more than one as a reward for their treachery
(Anon., 13, 32) belonged to Kufa and was admin-
istered by Kufaites. Mus'ab could not make
up his mind to deal drastically with the traitors
with whom Abdulmalik was in correspondence,
and in spite of warnings let them remain in
their posts. The man who had warned him and
advised him to put them to death was Ibr&him
b. Ashtar, the conqueror in the battle on the
Kh&zir. He had delivered the letter which he
got from Abdulmalik to Mus'ab unopened, with
the remark that all the leaders had probably got
their letters as well as he, but had kept them to

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 197

themselves. He was the only faithful man of
Kufa and at the same time by far the most
prominent one, a welcome phenomenon in such
an environment, the worthy son of his father,
the conqueror of Siffin. His fall, at the very
beginning of the encounter with the enemy at
the monastery of the Catholicus, decided the
defeat of Mus'ab. 'Attab b. Warqa gave way
with the cavalry ; the rest of the chiefs or tribe-
leaders impudently refused obedience to the
field-marshal and did not lead their troops into
battle at all. Finally he was left almost alone
on the field of battle, which strange situation
itself makes the battle famous. One needs no
knowledge of tactics and strategy to understand
its course. After his son, — a mere boy, for the
father was only 36, — had fallen before his eyes
he himself, already bleeding from many arrow-
wounds, was laid low by the Thaqifite Z&ida b.
Qud&ma of Kufa with the shout,— " This is the
vengeance for Mukht&r ! " UbaiduMh b. ZiAd
b. Zaby&n severed the head from the body.

After this not very honourable victory
Abdulmalik marched into Kufa, received the
homage of the tribes and appointed his officials
over the newly subdued provinces.1 He camped
40 days in Nukhaila, at the same spot as Mu&wia
had before encamped with the Syrian army.

1 For Khurasan c/., here and in other cases, Chap. 8.

198 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Daring this time also he sent Hajj&j b. YAsuf
to the Hij&z against Ibn Zubair. So says
Haitham b. Adi in the Anonymous Work, 18,1,
with whom W&qidi agrees. He says in Tab.,
830 and An., 38 that after the fall of Mus'ab
Hajj&j was despatched to Mecca with 2,000
Syrians, and this in Jumad&, i.e., in the very
month of the battle at the monastery, or a month
later, since the name covers two months. The
year he gives as A. E. 72. He cannot, indeed,
do otherwise because the siege of Mecca, accord-
ing to him, did not begin till late in the year 72
and lasted well into the year 73. But how then
can he antedate the battle in question in the year
71 ? From the fragments of him which are
preserved to us this riddle cannot be read. The
close connection of the events in Iraq and in the
Hij&z is indisputable, and therefore so also is
the year 72 as the date of the fall of Mus'ab.

Hajj&j did not advance upon Mecca by the
straight road, according to W&qidl, but first
went to T&if, where he arrived in Sha'b&n, and
stayed several months.1 From there he had
frequent skirmishes with the adherents of Ibn
Zubair on the plain of Arafa, in which he almost
always gained the victory. He next asked
permission from the Khalifa to attack the holy
town itself, and at the same time asked for

i Masftdt, 5, 259. Anon. Ahlw., 139.

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 199

reinforcements. By Abdulmalik's orders there
came to his aid Tariq b. Amr, who had occupied
Medina and expelled from it the Stattholder of
Ibn Zubair (Tab., 818. Anon., 34 ff.). According
to W&qidi in Tab., 844 ff. the siege began on
the 1st Dhulqada, 72, i.e., 25th March, 692.
Stones were cast at the town and the sanctuary.1
A terrible storm which came on aroused religious
scruples, but Hajjaj managed to allay them.
Ibn Zubair was more and more forsaken by his
men, and finally they all laid down their arms
and were pardoned by the Syrians, amongst
them even his own sons, But he, now a man
73 years old, was ashamed of this, and after
taking leave of his mother went alone into
the last conflict and was slain (Anon., 38 ff.,
Ham., 319). According to W&qidi this took
place 6 months and 17 days after the commence-
ment of the siege (Tab., 2, 844, note /.), on
Tuesday, 17th. Jum&d& 1, 73, i.e., 18th Sept.,
692. The day of the week does not agree.
According to Tab., 851, 10 and Anon, 57 the
month was not the first Jum&d& but the second.
Elias gives Monday, 17th Jum&d&, but in this
case the day of the week does not agree either.

The fall of Mecca was only an epilogue ; 2
the Hij£z had been a lifeless province since the

7 See above, pp. 165-6.

* Poetioal congratulation! upon this are in Hudh., 269, 17 ff. ;
pronounce Wafaddi.

200 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

murder of TJthm&n and could not be again made
the centre-point of the political life. Doubtless
this was Ibn Zubair's intention, an intention he
was bound to have from the kind of movement
through which he was brought to the front.1
At the same time he put forward the holy
character of his Khalifate by not leaving the
sanctuary in which he had taken refuge, even
when the world was open to him. But the
result was that in the Fitna which is called after
him, he himself was quite in the background ;
the struggle turned round him nominally, but
he took no part in it and it was decided without
him. Even in Arabia itself he had for years less
influence than the Kh&rijite Najda (Tab., 737,8.
Obawarig, pp. 29 ff.). Finally he was located in
the building where he kept himself in hiding,
and dragged forth, and so the great Fitna was
ended and the Jamaa again restored.

* See fcboye, p. 164.

CHAPTER IV.
THE FIRST MARWANIDS.

The storms in Iraq did not cease, however,
with the termination of the long warfare against
Ibn Zubair ; as we shall see, they lasted through-
out almost the whole reign of Ahdulmalik.
In Syria too, the quarrels of the Qais and the
Kalb caused further unrest. To be sure,
Zufar b. Harith in Qarqisi& had laid down his
arms in the year in which Mus'ab fell, but that did
not put an end to the tribal feud which out-
lasted the great war. In order to deal with it
in its proper connection we must go back to
Marj R&hit (Agh., 11, 61, 31). In this savage
battle the Qais suffered most heavily, and
according to Arab ideas they were bound to
make good their losses from the conquerors ;
they had their revenge to seek, and it was they
who were the aggressors, while the Kalb only
retaliated. On the side of the Qais the princi-
pal part was taken by the Amir and Sulaim,
along with the Ghani and the B&hila,1 as far as
these tribes had settled in Northern Syria and
Southern Mesopotamia, on both sides of the

1 B Athlr, 4, 256, 10, 15 ; 258, 18 ; 259, 17 ; 260, 24. In 256, 10
read A'$ur as at 256, 15,

26

202 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Euphrates. On the side of the Kalb were the
rest of the Qudaa,1 but only the Kalb seern to
have gone into action. The sources of the single
and sometimes widely separated " days " in
which the tedious feud ran its course are con-
temporary songs and tales connected with them,
which are preserved to us in Ibn Athlr and
the Kitdb-al-Aghdni, in the Ilamdsa and in
Mad&ini. The accounts are mostly quite reliable
though partly without connection and chrono-
logy, but there are threads to be grasped which
enable us to arrange them in tolerable order.

The feud, according to Agh., #0, 120 if., was
begun by Zufar b. Harith al-Kilabi in Qarqisia,
the leader of the 'Amir, making a sudden attack
upon a settlement of the Kalbites in Musaijakh
and killing 20 of their men. The Kalb, headed
by Humaid b. Huraith b. Bahdal,2 retaliated by
slaughtering 60 Numairites who lived amongst
them in Tadmor. Thereupon Zufar is said to
have murdered 500 or even 1,000 Kalbitns on
the day of Iklll, and after this feat to have got
off scatheless into safety at Qarqisia, Humaid
being unable to reach him. In another place
(122, 17 ff.), however, the attack of Iklii is
ascribed not to Zufar but to Umair b. Hub&b,
the leader of the Sulaim, who certainly from

1 In one of Zufar's versos in BAthlr, 256, 18 the Qudaa are already
called Yemenites.

2 With whom the Scholion to Hamaaa confuses him, 668, v. 2.

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 203

that time appears as the real avenger of the
Qais against the Kalb. Zufar was withdrawn
from the blood-feud in the desert by the great
struggle between Syria and the Iraq for the
Khalifate, being first exposed to the attacks of
Abdulmalik, which he withstood, as we have
seen, for several years, as warden of the marches
for Mus'ab, on whom he depended.

The entrance of Umair affords a chronologi-
cal starting point, for in the battle on the KMzir
he was in the Syrian army and not till then
did he join Zufar, i.e., not before the year 67.
Quite a number of " days " are given on which
he wreaked vengeance, named after different
places of the Samawa. At Kaaba, Humaid on
his swift steed had a narrow escape from him,
and the Kalb, who dwelt within the area of his
raids, at last left this district and emigrated for
a while to Palestine into the Ghor.

Then Umair also went back over the
Euphrates and settled with his Sulaimites
on the Khaboras. It was through this that the
Christian Taghlib, whose settlements there extend-
ed as far as the Tigris and beyond it, came into
contact with the Qais, and they approached
Zufar with the request that he should command
the Sulaim to vacate the Khaboras, as they had
taken the liberty to encroach and had caused
friction. Zufar did not see his way to this, and
so a feud arose between the Taghlib and the

204 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Sulaim. Zufar did what he could to allay it,
as he did not want to drive the Taghlib into the
arms of the Syrians, but Umair, that author of
misfortune, did the very opposite. He got
round Mus'ab, represented to him that the
Taghlib, being Christians, were under suspicion
of sympathy with the Syrians, and managed to
get permission to act against them in the name
of the government of Ibn Zubair and to give
free course to his hostility. At Maids or Maki-
sln he committed great slaughter amongst them.
With this the report of Agh., 20,120 ff., breaks
off, but the continuation is found in BAthir,
4,255 ff. and Agh., 11,51 f. ; 61 f. We learn that
Zufar also was dragged into the struggle al-
together against his will, Many surprise attacks
and encounters followed, the scenes of them,
also mentioned in the songs of Akhtal,1 being on
the Khabor and the Balikh, on the Tharthar and
in the region of the Tigris The Taghlib mostly got
the worst of it, but near Hashak on the river
Tharth&r, which flows into the Tigris from the
south, not far from Takrlt, they certainly were
the victors, slew Umair in A.H. 70 and sent his
head to Abdulmalik at Damascus. But then
Zufar, finding himself compelled to take up
the revenge for Umair, dealt the Taghlib a
severe blow near the town of Kuhail on the

1 I was not then able to take into consideration Qut&mt, ed. Barth.

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 205

Tigris and executed 200 prisoners who had fallen
into his hands. The great events of the years
71 and 72, the scene of which was Mesopotamia,
then put an end to the bloody minor war and
saved the Taghlib.

The feud between the Kalb and the Qais,
however, afterwards broke out again at another
place, qf. Hamasa, '260 IT.; Mad&inl,1 14, 85 ; Agh.,
17, 113if.; Yaqut? 1, 739. Humaid b. Huraith
b. Bahdal, the former leader of the Kalb in the
war with Umair,3 seized the opportunity to
make the Fazfira in Arabia proper, — their head-
quarters lay to the east of Medina, — atone for
the offences, on the Euphrates, of the Sulaim and
'Amir, whom he could not harm. These Fazfira
had hitherto taken no part in the feud at all,
but they also belonged to the great group of the
Qais, and some of them, members of its old
princely house who had taken up their domicile
in Kufa, had at any rate lent Zufar and Umair
their assistance (BAthir. i, 258, 19 f.). Humaid
got Khalid, son of the Khalifa Yaztd, whose
grandmother was a Kalbite, to prepare for him
a patent in the name of Abdulmalik, commis-
sioning him to collect the cattle-tax from certain
tribes. As plenipotentiary of the government

1 The translation in Freytag leaves much to be desired.

2 Itm Hablb in Madainl wrongly names his father Huraifch instead
of him ; on the other hand see Ham., 260, v. 2; Agh., 17, p. 113 at the
bottom, and 114, 28.

£06 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

he then marched through the desert with a
gigantic following of the Kalbite clans Abdwudd
and *Ulaim, and let the Faz&ra, who were his
real objective, feel his power. On trifling pre-
texts he perpetrated dreadful acts of violence
against them ; several were wounded and killed,
particularly at a place called 'Ah. Those con-
cerned now carried their complaint to Abdul-
malik, who thought he did enough in giving
them recompense in money for the blood that
had been shed. They took the money, but with
it purchased weapons and horses and equipped
themselves for a campaign of vengeance. They
then surprised a camp of the Kalb near the
Wells of BamU Qain in the Sarn&wa, and killed
19 men of the Abdwudd and 50 of the Ulaim.
Abdulmalik was very angry at this and ordered
his stattholder Hajj&j to exact compensation
from the Eaz&ra, whereupon the two chief
offenders averted the impending disaster from
their people by voluntarily giving themselves
up, and the Kalbites had to be satisfied with
their execution. The attack of Banat Qain is
the most celebrated "day" in the whole feud
between Qais and Kalb. Hajiaj was already
stattholder of Medina when it took place (A H. 73
and 74), and the cause of it, namely, the massacre
at 'Ah, cannot be placed much earlier.1 The

1 Of course it is not absolutely impossible for it to have happened
in the period before the restoration of the Jamaa, as Ibn Hablb gives

THE FIRST MARWAN1DS 207

supposition found in all the versions of the
narrative that the two hostile brothers Bishr
and Abdulaziz, sons of Mar wan, were in Damas-
cus on the day of Banat Qain and even after-
wards, is therefore erroneous ; the one had long
been stattholder of Kufa, the other stattholder
of Egypt. They might at most have been for
a time on a visit to the court.

The feud between the Sulaim and the Tagh-
lib had yet another sequel when the dispute over
the Khalifate was ended and peace had long
been restored in the realm ; cf. Agh., 11, 59 if. ;
BAthir, 4,, 261 ff. The poet Akhtal stirred it
up again by boasting at the court of Abdulmalik
of the prowess of his clansmen the Taghlib,
to the Sulaimite Jahhaf b. Hukaim, who had
himself under Umair taken part in the fights
against the Taghlib. Jahhaf then did exactly
the same as the Kalbite Humaid had done
before. Ha contrived to get a patent made out
for himself by which he was appointed tax-
collector in the district of the Mesopotamian
Taghlib and Bakr, in which official capacity he
started for Mesopotamia with a considerable band
of Qaisite cavalry. On the way he disclosed to
them his real intention, namely, to spill as much
Taghlibite blood as possible, and concluded with
the words: "You have the choice between hell,

it in Madaint. But Dozy, 1, 120, is quite wrong in putting the day
of Banat Qain into Muawia's time.

•208 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

if you follow me, and disgrace if you dont."
They preferred hell to disgrace and followed
him, surprised the Taghlib in A.H. 73 at Bishr
(or Rah&b) and made fearful havoc among them.
In this attack they also killed a son of Akhtal
and captured him himself, but let him go
because they took him for a menial. After this
Jahhaf fled into the territory of the Romans.
On the intercession of the Qaisites, Abduimalik
permitted him to return after a considerable
time, but he had to pay atonement-money to
the Taghlib for the bloodshed at Bishr. As
his means were not equal to this, he asked the
man at that time most powerful among the
Qais, namely Hajjaj, to come forward on his
behalf and undertake the payment, which the
latter, after refusing for some time, eventually
did. In the end Jahh&f became pious, under-
took, by way of a penitential expedition, along
with his accomplices, with rings in their noses,
the pilgrimage to Mecca, and there prayed
desperately for forgiveness.

We see that the Arabs in the Syrian and
Mesopotamian steppe had remained unchanged
under the new conditions. Neither Islam nor
Christianity kept them from making the tribe
and revenge paramount. They preferred hell to
disgrace and only felt remorse when it was too
late. Their conduct was even more cruel than
it had been before in their heathenism and their

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 209

old home, and they committed murder in a more
wholesale and ruthless manner. They slaughtered
the female prisoners, a custom not usual in Arabia
proper but attested to in Syria by the prophet
Amos. Even after the struggle over the king-
dom was decided and peace restored, the
barbarous conduct still went on before the gates
of the capital, under the Khalifa's very eyes,
and occasionally under pretext of his authority.

A second crater of the tribal-hatred yawned
in the far East. In Basra the old tension
between the Tamim and the Rabia was increased
by the immigration of the Azd Um&n, which
took place in the latter years of Mu&wia and
under Yazld I. The Rabla allied themselves
with the Azd, and on the other hand, the Tamim
joined with the Qais, so that here also two great
groups arose, and the feud broke out in the town
during the interregnum after the death of Yazld.
The stattholder, Ubaidull&h b. ZM had to flee;
Mas'ud b. Amr, the chief of the Azd, intended
to occupy his post, and by a trick seized the
citadel and the mosque with the aid of the Azd
and the Rabla, but while he was standing in
the pulpit in the mosque the Tamim rushed in,
tore him down and slew him. Blood-revenge
for the slain head of the tribe was now imminent,
but the wise leader of the Tamim, old Ahnaf,
managed to restore peace upon the payment of
a large sum of compensation-money. Still the

27

210 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

hatred between the parties remained, and it
broke out in Khur&s&n, then a Basrian colony,
whither the tribal relations passed on from
Basra. There the feuds were always blazing
out anew, first between the Tamlm and the
Rabia, and then, after the Azd, through Muhallab,
had also appeared on the scene, in Khur£s&n,
between the Mudar (Tamim and Qais) and the
Yemen (Azd and Rabia). The dualism of the
eastern groups at last united with that of the
western, mainly through the fault of the Qais,
who were equally represented in west and
east, and stuck together everywhere like pitch
and sulphur. It tried to absorb the other
opposing parties and to polarise the entire
Arabian world.

This tendency also weakened the ruling
circles, and it was difficult to keep clear of it.
What was a stattholder to do when the Qais
claimed him as their own ! If he rejected them
he robbed himself of their support and fell
between two stools. Even the princes at
A bdulmalik's court took sides, sometimes even
passionately, according as they had leanings
through their mother to the one side or the
other.

Now indeed the political idea of Islam, the
unity and solidarity of Muhammad's congre-
gation, made a counter-movement. Its born
representatives were the Quraish, who stood, by

THE EIRST MARWANIDS

right, above the tribes and outside of the rivalry.
To be sure, the ruling Quraish, the Umaiya,
had had to throw themselves into the arms of
the Kalb in Syria, in order to maintain their
sway against the Qais, who were on the side of
Zubair, but for all that the ties of: blood bound
them to the Qais,1 and so it became easier for
them to take up a middle position. Abdulmalik,
recognising his advantage, endeavoured to keep
himself above the parties, and after the Qais
had given up their opposition to him he treated
them kindly and tried to conciliate them.
Zufar b. H&rith and his sons Hudhail and
Kauthar after him were amongst the most
eminent and notable people at the court of
Damascus.2 The Kalb, naturally, were dis-
pleased at this, but their reproaches against
Abdulmalik that lie was not grateful enough
to them (Ham&sa, 656 II) are really a eulogy of
him. The assertion that he went over from
the Kalb to the Qais puts the facts of the case
quite falsely. Even later we find around him
men still influential in the Kalbite group,

1 " If ifc wore not for the Khalifa, Qudaa would bo master and Qais
servant," Tab., 487, 19 f. The Khalifa is reckoned as belonging to the
Qais (475, 18) since he at least belonged, like them, to Mudar and
not to Qudaa or* Yemen.

8 C/. Tab., 2, 1300, 1360 f, 1455. Anon. Ahlw., 173, 253, Aghant, 16,
42, 158 f . We see from this how powerful the position of these Qaisite
princes continued to be even under the Uinaiyids, but they did not
abuse it,

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

.g.9 Ibn Bahdal himself and Rauh b. Zinb&.
Abdulmalik acted as he was bound to act, being
Khalifa and a politician. The Umaiyids relied
upon the Syrians; with their help they had
subdued the whole Muslim kingdom, and with
their help they held it. It was all over with
their rule over the kingdom if the foundation of
it no longer held together, — namely if there was
a split in Syria. At that time Khur&s&n was yet
in the background and the schism in that distant
region so far affected the centre but little. But
it was different with Syria. The feeling that
they had to hold with the dynasty in order to
keep their own position could not be disregarded
even by the Syrian Arabs themselves. It
worked against the tribal dualism ; the other
provinces were subdued ; their land was the
ruling one ; even the material interest in the
possession of the Khalifate and the government
lent them a feeling of political solidarity, which
chiefly expressed itself when they, as an
imperial army, had to fight against the internal
and external foes of the monarchy — for which
abundant opportunity was given them.

2. In order to strengthen the political
supremacy of Syria still more, an attempt was
made to transfer the centre of the cult thither
also. A motive for this was found in the fact
that the chief holy place of Mecca had been
occupied by Ibn Zubair for nearly a decade and

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 213

was therefore hardly accessible to the Syrians*
if they remained faithful to their dynasty, and
Abdulmalik used this as a pretext to forbid,
absolutely the undertaking of the pilgrimage
to Mecca by his subjects and to insist upon their
making a pilgrimage to Jerusalem instead. So at
least Eutychius reports.1 There is no doubt
that Abdulmalik tried hard to invest Jerusalem
with greater splendour as a Muslim place of
worship, for the tradition that he was the
founder of its Dome of the Rock is certified by
the inscription still preserved in the oldest part
of the building. To be sure, the Abb&sid Mamftn
is now named there as the builder, but de Vogue
observed that this name has been falsified.2
The old date has escaped alteration, and the
original purport of the words may therefore be
accepted with certainty as follows : " The
servant of God, Abdulmalik, the Emir of the
Faithful, built this Qubba in the year 72." In
Jerusalem Syria possessed the only spot on earth
which could compete with Mecca (Tab., 1666, 3).
It was the Holy of Holies, not only of the Jews
and Christians, but originally of the Muslims
also. Muhammad only established Mecca in

1 Annales, ed. Pecoks, 2, 365. Eutychius relates the same thing
of Marw&n (2, 362), and a similar thing of Walld I (2, 373).

* Temple de Jerusalem, 1864, p,, 35 f . Cf. also Gildemeister in the
Zeitschr. des Deutschen Pal&stinave reins, 1890, p. 14 j the printer's errors
in the numbers are not to be put to the account of the author who wad
dead by the time it was printed.

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

its place later by way of a timely compromise
with the Arabian heathendom. The Khalifa Umar
had honoured it by his visit and thus excited
the envy of the Iraqites. Mu&wia had himself
first proclaimed there as Khalifa, and on that
occasion prayed at Golgotha, Gethsemane and
the grave of Mary. Nevertheless Abdulmalik
gave up his idea of putting Jerusalem in the
place of Mecca, --if he ever had it, — as soon as he
was no longer confined to Syria. For the whole
congregation of the Prophet is seemed hope-
lessly unattainable.1 But on the other hand he
made another attempt later on to enhance the
attractions of Syria as a place of worship at the
expense of Medina. Before his time, Mu&wia,
in A.H. 50, had already made preparations to
remove the pulpit of the Prophet from Medina
and convey it to Syria, but as a general distur-
bance arose and the sun was darkened, he had
let it alone, saying : " I wanted just to see
whether it was not worm-eaten." Abdulmalik
had the same plan in his mind, but his Keeper of ;
the Seal persuaded him to abandon it. Then his
son, Walid I, is said to have tried it once more,
but likewise in vain (Tab., 2,923, according to
W&qidl). The Umaiyids did not need to observe
such regard for Medina as for Mecca. The town

1 Khalid al Qasri indeed is said to have declared that if the Khalifa
ordered it he would remove the Ka'ba and rebuild it in Jerusalem
(Agh., 19, €0).

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 215

had oftentimes manifested its hostility towards
them, and had finally driven the whole of them
outside its walls, for which they bore it a grudge.
Abdulmalik seems to have even appointed its
stattholders sometimes in his wrath : amongst
them the Hakhzftmite Hish&m b. Ism&il
(appointed A.H. 82) was noted for special
villainy.

From the beginning Abdulmalik's relations
to Islam were different from those of his prede-
cessors. He was born and bred in it, nay more,
he was brought up in the very town of the
Prophet, where the tradition which started with
the Prophet and continued in the history of the
theocracy was zealously cherished and made the
subject of a professional guild. In his youth
he had himself taken a deep interest in these
pious studies and might rank as a Hafiz of the
Qoran. With his accession to the throne a
change is said to have come over him (Anon.
Ahlw., 164, 167, 190). Certainly, from that
time onwards, he subordinated everything to
policy, and even exposed the Ka'ba to the danger
of destruction. But from policy likewise did
he beware of injuring the religious feelings of
his subjects in the careless fashion of Yazid ; he
understood them far more intimately than the
latter and therefore knew better how to spare
them. The pious Raj& b. Haiwa alKindi, of
whom we shall hear more, was already influential

216 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

with him,1 He had a man put to death for
asserting, in defiance of Muhammad, that he
was a prophet (An,, 253). According to
Eutyehius, 2, 365 he even wanted to incorporate
the Church of St. John in Damascus with the
mosque near which it was situated, but refrained
from doing so out of consideration for the
Christians. We have not sufficient materials to
estimate his further relations with his Christian
subjects, but at any rate Christianity did not
prejudice in his eyes the Taghlib and their poet
Akhtal. The slaughter of the swine in Syria,
mentioned by Theophanes under A.M. 6186 no
doubt was caused by hostility to the Christians,
but did not originate with the Khalifa.

Where Islam coincided with Arabism it was
convenient to the ruler and could easily be
made to serve the ends of the kingdom. After
Abdulmalik had got the better of his rivals, he
again resumed the holy war against the Romans,
which had been at rest for close on 15 years/
Justinian II was defeated near Cilician Sebaste
or Sebastopolis in the year 73 of the Flight,
which year began at the end of May, 692.
Abdulmalik's field-marshal was his brother

1 Anon., 193. He is even said to have been treasurer at the build-
ing of the Dome of the Book in Jerusalem j Zeitschr. des Deutschen pa&.
vereinst 1890, p. 21,

2 Odttinger Nachrichten, 1901, pp. 431 ff. The war began anew in
Africa also ( Yfchyft, pp, 484 ft.).

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 217

Muhammad b. Marw&n, stattholder of
Mesopotamia and Armenia, who also had charge
of the conduct of the war in Asia Minor and
Armenia. As in Muftwia's time, a greater and
a smallar campaign were undertaken year by
year against the Romans, which, if they had no
further result, were at least a useful school for
the Arabs of Syria and Mesopotamia, whom they
kept constantly in military exercise. A measure
connected with the re-opening of hostilities
against the Romans, which conciliated the
religious as well as the national interests, was
the transformation of the coinage by Abdulmalik.
BalMhurl accounts for it as follows (240 ; 465tf.)
Paper came to the Romans from Egypt, but on
the other hand the dinars of gold came to
the Arabs from the Romans. Upon the sheets
of paper there had formerly been Christian
inscriptions and the sign of the Cross, as
watermarks, but under Abdulmalik the Qoran
verse " Say — He alone is God " was substituted.
The Romans threatened to retaliate by stamping
uponthedinars sayings abusing the Prophet, so the
Arabs then stamped gold themselves. Abdulmalik
began it in Damascus in A.H. 74, and Hajj&j's
stamping of silver began in Kufa at the end
of A.H. 75. Up till then Greek gold and Persian
silver were in circulation, and a few Himyarite
silver coins, (with the Attic owl upon them).
W&qidl, indeed, in, Tab., 2,939, says Abdulmalik
28

a 18 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

did not begin to stamp the silver drachms and
golden dinars till A.H. 76, but if Theophanes'
statement were correct that Justinian II's rejec-
tion of the Damascene golden coins caused the
re-opening of the war between the Muslims and
Romans, then Baladhurl's dating would need
to be put forward rather than back. The new
coins were struck in the name of All&h and bore,
as superscription, sayings from the Qoran
proclaiming his absolute power and the omni-
potence of his Messenger. } The Arabs certainly
stamped gold and silver also before Abdulmalik's
time, but according to Roman and Persian types.
It seems, moreover, that Mu&wia tried to do
what Abdulmalik succeeded in doing, for
according to Noldeke's Syrian, Mu&wia struck
gold and silver money, but it was not accepted
because there was no cross upon it. Even
Abdulmalik's gold coins were at first regarded
with suspicion, especially in Medina (Bal., 466f.)
because they only weighed the same as the old
worn dinars.2

1 The pious reproached Hajjaj with patting his own name on
the legends after the name of God.

8 Gf. again BAthtr, 4, 337f. That it was found impossible to
introduce a real uniformity of coinage and measures into the Islamic
kingdom is shown by an utterance ascribed to the Prophet in Yahya
b. Adam, Kit&b alKhar&j, p. 52 1 " Iraq obstinately sticks to its dirham
and qafiz, Syria to its dinar and modius, and Egypt to its dinar and
ardab ; ye are returning to your old divisions and lack of unity, to the
old particularism,"

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 219

A corresponding attempt to become more
independent of foreign influence was the intro-
duction of the Arabic language in the ministry,
i.e. in the exchequer, for the stability of the
government administration was essentially con-
fined to finance. So far the official business of
accounts in Damascus was done in Greek, in Kufa
in Persian. According to Baladhuri, 300f . (Fihrist,
242) the change to Arabic seems to have begun
at Kufa. Zadanfarrfikh b. Piri1 or his son
Mard&nsh&h was the last Persian clerk, His
assistant, Salih b. Abdurrahman, offered to
Hajj&j to do the reckoning in Arabic and
managed it, too, though the expression of the
fractions gave him trouble, for apparently figures
were not used in Kufa. The reason why the
government office became " arabianised " in
Damascus also is curiously given by Bal&dhuri,
p. 19!i. Because of an offence committed by
a Greek clerk Abdulmalik resolved to make
everything connected wth the office Arabian.
Sulaim&n b. Said, who got the commission,
completed it in a year's time and received as a
reward the ground-tax of Urdunn for one year,
amounting to 180,000 dinars. The Greek and
Persian system was, of course, retained and only
the language changed, and doubtless the existing
- Greek and Persian officials who were acquainted

1 Tab., 2, 1034. Anon. Ahlw., 343. 362.

220 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

with Arabic, also remained. S&lih b.
Abdurrahman, who initiated the change in Kufa,
was himself an Iranian from Sajist&n (Bal&dh.,
393, 15), but it was necessary to know Greek
and Persian in order to be able to turn them
into Arabic. In Damascus, even under
Abdulmalik, the Greek Sergius kept the
influential position which he had had under
Mu&wia and Yazid (Tab., 837, 11). Theophanes,
who ascribes the replacing of the Greek govern-
ment official language by the Arabic first to
Walid I,1 (A. M. 6199), says the Greek numerals
had to be retained by the Arabs and their
notaries were still Christians, — and indeed the
Christian privy-councillors in the time of the
Abbasids, in which the chronicler writes, were
more influential, more powerful and more detested
than ever. Besides, the Arabs generally were
regarded as useless for the management of taxes
(Tab., 458. 1470), for other reasons besides a
mere lack of technical knowledge.

One has the impression that Abdulmalik
put the government on a somewhat different
footing in other respects as well It evidently
became more technical and hierarchical, though
not to anything like the same extent as the
Abbasid government did later on. Certain high

1 In A. M. 87 Walid introduced the Arabic pulpit-language intc
Egypt, not, however, in place of the Greek, but instead of the Coptic
(Maqrtat, Khitat, 1, 98).

THE FIRST MARWiNIDS 221

offices are first mentioned under him, though of
course it does not necessarily follow that they
were not in existence before, but this much is
certain, that for him, the title Trpwrocrvjui/JoiAos is
no longer fitting, — the title which is characteristic
of the first Khalifas. With his officials he assum-
ed a strict and almost rough manner, even
with the highly, deserving Hajjaj, whom he
treated very differently from the way in which
Muawia treated his Zi&d. Even with the emi-
nent men whom he, according to old custom,
gathered into his society and council, he did not
establish such a free intercourse with himself
as had Mu&wia, whose spiritual superiority was
able to carry it off. The much-lauded amiabili-
ty of the Sufy&nid regents, which in their
case, as with the old-Arab Saiyid, was more a
virtue than an innate good quality, was a
characteristic neither of him nor of his succes-
sors, for he proved to be a strict master (Anon.,
178).

When his Khalifate came into question he
let every consideration go to the winds. His
cousin, Amr b. Said, who attempted to claim
it, he cut off practically by his own hand, while
the death of his brother Abdulazlz, who opposed
the succession of his sons, spared him the
necessity of putting him out of the way. For
the rest, he gave his TJmaiyid relations a larger
share in the enjoyment of power than his

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

predecessors had allowed them. To begin with,
practically all the stattholderships were in their
hands. In Egypt and Africa Abdulazlz ruled,
possibly in virtue of a testamentary arrangement
of old Marw&n, who had caused homage to be
paid to him as the successor after Abdulmalik.1
Muhammad b. Marwan received Mesopotamia
and Armenia, an important charge on account
of the wars with the Homans. Kufa and after-
wards Basra also were entrusted to Bishr b.
Marw&n, still a mere youth, and before that
another Umaiyid had administered Basra, name-
ly, Kh&lid, the grandson of Asld. At the court
the Umaiyids, since they had emigrated with
Marw&n from Medina to Damascus, presented
a far larger contingent of representatives than
before ; even Kh&lid, the son of the Khalifa
Yazid, played a part there. Abdulmalik sought
to console him for his unjust exclusion from the
succession by bringing him near to himself
and giving him his daughter in marriage.
He himself married a daughter of Yazid,
Atika by name, who became his favourite wife
and was allowed to order him about a good
deal.

1 Marwan antequam morerctur...Aegyptum vel ( = ct) ulterioris
Aefchiopiae partos, Tripoleos Africae ot usque ad Gaditana freta adjacen-
tes provinoias Habellaziz filio dereliquit, — so it runs in the Cont. B. A.t
par. 29. The demand that the tax of Egypt should be delivered up to
him was an insult offered to Abdulaziz by Abdulmalik (Anon., 239),
Abdulaziz was born of another mother (16., 261).

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 223

Numerous anecdotes about this, the most
celebrated Khalifa of the Umaiyid dynasty, are
served up in the Anonymous Work of Ahlwardt.
They enhance our personal knowledge of him
and also supply all sorts of interesting material,
e.g. about the places where Abdulmalik resided
in turn according to the season of the year, about
his wives and family, his regular daily business
and his care for the education of his sons, his
preferences and his weaknesses, his defects, — e.g.
his offensive breath, and his nicknames. He grew
old early and died at Damascus aged 60, on
Thursday, 14th 8hauw&l, 86 (9th October, 705).1

Abdulmalik is called the " father of the
kings" because four of his sons succeeded to the
rule after him, and only two of the later Umaiyid
Khalifas were not directly descended from him.
His brother, Abdulazlz of Egypt, had been
designated to be his successor, and homage
rendered to him accordingly. Abdulmalik did
all he could to induce him to renounce his claim
so as to be able to divert the kingdom to his
own heirs, but in vain ; the latter would neither

1 Following Abu Ma'shar in Tab., 2, 1172 (Of. Anon., 2(54), Waqidi
names Thursday in the middle of Shauwal ns the day of his doith •
according to Wustenfeld the Thursday fell on the 14th. of the month,
and in Elias Nisibenus there is the same date. His age is given by
Madaini in Tab., 1173 and by the Anonymous Author as 62 or 63 years ;
by Abu Ma'shar in Tab. as 60, and by W&qidt upon other authorities
as only 58 (Tab., 1153. Anon., 165, and the same also in the proper
reading, Anon., 152). The number 60 lies at the root of the statement
in Tab., 467.

224 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

be frightened nor cajoled. Fortunately, how-
ever, he died before the Khalifa (Tab., 1165. Of.
1171), and then the latter's eldest son Walld I
came into the succession. Under him Arabian
arms received a fresh impulse : Tyana was taken
after a long siege, and a great campaign against
Constantinople itself was begun. A second
period of great conquests commenced and
Transoxiania and Spain were subdued. In the
interior peace reigned at last and Walid enjoyed
the fruits of his father's work. He followed in
his footsteps and held firmly to the much-detest-
ed stattholder of the East, namely Hajj&j,
who in a certain respect directed the government
of the Khalifas whom he served. He attached
great importance to appearing as a lord and
master, and is said to have been the first Khalifa
who made a parade of his majesty (Anon., 243).
Expressions which remind one of " oderint modo
metuant " are put into his mouth (Tab., 1178)
He advanced Islam as t >e imperial religion, bul
he may have had a deeper relation to it as well
He put an end to the harassing of the Pious ai
Medina by the stattholder Hish£m b. Ism&il,
appointing in his place his cousin Umar b,
Abdulazlz, a man after the heart of the scholars
of the Scripture (Tab., 1182fif.), and he emphat-
ically insisted upon knowledge of the Qoran in
the case of everyone (Tab., 1271), though he, to
bis father's sorrow, no longer spoke the old

THE FIRST MABWANIDS 225

Arabic in which the holy Book is written (Anon.,
236f. 260). He carried out a plan which his
father had already had in his mind hut is said
to have abandoned, namely he took from the
Christians in Damascus the Church of St. John,
enlarged, by means of it, the chief mosque
which was adjoining and restored the latter in a
magnificent style in A. H. 84 (Bal., 1 25f . Tab.,
1275). He removed the gilded cupola of brass
from a Christian church in Baalbekk and placed
it on the mosque of Jerusalem, over the holy
rock (Eutych., 2, 373), and he also had the
mosque of Medina completely rebuilt (Bal&dh ,
67). To be sure, he annoyed the Pious by do-
ing so, and likewise by the fact that at the
speech from the pulpit which he held there in
the year 91, he did not stand, but remained
sitting, as he was accustomed to do at home
(Tab., 1233). He had a penchant for build-
ings of all kinds as well as for the laying-out
and improvement of covLtry estates, and he
infected his immediate circle with it (Tab., 1272).
Hajj&j supplied him with Indian buffaloes for
the marshy region at the bay of Issus. But
he also cared for the helpless and endowed the
lepers, the blind and the lame ; so that they did
not need to beg (Tab., 1271). The Syrians
profited most by him and regarded him as the
best of all their Khalifas (Tab., 1271, 3). It is
difficult to believe that he took the side of the
29

226 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

Qais against the Kalb in Syria, for he had no
need to do so, and it is not reported by the old
historians. We cannot conclude from them
that his mother Wallftda was a Qaisite (Anon.,
172, 191f. Ham., 672) and that the Qaisite
Hajj£j was his right hand. The later writers
are inclined to gather all the actors under the
one rubric or the other, and Dozy follows their
lead, Walid died in the middle of Jum&d& II,
96, on a Saturday, aged about 40. The 13th
Jum&d& II (23rd February, 715) was a Saturday.1
3. Iraq, which was the scene of the real
history of Islam in this period also, was during
the Khalifate of Abdulmalik and Walld for long
years under the Thaqifite Hajj&j b. Yftsuf b.
Hakam, who has been frequently mentioned
already and who had first proved his merit in
Mecca and Medina. Heavy tasks awaited him
when summoned to Iraq. The province was in
a tumult of unrest to its very core, and not
merely so because of the lengthy struggle about
the Khalifate. In Kufa the great rising of the
Shia allied to the Maw&li under Mukht&r was
certainly stamped out, but it left a smouldering
trail in men's minds.2 Basra was still not rid

1 " The middle of the month " did not perhaps in older times
exactly signify the 15th. of the month, as it is usually made out to be.
Klias Nis., however, givea Sunday, 14th Jumada II, 96, as the day of
Walld'a death.

9 Shia, p. 74ff.

THE FIRST MARWiNIDS 227

of the Khaw&rij,1 who for years had been threat-
ening it before its very gates ; Mus'ab had not
been able to overcome them. They crippled him
in the struggle with the Syrians, for on their
account he had to leave behind his best warriors
to protect Basra. When he was conquered by
Abdulmalik and fell far away on the Tigris,
Muhallab was in the field against the Az&riqa.
He summed up the situation and placed himself
at the disposal of the victor, who valued him as
he deserved. But the Umaiyid princes whom
he, as stattholder, sent into Iraq, would only
have been fit for a sinecure. Khalid b. Asid,
who came to Basra, set Muhallab aside, first
taking over himself the leadership of the war
against the dangerous fanatics and then entrust-
ing it to his brother. The result was severe
defeats of the imperial troops, and the Khalifa
had to interfere himself in order to restore
Muhallab to the position to which he belonged.
But it was not of much avail for him to depose
Kh&lid and hand over Basra also to his brother
Bishr at Kufa, for Bishr, a vain youth, did no
better t ban his predecessor, and was jealous of
M uhallab because the latter received his com-
mando direct from the Khalifa, and not from him.
In obedie nee to higher orders, he certainly re-
inforced hi m with Kufaite troops, but expressly
insisted that their leader should refuse subordina-

Ghawany, p. 32ff.

228 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

tion to Muhallab, and it was no fault of his
if the latter would not be induced to agree to
this but shook his head at the foolish boy.
Fortunately he died in A.H. 74 ! and Abdulmalik
then, to the joy of Muhallab, sent Hajj&j into
Iraq, where he arrived at the beginning of the
year 75. 2 Such, in essentials, is the account of
Abft Mikhnaf in Tabari, 821 ff. ; 855 if.

Hajjaj began his career in Kufa with an
introductory speech which is no less famous
than that of his countryman and predecessor in
office, Zi&d, in Basra. The report of it in Tab.,
863 ft', comes from Umar b. Shabba (according
to Abft Ghassan and Mad&ini), and with it are to
be compared the accounts in Anon. Ahlw., 266
ff., and in Kdmil, 665f. An unknown and obs-
cure young man stepped into the pulpit and for
a long time seemed to find no words to say.
One of the audience picked up a handful of
gravel 3 to throw at him, but it slipped quietly
out of his hand whenever the apparently help-
less speaker opened his mouth. The first duty
of the new stattholder was to restore the disci-
pline of the garrisons of Kufa and Basra, who
had taken the death of Bishr as a signal to leave
Muhallab's camp in B&mhurmuz without per-

1 Ace. to Waqidi in Tab., 852, 8 ; 854, 1 as early as A.H. 73, but
this is impossible.

8 But not only in Ramadan, as Tab., 872 has it. Cf. 944, 9 ; 876,
3. Anon Ahlw., 270, 1.

3 So Ziad seems not to have cleared away all the stones.

THE FIRST MARWiNIDS 229

mission. It did not suit them to be so long in the
field, far away from their wives and children,
when they were accustomed to a luxurious life at
home (Tab., 865, 12ff.). Hajj*Vj announced at once
to the Kufaites from the pulpit, — " Whoever
of those deserters from the standard still shows
his face after three days in the town, his life
and property shall be forfeited," and as he could
emphasise the threat it was effective. In the
same way as he had entered Kufa he next
entered Basra, and with the same success.
Those whose duty it was thronged over the
Tigris bridge to get back to Hamhurmuz, and
he himself accompanied them as far as the
general camp of Rustaqabad, where, in Sha'ban,
75, he had to quell a rebellion which had broken
out because of a reduction in the pay, which
according to Anon. Ahlw., 280ff. was far more
dangerous than appears from the brief notice
given it in Tab., 879. And now the war against
the Az&riqa could be carried on with ample
means, though, as a matter of fact, fully two
years more passed before they were quite anni-
hilated.1

The Az&riqa in the East were not yet sub-
dued when there arose in the beginning of 76
other Khaw&rij in the west of Iraq, who were
distinguished by the fact that they mostly
belonged to one tribe, the proud Banu Shaib&n

Chaivarig, pp. 39ff.

230 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

of Bakr, who not long before had emigrated
from their former settlements on the right bank
of the Euphrates, in the desert of Kufa and
Basra, to Northern Mesopotamia.1 Their most
famous and most dangerous leader was Shabib
b. Yazld, who with his swift cavalry was at
once everywhere and nowhere. In the year 76
he crossed from Mesopotamia into Iraq, routed
several columns sent against him by Hajj&j,
and actually reached the gate of the capital.
His favourite beat was the classic ground of the
old Khaw&rij, the territory of Jftkh& on the
Nahraw&n and the range of mountains to the
north of it. After a longish sojourn in the
highlands of Adharbaij&n, during which many
flocked to join him, he advanced in the seccnd
half of the year 77 towards the south with a
considerable force, to attempt a decisive attack
upon Kufa. A general levy was made against
him, but he put to disgraceful flight the whole
Kufaite army. Hajj&j's own resources were
exhausted, and he found himself compelled to
ask the Khalifa for Syrian troops, which arrived
just in the nick of time and repulsed Shabib,
who then retired to J&khS, but soon again with-

1 The family of Shabtb lived not far from Mosul, but it had
emigrated thither (via Kufa,-Tab., 977) from the water of Lasaf in the
Kufan desert (Hamftsa, 15). One section of the kinsfolk had remained
living there, and still frequently received visits from the elders of
Shabib (Tab., 915. 978). Possibly the breaking-up of the Shaibanites
was not exactly voluntary, but caused by Muawia.

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 281

drew from there into the far-distant Karm&n,
the stronghold of the Azariqa. Making a sortie
again from there he encountered on the Dujail in
Ahw&z the Syrian army that had been sent
against him, and was drowned on his retreat over
the river at the end of 77 (spring of 697 A.D.).
The Syrians had saved Kufa, but we shall see
how dearly their help had to be paid. The very
detailed account of Shablb in Tab., 881-1002 is
taken from Abft Mikhnaf.1

In the year 78, after the Kh&rijite menace
in the east and west of Iraq was abolished,
Hajjaj also obtained the supremacy over Khu-
r&s&n and Sajist&n (Tab., 1032f. Anon., 310f.).
He bestowed the province of Khur&sftn upon
the subduer of the Az&riqa, the Azdite Muhal-
lab, who had already won his spurs there (Bal.,
432), Muhallab remained there till his death
(the end of 82) and bequeathed his authority
to his family and his tribe.

ToSajistftn2 Hajj£j sent Ubaidull&h b. Abl
Bakra, a prominent Basrian of the well-known
Thaqifite family from which Ziftd b. Ablhi also
was descended. In the year 79 the former
undertook a campaign against Zuribil of K£bui
and Z&bul, who was withholding the tribute.3

1 Chnwarigt p. 41 ff.

* For the previous history of Sajistan. Of. Baladh., 392 ff.
3 ZunbM (a proper name as well as a title) and not Rutbil, is
the proper pronunciation (Cunningham in the Verhandl* des 10.

232 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

Zunbll enticed him far into the country and then
cut him off in the rear, and it was only with
great losses, especially among the Kufaite con-
tingent, that TJbaidullah made his way through,
bringing his army back in a pitiful plight. He
died not long after in A.H. 79 (xlnon., 320) or 80
(Tab., 104,6). Sajist&n had need of a tried war-
rior as stattholder, and Hajjaj selected for the
post a proud Kufaite of the family of the old
kings of Kinda, Abdurrahman b. Muhammad
b. Ash'ath, who was in the neighbouring Karman,1
and strengthened him with a numerous, fully-
paid and splendidly-equipped army of Kufaites
and Basrians, the so-called " army of peacocks."
Such was the situation when the rebellion
of the army of Iraq broke out against Hajjaj,
a rebellion which severely shook the Umaiyid
kingdom. Tabari gives preference to the lively

internal. Oriental-congresses, lt 244. Jnsfci, Namcnbuch, 385 ; Mar-
quart, Eranshahr, 37). Cf. Tab., 1652, 18. 3, 194, 3 , a Yemenite Zankbtl
appears in 1,1855,16. The lord of the Turks is called the Zttnbtl,
Tab., 2, 1132f. 1037, 2. 1042, 12. The subjects, certainly, wore Ira-
nians, but the dynasties (and soldiers) Turkish. Cf. Famzdaq, ed,
Boucher, 206, 10.

1 According to Abu Ubaida (An , 320f., Tab., 1046) he had there
to put down a mutiny under the Bakrite llimian b. Adi as Sadust (Of.
An., 342), but according to other accounts (An., 318, 2. 320, 10) he had
to fight against Khawarij. Anon., 309 says ho had originally gone
to Sajistan upon business relating to an inheritance, and there had
become entangled with the coarteaan Mahanosh. But the latter,
according to An., 334f. lived in Karman and had got not him, but
another well-known Arab so much into her toils that on her account
he pawned his saddle and Ibn Ash'ath had to redeem it so that he
might ride with him. Cf. Farazdaq, 209, 12.

THE FIRST MARWlMDS 233

and detailed account of Abfr Mikhnaf, who stood
quite near the events as they took place.
The account, likewise very exhaustive, in the
Anonymous Work, Ahlw., 308ff . follows different
guarantors. Abdurrahman, generally called Ibn
Ashcath after his grandfather, started upon a
different course from that of his predecessor,
undertaking not a sortie, but a regular cam-
paign. He occupied the places he had taken
and established a postal service to ensure
his lines of communication. After subduing
a part of the country he made a pause for a
time, so that his soldiers should first get accus-
tomed to the nature of the mountains, and he
sent word of this to Hajj&j. But the latter,
quick and impatient as usual, addressed him
sharply, and insisted in repeated letters on his
advancing without delay, or else giving up the
command to his brother Ishaq. Ibn Ash'ath
then gathered together the chief people, told
them the contents of the letters, and said in
conclusion, " If you want to advance, then I
shall do so ; but if you do not want to, then I
will not either." The men of Iraq hated Haj-
jaj ; the prospect of a hard, weary war in distant
lands was distasteful to them, and any opportu-
nity of returning home was welcome, so Ibn
Ash'ath was sure of their reply. " We will not
obey the enemy of God, who like a Pharaoh
coerces us to the farthest campaigns and keeps
30

234 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

us here so that we can never see our wives and
children ; the gain is always his; if we are vic-
torious, the conquered land is his ; if we perish,
then he is rid of us." They all did homage to
Ibn Ash'ath with the idea that he should drive
out Hajjaj, and the most zealous were the
Yemenites of Kufa, to whom he himself be-
longed.1 His brothers, however, were not on
his side (Anon., 326f.).

After peace had been made with Zunbil and
representative stattholders been settled in Bust
and Zaranj, the chief towns of Sajistan, the army
moved on in A.H. 81, collecting on the way
more soldiers from Kufa and Basra, who were
stationed as garrisons in the provinces. On
reaching Fars they saw the impossibility of
separating Hajjaj from Abdulmalik, so they
renounced the latter also and did homage to
Ibn Ash'ath as a preliminary to the conflict
against the Khalifa and the Syrians. Ibn Ash'ath
had no need to force matters ; he was urged
on in spite of himself, and even if he would,
could not have banished the spirits which he
had called up. It was as if an avalanche came
rushing down sweeping every thing before it.

1 Farazdaq allows that the Rabia and Mudar were also included,
but lays tho chief blame upon the Yemenites of Kufa, the Sabaites,
who had before extolled the Jew Mukhtar (211, 10) and now did the
same with the weaver Ibn Ash'ath (208, 9. 209, 16. 211, 11). The
Yemenites were scoffed at as weavers, just as the Azd were deride^
as fishers and boatmen,

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 235

Muhallab in Khurasan did not join in the
movement. He is said to have advised Hajj&j
not to stem the stream of the Iraqites and not
to attack them till they had reached homo again,
saying that once they were back home with
their wives and children, it would be all over
with their invincibility.1 Hajjaj, however,
did not follow his advice, but with his Syrian
soldiers, strengthened by hurried reinforcements
from Abdulmalik, marched against the rebels.
On the old battle-field on the Dujail, near
Tustar and RustaqabM, the first encounter
took place, when Ibn Ash'ath crossed the river
and was victorious on the evening of the 10th
Dhulhijja, 81, i. <?., 25th January, 701. The
vanquished fled to Basra, pursued by the victors,
who marched unchecked into the town, where
they were received with open arms. But
Hajj&j established himself in the suburb of
Zawia, and a few Tbaqifites and Quraishites
there joined him. He was determined to perish
rather than yield. For a month his Syrians,
under the leadership of the Kalbite Sufyan b.
Abrad,2 withstood the attack of the Iraqites
who where encamped in Khuraiba (An., 355),
and at last inflicted on them a decisive defeat
in Muharram, 82 (the beginning of March,

I Thus Tab., 1059. Ace. to An., 343 the counsel was not given to
Hajjaj until a later occasion, by his Persian clerk Zadanfarrukh or
by Abbad b. Husain.

II The conqueror of Shabib. Of. An., 838, 342.

236 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

701). In consequence of this Ibn Ashcath
marched with the Kufaites l away to Kufa, the
actual centre-point of the rebellion, whither
the Iraqite garrison troops from the provinces
were gathering from all sides. As his representa-
tive in Basra he left the Quraishite Abdurrah-
m&n Ibn Abb&s alHSshimi, who continued the
conflict, but only for a few days, as the bulk of
the Basrians accepted pardon from Hajj&j
(An., 349, 5) and let him march into the town.
At the beginning of Safar, 82 (middle of March,
701) Hajj&j was able to set out on the march
to Kufa, Ibn Abb&s alH&shimi hanging on to
his flank with those Basrians who would not
lay down their arms.

In Kufa an officer from Mad&in, Matar b.
N&jia atTamiml, had anticipated Ibn Ash'ath,
turned out the Syrian garrison and seized the
citadel, He unwillingly yielded to Ibn Ash'ath,
only doing homage under compulsion after the
Hamd&n had stormed the citadel and taken him
prisoner. This may have also been a reason
why Ibn Ash'ath had found himself obliged to
hasten his march from Basra (An., 318 ; 355),
but he had already got tlie better of his rival
before Hajjaj followed him. The latter made his
way through the desert on the right bank of the

1 Ace. to An., 349,1 there were only 1,000 men, so the great
majority of the Kufaites in his army must have already betaken
themselves back to their town— which is highly probable.

THE FIEST MARWANIDS

Euphrates and encamped in Dair Qurra near
Kufa, where he had easy communication with
Syria, the provision of which was indeed enjoined
only upon Ain Tamr and the Palalij. Accord-
ing to Arab custom, the rebel Iraqites marched
out of the town and occupied a strong camp near
Dair Jam&jim,1 opposite the Syrians, at the
beginning of Rabi I, 82 (middle of April, 701).
They are said to have been 100,000 strong, with
as many servants. Eor months daily encounters
took place, none of them decisive. Abdulmalik
grew restless; he sent a new Syrian army under
his brother Muhammad and his son Abdullah,2
but at the same time caused terms to be offered
to the Iraqites if they would submit. Their
pension was to be raised to be equal to that
of the Syrians; Hajj£j was to be recalled,
and to Ibn Ash'ath any province he liked was
to be granted for life. But in spite of the
persuasion of their leaders they would have
nothing to do with this, but once more renounced
Abdulmalik, trusting that the Syrians would
shortly run out of provisions. They were
mistaken, however. The Syrians held out
stubbornly, and they themselves gave up the
struggle after it had lasted 100 days. In
the middle of Jumada II, 82 (the end of July,

1 Is this the Monastery of Golgotha P

8 He thus denuded the marches in the direction of the Romans
and they took advantage of this; see Gvttinger Nachrichten, 1901,
p. 433.

238 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

701) they vacated the field for no proper reason ;
their enthusiasm had not the staying quality
of their opponents' discipline. One of their
chiefs took to flight from Sufyan b. Abrad, who
was again almost reaching a decision, and this
aroused suspicion of treachery and caused a
general panic. Ibn Ash'ath could not check the
flight : Hajjaj furthered it by the means
already approved at Basra, — by issuing a
proclamation promising pardon to all who
returned to their house and garrison, and by
forbidding the Syrians to pursue them. He thus
gained his end without much bloodshed ?nd
was able to make a victorious entry into Kufa,
where he accepted the homage of those who
had laid down their arms. They had also to
acknowledge that they had renounced Islam by
their rebellion, but there were very few who were
unwilling to purchase their life even at the cost
of such self-abasement.

Many of the Iraqites, however, who were
scattered at Kufa banded together again at
other places. Tbn Ash'ath then betook himself
back to the town of Basra, which the Quraish-
ite Ubaidullah b. Abdirrahm&n alAbdshamsi had
won for him again, but he did not stay long,
but returned to Maskin on the Dujail.1 With

1 It is not the very out-of-the-way Maskin between Mosul and
Takrtt, as Weil and Mailer think, but another in Izqubad (Tab., 1099
1123. Yaqut, 4, 529. 5,31).

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 239

the numerous troops which joined him on all
sides he once again made a stand against
Hajjaj, who was pursuing him, in Sha'bftn, 82
(Sept. or Oct., 701). The struggle was long
and obstinate, and was, according to Tabarl,
1123 f., at last decided by the fact that a Syrian
squadron, led by an old man well- versed in the
lie of the land, surrounded the Iraqites by going
through marshes and attacked them by night.
They fled across the Dujail, losing more by
drowning than by the sword.

Ibn Ash'ath now continued his retreat
towards the East. The Syrians pursuing him
under Umara b. Tamim alLakhml, spotted him
twice, at Sus arid Sabur, but he luckily shook
them off and by Karman, where he stayed a
considerable time, got to Sajistan (at the end
of 82 or beginning of 83). His stattholder in
Zaranj shut the gates against him, and the one
in Bust actually took him prisoner in order to
hand him over to Hajjaj. He was then freed
by Zunbil, who had pledged himself to keep a
place of refuge for him in case of need, and who
took him along with his great following toK&bul,
and showed him much honour. Meanwhile,
however, another crowd of Iraqites followed
their fugitive leader, gathered together under
the already well-known Quraishite Ubaidullahlbn
Abdirrahm&n alAbdshamsi and Abdurrahman
Jbn Abb&s alHashimi in Sajist&n, and called

240 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

him back. He came, took the capital Zaranj,
and punished his unfaithful stattholder there,
but when, against his wish, his troops for fear
of the Syrians, who were now at last arriving
under Umara, entered upon Khurasanite terri-
tory thinking they would not be attacked there,
he took the opportunity to return to Zunbll and
left them in the lurch. They now placed the
H&shimite Ibn Abb&s at their head, took the
town of Her&t and slew Yazid b. Muhallab's
official there, who at the end of 82 had succeed-
ed his father. Thus the latter was compelled,
much against his will, to go against them, and
he dispersed them after a short fight, in which
several prominent men fell into his hands.
Those of them who were his Yemenite tribal
relations he let go free ; the rest he sent to
Hajjaj, who had taken up his quarters in the
town of W&sit, just then being built (A.H. 83 ),
and Hajj&j held a bloody tribunal upon them.
So goes the account of Abft Mikhnaf (Tab., 1101-
6), but Madainl (1106-10) differs somewhat.

The Syrian commander TLu&ra meanwhile
became master of Sajist&n, after giving a
remnant of Iraqite rebels who had remained
there an opportunity to surrender under easy
conditions. Only Ibn Ash'ath himself was still
dangerous. Hajjaj now tried by threats and
promises to persuade Zunbll to hand over
his protege, and at last succeeded by offering

THE FIRST MARWANIDS

to let him off paying tribute for 7 or 10 years.
For all that he did not get his foe into his
hands alive, but only his head severed from the
body. Ibn Ash'ath is said either to have died
previously or to have committed suicide. This
was in the year 84 or 85 (Tab., 1138).

The chronology of these events is not quite
certain. Some of the days and months, indeed,
have remained firmly fixed in the memory, — for
instance, the battle of Tustar is agreed to have
been on the day of Arafa at the end of the year in
which the rebellion began, and in the next year
the month Muharram is fixed for the battles at
Basra, the months llabi and Jum&d& for the
battles at Kufa, and Sha'ban for the battle of
Maskin,1 but as regards the years tradition varies,
I have followed the chronology according to
which the rebellion broke out in the year 81, and
the battles at Basra, Kufa and Maskin fell into
the year 82, and those in Sajistan and
Khur&s&n into the year 83. Another chrono-
logy Pu*8 ^e dates a year later, namely 82, 83
and 84,2 in which case the death of Ibn Ash'ath

1 On the contrary, it can hardly hold if Waqidi pats the battle
of Dair Jamajim into Sha'ban, 82, and the beginning of the rebellion
into the same year (Tab., 1070. 1052). The "Arafa-day " in particular
ie fixed for Tustar.

8 Abu. Mikhnaf seems to mix up the different reckonings when he
puts the beginning of the rising and the battle of Tustar into the
year 81, and on the other hand, the battles at Zawia (Basra) and
accordingly the battles at Kufa, ace. to Tab. 1011, not till the
year, 83.

81

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

in the year 84 or 85 immediately follows the
subjection of Sajist&n by the Syrians. But
that is only an apparent advantage, for there
may quite well have been a longer interval
between the two events. On the other hand, it is
significant that coinciding traditions make Ibn
Ash'ath come to Sajistan as early as A. H. 80,
immediately after which he undertook the
campaign against Zunbil, and was on this very
campaign when he learned of the affront of
Hajj&j which caused him to rebel. The
rebellion cannot therefore very well have broken
out till the second year after 80. We have
also to take into consideration that the prisoners
of Herat were brought to Wasit when this town
was yet building, as is expressly stated (Tab.,
1119 f .). But,in A. H. 83 it was still occupied
by Hajj&j, and in A. H. 84«, he at any rate lived
there. Thus, then, the battles in Sajist&n and
Khurasan might quite possibly take place in
A.H. 83, but not in A. H. 81. Unfortunately we
can get at nothing decisive from the repeated
mention of the days of the week, for they do
not agree with the dates given either in the
years 81 and 82, or in the years 82 and 83.1

1 Aoo. to Anon. Ahlw. the battle of T us tar took place on Friday,,
the 10th Dhulhijja, 81 (340, 10), and on Thursday, the 23rd Dhulhijja,
81, Hajjaj occupied the camp in Zawia (342, 10). The days of the week
do not agree with those of tho month either for A.H. 81 or A.H. 82,
but do for A.H. 80, which is not mentioned in any tradition, and which
pne hardly ventures to consider. Accf to.Abfl Mikhnaf in Tab., 1094

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 243

Alfred von Kremer has shown the rebellion
of Ibn Ashcath in a new light, by which he has
dazzled others, e. p., A. Muller and G. van Vloten
(Recherches sur la domination arabe, Amster-
dam, 1894). He has, to wit, connected it with
the attempt of the Maw&li, i. £., the subjects
gone over to Islam in Kufa and Basra, to obtain
equal political rights with the ruling nobility,
i. £., the Arabs, to be freed from the subject-
tax and received on the pension list, which
hitherto was a register of the Arab nobility.
In order to prevent the decrease of the state
revenues, which by extending the exemption
from taxes and the payment of pensions to the
non-Arab Muslims, was bound to result or even
had already resulted, Hajj&j (he says) had
again imposed the poll-tax upon the numer-
ous Maw&li who had embraced Islam, a tax
which they, as Muslims, should by right have
had to pay no longer, and so the fire was
kindled. " Hajjaj ordered that those who had
embraced Islam, — the whole of the great class
of the new Muslims, must pay the poll-tax

the 100-days' battles at Kufa began on Tuesday, 2nd Rabt I, 83 and
ended on Wednesday, 14th Jumada II, 83. Here again the days of the
week do not agree with the days of the month either of A.H. 83 or A.H.
82. The nearest is A.H. 81, where there is a difference only of one day.
Such a difference seems negligible, and explicable by the variations of
the beginning of month or the beginning of the day (in the evening
or the morning). But should the correct way be neither 82-83 nor
81-82, but rather 80-81 ? Theophanes, A. M. 6192, says nothing
against it.

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

just as they did before their conversion, a mea-
sure which resulted in a dreadful rebellion of
the new converts and their clients.1 Many
people of Basra, in particular, took part in it,
old warriors, clients and readers of the Qoran.
One account has it that of these rebels 100,000
were included in the register of the yearly dole,
and so, to put it in a modern way, belonged to
the militia, and they were joined by as many
more. Hajj&j routed the rebels2 and deter-
mined once for all to disperse the whole class
of clients, so that it could never again gather
to form a solid opposition. He sent for them
and said, — 'Ye are miserable strangers and bar-
barians and were better to stay in your villages.'
Then he gave orders to divide them over the
villages and scattered their party most effec-
tively, and in order that none should be able
to get away from the village where he was
settled, he had the name of the village branded
on each one's hand/' This is Kremer's account
in the " Culturgeschichte des Orients" (187 5)
1,172 and in the " CulturgeschicMlichen Stretf-
zugen" (1873), p. 24*. He follows chiefly an
account of Jahiz in his book upon the Maw&ll
and the Arabs, which is quoted in the Iqd of
' Abdrabbih (ed. Bulaq, 1302 : 2, 93).8

1 What the addition " and their clients " means, I do not know.
* Kremer proceeds more summarily than Hajjaj.
8 " Tbn Ash'ath and AbdulHh b. Jarud had mutinied against
Hajjaj, and his experiences with the Iraqites were not happy, The

FIRST MARWAN1DS 245

There is no doubt that the fall of Mukht&r
did not once for all put an end to the rebellion
of the recent converts, and that Hajj&j had to
deal wiih the difficulties which arose from the
acceptance of Islam, touching their political posi-
tion and their taxation. It is also certain that
the rising of Ibn Ash'ath had its real origin
in Kufa, as bad that of Mukht&r.1 But
there is no suggestion in the primary sources
in Tab. and the Anonymous Writer of Ahlw.
that in its tendency it was simply a continuation
of that of Mukhtar. It did not take its tone
from the Maw&li, though there were certainly

most dangerous he had found to be the Baerians, their religious
scholars, ' their warriors and Mawalt. Because they were the most
numerous and the most powerful he wished to abolish thwir claim to a
pension and to distribute them so that they should no longer hold close
together and form a community. So he said to the Hawaii : ' Yo are
barbarians and strangers ; ye belong to your towns and villages.' Thus
he scattered them and broke up their alliance as he wished ; sent them
whither he pleased and had the name of the place where each was sent
to marked upon his hand." According to this, the despatch of the
Mawali into their villages was one amongst other measures which
Hajjaj carried out in order to break the power of the overgrown town
of Basra, which earlier experiences had shown him to be dangerous.
One of these experiences was the rebellion of Ibn Ash'ath, and another
was the earlier mutiny of Ibn Jarud (Anon., 280 ff. B Athir, 4, 309 ff),
which spread over several years. Nothing further is said. Ace. to
Tab., 1122; 1435 the Mawalt who were turned out by Hajjaj along
with the readers, who were in sympathy with them, undoubtedly stuck
to Ibn Ash'ath. But even there, there is nothing to show that the
rebellion was instigated by them.

1 This allows Farazdaq mockingly to say that as the Kufaites were
former adherents of Mukhtar (Sabaites) to now again they were
adherents of that new rebel, Ibn Ash'ath.

246 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

many of them in it. AM Mikhnaf (Tab., 1072)
tells that in the camp of Dair Jam&jim there
were 100,000 Arab defenders (Muqdtila) entitled
to pensions, and just as many Hawaii, but they
appear in the following of their Arab masters.
It was customary for the latter to take their
clients, if they had any, into the field with them,
and make them fight on foot whilst they them-
selves were mounted, — a similar arrangement
to that existing between knights and servants
in the Middle Ages, so the fact that the Maw&li
took part in it does not give the struggle its
character. They might well have an interest
of their own in the hostility against the Syrian
rule, which formed the backbone of Arabism,
but still they were only secondary ; the rising
did not originate with them but with the " Pea-
cock army " of Iraqites in Sajist&n, which the
garrisons of the other provinces joined, and to
which the capitals Kufa and Basra opened their
gates. The most prominent and notable Arabs
took part in it, — heads of clans like Ibn Ash'ath
of Kinda, Jarir b. b. Said b. Qais of Hamd&n
(Anon., 340), Abdulmumin b. Shabath b. Rib'l
of Tamim (Tab., 1056) ; Bist&m b. Masqala b.
Hubaira of Bakr (Tab., 1038, 1099) ; Quraishites
like Muhammad b. Sa'd b. AM Waqq&s (Tab.,
1099), UbaidullMib.Abdirrahm&n alAbdshamsi,
Abdurrahm&n b. Abb&s al H&shiml; scholars
like the Qftdl ashSha'bi and the historian

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 247

Muhammad b. S&ib alKalbi, the friend of Abft
Mikhnaf (Tab., 1096). Only the name of one
single Mauh\ is mentioned, that of the rich
Fair viz Husain from Sajist&n, who is perhaps
identical with the son of Sibucht (Farazdaq,
206). The Arab aristocracy reared itself against
the imperious and arrogant conduct of the
representative of the state authority, the
plebeian Hajj&j. " God and the pride of Ibn
Muhammad (b. Ash'ath) and his descent from
a race of kings older than Thamud, forbid us to
use ourselves to the rule of wretches sprung
from slaves.1 How many of the ancestors of
Ibn Ash'ath have worn the crown on glorious
brows ! The home of honour and of fame lies
between Muhammad (b. Ash'ath) and Said (b.
Qais), between Ashajj and Qais ; 2 the Hamd&n
and the Kinda follow their banner. There is
no Qais like unto our Qais, no Said like ours."
In these verses the poet A'sb& of Hamd&n
expresses the sentiments of the leading circles
(Agh., 5,153). The Arab clans, the regiments
of the army, followed their chiefs, and that all
the more willingly since the long service in war
and garrison in outlying districts were particu-
larly detested by them, and they were always

1 Thaqifites like Hajjaj.

a By Ashajj here Ash'ath seems to be meant ; cf. Anon., 335. Qais
is the father of the famous Said of Ham dan whose grandson, Jarir,
made common cause with the grandson of Asb'ath,

248 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

longing for home. The Yemenites of Kufa, in
particular, were numerously represented and the
Kinda, Hamd&n and Madhhij. They were in the
majority in Kufa and reckoned Ibn Ash'ath as
peculiarly their own, but the other clans and
those of Basra were not excluded either. Most
passionately and vehemently did the readers
take part, as well as the pious scholars of the
Qoran and men of prayer. They were in the
forefront with speech and action on all such
occasions,1 for in the theocracy the injustice of
the ruling power and the right of revolt against
it had always to have the sanction of the reli-
gion. But actually the rebellion under Ibn
Ash'ath had no religious motives. It was rather
a renewed and desperately powerful attempt of
the Iraqites to shake off the Syrian yoke.
Hajj&j had made it still more intolerable for
them by keeping in the land the Syrian soldiers
whom he had summoned against Shablb, not so
much as a defence against outside foes as against
internal ones. They were the embodiment of
the foreign rule.2 The Iraqite militia had to
be content with a scanty pension and maintain
the Syrians for it. They were told off for expe-
ditions and garrisons in districts far remote while

1 Their merits reoeiyed special prominence. Abu Mikhnaf in Tab.,
1086 ff. speaks as though the fall of the pious Jabala were the most
important event at Dair Jarnajiin. Cf. Chawarig, pp. 9 ff.

* In Africa and Spain also the introduction of the Syrians caused
great tumult,

THE FIRST M \RWANIDS 249

the latter remained in their quarters with their
families. The nature of the struggle, therefore,
cannot be misunderstood. It was not a contest
of the Maw&li against the Arabs, but of the
Iraqites against the Syrian Arabs (Tab., 1089).
It was a contest of the two provinces of the Arab
kingdom that had always been rivals, and the
Iraqite elements, from whatever source they
came, held together in the contest. Also, the
Syrian imperial troops felt themselves united
in the land of strangers. Of course, by prefer-
ence, they belonged to Kalb and Qad&a ; 'Akk
and Ashcar as pars pro toto (Tab,, 1102) seems
to be an insulting phrase to dub them barba-
rians. In Tab., 1393 they are called Copts and
Nabatseans, i.e., Caffres and Botokudi.

The result was that the military rule of the
Syrians in Iraq was still more accentuated. In
A. H. 83 Hajj&j built the fortified town of W&sit,
midway between Kufa, Madain, Ahwaz and
Basra, and made it the seat of government.
Thither he also transferred the bulk of the
Syrian soldiers, alleging that he did so in order
to prevent their committing improprieties in the
citizens' quarters at Kufa and Basra. But the
chief reason must have been that he wanted to
isolate them from the Iraqites1 and concentrate

1 For this reason he kept the Syrians at a distance from Khurasan,
so that they were not infected by the Iraqites, and sent them to India
where there were no Iraqites (Tab., 1257; 1275),

32

250 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

them around himself so as to have them as
docile instruments ready to hand, He moved
his residence from the midst of the community
out into a military headquarters, thereby proving
that he felt as if he were in a foe's country. He
uprooted the government from the patriarchal
soil on which it had grown up and openly
planted it upon military force. There was no
other way if the sway of the Umaiyids over Iraq
was to be preserved.

After the fall of Ibn Ash'ath the whole of
the East lay without opposition at the feet of
Hajj&j. Only the Muhallabids in Khurasan
still reared their heads. They relied on their
clan, the Azd Um&n, who through them had
come to Khurasan and had contrived that there,
too, as in Basra the Azd should, with the Rabla,
form the one group (Yemen), and the Tamlm with
the Qais the other group (Mudar). The chief of
the Muhallabids and the Yemenite group was the
ruling stattholder, Yazid b. Muhallab. He was, to
be sure, under Hajj&j, but the latter had, appa-
rently, not the power to set him aside, however
sufficient a reason he gave him for doing so. It
was only reluctantly that he set about dealing
with the adherents of Ibn Ash'ath in Her&t, and
then again exercised clemency towards the
captive ringleaders, at least towards the Yemen-
ites among them. He deferred the order to
expel the rebel Qaisites who had settled in

THE FIRST MARWiNIDS 251

Tirmidh (near Balkh) under MAs& b. Abdill&h,
considering that as long as they were dangerous
Hajj&j would let him alone and not put a
Qaisite in his place. He did not obey repeated
summonses to W&sit, but excused himself on the
score of urgent business, and it was only by
bringing to bear strong pressure upon the
Khalifa that Hajj&j at last in the year 85
obtained permission to depose him. He made
him prisoner and gradually removed his brother
also, but this he only managed to do after Abdul-
malik's death (86).

Abdulmalik indeed had shown himself to be
lord and master over Hajj&j ; Walid I, for
whose succession he was anxious, gave him a
free hand, and even in his own sphere of govern-
ment gave in to him and consulted his wishes.
At his instance he deprived Umar b. Abdilazlz
of the post which he had bestowed upon him,
because under his rule the Hij&z was becoming
the refuge of political criminals, especially of
religious seditionists (Tab., 1254). In A.H. 89 or
91 Khalid b. Jarir b. Abdill&h alQasrl came to
Mecca. In A.H. 93 or 9 1 Uthm&n b. Haiy&n
alMurri came to Medina. Both undertook the
clearing out of suspects with great zeal. Under
Walld HajjSj reaped the fruit of the hard
work which he had had to do under Abdul-
malik. In Iraq peace prevailed. He used it
to heal the wounds which a twenty-years' war

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

had inflicted upon the well-being of the country.
He was just as great a landlord as Walid. He
devoted his attention to the canal-systems upon
which depends the fertility of the marshy land
on the lower Tigris and Euphrates,1 and in the
midst of the chief marshy region he founded his
town of Wasit. He tried to stem the depopula-
tion of the alluvial lands which was resulting
from the thronging of the inhabitants into the
large towns. It is said he also forbade the
peasants to slaughter oxen, in order to keep

1 The Persian kings took great pains to drain the marshes and to
establish crown lands upon them ; when one of them reclaimed a piece
of ground from the bog he named it after himself. Under Qubadh a
great dam near Kaskar burst, overflowed a vast stretch of country,
which was left till Anoshravfm partly repaired the damage. In the
year 7 or 6 of the Hijra there again occurred serious bursting of
dams against which all the zeal of Parwcz proved unavailing. In
the confusion during the Arab conquest the marshy land (a/am
ralbati) extended still more ; the Dihkans (proprietors and district-
surveyors), could of their own power do nothing to stop it. It was
only under Muawia, and then more especially under Walid I and
Hi sham, that things improved. Hajjaj made the two canals of Nil
and Zabi, and introduced into the marshy land the Indian buffaloes,
which he also supplied to Cilicia. It was the fault of his limited
resources that he did not do still more. Ho asked for 3 millions fur
the restoration of the dams. Walid thought this excessive, but allowed
his brother Maslama to execute the project at his own expense, and
the latter made a great profit from it. The surveyor who did the
designing under Hajjaj and Hisham was Hassan anNabatt. There
is an untrustworthy story that Hajjaj intentionally did not repair
the damage caused by a great flood in his time, in order to punish the
Dihkans, whom ho suspected of entertaining sympathies for Ibn
Ash'ath ; <•/. Tab., l.QGOff. BaUidh. 292 f. Masudt, 1,225 f. BKhordadhbeh,
240 f. Yaqut, 3,174 11

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 253

them for the plough.1 He only carried on wars
against external foes and that, indeed, with
great success. Under him Qutaiha h. Muslim
alB&hill, the successor of the Muhallahids
in Khurasan, conquered Transoxiana, and
Muhammad b. Q&sim athThaqafi took the
Indusland. To ITajj&j is due the credit of
having put these men in the right plac?, and
his name, feared as it was far into the East,2
*ave them a powerful backing. He did not
take the field himself, but he was scrupulous in
his care for the needs and equipment of the
troops, down to the smallest detail (Bal, 136).
The money which he spent lavishly upon this
was abundantly recovered by him in the fifth
3art of the spoil. The chief expedition into India
3ost him, according to Bal. (440), 60 millions,
ind yielded a profit of 120 millions. For 20
pears he remained at his post, and died, as he
tiad wished, before Walid, at the end of Ramadan
;Tab.5 1217), or in Shauwal (1268), 95, i.e. June
DP July, 714, aged 53 or 54 years. Walld
granted him the successors proposed by himself
tnd confirmed the appointments of all his officials.
Later on his family was still esteemed in Kufa.3

1 Baladh., 290, 375. BKhordadhbeh, 15,241. Agh., 15,98. Yfiqut
,178.

2 Of, Baladh., 400f., 435 ; and Reiske, Adnot. 194 to Abulfeda, 1,427.
for the Irdian Kurk which Reiske cannot place, cf, Tab., 3., 359, 370,
nd Do Goeje, Bijdrage tot de gesch. der Zigeunerx, p, 5,

3 Tab,, 1699, 5. 1711,7-10. 1712,7.

254 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Zi&d b. Abihi and Hajj&j were the two
great viceroys of the TJmaiyids in Iraq, on
account of whom they were, with reason, envied
by the Abb&sids. They did not regard them-
selves as possessors of a fat living, but as repre-
sentatives of the government, — the Sultan, and
by the faithful fulfilment of the duties of their
office rewarded the confidence of their lords, who
gave them great power which they retained as
long as they lived, without troubling about the
favour or reproach of public opinion, It is not
out of place to compare the two. Ziad had
already reached a high position before Mu&wia
wooed and won him for his ally ; Hajjaj might
be called the creation of Abdulmalik. Zi&d
understood how to hold the native clans in
check (by playing off the one against the other)
and to make them work for himself, and he
succeeded in doing so. TJmar b. Abdulaziz
(Kdmil, 595) admired him because he had held
Iraq in check without ever summoning the
help of the Syrians. Hajj&j could only assert
himself by means of the foreign government,
supported by Syrian troops, which indeed followed
from their relationship, for the tension between
Syria and Iraq had meantime become accentuated.
In his achievements Hajj&j was in no wise
inferior to his predecessor ; even after his death
he determined the politics, — it was a question of
for or against him. His government regulations

THE FIRST MARWAN1DS 255

in matters of coinage, measures and taxes, and
in the importance assigned to agriculture
were epoch-making,1 In Iraq, exhausted and
demoralised as it was by the constant suc-
cession of wars, he had difficulty in maintaining
the state-revenues, but all the same he was
always in funds (Tab., 1062. Anon., 217). He
had the gift of ready speech, rather pluming
himself on the elegance of his Arabic style, and
disliking to be surpassed in it (Tab., 1132), so
that it is not without reason that the tradi-
tionists adorn his introductory speech in Kufa
with carefully-chosen turns of speech. He never
let his courage fail under any circumstances; it
took misfortune to bring out his greatness. But
he was a little too impetuous, and was quick
to get impatient with those who were executing
his orders. His iron hand was covered with no
velvet glove, nor had he any winning ways of
conversation. He was harsh and at times hard,
but not cruel ; neither was he petty and bigoted.
He showed mercy, and freed a notable rebel
prisoner because he did not try to excuse himself
but told the truth (Tab., 1112). He was bold
enough to admire openly the pseudo-prophet and
anti-Christ Mukht&r, whose greatness he recog-
nised. The thunder which pealed when he shot
at the Holy Town, apparently announcing the
anger of God at the wanton attack, he explained

1 Yahyfc b. Adam, Kit&b alKhardj> passim, especially p. 99ff.

256 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

off-hand as the salute of heaven promising
victory. He was not so prejudiced by supersti-
tion and tradition as his contemporaries, but
neither was he godless, and certainly not a
hypocrite. Living and dying, he had a clear
conscience. To the ordinary mind in the Hij&z
and Iraq, it was of course a proof of his wicked-
ness that he fearlessly cleared out the nest in
Mecca, and did not allow the piety of the sedi-
tionists to be their justification. Other shameful
deeds laid to his charge are inventions and
fabrications of the hatred of his enemies, which
even after his death did not abate. For example
he is said, according to an anonymous account
in Tab., 1123, to have slaughtered in Basra, after
the battle of Zawia, H,000 or even 120,000-
130,000 men. Kremer and Vloten apparently
believe this nonsense, and to suit their theory
they make the victims of his blood-thirstiness
the Maw&li. The old and genuine tradition,
however, says the opposite. In Basra, as in
Kufa, immediately after the victory, he had a
general pardon proclaimed for those who gave
up the struggle, and did his best to prevent the
licence of the Syrian soldiery in the conquered
towns. Only some of the recalcitrants who did
not accept the pardon and then fell into his
hands, were executed by him, e.g. in W&sit some
Quraishites and other prominent ringleaders
who were delivered over to him by Yazid b.

THE FIRST MAUWAN1DS 257

Muhahab, but even in this he respected the
rights of the private individual and did not
attempt, for example, to confiscate the property
of a rich Maul& (Fairitz Hucain) who at the last
moment disposed of it by will.1

4f. Walld I was succeeded by his brother
Sulaim&n, to whom Abdulmalik had already had
homage paid as the heir to the throne after
Walld, in Jumada II, 96, — the end of February,
715. He followed in his predecessor's steps so
far as to carry out the latter's project to attempt
a great blow at the lloman capital, with immense
forces, though not with much success.2 In
another respect, however, he was the direct
opposite of his predecessor ; he was displeased at
the influence which he allowed Hajjaj, and
even as heir to the throne must have opposed
him on this point. In the year 90 Yazid b.
Muhallab fled from the prison of Hajjaj to
Itamla in Palestine, where Sulaim&n held his
court. Sulaim&n gave him protection, undertook
the payment of the large sum demanded of him,
and interceded so strongly for him with the
Khalifa that the latter ordered Hajjaj to leave
him alone. Eor nine months he kept him beside
himself, came completely under his influence,
and let himself be still more prejudiced by him

1 Eulogies upon Hajjaj by Jarir and Parazdaq are preserved
to us.

a Qottinger Nachrichten, 1901, p. 439jf.

33

258 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

against Hajjaj. But the latter knew what he

was ahout ; lie was in favour of Walld's intention

to divert the succession to his own son, and

thus increased the hatred of Sulaim&n towards

himself.1 He had reason to fear the worst from

him should he succeed to the government, and

his earnest prayer (Tab., 1272) that he should

die before Walid was heard. Sulaim&n could

no longer harm him, but could only wreak his

anger upon his friends and officials. Uthnuin b.

Haiy&n alMurri in Medina and KMlid b. AbdiMh

alQasri in Mecca were deposed (Tab. 1282 ; 1305).

Qutaiba b. Muslim, the powerful statth older of

Khurasan, tried to anticipate the fate that

threatened him. Relying upon his victorious

past, he attempted to carry his troops along

with him in a rebellion against the new Khalifa,

but in vain. The Tamim, whom he had offended,

turned against him, and he surrendered to them,

since the others gave him no aid. The conqueror

of the Indus territory, Muhammad b. Qasim ath-

Thaqafi, did not rebel, though his Syrians would

have been ready to help him, (Tab., 1275, 3); he

was taken to Wasit, imprisoned there for a time,

and then executed.

1 The usual assumption is that this was the reason of Sulairnan's
hatred towards him, bat it seems rather to have been the result of
it; for there is no question of that intention of Walid till the end of
his reign (Tab., 1274. 1283f), but the strained relations between Sulai-
man and Hajjaj were of older standing, and even as early as the year
90 are put forward as the reason of Yazid's flight to Ramla.

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 259

The bitterest foe of Hajj&j, Yazid b.
Muhallab, succeeded to his place. This is the
great mark of distinction between the reign
of Sulaiman and that of Walid. Dozy regards
this change as a consequence of the two Khalifas
taking opposite sides in regard to the great clan-
parties, — Walid was all for the Qais, but Sulai-
man, on the other hand, w<*s inclined to the
Yemenites.1 " In the reign of Walid the power
of the Qaisites reached its height; when he
died their fall took place immediately, and it
was a terrible one.1' Yazid b. Muhallab certainly
sided with the Yemenite party, to whom he
as an Azdite belonged, against the Qiis. Haj-
jfij, on the other hand, was only compelled by
him, and before that by Ibn Ash'ath, to take
up his stand against the lemen, and so far be
on the side of the Qais. Indeed, from the
beginning he did not deny his descent from the
Thaqif, who might be reckoned under the head
of "Qais", and lie chose his entourage prefer-
ably from this circle of his acquaintance. Bat
that was a matter of course, and it cannot be
generalised and made into a principle of Qaisi-
tism. From the fact that the Qais themselves
claimed him as theirs, it does not look very
much as if he was the leader of a party-faction
of Qaisites; for the Arab clans clung to any
powerful man with whom they could claim a

1 Histoire des Mu$. d'Espagne, 1, 211, 125.

260 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

connection however distant. The reason why
Abdulmalik gave Hajj&j his position and why
Walld kept him in it was certainly not his
Qaisite tendency — he was in fact come of an
obscure family — hut his personal ability. His
personality, not his tribe, gave him his impor-
tance. So Sulaiman then directed his hatred
against his person and his personal influence;
and besides, he might well have been persuaded
that Hajjaj was not the right man to con-
ciliate the Iraqites, but was rather making the
Umaiyid rule hateful to them (Tab., 1337), and
he deposed the stattholders of Hajj&j because
they were his creatures, and not because of
their Qaisite tendencies. Kh&lid al Qasri, on the
other hand, was regarded by the Yemenites as
belonging to them (Agh., 19, 61). Qutaiba
belonged to the Bahila, a neutral clan. His
chief opponents in Khurasan were not the Yemen
but the Mudar, while in Syria he found sym-
pathy with the Mesopotamian (^is, amongst
whom the B&hila dwelt (Tab., 1300). MAs& b.
Nusair, in Spain, was a Yemenite. It is alleged
that it was on that account that he was ill-used
by Walid,1 but Sulaim&n treated the son much
worse than Waltd did the father, — an extremely
inconvenient fact for Dozy and his disciples
(A. Muller, 1, 429f.). At any rate, Sulaim&n did

1 Cf. Baladh, 231. Contin. hid. Hiap. par., 76.

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 261

not take up such a frankly Yemenite stand-
point as Yazid b. Muhallab. There is no evi-
dence of his having taken sides even in Syria
against the Qais and for the Yemen. He re-
gretted having injured the Syrian Qais by his
conduct towards Qutaiba. He had the same
mother as his brother Walid, — she was a Qaisite
from Abs; and he can hardly have denied his
own blood. The polarisation of the Arab world
by the tribal dualism was then only beginning;
personal hostility between powerful men contrib-
uted very substantially to it. One cannot
transfer the issue of the history as a kind of
principle into the prehistoric beginnings.

Since the death of Hajjaj, Zunbii of Sajis-
tan no longer paid tribute, and openly showed
how much inferior he thought the successors of
Hajj&j to be compared with him (13al&dh., 400f.).
The Iraqites breathed freely again when he,
and soon after Walid also, died, but they were
soon to discover that a change of personnel did
not mean a change of system. Yazid certainly
ill-treated the adherents of Hajj&j (Tab., 1359)
but in the government did not pursue any
different course from the latter. He likewise
resided in Wasit and kept the Syrians in the
country. He also found that he could not
make any change in the system of taxation by
which Hajj£j had made himself hated by the
Lrabs, if the revenue were to remain at the

262 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

same amount. In order, however, to shift the
odium on to other shoulders, he asked the Khalifa
to relieve him of the management of the taxes
and transfer it to another. This had a different
result from what he expected, for Sulaim&u now
made an old finance-official of Hajjaj, who
till then had served in the treasury, indepen-
dent, and placed him at the head of the adminis-
tration of the taxes.1 He was a Maula from
Sajistan, Sfilih b. Abdurrahman, the same man
who had made Arabic the written language of
the treasury. Ho had in Wasit at his disposal
400 Syrian soldiers and was quite independent
of Yazid. He flatly refused to charge upon the
exchequer the extravagant expenses which
Yazid incurred, by which meanness the latter's
stay in Iraq was made disagreeable. He con-
trived to get Khurasan also made over to him and
was allowed to make his residence in this old
province of his, where no one could pry upon
his doings.2 But he did riot get what he was
reckoning up:m there either, — tho luxury-loving
and shapelessly-obase in in could ill bear com-
parison with Qutaiba He tri^d to supplant

1 Such is AM Mikhnaf's report ia Tab., 1306ft'. How Dozy manages
to read his meaning into it may bejglo;med from his own works, (loc. cit.,
1,22G). Ace. to Tab., 1208 (BQutaiba, 183) in tho interval between
Tfajjaj and Yaz!d the control of the finances had boon made a separate
office from the stattholdcrship. The distinction must therefore have
been abolished again on the succession of Yazfd and then reintroduced
at, his instance. There ia nothing against this assumption.

8 A.H. 97. But he also retained the chief command in Iraq.

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 263

him by the subjugation of Jurjan and Tabarist&n,
but he was only indifferently successful, and by
boastfully exaggerating the amount of the spoil
which he had taken, he prepared his own doom.
As Khalifa also Salaim&n retained his resi-
dence at Ramla in Palestine, and in the country
there he was much beloved (Tab., 1831), but
he was often in the general camp at Dabiq, in
northern Syria, from which the great war
against Constantinople was carried on. lie died
there after a reign of barely three years in
Safar, 99 (Scpr., 717); Elias Nis. makes it
Tuesday, the 8th., but according to Abft Mikhnaf
(Tab., 1330) it was Friday, the 10th Safar.1
Whilst under Walid the themes of conversation
in the circles of prominent society were build-
ings and the culture of country estates, under
Sulaiman the subjects of conversation were
gluttony and women. Though dissolute himself,
he gave orders for proceedings to be taken
against the debauchery in Medina. It may
have been indeed only through a misunderstand-
ing of the stallholder there that he mutilated
the libertines instead of counting them (Agh.,
4, 59ff.). But his sensuality did not prevent
him from having leanings towards the pious.
This is to be seen already in the fact that

1 Ace. to Wiistenfeld, Tuesday was tho 9th and Friday the llth
Safnr. Similar differences of a day often occur and do not seem to
be of importance.

261- ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

he coquetted with the Iraqite opposition to
Hajj&j, which was always made in the name of
God and his rule against the dominion of
tyrants, and also in the fact that he pampered
the Alids (1338, 7), and that in Medina he made
an Ans&rite Stallholder, and a grandson of Amr
b. Ha/an at that, who had taken a leading part
in the rising against the Khalifa Uthman. But
it is most apparent in the fact that he lent an
ear to the court theologian Raja. The position
given to this man by the Umaiyid Khalifas is a
measure of their own position towards Islam.
His influence began under Abdulrnaiik, increased
under Walid, and reached its climax under
Sulaiman. Raja induced him to hand over the
Khalifate to Umar b. Abdilaziz. Of this we
have Waqidi's account in Tab., 1340ff. J

After Walid and Sulaim&n, Abdulmalik had
designated his son Yazld to be Khalifa and had
pledged the two former to this arrangement.
Disregarding this, Sulaim&n at once named as
his successor his own son Aiy&b. The latter,
however, died before him, and before he could
make over the succession to his second son
2, who was besieging Constantinople, he

1 His nnclo was as a child present in Dabiq and upon the accession
of Umar secured a few gold coins (Tab., 1361)

* The Biblical names which he gave his sons are perhaps another
proof of the piety of this Khalifa. They are otherwise seldom to be
met with among the Umaiyida at this period. His own name, Salai-
man, was of course none of his choosing,

THE FIRST MARWANIDS 265

was on his deathbed himself (Tab., 1335, 1341).
Then Raj& applied his lever and persuaded him
to make a will pleasing to God. Passing over
the next heir, he appointed in the will his pious
cousin Umar b. Abdilaztz to be Khalifa, and
Yazid b. Abdilmalik after him. Raj& remained
with the dying Khalifa, turned him towards the
Qibla, and closed his eyes. Without saying
that be was dead, he had the Umaiyids called
together into the mosque of D&biq, and demand-
ed of them homage for the Khalifa whomSulai-
man would name in his will, without mention-
ing any name,1 and only after they had done
so did he communicate the death of Sulaim£n
and the name of the appointed successor. It
was a surprise, for Umar sprang from a collat-
eral branch that had been supplanted by
Abdulmalik, and now, by a son of Abdulmalik
he was preferred to the numerous princes of the
direct line ! Nobody had dreamed of this, him-
self perhaps least of all, but no serious opposi-
tion arose against him. Raj£ apparently took
exactly the measures required. Hish&m b.
AbdilmaJik, to be sure, made some objection to
the doing of homage, but became reasonable
when he was threatened with the sword. Abdul-
aziz, the son of Walld [, was not present in

1 Ace. to Waqidl's report the dying Sulaimlu had already in person
done the same as Raja now repeated in the mosque after his death, — a
clear reduplication.

34

266 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

D&biq. When he heard of the death of
Sulaim&n, he thought his time had come, hut
composed himself when he learned that Umar
had become Khalifa.

CHAPTER V.
UMAR II AND THE MAWAL!.

1. Umar II was the son of Abdulaziz b.
Marw&n, who had for long been viceroy of
Egypt. He was descended on his mother's side
from Umar I, a fact which he laid great stress
upon. Born in Medina under Yazid I (Tab.,
1361), he spent there the greater part of his
youth, and was brought up upon the tradition
of the city of the Prophet. After his father's
death (A.H. 84 or 85) Abdulmalik attracted him
to Damascus and gave him his daughter in
marriage. Walld I sent him to Medina as
stattholder over the Hijaz, with the idea of
obliterating the evil memory of his predecessors
and conciliating the people of Medina. He
came into close relations with the masters of
the scripture erudition and science of tradition
which flourished there, and took no offence at
the fact that they found much to censure in the
conduct of the Umaiyid government, especially
that of Hajj&j. The consequence was that
the revolutionaries of Iraq sought refuge in
the Hij&z. This, of course, was not pleasing to

268 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

j, and at his instance Umar was recalled
from Medina. However, he did not fall into
disfavour ; he was the brother of Walld's wife
and remained in favour with him, while Sulai-
m&n also held him in high regard.

As we have seen, Islam was making progress
in the ruling family. Muawia, Abdulmalik,
Walid and Sulaim&n form, as it were, an ascend-
ing scale with Umar II as its culminating point.
But his piety differed from that of his prede-
cessors ; it permeated his whole life in quite
another way from theirs and determined his
public actions. Sulaimaii was a luxurious pro-
fligate, Umar almost an ascetic ; to the former
the ruling power offered unlimited means of
enjoyment ; upon the latter it imposed a weight
of responsibility. In everything he did judg-
ment loomed before his eyes, and he was always
afraid of coming short of the requirements of
God.

He was disinclined to wars of conquest, well
knowing that they were waged, not for God,
but for the sake of spoil, though it is uncertain
whether the Muslim army was first recalled
from Constantinople by him. Nor could he,
on principle, put an end to the Jihdd against
the emperor, but he gave up the advance out-
posts and withdrew the garrisons towards the
rear* He would also have willingly given up
Transoxiana, if Islam had not already had too

UMAR n AND THE MAWALI 269

firm a footing in a few of its towns, but at least
he forbade a further extension of the boundaries
there.1 His chief attention was directed to
internal policy, and with him there set in a
change in it, a change of another sort and of far
greater significance than that which distin-
guished Sulaiman from Walid.

He appointed new men to the most impor-
tant official posts, and took to task the offensive
Yazld b. Muhallab for not being able to pay up
the fifth-part of the Caspian spoil, the amount
of which, in his boasting, he had put at too
high a figure. Jarr&h b. Abdillah al Hakami
was sent to Khurasan, Adi b. Art&t al Fazarl to
Basra, Abdulhamid b. Abdirrahman alQuraishi
of the family of TJmar I to Kufa, Umar b.
Hubaira alFazari to Mesopotamia, and Amr b.
Muslim, a brother of Qutaiba, to India. Jarrah
(Tab ., 1354) and Amr were of the school of
Hajj&j, Adi and Ibn Hubaira were Qaisites.
But Umar did not appoint these men in order
to take the opposite side from that of his prede-
cessor, nor out of preference for the Qais and
Hajj&j, but because he considered them reli-
able and upright men (Tab., 1383, 3). To Spain
he appointed Samh b. M&lik al-Khaul&ni, a
Yemenite, and to Africa Ism&ll b. Abdill&h,
because he knew they did not belong to any

1 It was from Spain, of course, that in his reign Narbonne was
conquered and fortified.

270 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

party and were merciful to the oppressed. But he
was not satisfied with choosing men who appear-
ed to him to be suitable and then letting them
rule as they pleased, provided they only handed
over the necessary money. He felt himself
responsible in every point. What lay nearest
his heart was not so much the increase of power
as the establishment of right. The theologians,
who formed a party indepandent of the govern-
ment and hitherto rather hostile to it, attained
to influence with him. Accordingly, the Qddi,
or judge, appears also to have reached a more
independent and more important place. In a
letter to the Khurasanite Uqba b. Zur'a, he
names as the pillars of the government, (1) the
W&li, or executive governor, (2) the judge,
(3) the administrator of the taxes, and (4) the
Khalifa. The celebrated Hasan was Q&di in
Basra during his reign, and Amr ash Sha'bi in
Kufa, and he made the juris-consult Abu Zin&d
secretary to the stattholder Abdulhamid.

The government of the provinces in the Muslim
kingdom meant their financial administra-
tion, and the reform of this was one of the chief
objects of Umar II's activity, but it is not easy
to get a clear account of the measures he took
in the matter of the taxation. The conceptions
of it advanced by Alfred von Kremer and ac-
cepted by August Miiller are marred by actual
errors.

UMAR II AND THE MAWALI 271

According to Kremer and Mliller,1 Umar II
was impelled to make reforms in the taxation
only with the view to a return to the original
idea. They say that his model was the first

1 " His theological bigotry maclo all political judgment impo-
ssible for him, and if it cannot be disputed that some of his decrees
materially advanced Islam as such, still nearly everything ho did
contributed in the main to the complete disorganisation of a state that
was by this time secularized. The nation then existnhj which was
most adapted for politics, the Romans, did not unadvisedly lay down
the principle that a kingdom can be maintained only by the same
means which founded it. Bat Umar, in place of the exceedingly
realistic principles of government of Muawia's successors, wanted to
bring in ideal points of view which ho had adapted from the Qoran
and from tradition. And if this undertaking, in itself praise-worthy
enough, had only been set about with a moderate knowledge of the
real conditions ! But the pious Khalifa was so entangled in the
shibboleths of his theological circle that he did not even attempt to
use reason in applying the leading ideas of the Qoran to the wicked
world. His simple logic only said that it was God's will that things
should be thus and thus, and that, therefore they could bo brought to
pass. But God had plainly shown the believers how He wished the
Khalifate to be governed when Ho through His servants Abu Bekr
and Umar made subject to Islam first the rebel Arabs, and then the
whole o$ Persia, Syria and Egypt. Thus his ideal was no more than a
mechanical copy of the organisation given to the state by the first
Umar, but which the unworthy successors had disfigured in its most
important features by godless alterations. If wo bear in mind how
these alterations were compelled, not by any subjective arbitrariness,
but by the force of brutal facts, it is obvious that there was neither
rhyme nor reason in the old principles when applied to the state of
Abdulmalik and Hajjaj. But the pathetically pious confidence of the
wonderful man was unenlightened by the least glimmering of any such
notion. Tfcus, not long after his accession, he ordered the abolition of
the decree of Hajjaj by which the protected kinsmen accepting Islam
must in the interests of the treasury continue to pay the old poll. tax.
As by this the advantage was again on the side of the followers of
Other faiths who had received Islam, the pious prince, who organised

272 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Umar, to whose system he wished to revert and
to remove the distortions which it had had to
suffer from the preceding Umaiyid regents. Then
the preliminary question arises, — What was the

simultaneously in all the provinces a zealous missionary activity, had
the sweet satisfaction of seeing in a short time the bands of believers
in East and West increasing by millions. Tf these were at first only
simulated conversions, we must not forget that according to Muham-
madan law from the beginning the punishment of apostacy was death,
and thus withdrawal was made impossible to those once won over for
the Qoran. In this way, afterwards, the second generation at least
already consisted for the most part of good Muslims, and the
preponderance of the confessors of Allah over those of other beliefs
was therefore actually considerably increased by Umar's edict. But
the treasury suffered badly from it and this disadvantage was increased
out of all proportion by a second decree. This much was at any rate
plain, oven to Umar himself, namely, that the restoration of the old
prohibition against ownership of land for the Faithful was not to be
made, at least in the fashion of demanding, say, from everybody the
surrender of the estates acquired in the provinces in the course of over
70 years. For various reasons this was simply technically hnpoa sible,
and so at least this exfcremoly dangerous expsrnnent was uofc at tempt-
ed. But while from the year 100 onwards any further purchase of
ground and estate was forbidden to the Muslims, the Khalifa undertook,
in order to abolish an equalisation of believers and protected kinsmen
which was offensive to his orthodoxy, to put those properties of Muham-
madan owners which were illegally seized no longer under the Kharaj
so far imposed upon them, but only under the much lower tithe.
Naturally the result of this was a still farther deficiency in the state-
revenues, and it was unpractical in so far as the favour shown to those
who so far had acquired no ground or property, and now were destined
never to get any, assumed straightway the character of a privUegium
odiosum. It mattered nothing that to the latter a sort of amends was
simultaneously to be made by a more rigorous enforcement of tho sys-
tem of the yearly salary, for these stipends were, comparatively speak-
ing, far from being large enough, notwithstanding the fact that with
the huge increase of conversions they were a drain upon the govern-
ment- And ia addition to all these measures which deeply affected

UMAR II AND THE MAWALI 273

nature of the pattern which he wanted to copy ?
Two measures in particular that are traced back
to the first Umar come into consideration. He
is said to have permitted the Arabs to acquire
landed property in the conquered provinces, and
to have ordered that on the conversion of
subjects, i.e. of the conquered non-Arabs, the
new converts should only be relieved of the
poll-tax, but the ground-tax upon the cultivated
land should remain. As a matter of fact he did
neither the one nor the other.

In the cause of God and justice the whole
land gained by conquest would have fallen to
be divided amongst the Arab warriors, to whom
it belonged by right of spoil. For practical rea-
sons it of course remained undivided and became
either State-land or Muslim territory. To the
treasury or the ruler fell those estates vacated
by the old proprietors and yielded without a
struggle, — those of the dynasty, the nobility,
and mortmain, e. g. the post and the fire-temple.
These domains (Sawdfi) covered a vast extent,
especially in those provinces which generally

the treasury, thero came lastly tho order issuing from a humane but
unpractical sense of justice, that all excess moneys which might have
been collected from the subjects by illegal extortions were to be re-
turned to those who had been defrauded. Whether this happened in
individual cases we do not know, but the most faithless official could
not desire a finer opportunity for unpunished plundering of the public
treasuries." Thus A. Miiller, Ge*ch. rfo.s Islams, I, 439 ff,, freely follow*
ing Kremer, Cidturgcsch. des Orients, I, 174 ff.

35

274 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

were of most financial consideration,1 particularly
in Iraq (Saw&d). On the other hand, what was
won in combat by the Arab warriors was con-
sidered the collective possession of the Muslims,
and was left in the ownership of the vanquished
on payment of tribute. Now, the tribute ought
really to have been divided every year as income
amongst the legal owners of the capital, but the
state laid hands upon it and paid the Muslim
warriors only fixed pensions, according to its
own pleasure. Thus the distinction between
estate-land and tribute-land disappeared, the
revenues from both flowing equally into the
treasury. This development was consummated
in the time of the great conquests, and Umar I
either introduced it or made it legitimate
through usage. But he did not go so far as
actually not to permit in the tribute-land any
real private ownership of property. A general

1 " The area of the Sawad amounts to 10,000 square parasangs, the
parasang to 10,000 common, or 9,000 Hashimid ells. A square
parasang comprises 22,500 jarib, so 10,000 square parasangs are 225
million jarib. In valuation a deduction of one-third is made from
this for hollows, hills, saltlields, marshes, streets, river-courses, boun-
daries of towns and villages and so on, which comes to 76 millions, so
that in fields there are left 150 millions. Of this alternately half lies
fallow and half is tilled. But there are to be added (for taxation)
the palms, vines, and other trees scattered over the whole (all
three thirds) which are not assessed according to the square
measure of the fields." Thus Qudama in MAwardl, ed. Enger, p. 301.
That the valuation of the whole area got to be false and excessive
has been pointed out by Hermann Wagner, Odtt. Nachrichten, 1902,
pp. 224 If.

UMAR II AND THE MA WALL 275

prohibition against the ownership of land by
the Arabs in the provinces was never made.1
Like the Prophet himself, his successors also,
not excepting Abubakr and Umar, had full
control over the state-lands and presented parts
of them (qat&i') to eminent deserving men,
not perhaps as fiefs but as allod, and it was thus
that All, Talha and Zubair became men of great
possessions.^ Further, all the Arab warriors
in the Musftr were owners of estates as a matter
of course, and owned not merely their house and
farm but also estates in the villages round
about. During the reign of Umar I they
certainly put war and booty first, but in the
more peaceful times that followed this was
changed. The love of annexing ground and
land had been already awakened in them in
heathen times, and it was not suppressed by
Muhammad and Islam but encouraged, and
doubtless lent its additional influence at the
time of the wars of conquest. The old law by
which ground not already occupied became the
property of him who made it productive, held
not only in Arabia but in the provinces also,
and was there actively enforced. But the
eagerness for land did not stop even at the
taxable tracts of land belonging to subdued
peasants, for they frequently passed into the

1 Cf. Juyiiboll in the Indian Gicfr, February, 1899.

a Yahya b. Adam, Kitto al Khar&j, pp. 42, 56 ft'., 61. 07.

276 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

possession of Arab lords by purchase or less
honourable means, nor is it anywhere apparent
that the latter were, to begin with, prohibited
from this by law. Umar I had no motive in
objecting to a procedure which in his time had
scarcely begun, and at any rate had not yet led
to harmful consequences.

Neither did Umar I lay down the law that
the Kharjij upon a tract of land should remain
whether the owner were a Muslim or not, and
that conversion to Islam freed men from the
Jizia only, because this, being a poll-tax, was
adjusted according to their position and was a
personal mark of distinction between the van-
quished and the Muslim. Both were originally
equally considered as tribute payable by the
serfs to the citizens of the theocracy — the child-
ren of the kingdom (Matth., 17, 25). The latter
had not to pay taxes either on their persons
or on the soil of their fields, but had only to
surrender the tenth-part of the crop, and that
not to men but to God. The thought never
occurred to them that it was only the obligatibn
of paying tribute on the person that was a
dishonour to the Muslim, and not that on
territory. Neither is there in older terms of
speech any difference whatever made between
Khar&j and Jizia ; both mean the same, namely
the tribute of non-Muslims. There is frequent
mention of the Jizia of the land, but just as

UMAR II AND THE MAWALI :277

frequent mention of the Kharaj of a person. '
Under what title the individual tax-payers had
to raise their quota mattered little to the
Arabs, especially in the case where the tribute
was imposed as a lump sum of fixed amount
upon the community, as a whole — which at
first seems to have been rather the rule than
the exception.

The original practice then was that Islam
freed from all tributary obligation, and that a
,Khar&j piece of ground became tax-free when
an Arab Muslim acquired it,*' or when the non-
• Arab owner became a Muslim. But this put a
premium first upon the exploiting of the peasants
on the part of the Arab lords, and next upon the
conversion of the tribute-payers to Islam. In
both cases the difference between their positions
and the nature of their holding was abolished, —
the difference which was the basis of Umar I's
system of finance, — and difficulties and embar-
rassments arose. If the tribute were lessened in
proportion to the amounts dropped through the
conversions to Islam, then the exchequer bore

1 Gf. De Gooje in the Glossary to Tab., and further Italadh., 05, 7
with 60, 15 ; 351, 1 with 351, 5. 13. In Khurasan Jizia was always
said and not Khnr&j, which is more prevalent olsowhere. (Tab., 1354.
1364 ff, 1507 ff.). In Yahya b. Adam's book of taxes the indiscrimi-
nate use is found. It ia quite usual there to find it called the " Jizia
of the land."

a So with us (Germans) formerly a farm became tax- free when u
noble acquired it, for, a? a noble, he was exempt from the tax.

278 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the brunt ; but if it was further raised to its old
amount by a lump sum, then the burden was
increased for the community, which had become
less able to pay taxes because of the conversions.
Neither was it a good thing when the new
converts, as frequently, and perhaps mostly,
happened, left land and community to their fate
and migrated to the Arabian towns. This took
the labour away from the land, so that it was in
danger of becoming partly barren. The influx
into the towns, however, was unwelcome. In
Kufa and Basra, — for in all these circumstances
we get our best and almost exclusive information
from Iraq, — there were already plenty of new
Muslims or Maw&li, originally freed prisoners
of war, mostly of Iranian extraction. They
occupied a position half-way between the Arab
lords and the non-Arab subjects, and while they
certainly paid neither land-tax nor poll-tax, were
not entered in the Diwan of the Muqatila and
received no pension, although in time of war
they fought in the train of their former masters,
to whom they were morally bound to render all
kinds of service. Their position being neither
one thing nor another, naturally did not content
them ; Islam made them alive to their claims,
and they sought to obtain full equal rights.
Their revolt under Mukht&r showed the danger
they threatened to be to the Arab realm, and
indeed the suppression of it cost them many

UMAR II AND THE MAWALI 279

lives. Bat the gaps that the sword had made in
their ranks were easily filled up again by the
new Muslims emigrating from the villages and
country towns, who, though they might he of
more peaceahle disposition, had nevertheless the
same interest in their standing. A significant
breach in Umar I's system was also caused by
the fact that the army and government towns
very soon lost their specifically Arab character.

This somewhat primitive system of admini-
stration of Umar I which confined itself to broad
lines, gave rise to a development unforeseen by
him which threatened its destruction. Under
him the disadvantages were not yet perceptible.
The acquisitive instincts of the Arabs at that
time took, on the average, another direction
from that of aspiring after estates and landed
property, and the tax-paying non-Arabs were not
yet coming over to Islam in such numbers that
the treasury suffered thereby, — a treasury which
then indeed was filled to overflowing, by the spoil
which ever kept coming in, and had very much
more modest claims to meet than it had later on.
In the next generation, i.e. under the Umaiyids,
this was different. But Hajj&j, according to
tradition, only decided to interfere with the
recognised practice in order to remove the injury
which the exchequer was suffering by it. He
did not release from the Khar&j the Arabs who
had acquired property in the Khar^j -country,

280 ARA.B KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

and even re-imposed it upon those who had
before been freed from it. In the same way he
is said to have treated the new converts with
regard to their obligation to pay tribute, when
they remained in the village and retained their
farm. But he forbade Hijra to them, — i.e. emi-
gration into the centres of Islam and of Arab
government, and eventually brought them back
by force. His was a new procedure and did not
square with what had hitherto been looked upon
as justice, and it aroused the common outcry of
the Arabs and Hawaii affected by it, as being a
slap in the face of Islam ; but he paid no heed
to it.

Umar II's sentiments made him adopt ano-
ther way. His aim was not so very much differ-
ent from that of Hajj&j, but he tried to reach
it only in a way which did not offend against
the Islamic idea of justice. Thus he agreed
with the old way in this respect, that a Muslim
whether of first or second rank, whether Arab
or Maula, need pay no tribute, either poll-tax
or land-tax. But in ord^ >• to prevent the de-
crease of the state revenue, he made the deduc-
tion, quite in agreement with the Scripture-
scholars of Medina, from history, that the
Khar &j -land was first of all the joint property
of the Muslims, and secondly must he considered
the joint possession of the communities concern-
ed, to whom the Muslims had handed it over for

TTMAR II AND THE MAWALI 281

usufruct on payment of tribute, so that there-
fore portions of it must not be taken from the
whole to become, by passing into Muslim owner-
ship, tax-free private estates. Consequently
he declared the selling of Khar&j-land to Arabs
and Muslims to be prohibited from the year 100,
without, however, giving the prohibition a
retrospective force. In the case of the con-
version to Islam of an owner of land liable to
taxes, he seems to have decreed that his property
should revert to the village community. He
might then remain upon it, say, as a lease-hold-
er,— a lease not being tribute ; but he might
also come into the town (a thing which Haj-
j&j had been against permitting), and this, in
fact, was the rule. Whether he also became
entitled to a pension through the hijra is a
question not to be easily answered.

While by the recognition of the immunity
of Muslims from the subject-tax it was only
the old usage, which had not yet disappeared,
that was again put in force, the prohibition of
a further alienation of tribute-land was a new
legislative measure which cut deep. It was
certainly based upon the historical origin of the
tribute-land, and was a consequence of the fact
that in time of conquest the soil was not
treated as booty but remained undivided. But
in that time itself this practical consequence
had not yet appeared.
36

282 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Umar II did not succeed. By the method
he tried the deterioration of the finances was
inevitable. The principle of the inalienability
of the tribute-land could not be carried through,
and the change of property was no more put a
stop to than the change of faith. The later
practice reverted to the method of Hajjftj,
but with a difference, which, though materially
small, had much formal significance. There
was, in fact, a distinction drawn between Khar&j
and Jizia which had not existed before. The
Jizia, according to this, rested on the person
and only affected the non-Muslims, being a load
removed from their necks when they were con-
verted. The Khar&j, on the contrary, rested
on the land and did not degrade the person ; it
was to, and had to, be paid even by Muslims
owning tribute-land. Since the land, at any
rate, was the chief object of taxation the poll-
tax was really a small sacrifice.1 Thus cheaply
did the exchequer settle the claims of Islam.
It was a piece of legal finesse, an expedient which
was only resorted to of necessity, for to the
plain human understanding it was certainly not
the land that paid the tax, but the owner of it.

7 Neither was the poll-tax ever exacted from the new Muslims, the
Hawaii, in Kufa and Basra. They only felt slighted because they
were not received into the Diwan of the Muqatila and made participa-
tors in the pension, and in this respect they aspired to eqnal
rights,

UMAR n AND THE MAWALI 283

We hear of a tax-reform of the last Umaiyid
stattholder of Khurasan, Nasr b. Saiy&r. He
hit upon the arrangement of raising the tribute
in a fixed amount solely from the land-tax,
which was imposed as a lump sum upon the
individual taxable districts. All land-proprie-
tors, Muslims or non-Muslims, Arabs or Iranians
had to contribute to it in proportion to their
property. But the poll-tax was separate from
it and contributed only by Zoroastrians, Jews
and Christians, not by Muslims, not even by
newly-converted ones. That the revenue was
falling in consequence of the increasing conver-
sions was foreseen, and did not matter when
put against the fact that the land-tax alone
was already yielding the necessary assured
income for the treasury.1 This regulation was
new, and did not exist before, and it was suc-
cessful in Khurasan as well as, sooner or later,
in other parts of the Islamic realm because it
cleverly reconciled the financial interest with the
principle of the freedom of the citizens of the
theocracy from tribute. No doubt the jurists
did yeoman service in this, but what had real-
ly been the outcome of a complicated process
mediating between opposing claims they after-
wards regarded as the matter-of-course law
which always had been valid. If this law had

1 This subject is more fully treated in the intermediate piece of
Chap. 8 upon Khurasan, to which attention may be directed.

284, ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

really been valid from the beginning, then no
difficulties would have arisen.

2. The Muslim jurists have everywhere a
way of tracing back to their beginnings the
things that have come about gradually and
which have been brought about by gradually
arising needs or tendencies, and of sanctioning
them by the precedent (the Surma) of the Pro-
phet and the first Khalifas. Thus they even
trace the form to which the laws of taxation
or administration at last attained after long
fluctuation, back to tho first Umar, who only
made the first initial steps. We have to beware
of this historical dogma in order to form a just
judgment of the conduct of Hajjaj and the
second Umar. We should, in the first place,
stick for preference to the proper historians, i.e.
the oldest ones, who have more respect for the
facts, rely partly upon documentary evidence,
and report not so much the principles of the
rulers as individual differences, which cannot
be made into generalisations without considera-
tion. We may well bring under this stricture
also the historical evidence of the jurists, among
which there is much to be found that is not in
their line at all, and is independent of their
tendency. My view of the difficult and disputed
matter has been evolved gradually and unarbi-
trarily; I did not make, to start with, a collec-
tion of the data from which it proceeds. Those

UMAK II AND THE MAWALl 285

which are by me I gather together here, and
thus an opportunity is given of adding anything
that has not been mentioned in the previous
resume.

Concerning Haj ja j, Baladhuri, 368, informs us
that he reimposed the Khar&j on these portions
of land in Mesene which were relieved from
it througli the conversion of the old owners
or by passing into the possession of Arabs.
According to the passage quoted on page 244 from
the Iqd of Abdrabbih, Hajj&j also brought the
Maw&li from the Musur back into their country
towns and villages. u He said to the Hawaii, —
' Ye are barbarians and foreigners ; your place is
your towns and villages.3 So he sent them
where he wanted and had the name of the
place each one was sent to marked on his hand
by the Ijlite, Khir&sh b. J&bir. Hence the
verse runs, " Thou art he whose hand the Ijlite
branded, and thy sire fled to Hakam ; " ' and
other verses say, — " A maiden who does not
know what the driving of camels means " 2 has
been dragged forth by Hajj£j from her shadowy
hiding-place. If Amr had been present, and Ibn
Khabal, her hands would not have been marked
without a hot conflict.35 When, later on, a
Maula, N&h b. Darraj, became Qadi of Basra,
this verse was made upon him, IC The last day

^llakam b. Aiyub ath Thaqaf i was Haj jaj's representative in Basra.
2 "Who has never yet goiie on a journey."

286 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

is surely come, since N&h has become
If Hajjaj were still there, his hand would not
have escaped his (Hajj&j's) mark." l The fact
is also testified to by Tab., 1122, 1425 ; Anon.
Ahlw., 336. Here it says in order to prevent
the falling off of the tribute, Hajj&j wrote to
Basra and other towns that those Maw&ll who
had immigrated there from the country should
go back to their villages. Then those who were
expelled assembled in Basra, not knowing
whither to go, and called in lamentation upon
the name of the Prophet. The pious readers
were on their side, and so they in turn joined the
readers who deserted to Ibn Ash'ath when the
latter came to Basra.

According to Bal&dhuri, 368, Umar II made
invalid the inclusion of the Muslims in the
Khar&j, introduced by Hajj&j, not only in
Meserie, but everywhere. In a letter mentioned
in Tab., 1366 f. to the stallholder of Kufa, he
lays down the principle, — no Kharaj for those
who have embraced Islam. According to Theo-
phanes, A.M. 6210 he relieved from the tax the
Christians who had received Islam.

The further measure of Umar II forbidding
for the future the sale of Kharaj -land to
Muslims, is testified to by a passage from Ibn

1 Hasan alBasri, the Qa,di at tho time of Umar II, was also a
Maula.

UMAR II AND THE MAW All 287

As&kir's History of Damascus given by Alfred
von Kremer in the " CulturgeschivhtUche Streif-
zuge" pp. 60 ff. in the Arabic text, and partly
translated by him in the " Culturgeschichte des
Orients" 1, 76. It deals with Syria and is im-
portant precisely because it shows that matters
there proceeded in analogy with those in Iraq,
about which we have particular information.

"TJmar I and the eminent Companions of the
Prophet agreed to leave the vanquished their
lands on condition that they tilled them and paid
the Kharaj on them to the Muslims. If after-
wards one of them embraced Islam, then the
Khar&j was removed from his head,1 but his
land and house were divided among the village
community so that they paid the Khar&j on
them, while what he possessed in money,
servants and cattle was left to him. He was
then received into the army- and pension-list of
the Muslims 2 and became entitled to the same
rights and obligations. They (i.e. Umar and the
Companions) were of opinion that he, as a
Muslim, had no claim to his land in preference
to the village community,8 because the land as a
whole had passed to the Muslims as a joint

1 Here also the same expression is used for the ground- tax and
poll-tax.

* It is considered a matter of course that the new Muslims
emigrated to one of the Arab army towns. Only the pagani held to
their old religion.

• For tlty* read

288 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

«

possession. Those who stuck to their Christian
religion and stayed in their villages were called
kinsmen under the protection of the Muslims
(Dhimma). Umar and the Companions further
held that no Muslim by using coercion might
buy a piece of land from these protected
persons, because the latter could appeal to
the fact that they had abstained from war
against them and had not assisted their
enemies (namely the Romans).1 Therefore the
Companions and rulers were chary of using com-
pulsion towards them a and of seizing their
estates. But they also disapproved of the
Muslims' purchasing freely offered lands for the
reason that the owners had no real proprietary
right to them, and also because they wished to
reserve the land as a collective possession set
aside for the Muslim warriors of the future, as
a means of carrying on war against the still
unconquered heathen, so that it was not sold or
inherited like private property. For they were
determined to keep the command in Sur.9 2,
189 ; 8, 40.

In spite of this :J many Muslims had long had
private estates in Syria, especially the so-called

1 Kremer's translation is incomprehensible.

9 For a|""^ read * \ » «*> &.

3 What follows is only briefly given. In Kremer the text is in
several places out of order, but on the whole the sense can be
followed.

UMAR II AND THE MAWALI 289

Qatai'. These were originally the property
of the patricians who took to flight at the
capture of Syria, and of those who had fallen
in the battles. They were taken in as estates
(Saivdfi) and the revenues from them at first
went into the treasury like the Khar&j, but
when Muawia was stattholder of Syria and
found it difficult to make his income meet his
outlay, Uthman assigned to him, at his request,
these estates, or at least a great part of them.
As Khalifa, Muawia devoted them as an inalien-
able fund for the needy of his own family and
other indigent Muslims. But the estates which
Uthman, in his time, had not yet given to him,
he divided among Quraishites and other Arabs
who asked him for them as Qat&i', not in fief,
but as free property, which they might sell or
bequeath. Then Abduhnalik did the same with
what was still left, arid he also took in Kharaj-
land the owners of which had died out, and
divided it among the Muslims as tithe-land, so
that the Kharaj declined. Thereupon Abdul-
malik and his two next successors did not indeed
adopt the method of taking away Khar&j-
land by force from the owners and giving it to
Muslims, but they did allow them to buy it. The
price then came to the state-treasury, and ths
Khar&j of the village was reduced by the corres-
ponding amount ; the actual Muslim owners paid
only the tenth.
37

290 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Umar II did otherwise. He did Dot, indeed,
go back upon what had happened up till the
year 100, but decreed that there should be no
Jizia l upon the Khar&j-land which had up till
then passed into the hands of the Muslims by
purchase, but only the tithe. But for the
future he declared such purchases to be invalid,
and in this his two successors Yazld II and
Hish&m acquiesced. Because of this the year
100 was called the " term." It was not long,
however, till the old way of doing returned and
on the lands sold to Muslims there was imposed
not the Jizia but only the tithe, but as the
Khar&j consequently declined Mansur interfered.
He wanted, actually, to give back to the original
owners the estates sold against the law of Umar II,
but that presented too great difficulties, so
he commanded that the Qut&i' and the tracts of
Khar^j-land sold up till A. H. 100 should only
pay the tithe, but that those sold since then
should pay the KhanVj. In the year 141 he sent
officials to Syria to separate the lands and rate
them accordingly."

Ibn As&kir is an author of the sixth century
of the Hijra who suffers detraction from the view
that had then been long prevalent, namely that
the first Umar and the Companions, after Muham-
mad's death the authoritative regulators of the

1 Jizia is here also need for land-tax.

UMAR II AND THE MAWALI 291

conditions newly created by the conquest, fixed
from the beginning, in all questions, the standard
for the future, and that the disposal of domain-
lands and the alienation of tribute-paying land
were misusages which were in direct opposition
to the standard, and only arose since the time of
the defection which followed with Uthman and
the Umaiyids. But so far as his accounts are
not influenced by this view, we have no reason
to doubt that he got them from old sources.
They are too positive to have been invented.
We may therefore believe that Umar II start-
ed with a reaction against the chipping and
partitioning of the state and common property
prevalent among his predecessors, by forbidding
the selling of Khar&j-land. That he also kept
the estates together and did not give away any
of them Ibn \s&kir does not actually say, but
it may be taken for granted.1

1 What Ibn Asakir gays about the disappearance of the landed
properties is added to by a remarkable notice which we find in Baladh.,
272 f. and Yahya, 45. " Umar b. Khattab made into crown-lands in
the Sawad the property of those fallen in battle, that of those who had
fled, that of the Persian king and his adherents, and that of the post and
the marshes. The revenue from these amounted to 7,000,000 dirhems.
But at the time of Hajjaj, after the battle of Jamajiin, the people burnt
the Diwan (the old document with information concerning titles and
estates), and everyoae took whatever he could lay hands on." So the
estates were in danger not merely from the fact that the Khalifas gave
away parts of them. There lurked among the people a general rage
against the Latifundia of the state, the rulers and the great men, They
attempted to destroy or obscure the historic*! titles upon which rested
the right of possession which was offensive to them.

292 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Now when this Khalifa opposed the taking
of tribute-land from the state by its being sold,
he cannot either have been willing that the
same thing should come about through change
of faith. He seems to have devised measures
by which the principle that no new convert
should be liable to tribute lost the point which
caused the treasury to suffer, and assumed an
ideal rather than a material significance.1 In
Yahy& b. Adam, 4.4 it says that Umar II re-
fused to change the Kharaj into the tithe for
those embracing Islam, and declared instead
that those of them who remained by their
canals 2 should, after conversion, pay the same
as before, but those who came into the town
should forfeit their land to the village com-
munity. That the new Muslim who stayed on
beside his canal should have had to go on
paying the Khar&j certainly does not agree with
what we already know, but the contradiction
disappears when we learn that the payment
was no longer regarded as tribute but as lease-
money.3 In the passage quoted the statement

1 It would bo difficult to find proofs for the assertion that in conse-
quence of the remission of the tax millions accepted Islam undcrUmar II.

* The Kharaj-laud in Iraq means the land watered by the canals.
Tithe-land was to be found only outwith the alluvium.

3 According to Yahya 43, Ali is said to have remarked to a newly-
converted proprietor of Aintamr, — " Thy land falls to the Muslims ; if
thou wilt, get thee into the city and receive pension, else must thou
remain as farmer (qahruman) on the land and deliver to us a part of the
rerenue."

UMAR II AND THE MAWAL1 293

is certainly correct, that the Khalifa considered
the arrangement of the tribute-land and the
state-revenue it yielded as a very great blessing.
Even though he could not undo the diminution
that had already taken place, still he wanted
for the future to keep the assurance of the Fai
intact. And even though he did not, in prin-
ciple, infringe the Muslims5 freedom from tri-
bute,— that of the new Muslims as well as the
old, — still he did not want the old historical
right to he injured by additional alterations, and
lands to become free private possessions which
in reality belonged to the inalienable ownership
of the community.

In the provinces already conquered nearly
a century before, whose system of taxation was
regulated once for all by the act of conquest,
according to the somewhat modified law of
spoil of Islam, Umar II, in essentials, maintain-
ed the status founded upon this historical basis
and protected it from threatened infringements,
but it was not so in the lands which were only
annexed in his time, or at least were not yet
thoroughly and completely subdued, — in Trans-
oxiana and India, in Africa and Spain. The
course which he here adopted must be consider-
ed absolutely by itself and must not be confused
with the other; it does not come under the
same point of view. Before the hostilities against
a heathen people began there had to go

294 AftAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

out to them the summons to receive the Faith
and submit to Allah. If they obeyed the sum-
mons they then entered the theocracy with full
privileges and needed to pay no tribute. Thus
it was prescribed by Islam, but no one took it
in earnest. The Jih&d was to bring in money
and spoil — that, and not the spreading abroad of
the Faith, had become the aim. Umar II hated
this Jih&d, and wanted, on the contrary, a peace-
ful gathering-in of the nations to Islam, and
in this case demanded no tribute. There was
no mention of giving up the Fai, because no
Fai existed.

According to Baladli,, 441 he summoned the
kings of the Indus-territory to accept Islam and
promised them complete equality of status ; they
were then converted, and took Arab names.
According to 13 .l&dh, 426 many Transoxanian
kings received Islam under him, and then need-
ed to pay no tribute and received a pension.
Tab., 1354 says a complaint was lodged with him
that the Maw&li in the army of Khurasan, al-
though they fought with the Arabs against the
heathen at a strength oP 20,000 men, were still
excluded from the pension and actually had to
pay tribute; for them he procured redress. At
the same time he gave a general order to remit
the tribute in the case of every one who acknow-
ledged Islam. Then the hitherto heathen Sogh-
dians flocked into the community of the ruling

UMAR II AND THE MAWALI 295

religion. According to Baladh., 422 and Tab.,
1364f., Umar did not however deliver up
again to the Soghdians the capital Samarqand,
although he recognised it was only by a breach
of faith that the Arabs had taken possession of it.
What had happened years before hedid not redress.

Even the Berbers were, acoording to Bal&dh.,
531, 225 summoned by Umar IT to accept
Islam, and troops of them obeyed the call. He
consequently relieved them from the tribute,
which consisted in the handing over of children.
As regards the girls who had already been deli-
vered up, he decreed that their masters should
either take them in marriage in lawful form,
or give them back to their parents.

Different and very unique is a measure which
was passed in Spain, according to the Contii. Isid.
Hisp., par. 186, not indeed by Umar himself,
but doubtless with his approval and by his order,
by the stattholder Samh, whom he had appoint-
ed over that land. Zama ulteriorem vel ( = et)
citeriorem Iberiam proprio stilo ad vectigalia in-
ferenda describit. Predia et manualia vel
quidquid illud est, quod olim predaviliter indi-
visum retentabat in Spania gens omnis arabica,
sorte sociis dividendo partem ex omni re mobili
et immobili fisco adsociat.1 Whilst therefore a

1 I have altered Mommsen's punctuation and changed preda into
predia according to what follows : res mobilis^manualia -t res irnmobi-

296 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

part of the captured land remained to the old
inhabitants on consideration of the tax, there
was another part till then reserved, after deduc-
tion of the fifth, divided among the army. Of
what sort this reserved part was is not plain.
It may have consisted of such portions of land
as had been confiscated in Iraq and in Syria as
"estates."1 In Spain Umar II had still to some
extent a free hand. His procedure was doubt-
less determined by the idea of attaching the
Arab warriors to Spain by possessions of land.
He is said to have taken the example of Umar I
as his model. If the latter had given the sol-
diers in India no landed property then the de-
fence of the land would have been impossible.2
Of course Umar I had nothing to do with India,
and as a general thing he rather set the example
of the most extensive fiscalisation of the land-
spoil possible, but he must, all the same, play
the precedent were it even in a sort of round-
about way. Moreover it deserves to be noticed
how little the old tradition bears out the more
modern opinion that the Arabs in the provinces
were not permitted to own any landed property
whatever.

I also add some particulars concerning fur-
ther financial measures of Umar II, taking firstly
those that concerned the Muslims.

1 Of. the note on page 291. It was at any rate not the fifth.
» Dozy, Recherche* (1881), 1, 76.

OMAR II AND THE MAWALI 297

The oasis of Fadak near Medina had till
then been regarded as the property of the reign-
ing ruler, but Umar II made it over as the
private property of Muhammad to his family,
the Alids. By so doing he abolished the con-
trary decisions of the first two Khalifas, thus
showing that he was not slavishly bound to
them. (Baladh., 30-32.) He also gave back to
Talha's family their property in Mecca, which
had been taken from them (Tab., 1483f.).

In the Yemen a tax in addition to the
tithe had been levied by a brother of HajjAj who
ruled there; Umar II redressed this (Bal&dh.,
73). In Um&n the tithe was consigned
to the state-treasury of Basra ; Umar II re-
established the custom of its remaining in the
land and there being divided among the poor
(Bal&dh., 77f.)- This was not the general custom
all over Arabia, but differed here and there
according to the more or less favourable con-
ditions under which the clans and districts
had first gone over to Islam.1 The order of
Umar II, also, that the Khardj of Khur&s&n
should remain in the land and be spent there
(Tab., 1366) must not be made general; there
were special reasons for it.

As regards the pensions of the Muslim
warriors in the army-towns and garrisons, the
government acted at all times very capriciously.

1 Skizzen, 4, 95.

38

298 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

It struck unpopular names out of the list
and inserted others instead, and curtailed or in-
creased the amount as it saw fit. This gave
a continual ground for complaint, for the
revenue of the Fai, from which the pensions
came, belonged by right of spoil entirely to
the heirs of the conquering army, and they
never ceased from their demand that nothing
less than the whole should be poured out before
them. It is certainly not to be credited that
in this matter Umar II, — as forsooth Ala is
said to have done before him, complied with
their wishes. He took care to abstain from
very imprudent steps (Bal&dh., 458f.). But
he did much to appease the claims made upon
the state-treasury. He extended the circle of
those entitled to pensions further over the Arabs
than it had ever been before. To the whole
of the Maw&li of Khurasan who were in the
army and had taken part in the campaigns
against the heathen, he granted not merely
freedom from taxation but also maintenance
(rizq) and pay (at ft,) ; he declared he was ready
to contribute from the chief treasury of the state
if the Khar&j of Khurasan were not sufficient,
but this was not necessary (Tab., 135 i).
But whether it is correct that he regarded
every new convert who immigrated from the
country into Kufa or Basra as a Muh&jir,
and granted him an equal claim with the heirs

UMAR II AND THE MAWlLI 299

of the Arab conquerors must be very much
doubted. Legally it could hardly have been
justified, and practically ih would have had the
very worst consequences. The custom of givim?
pensions also to the children and the family
of the Muqlttila had already been restricted
by Mu&wia and discontinued altogether by
Abdulmalik, but Umar II re-introduced it
(Balddh., 458f. ; Tab., 1387). He also supported
the Muslim poor, especially the needy pilgrims
to Mecca and certain sick people, by fixed
amounts, not indeed confining his benefactions
to Syria, like Walid I, but exercising them also
in Iraq and Khurasan, as if he made no distinc-
tion whatever between the provinces (Tab., 1337,
1364, 1367, 1854).

As regards his conduct towards people of
other faiths, Theoplirtnes, in A. M. 6210, gives
this account. " When in the same year in
Syria a great earthquake) took place, l Umar
forbade wine in the towns and compelled the
Christians to go over to Islam. And those who
did so he freed from the tax, but slew the
rest and made many martyrs. And he decreed
that the testimony of a Christian against a
Saracen should not be accepted. He also
wrote a dogmatic letter to the Emperor Leo
in the hope of persuading him to receive Islam."

' The earthquake wag on the 15th Jumadi I, 99* 24th Dec., 717
JLD. Umar had succeeded to the government in Safar (Sepr.,

300 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

In these statements there is a mixture of truth
and falsehood. It is true that Umar II was
a zealous Muslim and that the Christians had
cause to know it. Bat he did not force them
to conversion on pain of death,1 for then he
would have been infringing the existing law,
and that he did not do, being a good Muslim.
With regard to the Christians he kept absolutely
within the bounds of justice even though it might
seem otherwise to them. He protected them
in the possession of their old churches, which
was assured to them by the terms of their capitu-
lation, and only did not allow them to build
new ones (Tab., 1371), The church of St. John
in Damascus, illegally wrested from them by
Walid I, he was willing to vacate again for
them, if they renounced the Churches before
the Gate, i.e. of St. Thomae, which they possess-
ed actually but not by agreement, because the
land outside of the wall was forcibly taken and
not surrendered by capitulation, and when they
did not accede to this he made the one compen-
sate for the other (Tab., 1275 ; Baladh., 125).

1 Uiehl, Hist. d'Afriquc, 1890, p. 591, asserts that he ordered the
Catholics in Africa either to be converted or to leave the land. He refers
to Monum. Germ. Epist., 3,267, but there Pope Gregor only instructs
Bonifacius that he ' Afros passim ad occlegiasticos ordines praetendes
nulla ratione suscipiat, quia aliqui corum Maniclmei, aliqui rebaptizati
aaepiue sunt probati.' Is that to suffice us as a proof of an order of
Umar, which would have been absolutely contrary to the law of
Islam ?

UMAR II AND THE MAW AM 301

The law which he here exercised was certainly
the formal law of the jurists, but he could not
do otherwise without renouncing Islam. Where
it was merely a question of money he was more
open-hearted. In the course of time, under
some pretext or other, the tribute of the Christ-
ians in Aela and Cyprus had been increased,
but he reduced it to the sum originally fixed
(Baladh., 59 ; 154f.). The Prophet had decreed
that the Najnmians in the Yemen should pay
2,000 pieces of cloth yearly, each of the value
of 40 dirhems, and for this had assured to them
the right of remaining as Christians in their
land and on their estates. Umar I broke the
treaty by a flagrant breach of justice which is
excused in various ways. He compelled the
Christian Najr&nians along with their Jewish
adherents to leave Arabia and emigrate to Iraq
or Syria, whilst he bought their properties from
them or gave them others in exchange for them
in their new abodes. Their chief colony was
Najr&nlya, near Kufa. They were obliged again
to pay their tax at the old amount ; their chief
in Najr&nlya was responsible for it and exacted
it also from the kinsmen settled in Syria.
Umar's successor, Uthm&n, reduced the amount
by 200 pieces of cloth, and Mu£wia by 200
pieces more, as the number of the Najr&nians
had decreased by death and by conversion to
Islam. Hajj&j, however, raised it again by 200

302 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

pieces, because he is said to have suspected
them of sympathy with Ibn Ash;ath. Now
when Umar II came into power they complain-
ed to him of their wrong, saying that their
numbers had decreased and dwindled by the
constant campaigns. It appeared, in fact, that
they had declined from 40,000 souls to 4S000.
As a beginning of redress, he thereupon declared
that their tax should not rest in its strict amount
upon their landed possessions (which indeed
were stolen, or at least diverted from them) but
was to be raised according to the number of
persons after deducting those who had died and
those gone over to Islam. According to this
principle' he reduced their tax to one-tenth,
since their number had declined to one-tenth,
taking only 200 pieces of cloth instead of 2,000,
or 8,000 dirhems instead of 80,000. In doing
this he may also have wished to make good to
some extent the injustice of Umar I (Bal&dh.,

67f.).

In the afore-mentioned letter to Abdulhamid

of Kufa (Tab., 136Cf.) Umar II directs the
stallholder to treat the non-Muslim subjects
also justly and fairly, not to extort the tribute
with severity and not to levy it equally upon
cultivated and uncultivated land. He prohibits
all duties over and above the tribute,— duties
which had for ages been multiplying in the
territories once Persian : presents at the Naurftz-

UMAR II AND THE MAW All 303

festival and the Mihrig&n-festival, fees for sub-
ordinate officials, wedding-fees, stamps for docu-
ments, and the ffin^ i.e., literally custom, possibly
in tbe sense of toll, like the English " custom." 1
These dues, misused and difficult to control,
did not, as a rule reach the state-exchequer
at any rate, and they were all the more difficult
to abolish. The stattholders were quite willing
that people should wait upon them at New Year
and on other occasions, and not with empty hands
either (Tab., 1635ff.).

Fiscal considerations induced Umar to pro-
hibit the alienation of Khanvj-land. He wished
to prevent it from passing into the possession of
tax-free Muslims and so being absolved from the
tribute, which consequently would decline. But
at the same time he put a check upon the
peasant class by doing this ; he protected the
tax-paying owners against the Arab lords3 greed
of acquiring land, for the land was of more value
to the latter than to the former because they
did not need to pay any tribute for it. Similarly
in North-western Germany, e.g. in Braunschweig
Liineburg, the princes for financial reasons
were against the peasants' land passing over to
the possession of the nobles, simply because
it then became tax-free, but by doing so they at

1 The Muslim tax-legislation is not cognisant of the idea of duty,
but only with that of the Kharaj and the tithe, bnt these it contrives
to apply even to the assessment of travelling traders.

304 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

the same time unintentionally saved the peasant
class. Umar, indeed, was not so successful. The
conditions in the East, too, were different. There
were few peasants in our sense of the term ; even
the non-Arab landowners were mostly masters of
an estate or village (Dihkans) and the FeMhin
were their bondsmen.

3. But whatever is uncertain, one thing at
any rate is pretty clear, that we simply make
ourselves ridiculous if we treat this Khalifa with
superior scorn, as Dozy has set the example in
doing. He may, have been more strongly in-
fluenced by theology, i.e. in this case by juris-
prudence, than one could wish. His scrupulous-
ness may frequently have led him to paralysing
doubts. He is said to have once ended a sermon
with the words, — " I make these reproaches
against you without, for all that, feeling myself
to be in the least better than you are.55 Ho
lacked the complete consciousness of his personal
authority, by which his great-grand-father of
the same name impressed the world, but he
cared not only for his own soul, but for the
salus publica. His piety made him discharge
well the duties of the government, and act up-
rightly in the difficult tasks which it entailed
upon him.

To be sure, his ability generally did not cor-
respond to his good will. As the chief proof of
his political incapacity it is put forward that he

UMAll II AND THE MAWALI 305-

made disorder in the finances, and we have seen
how things stood in that respect. If he imposed
no tribute upon the nations and kingdoms which
became new converts to Islam, he was only
putting a check upon the raids made for booty
but not surrendering any state-revenue, for the
fish were yet to catch. In the provinces seized
long before and taxable according to the law of
seizure, in Sawftd, for example, and in Egypt,
he maintained the historical right and opposed
the decrease of the state-property and the state-
income, and tried to anticipate the injurious
effect which the remission of tribute for all the
Muslims here might have upon the finances.
By abolishing the abuse of gifts and presents he
certainly affected nobody but the officials who
annexed them. The most we can reproach him
with is that he exacted rather much from the
public exchequer by the subsidies and con-
tributions which he made broadcast from it, or
was prepared to make. But for himself he
neither used nor hoarded any of the state-
moneys, nor did he squander them in expeditions
against Constantinople, — very differently from
his predecessors. He took care, like wise, that the
stattholders did not use their office chiefly as an
opportunity of enriching themselves, whereby
the f alling-off which might -perhaps have been
the result of his reforms was probably made
good twice over. We need not decide whether
39

306 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the assertion that under him the state-money
vanished as if by magic, and the amount of the
taxes suddenly fell (Miiller, I, 411), is anything
but the result of an error ; it is certainly quite
incorrect. In the troubled times of Abdulmalik
and Hajj&j the finances were in a bad state ;
under Umar II they had recovered. Besides,
anyhow, the fiscal interest is not the only one
in a state. Who would venture to disallow that
Umar abolished the child-tribute of the Ber-
bers or lightened the burden of the Najr&nians ;
that he protected the subjects from the officials,
and regarded the government of the provinces
as more than a mere means of financial exploita-
tion ?

Kremer and Miiller are of opinion that he
was simply obsessed by his pious Utopia ; in-
terfered with the finances without any practical
necessity; disturbed their natural course and
threw them off the lines laid down for them by
previous development. He had, they say, no
idea of the actual conditions. As a matter of
fact it is the other way ; it is his modern critics
who have a false conception of the real condi-
tions of that time. They were in a state of
chaos, and required regulating anew. Umar
was not the first to create the confusion in the
system of taxation ; it was there already, and
could not continue. It was no chimerical
problem to which he addressed himself, but a

UMAB II AND THE MAWALI 807

real and pressing one. Hajj&j had first attack-
ed it seriously, but in a manner which roused
public opinion against himself. Umar tried it
in another way, with a considerate regard for
the sensitiveness founded in Islam, or at least
resting upon it. But both had the same problem
which was continually being set, and must
necessarily be solved. The result was that the
tribute-land passed more and more into the hands
of owners who were exempt from tribute.

Thus also is substantially refuted the re-
proach that Umar II shook the foundation of
the Umaiyid kingdom. It was tottering before,
and was not very secure to begin with. The
paragraph of Roman wisdom which A, Miiller
uses to condemn Umar's turning aside from the
tradition of his predecessors, namely, that every
kingdom is maintained only by the means to
which it owes its rise, can be directed with equal
justice against the Umaiyids themselves.
Their government did not by any means carry
on in a straight line that of the Prophet and his
Companions. Instead of being supported by
Islam, on whose foundation it still claimed to
stand, and which it did not dare to deny, it was
rather uprooted by it. The Umaiyids had to be
constantly on the alert to keep down the opposi-
tion which rose up against them in the name of
Allah and the religion. They were further
menaced by the implacable hostility of Iraq

308 ARAlfKINGDOM AND ITS FALL

which broke out intermittently in gigantic
revolts against the hated Syrian tyranny ; but
the greatest danger for them was a social move-
ment, directed not against them alone, but
against the Arab government generally. Umar I
had established the Islamic state, according
to the law of seizure, as a sway of the Arabs
over those they had vanquished. He had found-
ed it on the distinction between two classes,
separated as much by religion as by nationality,
— the Arab Muslims and the non-Arab followers
of other faiths ; the Arab warrior-nobility and
the non-Arab tribute-paying plebs. But there
he had not built on a sure foundation, for the
wall of separation between masters and servants
was broken through by the fact that the latter
accepted Islam more and more, and did away
with the Arab army towns. The increasing
Islamisation of the conquered, a natural and
inevitable process, made the system of old Umar
questionable, not in his time but in the time of
the Umaiyids who had continued it. In accord-
ance with the theocratic principles at least,
the political status also had to be fixed by the
religion. It was Islam and not nationality
which conferred the rights of citizenship in the
theocracy.

The Mawali were clamouring at the gates
and demanding equal rights with the Arabs.
They had Islam on their side, and were recruited

UMAR II AND THE MAWALI 309

by the revolution which based itself upon Islam.
Umar II tried to satisfy their claims cheaply ;
he was probably actuated not so much by
statesmanlike motives as by religious ones, but
the one did not stand in the way of the other.
Islam could not be broken ; it had got to be
taken into account. Enmity to it threatened
the fall of the kingdom of the Umaiyids. An
Umaiyid thus did not act against the interest of
his house when he put himself on good terms
with Islam and tried to avoid the refusal of its
alliance by removing justified grievances and
supporting claims which could not be gainsaid.
That, in ail likelihood, was the programme of
Umar II. In Islam he tried to find common
ground for the government and the hostile
powers working against it. From this stand-
point he pursued a policy of agreement and
conciliation, and that not towards the Maw£lf
only. He also tried to abolish the ill-feeling of
the provinces and especially to remove from
the Iraqites the sense of being under Syrian
foreign rule. He treated them all with equal
care ; he even thought he could satisfy the
Khaw&rij by entering into their arguments, and
had at least this much success, that they left
the sword in the sheath as long as he lived.
He did not punish political crimes, though severe
against others. He was gracious to the Alids,
restoring to them their confiscated property, —

310 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

as well as to the heirs of Talha — and struck out
of the pulpit prayer the curse upon their
ancestors.1 But it does not follow, and we
cannot believe, that he, at heart, recognised
as just their claims to the Khalifate.2 He was a
Muslim of the old school. The old Islam had
at bottom no sympathy with the legitimism of
the Shiites, and it would even have put up with
the Umaiyid dynasty, in spite of its illegal
origin, if it had not been hostile to it from the
start. The Abb&sid MansAr testified that
Umar IPs rule in general was worthy of praise,
but that, for all that, he was an Umaiyid and
held fast to the prior claim of his house (Tab.,
3, 534).

Hamer in exercitibus nihil satis prosperum
nee quicquam adversum peregit, tantae autem
benignitatis et patientiae fuit, ut hactenus
tantus ei honor lausque referatur, etiam ab
externis, quantus ulli umquam viventi, regni
gubernacula praeroganti, adlatus est. So
runs the judgment of the Arab-Byzantine
continuer, Isidor (par. 38) concerning this
Khalifa. His intentions were, at any rate,

1 Agh., 8,153. Yaqubt, 2,366. Weil's doubts of the facts are un-
justified. Even after U mar's death the official execration of Alt wa«
not again introduced (Tab., 1482f.)

* The article of the Kit&bal Agh&nt on Umar tries to make him
out a secret Shiite, but in the same way the Khawarij are said to have
considered him to be a participator in their persuasion, and they were
diametrically opposed to the Shiites.

UMAR II AND THE MAWALI 811

good, and perhaps not unwise either. What
he would have accomplished it is impossible
to say, since he reigned scarcely 2-| years.
He died at the age of 39 on Friday, 24th or
26th Rajab, 101 (9th Feb., 720) in Khunftsira,
near Damascus. According to Abit Ubaida, he
was poisoned by the Umaiyids, because they
were afraid he would yield to the Kharijites and
exclude as unworthy, from the succession, Yaztd
b. Abdilmalik, who had been appointed by
Sulaim&n to succeed him as Khalifa. But of this
account those of the old historians who are
reliable know nothing. Indeed they only
express their disappointment that the reformer
of the world was snatched away before his time,
and that the old regime returned.

CHAPTER VI.
THE LATER MARWANIDS.

1. Yazld II was the grandson of Yazld I
through his daughter Atika, whom Abdulmalik
had married ; he is often called Yazld b. Atika,
after his proud mother.1 He fancied himself of
higher degree than the rest of the Marw&nids
and boasted of his Sufy&nid blood. He also
possessed some of the spirit of his maternal
grandfather after whom he was called, though
he had not inherited the latter's mildness and
affability.

Immediately after his accession there hap-
pened an event which had a marked effect upon
his reign and upon the time to come. He was
nearly connected with Hajj&j, whose niece he
married, and during her uncle's life-time she
bore him his son Walid, who was Khalifa later.
Her first son, who died early, was named
Hajjfrj. Accordingly he was prejudiced
against Sulaim&n's favourite Yazid b. Muhallab,

1 At that time great stress was laid upon descent from a well-born
mother. Maslama b. Abdilmalik was descended from a slave, so
there aras no question of him as successor, though he was very brave
and also very highly esteemed in the Umaiyid family.

THE LATER MARWANIDS 313

who, as stattholder in Iraq, had ill -treated the
family of Hajjftj. The latter expected no good
at his hands when he came to power ; he escaped
from the debtors' prison in which he was
detained — according to W&qidt not till after
Umar's death, but according to Abit Mikhnaf,
the chief narrator in Tabari, before that, on
hearing the news of his serious illness. His goal
was Basra, the home of his family, the Mah&liba,
and of his clan, the Azd Uman. He eluded the
Qaisites who pursued him, and the Kufaites who
all but captured him, and appeared before Basra
with a little band, where in the meantime his
brothers and cousins, as many as could be got
hold of, were seized and made prisoners in the
citadel. The stattholder, Adt b. Art&t, advanced
with the Basrian clans before the town in order
to keep him from entering, but when he arrived
they all made way for him ; a cavalry-leader
of the family of Hajj&j, who was about to raise
his hand against him, was quietly thrust aside,
and he was able to enter without opposition and
take possession of his quarters. Obviously the
new Khalifa had not a good reputation to begin
with. Syrian troops do not seem to have been
to the fore in any great numbers either in Basra
or in W&sit ; Umar II may have withdrawn
them.

The son of Muhallab first began to treat
with the stattholder to persuade him to set free

40

314 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the prisoners in the citadel, and when he did
not succeed he employed force. He had on his
side the Yemen, i.e. the Azd and Kabia, who
were allied in Basra as in Khurasan, and he
strengthened their allegiance by handsome
presents. The Tamlm and the Qais, who since
time immemorial had been rivals of the
Yemenites, stuck to the stattholder. But as the
latter was stingy with money because he was
too scrupulous to venture to help himself from
the state-treasury, they were lukewarm, and at
the first encounter of the parties they scattered.
He fled and was besieged in the citadel. The
Muhallabida who were imprisoned there, bar-
ricaded themselves so that he could not hurt
them, and after a few days, the citadel fell and
he was taken captive. He cheerfully submitted
to his fate because he was confident that out of
fear of the " troops of God in Syria " (i.e. the
government troops), no one would hurt a hair of
his head.

A pardon for Yazid, wrung from the Khalifa,
came too late. He had gone too far. He now
openly issued a summons in the name of the
Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet to
the holy war agaiust the Syrians, which was,
he said, more urgent and necessary than that
against Turks and Dailamites. His idea was
to yoke Islam to his waggon. But there was a
man in Basra who dared to raise his voice loudly

THE LATER MARWANIDS 315

against him, — old Hasan, a friend of Umar II
In these citizens* wars, he said, it was a question
not of God, but of the world and its gain.
They upbraided him as a friend of the Syrians,
a traitor and a hypocrite, saying: " If a neigh-
bour were so much as to pull a reed out of his
hut,1 he would give him a bloody nose, and yet
he reproaches us for seeking what is best for
ourselves and defending ourselves against
injustice ! " He did not let this affect him any
more than Jeremiah did in a similar situation,
but continued to restrain those who were willing
to listen to him from taking part, and his
influence was particularly felt in the case of the
non-Arab inhabitants of some districts in the
neighbourhood of Basra. But the position he
took up was exceptional in that it separated
religion and politics in the sphere of the theocracy,
and his following was insignificant, otherwise he
would scarcely have been left uncontested.
The average pious folk of Basra, the readers
first of all, yielded to the allurement of Yazid,
and the Hawaii to a great extent followed them.
This greatly increased his following, but their
war-like capacity did not correspond to their
numbers, and Islam proved to be a stubborn ally.
The districts belonging to Basra, viz. Ahw&z,
F&rs and Karm&n, also fell to the rebel, but not
his old favourite province of Khurasan, because

1 The houses of Basra were usually of reeds.

316 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

there the Azd were held in check by the Tamlm.
He was advised to establish himself in F&rs,
where he could most easily maintain his power,
but he did not want to leave Iraq to the advanc-
ing Syrians, but, if possible, to get to Kufa
before them. Towards the end of the year 101
(summer of 720) he set out thither by way of W&sit,
which he took, and the Nil canal. At the point
where this canal emptied into the Euphrates he
halted at a place bearing the oft-recurring name
of Aqr (Castle) and situated near the ancient
Babylon.1 ihe stallholder there tried to bar his
way to Kufa — having taken up his position on
Ihe other bank near Nukhaila, but he could not
prevent numerous Kufaites from going over to
Yazid, amongst them heirs of the most celebrated

1 According to the verse, Tanbth, 332, 1, the battle took place
between Babel and Aqr. So the Aqr that is meant was situated, like
Babel, on the east bank of the Euphrates and was not the Aqr of Kar-
bala, which must be looked for to the west of the Hindiya. It is only
the description of the way that Maslama took (in Tab., 1395) that
offers difficulty : — " He marched by the Euphrates and halted at
Anbar, then threw a bridge over the river ('alaihi) opposite the town
of Farit, and marched on till he came to a halt in front of Yazid (at
Aqr)." As Anbar lay on the east bank, Maslama must have crossed
from there first near Farifc in a westerly direction and then back
again in an easterly, — just as Qahtaba did later. There is no mention
of a second crossing But there is mention of a bridge over which the
Syrians had come and which they burnt behind them. Nflldeke

identifies Aqr (wcpa) with Qasr (castra) probably rightly, as the old
Nil discharges between Qasr and Babylon and the fortification lay
at the influx of the Nil between Aqr and Babylon. The topographical
statements in Tabari, 1397 are confused, and BSerapion does not make
them any clearer.

THE LATER MARWANIDS 317

names, and not only Yemenites and Rablites,
but Tamimites as well.

It was not long until Alaslama b.
Abdilmalik, for long the leader of the campaigns
in Asia Minor and Armenia, also appeared on
the scene with the Syrian main army. Yazld
let him advance towards him over the Euphrates
and pitch his camp without molestation quite
near him. Then two leaders of sects who had
great influence on the crowd, Samaida and Abfi.
lluba, protested against his attacking the
Syrians, who, after all, were also Muslims, in
cold blood and even by night, too, without first
having given them, by an appeal to Qoran and
Sunna, the chance of repenting.1 He yielded,

1 The circumstances of tho case were probably these : — Abti.
Mikhnaf does not say that Maslama was forced to cross the Euphrates,
—see the preceding note. Samaida was essentially a Kharijito, Abu
Ruba a Mnrjiite, The Murjiites blunted the edge of the older
parties and tried to bring about an approach to the Jamaa, to Cathol-
icism. They also refused to acknowledge the Umaiyid rule, but
left the question "All or Uthninn ? " to God. They believed that even
such as followed a false Imam might still be good Muslims. They
protested against the Khawarij alone considering themselves Muslims,
and having in general their fixed judgment upon the condition of every
man's religion and thus forestalling the judgment of God. "We
Muslims, as distinguished from idolaters, all acknowledge tho same one
God and are united through Islam j the Khawaiij err in tho theory
they oppose to this, however pfons and earnest they may otherwise be.
I could not say that a decision in the dispute between All and Uthman
was revealed in a verse of the Qoran j both of them are servants of God,
and at the last day God will judge them according to their deeds."
This is the gist of a Murjiite's creed, incorrectly translated bv Vnn
Vloten, D.M.Z., 1891, p. 163,-**

318 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

as Ali did long before at Siffin, but lost every
remnant of confidence in his troops and expressed
aloud the desperate wish, — would that he only
had with him his Azdites of Khurasan instead
of that countless horde !

On Friday (Saturday), 14th Safar, 102 (24th
August, 720) Maslama opened the attack after
burning down the bridge behind him. The
Iraqites did not hold their ground, and the
Tamim of Kufa were the very first to take to
their heels. It was as if the wolf had broken
into the sheop-fold. Yaztd was not surprised.
Scorning the advice to retreat with the men he
could trust to W&sit, whither the way was
open to him, he sought and found death on the
field of battle. With him fell two of his brothers
and also the pious Samaida. One or two hundred
prisoners wore taken, mostly at the storming of
the camp. Most of them were afterwards
executed, including a few Tamimites, whose
expectation of recognition of their having by
their flight made the victory an easy one for
the Syrians was vain. On the other hand a son
of Yazid in Wasit had the stattholder, Adi b.
Art&t, put to the sword, with 30 other Basrians
of the opposite party who were in his hands.

The crowd of fugitives scattered in all
directions, pursuit only being made after the
Muhallabids, who were hunted like game. They
first gathered in Basra, and with them also

THE LATER MARWAMDS 319

some prominent Yemenites from Kufa, descen-
dants of Ash'ath and M&lik al-Ashtar. There
they took ship and landed on the coast of
Karman. Driven thence, they sought a refuge
in the Indian Qand&bil, but failed to find safety
there either. All the men among them fit for
war, with the exception of two, fell by the sword
of the pursuers, and their severed heads were
sent to Syria and exposed in Halab. Eleven
youths were brought as prisoners to the Khalifa
and executed. The rest of the prisoners, women
and children, were, in defiance of all Islamic
usage, exposed for sale in Basra ; but Jarr&h b.
Abdillah alHakami, one of the bravest and
most faithful officials of the Umaiyids, with
a sense of the fitness of things ransomed them.
The family estates were, of course, confiscated.1
Iraq was first made over to the conqueror
of Aqr, Maslama b. Abdilmalik, who appointed
new officials in Kufa, Basra and Khurasan. But
he was soon deposed because he did not credit to
Damascus the surplus of the provincial exche-
quers.2 In his place, as viceroy over Iraq and
the East, came Umar b. Hubaira alFaz£r1
from Qinnesrin, who had governed Mesopotamia

1 Cf. the verses of Jarir in Reiske's AbulfidA, 1, adn. 207. They
are not in the Egyptian edition of A.H. 1313.

9 Even Abdulazlz b. Marwan in Egypt had not done so, and did
not need to do it. Maslama may have been appointed with the same
privilege as a reward for his victory.

320 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

under Umar II. He was a thorough Qaisite
and ruled accordingly. The Azd and the
Yemen in general, particularly in Khurasan,
were made to suffer under his rule, for they
were slighted and humiliated, and those who
were well-disposed to the Muhallabids, or
suspected of being so, were tortured and ill-
treated. But the Qais triumphed, and in all
the East they could not but feel themselves
masters. Although they might play each other
ill tricks, they nevertheless held faithfully
together against foreign clans. A story, not
very trustworthy otherwise, but very enlighten-
ing in this respect is related in Tab., 1453ff.
The stattholder of Khurasan, Said b. Amr
alETarashl, a Qaisite, chastised another Qaisite,
Ma'qil b. Urwa in Her&t, who thought he
did not owe him obedience because he was
appointed over Herat not by him, but directly
by Ibn Hubaira. Ibn Hubaira sided against
alHarashi and banded him over to the revenge
of his antagonist, who was to torture him to
death. Now when he put the question to the
company that, according to custom, regularly
assembled at his house in the evening, who was
the most eminent man among the Qais, and got

1 The poet Farazdaq, though himself not belonging to the Yemen
but to Mudar, nevertheless scoffingly said that the only thing lacking
was that a man of Ashja* should rule over Iraq. Fazara was the head
and Ashja* the tail of the Qaisite Ghatafan,

THE LATEB MARWANIDS 521

the answer that he himself was, he said, — "What !
The most eminent is Kauthar b. Zufar b.
H&rith, for he has but to have a horn blown,
and 20,000 men come and never ask why he
summoned them l ; the greatest benefactor of
the Qais I certainly am, — always only anxious
to be useful to them, but the bravest of them
is that ass whom I have given orders to slay."
Then a simple Bedouin replied, — " How can you
be the greatest benefactor of the Qais if you
slay their bravest man ? Immediate 'y after this
remark he gave orders to let alHarashi live.
Later on the tables were turned. Ibn Hubaira
had to flee from Kh&lid alQasrl, and his foe
alHarashi was sent out to pursue him. When he
had overtaken his fugitive on his ship, he asked
him, — " What, think you, shall I do to you? "
" I think," was the answer, " that as a Qaisite
you will surely not hand me over to a Qaisite."
"There you are right," said the other, "be off
with you ! "

The spirit of Hajjaj had a power after his
death of which he would hardly have been proud.
The opposition of the Qais and the Yemen which
was embittered by his enmity to Ibn Ash'ath

1 Zufar b. Harith, the head of the Qais of Mesopotamia, is every-
where described as a man of great nobility, and far above political
aspirations. His sous, Hud hail and Kauthar, inherited the respect
accorded to him and were also held in high esteem by the Khalifas.
Cf. Tab., 1300. 1360f. Agh., 16, 42, and the poems.of Qutftml now pub-
lished by Barth.
41

322 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

and Ibn Muhallab grew still worse after his
death. The action of the Khalifas in taking
sides brought this about, no matter which side
it was they took. Prom an opposite stand-point
Yazld II cut open the same wound as Sulaim£n,
after it had but partially healed during the
intervening reign. Being influenced by Hajj&j
he distrusted the Muhallabids and nursed his
hatred against them. The distrust of their
aspirations in the East of tho kingdom was
justified, and by their rebellion they themselves
brought about the outburst of his hatred. But
the proscription of the whole of the prominent
and powerful family, a measure hitherto unheard
of in the history of the Umaiyids, came like a
declaration of war against the Yemen in general,
and the corollary was that the government was
degenerating into a Qaisite party-rule. The
Khalifa was to blame for this. He put Ibn
Hubaira into power and let him carry on as he
pleased in his wide sphere. His motive was
certainly revenge only. He was no statesman
and did not size up the far-reaching political
bearing of his mode of action. In Syria he did
not favour the Qais more than the Qud&a. The
Qud&a were the nucleus of the army that was
victorious at 'Aqr. A Kalbite cut down Yazld
b. Muhallab when he was attacking Maslama,
and it was Kalbites who pursued the fugitive
Muhallabids and wiped them out.

THE LATER MARWANIDS 323

Yazid II had departed far from his immediate
predecessor's policy of conciliation. According
to BAthir, 5,50 he made invalid everything in
the latter's management of the kingdom that
did not please him. Immediately on his acces-
sion he appointed new officials in Medina and
Africa, without, however, at once proposing a
systematic and general change. But he had
the Soghdians, who on the promise of freedom
from tribute had come over to Islam, relieved
from the tribute. His stattholder, Yazld b.
Abl Muslim, acted similarly towards the
Berbers, but they killed him, re-established his
predecessor, and duly communicated the matter
to the Khalifa,1 who declared himself in agree-
ment with it. He preferred to let things
happen, rather than to order them to be done,
being weak and indifferent. It was not from
policy or intention that he opposed Umar II.
If he ever did get hold of any good antecedents
he is said to have taken him for a pattern to
himself (Agh., 13, 157). But his was quite a
different nature from Umar II's. It was not
puritanical seriousness but aristocratic frivolity
that was the basis of his disposition ; he was
more of a cavalier than an administrator. He
handed over the provinces to the stallholders,

1 Tab., 2, 1435. Ace. to Baladh., 231, the stattholder was slain
by his Berber bodyguard because he had the word " Guard'1 branded
on their hand.

324 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

and devoted his time not to business but to the
generous passions. The vagrants put down by
his predecessor, came into repute again under
him. He paid small regard to the dignity of
the firm which he had to represent, and did not
take the trouble to make a pretence of doing so.
Two women singers, Salama and Hababa, played
a great part at his court. Whoever wanted to
get anything out of him had recourse to them.
Ibn Hubaira himself is said to have attained his
high position by this means (BAthlr, 5, 75f. ;
Agh., 13, 157). He was so beside himself at the
death of Hababa that Maslama begged him at
least not to show himself in public in this
distraught state. Seven days later he died,
people believed of sorrow at the loss of the
beloved maiden. There was some romance in
him and he had a taste for poetry and music, in
which he was different from Sulaim&n.

Theophanes relates that Umar II hoped to
be able to convert the Emperor Leo to Islam.
He says further that Yazid II got a Jew from
Phoenician Laodicea to prophesy that he would
remain in power for 40 years if he destroyed the
images in the Christian churches of his realm,
and that, induced by this, he issued a general
edict against the sacred images, but it was not
executed because of his death, which happened
shortly after, and it did not come to the know-
ledge of outside circles at all ; but that the

THE LATER MARWiNIDS 325

Emperor Leo shared in the wicked heterodoxy
and was backed up in it by a Christian of the
Arab name of Bishr, who had received Islam as
a prisoner of war in Syria, and after his libera-
tion had not altogether discarded it. It raises
serious doubts against the existence of the
diabolical decree of the Khalifa that it is said to
have been known only to the very few. The
simple statement that a Jew foretold to him a
40 years' reiga is also found in Tabari, but the
prophecy was not fulfilled. Yazid II ruled only
4 years and died on Wednesday, 24th Sha'Mn,
105 (26th January, 724) at Arbad in the East
Jordan country. Accounts of his age vary
between 33 and 40 years.

2. As heir to the kingdom he had first desig-
nated his brother Hish&m, and after him his son
Walid. Talis enim inter Arabes tenetur perpetim
norma, ut nonnisi cunctas regum successiones
prerogative a principe pej* cipiant nomina, ut eo
decidente absque scandala adeant regiminis
gubernacula. Thus comments the Spanish
Continuator of Isidor. The arrangement of the
succession by will is certainly noteworthy.

Hish&m b. Abdilmalik was called after his
mother's father, the Makhzftmite Hish&m b.
Ism&il, and favoured his mother's brothers. He
received the insignia of government, — the staff
and ring — in Rusafa,1 a lloman settlement on

1 Ace. to Tab., 1463, 16, however, it was in Hims (Emessa).

326 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the border of the Syrian desert not far from
Raqqa, which he had restored and which, even
as Khalifa, he preferred as a place of residence,
because he thought Damascus unhealthy. He
received homage in the capital. He was not
much like his deceased brother, being prudent
and honourable and before all things a thorough
business man. But he differed just as much
from Umar TI, for he had no idealism about
him.

His first act was to break up the insolent
Qaisite regime in the East of the kingdom by
deposing Umar b. Hubaira, in whose stead there
came KMlid b. Abdill&h alQasri in Shauw&l, 105
(March, 724), and thus Iraq again got a ruler
comparable to some extent to Zi&d and Hajjaj.
His personality attracts our interest more than
that of the Khalifa himself , though we hear more
about his fall and its serious consequences than
about the activity of his rule.

He had begun his career under Hajj&j and
at his instigation had come to Mecca in A.H. 91
to prevent the political criminals of Iraq from
finding a refuge there. This task he accom-
plished by making the owners of houses respon-
sible for their inhabitants. The Holy Town had
also him to thank for a water-conduit, which
indeed brought him as little gratitude as the
one at Jerusalem in former times brought to
Pilate. He was then deposed by Sulaim&n as a

THE LATER MARWANIDS 827

creature of Hajj&j and after that did not hold
office again until Hish&m preferred him and
entrusted to him the most important office in
the kingdom. Like Hajj&j, he resided in
"W&sit, and devoted himself to peaceful activities.
He seems to have been by nature gentle,
although he had no lack of energy.1 He was
not regarded as a warrior, but passed for a
coward and was despised because he called out
in terror for a glass of water when he received,
in the pulpit, word of a Shiite riot in Kufa, in

which the whole number concerned consisted of
eight Iranians, as it turned out afterwards. He

had not indeed much occasion to unsheath the
sword. About the end of his term of office a
few Shiite and Kharijite risings took place,
only one of which spread to any great extent,2

1 Weil, 1, 620, appealing to Tab., asserts that Khalid cruelly ill-
treated his predecessor and finally killed him, bnfc in the Leiden edition
there is no mention of this. Ace. to it Tbn Hubaira escaped Khalid's
pursuit and then, in his own native place, Qinuesrin, fell into the
Khalifa's hands, and he ordered him to receive 100 lashes, and yet after-
wards was much annoyed with Yazid b. Ibn Hubaira for being unwilling1
to have him as his daughter's father-in-law. Thus also Khalid treated
certain seditionists mildly and only destroyed them upon a direct
command from heaven (Tab., 1628). Indeed he is alleged to have only
allowed the poet Kamait to escape so that with Hish&ra he should be
out of the frying-pan into the fire.

• The eight Iranians who are s-ud to have caused Khalid to call
for water were the so-called Wusafa in Kufa, under Mughtra " the
wizard " and Baian. They may have been connected with the Abbasid
propaganda. Also Wazlr asSakhtiant (the leather-merchant, cf
Tanya* b. Adam, 34, 18), who with his band rendered the district of
Kufa unsafe, seems to have been an Iranian Maula and to have

328 A.RAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

but on the whole, under him Iraq enjoyed an
unusually long time of peace and flourished
economically (Tab., 1778, 13ff.), Still he was
not beloved but most bitterly opposed. A mass
of ill-natured gossip is collected against him in
the article upon him in the Kitdb alAghdni
(19, 52ff.), but even in Tabari we can find plenty
of it as well.

The Qasr family from which Kh&lid sprang
was a branch of the Bajila. The Bajlla, broken
up during the heathen period by serious internal
disputes, had sunk into insignificance, and had
only been somewhat recuperated through Islam.
Khalid, therefore, had no family connection at
his; back,' no esteemed and powerful clan to rely
upon. If this was a disadvantage, it might, on
the other hand, seem an advantage for him in
the prosecution of his office that the Bajila
belonged neither to the Mudar nor to the
Yemen. His descent did not prescribe to him
a fixed position in the dualism of the clan-
groups. But the Qais were naturally bound to
regard him as their foe since he was sent to
supplant their benefactor, Ibn Hubaira, and to

belonged to the Shiito sect. Sahiiri and Bahlul, again, were Arab
Khawarij. The latter, a son of the famous Shabtb, with 30 Bakrit.es
from Jabbul on the Tigris made an attack upon Khalid's estate of
Mubarak. Bahlul b. Bishr raised a more important rebellion from
Mosul and twice conquered a troop sent out against him, but was then
overcome in the battle of Kuhail. The story of these rebels is told in
Tabari by Abu Ubaida.

THE LATER MARWANIDS 329

set aside their overlordship. Apparently the
rest of the Mudar did not receive him cordially
either. A prominent Tamimite in Basra who
was refractory to his stattholder there (a
descendant of Abti. Musa alAsh'ari), had to pay
the penalty with his life. Even though he
himself had come with the idea of preserving
neutrality, he was nevertheless drawn into the
party whirlpool, and the hostility of the Mudar
drove him for good or ill to the side of the
Yemen. In the tradition he appears from the
beginning as a Yemenite incarnate, inspired by
hatred and suspicion of the Mudar and the
Quraish belonging to them, even of those in
highest place, and as a proud Bajilite, he is
absurdly reported to have given open expression
to these sentiments. This is, of course, a great
exaggeration. In this respect he is not at
all to be compared to Yazid b. Muhallab, the
recognised leader of the Azd. It was only after
his deposition, and further after his death, that
the Yemen supported him with acclamation and
made him a pretext for rebellion, without his
sanction and against his will. He himself was
quite explicit in his own mind about his absolute
dependence upon the TImaiyids (Tab., 1656)
and felt that he was their servant and not their
clan or party leader. A proof of his fidelity
to the dynasty was afforded by his decisively
advising Hish&m not to subvert the will of

330 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Yazid II and exclude the latterV son from the
succession, although he could not but have a
good idea of what he himself had to expect at
the hands of the son of Yazld. Even after his
fall he preserved his honourable loyalty, which
then shone out with a brilliant lustre.

Along with the hostility of the Qais, KMlid
also drew upon himself the hostility of Islam.
His mother was, and remained a Christian, and
he built a church for her in Kufa. He permit-
ted the Christians in general to build new
churches,1 and in the same way showed himself
tolerant to the Jews. He took into his service
as officials of finance and administration many
Zoroastrians. The Kharijite Bahl&i reproached
him with the fact that he destroyed mosques,
built synagogues and churches, allowed Zoroas-
trians to rule over the Believers, and permitted
Christians or Jews to have Muslim wives.
Shocking things were circulated about him, —
that he was descended from Jews, if not actual-
ly from slaves from Hajar ; that he had grown
up among dissolute companions in Medina and
had there served the poetic libertine Ibn Abl
Rabla as "postilion d* amour"; that he was a
Zandiq (libertine), an infidel and profligate;
in Mecca he had called the Zamzam spring.

1 In Htra, however, the Christian town near Kufa, the Christians
at his downfall zealously sided against him. (Tab., 1653.)

THE LATER MARWANIDS 331

which by means of his new aqueduct he could
cause to overflow, a brackish, verminous stream,
and had uttered similar blasphemies against
• the Ka'ba, the Prophet and his house, and even
against the Book of God itself. The remark
directed against the stupidity of the pious fra-
ternity, that there never was a sensible man who
knew the Qoran by heart, he is quite likely to
have made. He apparently was aware of his
spiritual superiority, and did not always keep
a check upon his ready tongue, and thus gave
offences which could be used against him.

He also laid himself open to other re-
proaches. He was noted for his zeal for the
culture of the ground, and in this emulated
Hisham, He continued what Hajjaj had
begun. The engineer who, under him, conduct-
ed the drainage works in the district of Wasit,
in the marshes of the lower Tigris, was the same
Hass&n an-Nabati who had served the latter.
But he worked at it more than was good for
himself. By the drying of the marshes he
gained a very extensive and productive area;
his chief estates are enumerated by name in
Tab., 1655, and from the crops he had tremen-
dous revenues. He had no need to consider
money and practised an extravagant generosity
especially towards his servants and confidants,
whom he attached to himself by this means.
He liked to appear a grand seigneur; but at his

832 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

repasts he did not satisfy his guests' greediness,
which was insufferable to him (Agh., 19,
62).

Naturally the people grumbled at this.
They were, in general, annoyed at the making
of canals, i.e. at the occupation of great stretches
of virgin soil by favourites whe had the per-
mission and the means to cultivate it. This
business was at that time vigorously pursued,
mostly by the princes of the ruling house, and
by Hish&m himself in particular. But they
could not so easily make a complaint against
him. They confined themselves to his statt-
holder who was, at any rate, widely hated.
The charge itself —that he exploited the means
of his official position for bis own private use —
they may not have laid against him in so many
words, for, after all, that was the fashion, if
only in the doing of it private property was
respected and the surplus of the taxes sent to
Damascus to a sufficient amount. But they did
reproach him with raising the price of his corn
by delaying the sale of it. They also thought
that the money which he scattered about so
lavishly did not come solely from the yield
of his estates, but that he was embezzling large
sums from the state-treasury. His Mammon
excited envy, and his method of gaining friends
by means of it only increased the number of
his foes.

THE LATER MARWlNIDS 333

In spite of this he remained for nearly 15
years at the head of Iraq, longer than any other
stattholder with the single exception of Hajjaj.
It must be put to the credit of the Khalifa that
he kept him so long, but at last he yielded to
the pressure of his foes. Prominent Quraish-
ites and Umaiyids to whom Khalid had given
offence made common cause with the Qaisites
against him (Tab., 1642, 1655f.). Hassan
an-Nabati, who should have known better, was
won over to an intrigue against him. Hisham

o o

certainly did not consider him actually to
be a political suspect, but he felt a sort of
jealousy of him and possibly regarded him as a
competitor in business affairs. He also
resented the pride and candour of his
disposition and his irreverent remarks about
himself which were reported to him. So he
determined to depose him and to make his
successor a Qaisite, the Thaqifite Yusuf b.
Umar, a relative of Hajj&j, who for many
years had governed the province of the Yemen.
When a change of this kind was made it often
happened that the one to be deposed was taken
by surprise by the actual accomplishment of
the deposition, and heard nothing about it till
his successor appeared to bring him to account ;
he was not meant to have time to make his
preparations. But the secrecy with which
HisMm acted in this case was extraordinary.

334 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

There is a delightful story about it told in
Tab., 1640 ff. By his orders Yusuf b. Umar
suddenly appeared in Kufa in Jum&d& I, 120
(May, 738) with a few followers. The Christians
in Hira and the Thaqif with other Mudar in
Kufa put themselves at his service and no one
offered him resistance. Khalid himself was in
Wasit and quietly let himself be seized and impris-
oned. His prison was in Kufa; Y&suf took up
his residence not in Wasit but in Hira. Apparent-
ly the little Christian town was better suited
for a garrison than the populous neighbouring
Muslim town of Kufa ; also Hisham had ex-
pressly forbidden Yusuf to quarter the Syrian
soldiers with the Kufaites. Kh&lid and his sons
remained in prison for 18 months. Not a single
Yemenite opened his lips on his behalf, only an
Absite, a man of the Qais, expressed his sym-
pathy for him in poetry (Tab., 1816). He was
required to give an account of the state-moneys,
i.e. to confess to the embezzlement of a large
sum and undertake payment of it. For this
purpose the rack was the means resorted to,
but it was only after long pressure that Hish&m
permitted it, and then only conditionally. He
threatened the torturer himself with death if
his victim should succumb to his torture, and
sent a body-guard expressly to be present
at the application of torture. In Shauw&l,
121 (Sept,, 739) he commanded the release

THE LATER MARWANIDS 335

of the prisoner, since there was nothing to be
got out of him. Kh&lid then sought him at
Rus&fa, hut was not admitted to his presence,
and had to confine himself to an intercourse
in writing with his most trusted counsellor,
the Kalbite alAbrash. In Safar, 122 (January,
740) he went to Damascus where he took up
his abode. Y&suf b. Umar did not desist from
following up the prey that had slipped
through his fingers and at last prevailed upon the
reluctant Khalifa to order Kh&lid's son Yazid
to be delivered up to him, but he escaped im-
prisonment by flight. The prefect of Damascus,
KulthAm b. ly&d alQasri, acted in concert with
Yftsuf, although he may not have had an under-
standing with him. He was a cousin of Kh&lid
and by virtue of his office had to oversee him.
He may, in quite good faith and out of zeal for
his business, whilst making the campaign in
Asia Minor with him in the summer of 122
(740), have suspected him of having something
to do with great conflagrations by which at that
time several quarters of Damascus were re-
duced to ashes. Hish&m listened to him, as
he did not think him capable of any ill-will
towards his relative, and had the whole lot of
Kh&lid's followers arrested. It was soon

1 The matter is also mentioned by Theophanea, A.M. 6232, and
must have caused some excitement.

336 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

evident, however, that the latter had nothing to
do with the incendiarists, although they were
certainly Iraqites. When Kh&lid came home
he was beside himself, and expatiated in treason-
able language, adding that they might convey
his remarks boldly to the one against whom
they were directed. On another occasion, too,
when Hisham, through Abrash, called him to
account because he was alleged to have uttered
in a great gathering flatteries of a panegyrist
which were absolutely blasphemous, he burst
into a great passion and let all respect for the
ruler go to the winds. The latter pocketed the
affront quietly, only remarking that he was
out of his senses and did not know what he was
saying. It was only against his will that he
was constantly compelled to distasteful measures
against the old servant of whose fidelity he
himself indeed had no doubt, and afterwards he
had constant occasion to repent of them. It is to
his honour that he felt ashamed and did not take
offence at the open wrath of Khalid, but ac-
knowledged it to be the testimony of his
clear conscience. In the last years of his
reign he left him unmolested in Damascus
even though the popularity which he won
there could hardly be pleasing to him.

If under Kh&lid there had been peace in
Iraq for long years, it was not long till there
was a rising in the capital under his successor,

THE LATER MARWANIDS 337

which opened up serious prospects. The Alid
Zaid b. Alt b. Husain h. All had very unwill-
ingly come to Kufa from Medina, the seat of the
family, but then remained there because he had
fallen into the hands of the Shiites who detained
him. They told him that the time was ripe, that
the rule of the Umaiyids over Kufa rested only
upon the few Syrian soldiers who could not face
the 100,000 Kufaite warriors, and he suffered
himself to be fooled, only he was wise enough to
keep changing his quarter constantly. His
stay lasted altogether about 10 months, during
which time he prepared for a rebellion and
made recruits also in Bisra and Mosul. In
Kufa 15,000 men had themselves enrolled on
his army-list. In the formula of homage-pay-
ing it said that the Book of God and the Sunna
of the Prophet were to be taken as the rule of
conduct, unjust usurpers were to be fought
against, the weak defended, pensions returned
to those robbed of them, the state-revenue (the
Fai) divided equally amongst those entitled to it,
atonement made to those who had been wronged,
those sent off upon distant campaigns recalled
home, and the family of the Prophet defended
against all who opposed it and denied its right.
Ytisuf b. Umar was for a long time in the dark
about the movement, but at last he succeeded
in gathering particulars of Zaid's doings from
two of his fellow-conspirator;? whom he arrested.

338 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

Then he also discovered that in consequence of
these arrests the latter had hurried on the re-
bellion and fixed the date of it for Wednesday,
1st Safar, 122 (6th January, 740). At his orders
the men of Kufa were now summoned on the
preceding Tuesday into the courtyard of the
mosque, hemmed in there, and guarded by
some Syrians. They appear to have been quite
pleased at this protection from their own im-
prudence. When Zaid, with the 218 men whom
he had still managed to gather together in the
dead of night and bitter cold on the Wednesday,
tried to free them, they would hardly lift a
hand themselves and presently he had to with-
draw from the mosque because 2,000 Syrians
from Hira were advancing against him. On
Wednesday he repulsed them and still held out
against them on Thursday, but at nightfall
his few trusty followers had to withdraw into
the town before the Kikanite archers, and he
himself was fatally wounded by an arrow.
His body fell into the hands of the Syrians ; the
trunk was nailed to a cross in Kufa, and the
head exposed in Damascus and Medina. His
son Yahy&, a mere boy, fled to Khur&s&n, and
kept in hiding for several years in Balkh, but
was then discovered and hunted from place to
place till he fell with his followers in battle
under Walid II.

Though this rebellion had such a lamentable

THE LATER MARWANIDS 339

ending, it is nevertheless important because
later Shiite rebellions, which brought about
the final destruction of the kingdom of Damas-
cus, were connected with it. Soon after the
death of Yahya, Abft Muslim appeared as his
avenger and killed his murderers,

3. We should get a false impression of
the Khalifa HisMm if we were to imagine him
as interested solely in the government and in-
ternal affairs. He was certainly not a soldier,
yet did not in any way shrink from warfare
and carried on war energetically with all his
means, fitting out powerful armies, and sparing
neither money nor human lives. He had always
his hands full with military undertakings in
all quarters.

Just at the beginning of his reign he ener-
getically resumed the war against the Romans,
which had been in abeyance after the attack on
Constantinople in A.H. 98-99 (716-717) had
exhausted all their strength and had yet led to
nothing. He again prevented the fortification
of the boundaries (Bal., 165-167) and every
summer caused great predatory expeditions to
be undertaken, — two or three simultaneously
in converging directions. His sons, Muawia and
Sulaiman, both ardent warriors, generally had
the command. The first, the ancestor of the
Spanish Umaiyids, perished in A..H. 118 or 119
(736 or 737) in the enemy's land through a

340 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

fall from his horse while hunting. His father's
lament was, — " I bred him up for the Khalifate
and he pursues a fox ! " But the chief hero of
these fights appears in tradition and story to be
alBattal (" the fighter "). They put forth great
efforts and managed to capture citadels and
towns, which to be sure were held in \vinter with
difficulty. Normulla prospera per duces exercitus
a se missos in Romania terra et pelago gessit.
But the Romans defended themselves fairly
successfully. In the year 122 (740) they wiped
out an Arab army at Akroinus in Phrygia, where
alBatt&l fell. In the following year they, on their
side, made an attack upon the capital of Melitene,
but withdrew again when Hisham himself
hastened thither from Rus&fa in reply to the call
of the besieged for aid. Alongside of the
struggles with the Romans, battles with the Turks
were taking pluce in the north-east, on this side
of the Caspian Sea, in which, also, fortune was
not always on the side of the Arabs. In the year
112 (730) tliey suffered a severe defeat, but
afterwards things took a favourable turn, thanks to
Maslama, and especially Marwan b. Muhammad.
With an impetus almost greater than that
from the East the Muslims were pressing for-
ward simultaneously from the west against
Europe,1 taking the Christian world between

1 The fullest and best information about this is to be found in
the Gontin. Isid. Hispana, but unfortunately on account of the barbar-

THE LATER MARWlNIDS 341

two fires. A year or two before Hisham's time
they had made an attack from Spain on the
Franks. The Emir alHurr first crossed the
Pyrenees, — perhaps, indeed, in Sulaim&n's time.
Under Umar II Samh took the town of Nar-
bonne, and it remained for long the vantage-
point and refuge of the Arabs. But when he
pressed further forward to Toulouse he was
beaten by the Franks under Eudo in Dhulqa'da,
102 (May, 721). His successor Anbasa, after
several expeditions which he did not always lead
in person, in A.H. 108 (726) undertook a great
campaign, during which he died. This was
under Hisham. Then a pause followed. The
Emirs changed frequently and had their hands
full at home. The Berbers, who formed a very
large contingent of the army, felt themselves
put in the background by the Arabs, and in-
jured in their rights as Muslims and warriors,
and the Arabs themselves were lorn by factions.
A change was first effected by Hish&m making
Abdurrahman b. Abdillah stattholder instead of
the passionate and hated Haitham. Abdur-
rahman had first a thorn to remove from his own
flesh. The Berber Munuza defected from the

ous Latin, it is very hard to understand, it is collected and arranged
by Dr. Ludolf Schwenkow in a Gottingen Lecture of 1894, entitled
<{ Critical Consideration of the Latin Sources of the History of the
Conquest of Spain by the Arabs." It does not detract from the value
of the exceedingly careful work that the editor frequently follows
perverted ideas of things essentially oriental.

342 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Arabs, and asserted his independence on the
Spanish northern boundary by striking a com-
pact with Eudo and marrying his daughter.
After dealing first with him, Abdurrahm&n
turned against Eudo, besieged him between the
Garonne and Dordogne and pursued him in
the direction of the Loire. Then he fell in with
Charles Martel, whom Eudo had called to his
aid, in Ramadan, 114 (Oct., 732) between Tours
and Poitiers. After several days' skirmishing
the Arabs made a wild combined attack, but
the Australian Franks held out all day, and the
next morning they saw with astonishment that
their foes had vacated the field after their
leader had fallen. Gibbon paints what would
have happened if the Arabs had conquered.
Perhaps then the Qoran would now be expound-
ed in Oxford, and beforo a circumcised people
the holiness and truth of the religion of
Muhammad would be set forth from the pulpit.
The service of the Franks to Christian Europe
was great, but the Romans have done even
greater work in the East than they.

At Tours the Arabs were not repulsed once
for all. The Khalifa himself zealously continued
the war against the Franks. Abdurrahman's
successor, Abdulmalik b. Qatan (A. H. 115 =
733) was brought to book by him for not attack-
ing them. Accordingly he set out on the march
but did not get far, for the Christians in the

THE LATER MARWANIDS 343

Pyrenees barred his way and drove him back
into the plain. Thereupon Hish&m put in his
place Uqba b. Hajjaj (A. H. 117), whose name in
the Spanish chroniclers is prettily latinised into
Aucupa. But soon the latter was occupied for
a considerable time with internal affairs, and
when he did set out towards Gaul letters met
him in Saragossa, calling him to Africa to help
to suppress a rebellion of the Berbers which
had broken out there. He then turned and
crossed the strait at the transductine promontory1
with the Spanish-Arabian army. After he
thought be had finished his work in Africa he
returned to Spain, and died in A.TI. 122 (740).

Involuntarily the Berbers proved to be valu-
able allies of the Franks. They were enraged that
they, although good Muslims and zealous partici-
pants in the Jih&d, were still treated by the Arab
officials as tribute-paying vassals after Umar II
was no more. To certain KMrijite emissaries
from Iraq, of whom the Sufrite Maisara was
named as the chief, they afforded favourable
soil for the sowing of their seed. According to
Saif in Tab., 1, 2815f. they first loyally enough
applied to Hish&m and asked him to redress
their grievances, but their embassies were not
admitted to his presence at all, and as their

1 According to the Spanish Continuatio there also took place on
this promontory the battle in which Roderick, King of the Goths, fell,
apparently in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar.

344 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

funds went down they withdrew, after some
waiting, disillusioned, leaving their names in
writing, just as if they had been leaving their
cards. They were now convinced that the
Kh&rijites were right in asserting that the
tyranny of the officials was practised by com-
mand of the Khalifa himself, who by his greed
of gain compelled them to extort money from
the subjects. Consequently they made a
tremendous revolt under Kharijite leadership,
— a revolt extending from Ylorocco to Qairaw&n.
The African Emirs proved powerless against it
and even the help of Uqba from Spain was of
little avail. They had to fall back upon the
veterans, the Syrian imperial troops, who, as in
Iraq, had to come here also. Despatched by
Hish&ra, they appeared in A.H. 123 (741) 1 in
great numbers on the scene of warfare in
Morocco, under the command of the prefect
of Damascus, KulthAm b. lyad al Qasrl, 2 but

1 Thus rightly Baladh., 232. Ace. to Tab., 1716 (Thcoph., A.M.
6231) as early as A.H. 122, but in that year, when Khalid alQasr! joined
in the campaign in Asia Minor, Kulthum was still prefect of Damascus.
In Theoph, 6231 he is called kapaffK-nvos.

- Ho is usually called alQushairi, thus everywhere in Baladh.,
and BAthir ; and also in Tab., 1716, 1871. But alQasrl, as he is called
in Tab., 181.4ff., is tho correct form, for ho was a cousin of Khalid.
" Naturally a Qaisite," remarks Mfiller, 1,449, as if he knew a priori,
in spite of his knowledge of Arab tribal psychology and the govern-
ment principles of Hisham (l,-U5f.). Kulthum, in truth, was as little

a Qaisito as Malik alAshtar (1,325). The inter change of ^j"** with
often appears j cf. Tab., 1456, 7.

THE LATER MARWANIDS 345

even the well-armed Syrians who were practised
in warfare went down before the half-naked
Berber cavalry. In a great battle on the river
Nauam, graphically described by the Spanish
chronicler, Kulthftm fell, and it was only with
a third of the army that his nephew Balj
managed to escape to Ceuta and thence to
Spain. It was the worst defeat that the Arabs
had ever sustained up till then, incomparably
worse than that of Tours. In the name of Islam
the Berbers dealt the heaviest blow at the Arabs
in the west, even though the latter in the follow-
ing year won a victory which enabled them to
assert their possession of Qairawan.

In the Oxus territories, too, quite at the
other side of the kingdom, which were always
turbulent, matters were more stormy than usual
under Hish&m. The Soghdians, following their
princes, had gone o?er to Islam under Umar II,
with the concession that as Muslims they
needed to pay no tribute. As it fell out, how-
ever, the stattholders did not adhere to this
condition ; they did as they pleased, and as they
were often changed, one did one way, and
another another. Still, with all of them might
overcame right ; if one did allow a remission of
the tribute, it was a specially granted favour
that was soon revoked. Provoked and irritated
by this, the Soghdians threw themselves into the
arms of their old foes, the Turks, and called
44

346 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

them into the country. They had also on their
side the sympathy of the pious Muslims, which
did not express itself merely in words. Against
this coalition it became very difficult for the
ruling Arabs to assert themselves. More than
once their armies got into an extremely dan-
gerous position, and were forced to be content
with escaping with great loss, How much
the Khalifa was accustomed to bad tidings
from Khurasan may be seen when he would
not believe it when there once actually came
to him the news of a victory. His favourite
method of improving matters — namely, chang-
ing the personnel of the command — frequently
miscarried and always had bad secondary effects,
but at last he really made a coup. After the
deposition of Kh&lid alQasri, the latter's succes-
sor in Iraq, Yusuf b. Umar, was inspired with
the hope that Khurasan also would be put under
his rule. He would have placed there a
thorough Qaisite, and increased the party-strife
still more, though that was already bitter
enough, but Hish&m intervened, and on his own
initiative nominated the old Nasr b. Saiy&r
alKin&ni, an experienced officer and official not
belonging to any powerful clan in Khurasan.
He asserted himself as well as he could, but
held a hopeless post.

Hish&m died in Rus&fa on Wednesday, 6th
Babl II, 125 (6th Feb., 743). He was not yet

THE LATER MARWANIDS

old, — had just reached the fifties — but he had
never been young. His outward appearance
did not recommend him, — he squinted. Though
he could make himself respected, he never-
theless had not the qualities which make an
immediate impression upon men, to win them or
compel them. He was rather narrow-minded
but prudent and circumspect. Personally he
gave no offence to the pious ; he was a correct
Muslim of the old type — a friend of the taadi-
tionists azZuhri and Abft Zim\d, and a foe to the
new-fangled Qadarlya, who raised dogmatic
questions and asserted the freedom of the will
(Tab., 1777— of. 1733). To his Christian subjects
therefore, he was not intolerant ; he restored to
them (the Melohites ?) the possession of the see
of Antiochia, from which they had been debar-
red for 40 years, under the condition, certainly,
that they chose as Patriarch not a learned and
prominent man, but a simple monk, his friend
Stephanus, to which they agreed.1 He took his
own son Muhammad severely to task for having
had a Christian, by whom he thought himself
insulted, flogged, instead of complaining of him
before the Qadi. As regent he tried his best
to keep above the parties ; if he could only have
wrought a change in the hearts of the Arabs

1 Theopb., A.M. 6234. C/. 6236. The execution of the Roman
prisoners, if they were not ransomed or did not accept Islam (A.M.
6232), was nothing unusual, but an old right of war.

34,8 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

and stattholders ! He had a certain shyness
of publicity, and liked to withdraw into the
back-ground to lonely Rus&fa, and made use of
the mediation of his cc alter ego" the Kalbite
Abrash, on whom he could rely, in his inter-
course with the men who sought him out there.
(Tab., 1,2816. 2,1813). For all that, he held
the reins, understood his role, and gave all his
zeal to his work. His Diwan, i.e. his exche-
quer, was in perfect order, and was the admira-
tion of the Abb&sid Mansur. He put a stop to
the abuse of granting the military pension to
prominent people as a benefice (" living ") ; no
one got it — not even an Umaiyid prince, — who
had not either seen service in war himself, or
sent a substitute. His own share he gave to
his Maula Yaq&t, who had to take the field in
his stead. In the anecdotes told of him, which
are as numerous as those related of Umar I,
Mu&wia and Abdulmalik, he seems, above all,
to have been very frugal and economical.

This quality, justified perhaps in itself by
the very opposite behaviour of his predecessors,
in his case degenerated into a fatal fault. His
aim was to fill his exchequer. Theophanes,
thus describes him : —

/crt£etv KCLTO, j(O)pav /cat TTO\W TraXarta KOLL

<,
Karaa"rropa$ TTOICIV /cat TrapaSetcrovs, /cat uSara

THE LATER MARWANIDS 349

He did this in his own interest, and thereby
aroused such discontent that the Abb&sids in
their plan of government thought the best way
to recommend themselves to their subjects was
to promise not to build any castles or construct
any canals. The canal is the estate and the
castle belongs to it. As a large land-owner he
vied with KMlid and forbade him to sell his
corn before him in case the prices should be
reduced. Still worse, he regarded the state
itself as an estate from which the greatest
possible amount of money was to be extracted.
His prudence in the end amounted to a distinct
fiscaiism. His stattholders had to hand over to
him the highest possible sums, and he did not
trouble himself about the means they took to
extort them. He raised the tribute of Cyprus
and doubled that of Alexandria, and drove the
subjects in Transoxiana, Africa and Spain to
despair. Cupiditate praereptus tanta collectio
pecuniarum per duces Oriente et Occidente ab
ipso missis est facta, quanta nulla umquam
•tempore in reges qui ante eum fuerant extitit
congregata: unde non modicae populorum
katervae cernentes in eo improbam manere cupi-
ditatem ab ejus dicione suas dividunt mentes.
This is the account of him in the Spanish Con-
tinuatio with the usual exaggeration in the esti-
mate of the moneys collected. The opinion of
Alfred von Kremer and his successors may be

350 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

that he reverted to the old sound principles of
the Umaiyids, after the alleged wreck of the
state-economy by Umar II, but in any case the
end of his fairly long and toilsome reign was as
unhappy as it could well be. He was popular
nowhere, and everywhere had heavy misfor-
tunes. He left the broad kingdom in a far more
disconsolate state than he had found it, and it
was not mere accident that the propaganda of
the Abb&sids became active in his time.

4. In the will by which Yazid II passed on
the Khalifate to his brother Hisham, he had
appointed his own son Walid as Hish&m's succes-
sor. Walid II was like his father but surpassed
him physically. The Spanish Continuator
designates him u The Beautiful." He was well-
built and of unusual bodily strength, as well as
full of life and of great mental gifts, which were
awakened and directed by his teacher, the
philologist Abdussamad. He grew up at his
uncle's court, but his youth was not happy. He
did whatever he had a mind to, and nothing
more. His future was, of course, assured.
From his youth he felt that he was the heir to
power and was encouraged in this idea by his
frivolous companions. Hish&m regretted his
lack of seriousness and dignity, frowning upon
the fact that he passed his time at the chase and
over the wine-cup in dissolute company, think-
ing more of music and poetry than of the Qoran.

THE LATER MARWlNIDS 351

He tried to correct him, but did not set about it
the right way and failed in his purpose. Walld
did not see any kindly intention in the conduct
of the irascible old man, but took it to mean
that he did not want to bestow the succession
upon him. He may not have been altogether
wrong in so thinking ; it was only natural. In
any case the behaviour of the incorrigible at
last induced the Khalifa to make arrangements
for his disinheritance and the diversion of
the rule to one of his own sons, Maslama b.
Hish&m.

He encountered determined opposition, how-
ever, among his brother clansmen and promi-
nent officials, especially as Maslama himself was
also a gay fellow. In the first place Walld
could not be persuaded to waive his claim, but
it was really the many kinds of mortification
which were consequently inflicted upon him
both at the hands of Hisham and the court circle
that drove him to defiance and hatred, and at
last he could stand the court no longer. After
the death of the old and respected Maslama b.
Abdilmalik, who had in some degree kept him
in check, he left Rus&fa L and withdrew to an
outlying place in the desert east of Palestine.2

1 This appears evident from Agh., 6,103. It is also plain other-
wise that it did not happen till the latter years of Hiaham. Maslama
died in A.H. 122.

' Aco. to alAbraq or alAzraq, beside the water of alAghdaf
between the district of the Balqain and the Fazara (Agh., 6,104;

352 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

There he pursued his old course, only more
unrestrainedly than before. He had no lack of
visitors who speculated upon his generosity and
upon his expectations and sponged upon him.
He was awaiting the death of Hisham and made
no secret of it. Be never put any constraint on
his feelings, and expressed them in verses which
he did not keep to himself.

He had a year or two to wait. Then the
event took place which was longed for by more
than himself. Hish&m's reign was too long for
the people ; they drew a breath of relief when
he closed his eyes. Scarcely was he dead when
Walld's correspondent in Rus&fa, who till then
was kept in prison, received his liberty and the
provisional government. He sealed up every-
thing so thoroughly that there was left not so
much as a vessel for washing or a piece of cloth
for wrapping the corpse in, which by his orders
had been at once removed from the bed in the
death-chamber. Walid received the news of
these events along with the insignia of office,1
and celebrated the occasion after his thirsty
fashion, also composing a poem in which, as a
spice to his enjoyment, he imagined the grief

Tab., 1743), in 'Amman (Tab., 1795, 11). Prom Tab , 1754, 11 we might
conclude that the place was situated near Ztza, but that is too far
south.

1 He himself in Agh., 109,1 (in the sixth book) only speaks of the
ring ; further on (109,18) ring, staff and legal document are mentioned ;
the legal document (Tomar) is doubtless the certificate of death.

THE LATER MAEWANIDS 853

of the dead man's daughters. Then he gave
orders to seize the fortune of Hish&m in Rus&fa
and to arrest his relatives and officials, with the
exception, however, of Maslama h Hish&m ; for
the latter, though really his rival and formerly
greatly scoffed at by him under a disguised name,
had always behaved honourably and good-natur-
edly towards him. He betook himself for a
while to Damascus so as to receive the homage
in the capital (Agh. Ill, 12). Deputies came
from all the provinces, the stallholders sent their
respects by letter, gave reports of the homage
done to him in their residences and described
what enthusiasm the change in the rule had
called forth. There was nothing but jubilation.
Then the new Khalifa also showed himself grate-
ful. The means which his predecessor had
hoarded up enabled him to satisfy people's
expectations of him. He increased the pension
everywhere by 10 dirhams but in Syria by 20,
and restored it to the citizens of Medina and
Mecca, from whom Hish&m had taken it away
as a punishment for their sympathy with the
Alid Zaid b. All. For the Umaiyids who came
to visit him he doubled the guests' present, pro-
vided liberally for the maintenance of the sick
and blind in Syria and for their attendance
and nursing, and lavished perfumes and
clothes upon the wives and children of the
people.
45

354 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

But upon his foes he had revenge. He cer-
tainly did not direct it straight against the
family of his predecessor, because that would
have aroused the Umaiyids ; Sulaim£n b.
Hish&na only he had scourged and afterwards
imprisoned in 'Amm&n. But the Makhzftmites
Ibr&htm and Muhammad had to pay the penalty
for having sided against him for the son of
Hish&m, who was descended from their sister.
They were first pilloried and exposed to the
public insults at Medina (Saturday, 17th Slia'-
b&n, 125, i.e. 14th June, 7*3), where they had
earned bitter hatred, and then they were sent
to Kufa to Yftsuf b. Umar to be tortured to
death by him, — an order which he conscientious-
ly carried out. The Banu Qa'qft,' of Abs had a
similar fate ; they had likewise backed up
Hish&m in his intention to disinherit his nephew
in favour of his son (BAthir, 5, 198). They were
deprived of their power in Qinnesrin and Hims
and delivered over to the vengeance of the
Faz&rite Yazid b. Umar b, Hubaira, whose
father 20 years before was scourged by them
by order of Hish&m. The old brotherly feud
between Abs and Faz&ra had here a bloody
sequel. As in Hims and Qinnesrin, so also in
Medina and Damascus he deposed the statt-
holders of Hish&m and appointed new ones.
To Medina he sent a brother of his mother,
Umm Hajj&j, Yftsuf b. Muhammad b. Yftsuf

fHE LATER MARWiNIDS 355

athThaqafi ; in Damascus he placed a man of
the same family, directly descended from
Hajj&j, Ahdulmalik b. Hajj&j b. Yusuf, and
connected with the Qaisites through his mother's
relation.

But in the two chief posts, Iraq and Khur-
asan, he left the officials whom he found there,
Yftsuf b. Umar and Nasr b. Saiy&r. He even
retained to the last as his confidant Abrash
alKalbt who had enjoyed the same position
with Hish&m. His opposition to the latter was
entirely of a personal nature. In religion even,
though he differed very much in person from
the latter's type, he was not so very different in
principles. Of the two theologian friends of his
predecessor he hated the one .who had express-
ed his displeasure at him, arid was inclined to
the other who had prudently kept silent. He
maintained the same hostility as Hish&m to-
wards the heretical Qadarites, and gave his
unqualified assent to the banishment of their
chiefs to the island of Dahlak (near Massaua),
and maintained it strictly. Religion was not to
pass from use and wont into reflection. Theo-
phanes might, from some of his accounts, give
the impression that he persecuted the Christ-
ians, but it does not seem like him. As a matter
of fact he does not appear to have had any-
thing to do with the measures taken against
the metropolitan Petrus of Damascus and the

856 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

finance- official Petrus of Maiuma. Both of these
incurred their martyrdom by insulting Islam
and the Prophet. The transference of the
Cyprians to Syria had nothing to do with
religion.

On the whole Walid II only played with
his power. He treated the duties of governor
as sport and never occupied himself seriously
and carefully with them. Even as Khalifa he
kept his residence in the desert in the district
east of the Jordan (Tab., 1795, 11). The bitter,
misanthropic disposition of his youth never
left him. Even after the death of Ilisham ho
kept at a distance from the circle to which he
really belonged, and cut himself off from that of
his relatives and peers (Agh., 137, 6). l?or
public opinion he had no regard whatever, and
never allowed it to affect him. Ho had, of
course, a government office at the court, but
horses and hounds, singers male and female,
poets and litterateurs formed, as before, the
intimate circle in which he liked to live. By
day he scoured the desert, feats of physical
exercise were easy and necessary to him. He
could, when springing into the saddle, tear out
of the ground a peg to which his foot was fasten-
ed. The nights he passed in carousing. He
vas distinguished by a foolish, frothy sense of
power. He wished that all women were lioness-
es so that only strong and courageous men

THE LATER MARWANIDS 357

should dare to approach them. But he did not
sink into common wildness. in his case his
intimacy with the maidens was compatible with
an enthusiastic love for a noble lady whom he
had long wooed in vain, and whom he soon lost
again by death. Every occasion stirred him to
little songs in which he crystallised the mood of
the moment with grace, lightness and originality.
His biography might be collected from these
if only they had been preserved to us more
completely, but as he was Khalifa his poetry
could not be collected and published, but only
stolen. He actually sometimes preached in
verse. He could do everything, but everything
was to him only a whim and his whims changed
in the turning of a hand. He would plunge
into a learned theological conversation, and
then again he would have a drinking-bout and
scoff at the holy man. He could not refuse
any one a request, and yet at the same time
could be not only passionate but fierce like a
child. Power was a curse to him.1

He got through Hish&m's money sooner than
he thought. His regular revenues were not
sufficient for him ; he required extraordinary
ones. Ytisuf b. Umar used this fact to buy

1 Cf. the article upon him in Agh., 6, 101 ff , much of which is
unreliable. When they sought to stir him up against the Khalifa,
Khalid alQaarl said that he did not know whether the rumours about
him were true or not (Tab., I776f.).

458 AfeAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

over to himself Nasr b. Saiy&r, who was made
independent of him. He offered a large sum
if Khurasan were again restored to him and got
the bargain made. The Khalifa summoned Nasr
with his whole family and enjoined upon him
that he must bring with him hunting-falcons
and horses, musical instruments, gold and silver
vessels. To get what was wanted and many
beautiful maidens and richly-accoutred slaves
as well. Nasr .spared no expense, but it took
time, and when at last he set out he got news
of Walld's murder and turned back again.

On the other hand the diabolical Yusuf after
repeated vain endeavours, succeeded in getting
Kh&lid alQasr! into his power. Walid should
have had reason to be grateful to this man, for
under Hish&m he had stepped in on his behalf,
and even after Hisham's death let no entice-
ments induce him to break faith with him. But
he did not trust him3 because he knew more
than he dared to say. He put him in prison
and tried to extort from him all manner of
things which the latter would not betray for
fear of getting others into misfortune. When
he could not make him yield by force he at last
sold him to his deadly foes for many millions.
Yftsuf transported him with the utmost cruelty
to Kufa and there tortured him to death, but
could not break his pride or even contrive to
make him cry out or distort his features. He

THE LATER MARWANIDS 859

died on the rack in Muharram, 126 (Nov., 743)
and was buried in Hira.

Shortly before this (Tab , 1820) Yahy& b.
Zaid b. Ali had been killed. The Khalifa
had his head sent to him and exhibited it to a
distinguished company bidden specially for the
purpose, and increased the bitterness which his
conduct called forth in the wide circles of the
East by the command to treat the calf of Iraq
as once the idol of the Hebrews was treated,
namely to burn it and scatter the ashes on the
water. But the feeling excited by the slow
execution of Kluilid was, as we can understand,
at the moment still worse. It might be taken
as an insult to the Yemen, — Yusuf against
Kh&lid meant Qais against Yemen, and the
Khalifa apparently identified himself with Yusuf
arid the other Hajjajids. Verses, both spurious
and genuine, had the effect of its being so taken
up. For the first time there arose a general
political agitation in Iraq and in Syria which
bound together the Yemenites in both places.
The Syrian Yemenites, particularly the Kalbites,
were most strongly seized by it, because Kh&lid
had spent his last years with them in Damascus
and had there won many friends. But the
feeling was directed far less against the Qais in
general than against the Khalifa specially, and
it was stirred up by bis personal enemies and
used as a means to their own particular end.

360 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

The participation in the factious rising which
resulted from it was not at all general, and even
if it might emanate from the Yemenites it was
not a matter of Yemenites exclusively on one
side and Qaisites exclusively on the other. The
Qaisite Abs sided against the Khalifa because he
had enraged them by his behaviour to the BanA
Qa'qa6 ; on the other side there came to his aid
not only Bahranites from Hims (wrongly called
Qaisites by A. Miiller), but also Kalbites of the
tribe of 'Amir and the family of Sulaim b.
Kais&n. The fire did not break out at once
with elemental force, but only reached the
furthest circles through the murder of Walid.
Any occasion sufficed to awaken the slumbering
danger and to bring the morbid tendency to a
head ; every dispute inclined to degenerate into
the general tribe-feud. Naturally Islam bore
its part in this as well. The pious were enraged
at the godless Khalifa (Tab., 1837), especially
the Qadarites, who had most reason.

As far back as the time when Kh&lid alQasrl
was still living in Damascus, a plot was made
against Walid. The chief conspirators were his
own clansmen, Umaiyid princes, though they
were not perhaps the intellectual originators of
it (Tab., 1823). They were his counsellors by
birth, but he withdrew from their company,
their influence and their sway, and threatened
to dissipate the inheritance of his fathers, to

THE LATER MARWiNIDS 361

which they also had a claim. He also offended
them by appointing as his successors two of his
sons, without intermediary, — an arrangement
of which he had had bitter experience in his
youth — although they were still minors, besides
being children of a slave, and for both reasons,
according to Arab and Islamic ideas, not eligible
to reign.1 By this proceeding the numerous
(Tab., 1794)' sons of Walid I in particular felt
badly used. Their father was Abdulmalik's
first-born, and even at the death of Sulaim&n
they had counted upon the succession (Tab.,
1345), but they had never yet had their turn,
and now they were to be supplanted by the
descendants of Yazid II. The sons of Hish&m
and also the other Marwanids sided with them ;
they were not in favour with their reigning
cousin and were sure that he had any amount
of punishments in store for them. Their
helpers, and it may be their instigators, were
prominent Kalbites a in Damascus, discontented
and slighted officers and officials who are said
to have attached themselves already to Kh&lid
alQasri in order to stir him up. Their names
are enumerated in Tab., 1778, but it is Mansftr

1 Cf. the two letters of Walid to Nasr in Tab., 1755-64 of Tuesday,
22nd Rajab, 125 (21st May, 743) and of Thursday, 15th Sha'ban, 125
(13th June, 743) written from Samal and Nadr. Khalid alQasri was
disinclined to pay homage in advance to the two children (Tab., 1776).

* Some genuine south- Arabian families were allied with the
Kalb, living in tha neighbourhood of Damascus,

46

36*2 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

b. Jumhftr who gets most mention later.
Naturally the sons of Khalid alQasri were also
of the party, and Yazid b. Khalid emerged
from his hiding-place and played a prominent
part. On the other hand the dut'y&nids took the
side of Walld II, who belonged to them in so
far as he was descended through his grand-
mother from Yaztd b. Muawia b. Abl Sufy&n.
Abti. Muhammad (Ziad b. Abdillflh b. Yazid b.
Mu&wia) asSufy&nt is most prominent among
them, and a Marw&nid actually stuck to him
and had his confidence, Abbas b. Waltd b.
Abdilmalik.

The most ambitious amongst his brothers,
and the son of a captive Soghdian princess,
Yazid b. Walld b. Abdilmalik had himself put
forward as opposition Khalifa. He gained men
to his side by squandering quantities of money
(Theoph., 6235), and managed to captivate even
the pious by his speech and manner (Tab., 1837,
1867). At the appointed time he rode in disguise
on an ass to Damascus \vith a few followers, and
from thence got into communication with his
partisans, who for the most part lived not in
the town itself but in the country round about.
With their help he forced his way into the chief
mosque, in which there was a great store of arms,
on a Friday,1 the day of the special service, a day
specially to be chosen for such a movement.

1 Am exact date is not given,

THE LATER MARWiNIDS 563

He arrested the officials in the town, and had
also the absent stattholdev1 and the Emir of
Baalbekk apprehended. Through the opened
gates there came to join him 1,500 Kal bites
from Mizza, and from other neighbouring dis-
tricts people of Ghass&n, Lakbm, Kinda, and so
on, especially from the south-Arabian clans.
Nowhere did serious opposition arise. Evidently
the government in Syria had not any great num-
ber of soldiers ready. As early as the forenoon
of the following day Yazid III received the
homage of the Damascenes. He was in good
spirits and hummed a song, to the astonishment
of his pious companions ; till then he had had
nothing but the Qoran on his lips. But when
he now invited volunteers to fight against the
lawful Khalifa, few came forward. He had to
put the reward he offered at a higher figure be-
fore he could muster 2,000 men. The command
he made over to his cousin Ibdulaziz,

Walid II's reward to the messenger who
brought him the first news of the rising was
100 lashes. The counsel of his loyal friends
to flee to Hims or Tadmor or any nearer forti-
fied towns he at first rejected, and it was only
at the last moment when the army of Abdulaziz
was already on the march that he left Aghdaf
and took refuge in the fortified castle of BakhrA,

T He wai afraid of the bad air of Damascus and lived in Qatan.

364 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

not far away. He had with him 200 men, and
several small companies of horsemen hastened
to him from near and far, Kalbites from Tadmor
(under a nephew of Abrash), Bahranites from
Hims and others. Even Abb&s b. Walid with
his thirty sons set out to his aid, but was caught
just in the nick of time by Abdulaziz and forced
to join his army.

Messenger after messenger kept announcing
to Walid the ever nearer approach of the foe ;
he did not trouble about it till he saw them
before him. His meagre troops were encamped
in Arab fashion before the citadel. They got
from him, since his ready money was exhaust-
ed, only a note of hand on the future, and con-
sidered the present hopeless. The defection of
Abb&s to the opposite side set them a dangerous
example, and, besides, the Kalbites of Tadmor
were not inclined to tight against the Kalbites
of Damascus. Under these conditions it was
an easy game for Abdulaziz when he advanced
to the attack at sunrise. Walid, who took part
himself in the battle and fought with the great-
est bravery, soon found himself forsaken by
everyone. He then withdrew again into the
citadel, sat down in an inner room and read the
Qoran, so as to meet death like Uthm&n, and
thus he received his death-blow,1 A piece of his

1 The names of those who rushed in npon him and attacked him
are enumerated in Tab,, 1830, Cf Tab., 1778.

THE LATER MARWANIDS 365

skin as large as a man's hand was delivered to
the heir of Kh&lid alQasri as a voucher of
completed revenge. The head was severed by a
man who bore the nickname " Earthing-Face "
(Wajli al-Fals ; Tab., II, 1809,5), and delivered
to Yazid. The latter had it exposed and carried
around everywhere, and only gave it up to the
brother of the murdered man a month after,
but he, out of cowardice did not dare to bury it,
alleging religious reasons. The day of the
catastrophe was Thursday, 27th Jum&d& II, 126,
i.e. Thursday, 17th April, 744. 7 If we are to
believe Yazid III, he was called to rule by the
will of the people, and Walid was killed in
necessary self-defence, as he answered with the
sword the pacific invitation to leave the settle-
ment of the impending dispute to a Shiird (an
advisory council), and so was the first to shed
blood (Tab., 1843ff.). When the deed became
known in Himsf the inhabitants destroyed the
palace of Abb&s b. Walid, whom they regarded
as a traitor, and marched upon Damascus with
the idea that the Sufy&nid, Abft Muhammad,
whom they had put at their head, had only to
show himself in front of the town and it would
surrender to him. But it fell out otherwise.

1 Im Tab , 1810, 6 (Tanbth, 324) Thursday is gi>«n as the 27th
Jumada, but in 1836, 14, Wednesday. Theophanes, A.M. 6235,
makes it Thursday, 16th April ; Klias Nisibenus says Thursday, 25th
Jumfcda II.

366 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

They were totally defeated by Sulaim&n b.
Hish&m near Damascus and would have been
annihilated had not Yazid b. KMlid alQasri
and the Kalbites intervened. Abu Muhammad
was forced to enter the Khadra, the prison of
the capital, where two other Sufy&nids and
Walid II's two sons were. In the Palestine
provinces also insurrections were suppressed
without much trouble, either by force or clem-
ency.

5. At the homage ceremony in Damascus
Yazid III made a significant opening speech, in
which he took as his pattern the Holy One of
the Umaiyids, Umar II. He pledged himself to
erect no buildings, construct no canals, store up
no treasure, to spend the moneys which accumula-
ted in a province absolutely upon itself, not to
keep those in military service too long in the
field so that neither they nor their wives should
fall into temptation, not to burden the non-
Muslim proprietors so much as to make them
leave house and home in despair, and always
to listen to the complaint of the weak against
the strong. "If" I fail to do so, then you may
depose me or demand atonement from me; if
you know a fitter man than me, then put him at
your head and I will be the first to do him
homage ; not to man is paid unconditional obe-
dience, but to God only." In this the Khalifa
indeed spoke sincerely to the Qadarites, who

THE LATER MARWiNIDS 367

in their political principles are said to have been
at one with the Murjiites with whom he was
coquetting at the same time (Tab., 1867, 1874).
He was loudly praised by the pious demagogue
Qais b. Hani alAbsi, who spoke next, for
such a fine and proper assumption of the duty
of a ruler, and at the same time exhorted to
keep his word now, and, if necessary, let him
self be deposed willingly. He further promised
to pay the soldiers' wages duly at the beginning
of the year and the allowance every month, —
which was thus just as far from being a matter
of course as it is today in Turkey. However,
he again reduced the amount of the pay which
had been raised by his predecessor. Erom this
he received the nickname " naqis 5J (lacking),

He relied to a marked degree upon the
Yemenites and in particular the Kalbites ; not
a Qaisite was to be found in his circle (Tab.,
1837). The Kalbite ,Mansur b. Jurnhur was
elected stattholder of Iraq, a foolhardy, ruthless
man, and he departed immediately after the
murder of Walid into his province. 500 Qais-
ites who were to have lain in wait for him let
themselves quietly be stripped of their arms by
him though he had only 30, or some say only
7, men with him. Yftsuf b. Umar got no
support from the Syrian government troops in

368 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Hira and Kufa ; the domestic garrison was, even
at that time, a negligible quantity. His attempt
to separate the Qaisites from the Kalbites mis-
carried ; they said to him, — " We belong also
to the people of Syria and own allegiance to
the same Khalifa as they." After Walid IPs
death they had * no longer an Im&m and did not
know whom to fight for. The little, lorig-
bearded goblin wavered between defiance and
despair ; one moment he stood on tip-toe and
then sank back into himself again. He would
have fallen into the hands of Mansur, who had
intentions upon his person, had not the colonel
of the Syrians in Hira, the Kalbite Sulaim&n b.
Sulaim, saved him, by urging him and making
it possible for him to flee. He went into hiding
in the Balq&, in the East Jordan district, but
did not long remain hidden there. He was
dragged out of the women's apartment by a
Kalbite and then thrown into the Khadr& of
Damascus, where the little man made himself
ridiculous by his silly fears, and by his long
beard afforded opportunities for practical jokes
at his expense. They had the toad on a string.

Mansftr b. Jumh&r entered Hira and Kufa
as early as the beginning of Rajab, 126 (the end
of April). 744), took possession of the treasury,
paid the overdue wages and set the prisoners
free. The towns of Wasit and Basra accepted
his officials without opposition, but he did not

THE LATER MARWANIDS 369

long keep the upper hand in Iraq. In Kama-
d&n or Shauwal, 126 (July, 7 44) Yaztd put in
his place Abdullah 1). Umar. who he might be
sure would he specially acceptable to the Ira-
qites as the son of his father, the Khalifa
Umar II.

The province of Sajistfin and Sind likewise
recognised the now Khalifa and received a Kal-
bite as stattholdsr. Kgypi also, according to
Theophanes, submitted to him, but it is incorrect
for the Spanish Continuator to assert: omncs
suae patriae (eum) ocius recognoscunt. Nasr b.
Saiyar in Khurasan and Marwan b. Muhammad
in Armenia and Mesopotamia did not consider
themselves his officials, and adopted the course
of waiting to see what would happen. They
had not long to wait. Ya/td died on "Friday,
12th Dhulhijja, 120 (25th Snpr., 744\ 162 days '
after his accession. He had appointed as his
successor his brother Ibrahim b. Walid, and
that, indeed, as is specially noteworthy, at the
instance of the Qadarites, who thus exercised
over him more than a more religious influence.

Thus rightly Elias Nisibenus.

CHAPTER VII.

MARIAN A.ND THE THIRD ClVIL WAR.

The deed of violence done upon Walid II
was the signal for the overthrow of the Umaiyid
dynasty. The ruling family had committed
political suicide. Even in Syria its lawful
authority and the '.sanctity of its Khalifate Avere
no more. Even Syria, the corner-stone of the
existing order, was drawn into the whirlpool of
revolution ; there too the revolutionary piety
found a footing and gained ground. The Kal-
bites themselves, hitherto the most loyal of the
loyal and the bodyguard of the government,
broke their allegiance and let themselves be led
to revolt against the rightful ruler. How the
shock in the centre of the kingdom affected the
periphery can be imagined. Everywhere the
bonds which held in check the centrifugal
forces were loosed ; manifold varieties of opposi-
tion reared themselves everywhere. Changing
shapes emerged from the chaos; the elements
ran together around any centre at all and then
again separated to form other combinations. It
was just the time for adventurers and place-
hunters; in a flash they rose to tremendous
power, and then disappeared into nothingness.

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 871

In opposition to the successors of Abclulma-
lik, and in particular ,to the sons of Waltd I and
Hisham, who were guilty of, and had profited
by, the murder of WaM II, there arose a bas-
tard l from a side-branch of the reigning family,
Marwan b. Muhammad b. Marwan, a man then
between 50 and 60 years of age (Tab., 910). He
was in mockery called the " ass " because he
liked the peony, which was called the " ass's
rose." 2 His father Muhammad, Abdulmalik's
brother, had for long years been governor of
Mesopotamia and Armenia and as such had
carried on the hostilities against the Romans.
Then Maslama b. Abdilmalik and others had
taken his place. Marwan made his first appear-
ance in the year 115 ,and was put over at least
Armenia and Adharbaijan. It was a post which
required a soldier, and Marwan proved himself
one by energetically protecting the Caucasian
boundary against the Turks, and undertaking
successful raids into their territory. This post,
which he held for 12 years, was for him a mili-
tary school. The army organisation was then
gradually undergoing a change and developing
more in a technical way. The old militia, the
Muqatila, proved pretty useless for tedious and

1 Anon. Ahbr., p. 20.

* Thua ace. to Syrian chroniclers. A. Mullor, 1,453 txplaini the
•urnamc off-hand as Elogium {and rofors to Hind, 11, 558. Manram is
also called alJa'di, for \vhat reason I cannot ear. Of. Tab., 1912.

372 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

distant campaigns, and for interests which did
not closely affect them. They were abolished
and replaced by Syrian government troops. It
was of little use trying1 to achieve military de-
signs under the system of fixed pensions for
every Arab capable of bearing arms. If men
were wanted who would obey orders and go
where they were led, it had to be made worth
their while. Yazid I paid to everyone who
was ready to march against Medina and Mecca
100 dinars over and above the full year's pen-
sion. YYa/M III offered to those who enlisted
to light against Wai id II, 2,000 dirhains each,
while Walid II, on his part, offered his defend-
ers 500 dirhains each. The Syrians who in the
year 130 (748) took the field against the South-
Arabian Khawarij got every man 100 dinars,
a war-horse and a beast of burden. Even the
Kh&rijite Dahhak won his men by the high pay
which he gave (Tab., 1939). -Regular regiments,
as the backbone of the army, more and more
took the place of the tribes, its old frame- work;
instead of the tribe .leaders there appeared as
commanders generate whose business it was
(Qdid), and the regiments were partly named
after them, as the Waddahlya and the Dhak-
w&niya after Waddah and (Muslim) Ibn Dhak-
w&n. Alongside of this there came about an
improvement in tactics. Before, they had
fought, according to old Arab custom, and one

MARWiN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 373

hallowed by the example of the Prophet him-
self, in Sufilf, (long lines) ; in the intervening
space between the opposing lines the single
combats took place, according to the issue of
which it often was decided whether the main
body should advance or flee. Now the old
clumsy Sufiif were done away with and replac-
ed by KarddU, smaller units, which wore at
once more compact and more movable. The
institution of these Karddis is ascribed to Mar-
w&n b. Muhammad, and even if it goes further
back in its origin, he at any rate brought it to
completion. The fact that he was regarded as
the originator of it shows how great was his
reputation as a military organiser.

He was besides well versed in political in-
trigue. He kept up connections on all sides
and had exact information of everything that
was on foot in every place. When Walid II
succeeded, he tendered his sincere congratula-
tions, at the same time censuring Hisham,
even though it was he whom he had to thank
for his position. In an earnest letter he con-
demned the conspiracy against him, while at
the same time making a display of sentiments
quite different (Tab., 1853). In any case the
murder of Walld was very opportune for him ;
he was able to rise up against its perpetrators
as avenger, and under a good pretext wrest the
spoil from them. When tidings of the event

374 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

arrived he tendered his allegiance to Yazid III
by setting out from Armenia to Mesopotamia.
His son Abdulmalik had already taken posses-
sion of this province for him, since the change
of ruler obliged the stattholder to leave it. In
his rear, however, the Syrian Yemenites i nder
Thabit b. Nuaim alJudhami mutinied. These
he had left behind by the Caucasian Gate,
as a protection against the Turks, because he
did not altogether trust them. They would do
homage to no other Khalifa than the one their
brothers in Syria did homage to, and demanded
to be led back borne, and this obliged him to
turn back again. They gave way to him and
handed over Thabit, but they got their demand
acceded to. Marwan allowed them, together
with the Mesopotamia!! Qaisites, who formed
the nucleus of his army, to march as far as
Harran. From there lie discharged them. He
himself remained in Harr&n, thinking it advis-
able to do homage to Yazid III, all the more
since the latter was ready to give over to him
the whole district which formerly in Abdul-
malik's time had been governed by his father,
— -Mesopotamia, Mosul, Armenia and Adhar-
baijan.

Yazid III, however, died just six months
after his accession, and against the successor
he had appointed, Ibrahim b. Walid, who was
only recognised in the southern part of Syria,

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 375

Marian immediately set on foot his original
plot. He advanced into Syria over the Euph-
rates; the Q.aisites of Qinnesrin under Yusuf
b. Umar b. Hubaira joined him, and the Arabs
of Hims ] also went over to him. He met no
opposition till he got to near Ain alJarr on a
brook of the Antilibanus, which unites with
the Lita. There, under Sulaimfm 1). llish&m,
the son of the Khalifa ITishanv stood the
army of the southern Syrians, This Sulaiman
b. Hisham had spent his whole youth in war
against the Romans, and was at Iris best in the
field at the head of his troops. His bodyguard
were the Dhakwimlya. He now encountered
Manvan for the first time, and often later, but
he was no match for him; he was defeated and
fled back to Damascus. His great army broke
up ; the victor exercised moderation, only
executing two Kalbites who had fallen into his
hands, and who had taken part in the murder of
Walid. To the rest of the prisoners he made
presents and let them go free, but they had
first to do homage to the two sons of Walid who
lay in the prison of Damascus. Marwun
prudently did not come forward in his own

1 In Theophanes, A, M. 0235 Kmesti is, of course, to be road instead
•f Edena.

1 Th« site is described by Theophanes ; he calls the place Garis,
and translates Lita as if it were called " the accursed." In Syriac the
place is called En Gara, c.f. D.M.Z., 1897, p. 581. Am alJarr lies on
the road from BaalbekK to Damascus, Tab., 3,48.

876 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

name, but as the deputy of the heirs of Walid II,
and this cost the latter their lives, since they
were in the power of the enemy. For if they
came to rule it was plainly to be foreseen that
they would take the most terrible revenge upon
the murderers of their father, and not even spare
the sons of Abdulmalik. So Sulaiman had them
executed as soon as he got back to Damascus.
Yazid b. Khalid alQasri carried out the order,
and killed also Yusuf b. IJmar in prison, whilst
Ab& Muhammad asSufy&ni managed to escape
and get into biding. Then Sulaiman succeeded,
just in time before Marwan arrived, in getting
away with as much treasure as he could collect
in the hurry. He went with Ibrahim to Tadmor,
the headquarters of the KalbitevS.

Now that the two sons of Walid were
successfully removed, Marw&n II had homage
paid to himself in Damascus on Monday, 26th
Safar, 127, i.e. 7th Deer., 744.1 The first to do
homage to him was AM Muhammad asSufyam ;
he asserted that the sons of Walid had, at their
death, made a disposition in favour of Marw&n,
and complained bitterly that on his mother's
side he was connected with the detestable
Kalbites, and therefore forfeited the claim to
the Khalifate. According to Theophanes,

1 So rightly Elias Nisibcnus, only the Tuesday named by him
should be corrected to Monday, ace. to the Taribth in which, on the
•ther hand, the day of the month is wrongly given.

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 377

Marw&n, after he had occupied Damascus, put
to death many prominent people who were
accomplices in the murder of Walid and his
sons, and mutilated others. This is hardly
correct. He may, indeed, have punished one
or two of the actual murderers of Walid, when
he got hold of them. He also seems to have taken
severe action against the religious revolutionar-
ies. He executed that Qais b. H&ni alAbsi who
had expressed himself so freely at the paying of
homage to Yazid III, and he persecuted the
Qadarites, l who had been pampered by his
predecessor. But according to the Arab tradi-
tion he marched into Damascus for the first
time without drawing the sword, and did not
appear at all in the guise of an avenger. It was
not by his orders that the body of Yazld was
exhumed and, in addition, hanged. He even
granted to the Arabs of the four great Syrian
provinces * that they might choose their WAlt
themselves, and he thus consented to Th&bit b,
Nuaim becoming Wall of FiHstln, the very man
who had led the rising of the Syrian soldiers in
the Caucasus against him. His aim was to
awaken confidence and soothe people's minds.
When he returned to Harr&n after his work

1 Ace. to Theopli , 6241 he was a fatalist, being an opponent of the
doctrine of free will. The truth was, he followed not dogmatic but
political considerations.

* Fills tin, Urdunn, Damascus and rfims. Qinnesrin as Qaisite is
included with Mesopotamia and separated from Syria.

48

378 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

was completed, his two chief opponents actually
came to him and were received into favour,
namely, Sulaiman b. Hish&m and the Khalifa
Ibr&hlm.

Marw&n's struggle against the sons of
Ahdulmalik was a struggle against the Kalb
and Qudaa* The Qais adhered to him and
fought for him. He now took up his residence
in the midst of the Qais, in the Mesopotamian
Harr&n. There his father had lived, there
he himself had grown up, and there he felt at
home.1 All his predecessors, so it says in the
Taribih, resided at Damascus, a few indeed
preferring to sojourn in the desert. In any
case, if they did keep away from Damascus,
it was not for political reasons, nor with the
view of degrading the town from its position as
capital. Marw&n, however, seems to have really
had this intention. He transferred the seat of
government to Harran, and, Theophanes says,
also transferred all the business and the treasure
from Damascus thither. This had dangerous
results for him. All Syria felt, with Damascus,
robbed of the government, with the exception,
perhaps, of the northern part. The party
differences were more and more absorbed in this
feeling; people wished for the earlier times
back again. Naturally, too, the sympathy with

4 Theophanes explains his fatalism by his close connection with
the Aramaeans of Harran, who had remained heathen.

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 379

the lawful ruling family which had been
dethroned, and which had ties and connections
everywhere, was not so easily rooted out and
transferred to the alien usurper, whose mother
was a slave.

It was still the year 127 when Syria revolted
against Marwan.1 The rising appears to have
started from Filistin, for Thabit b. Nuaim was
the moving spirit of it, but it extended on all
sides and actually spread over the town of
Hims, which till then had stuck to Walid II
and to Marwan. On the 2nd Shauwal, 127, i.e.
7th July, 74*5,2 Marwan appeared before Hims.
Then the inhabitants' courage failed ; they
admitted him and betrayed the thousand Kalbite
troopers who had hastened to their aid from
Tadmor. 3 Marwan now despatched a strong

1 Waqidl in Tab., 1742 gives the year 128: Elias Nisibenug actual-
ly the year 129. I follow Theoph. (A. M. 6236) and the chief
report in Tab, (1890ff.), the reasons for which I shall give in the
course of the following statement. Confusion was easily possible
because Hims was twice besieged by Mar win, in A.H. 127 and A.H.
128.

2 Two days after the Fitr, 127 (Tab , 1893).

3 Ace. to Theophaiies, 6236 ho had 120 Kalbites (Xa\0e*/oi)
hanged, but ace. to Tab. it was only the bodies of the fallen. Abbas
b. Walid I lived in Hims. Tho people of TCmessa had destroyed his
palace in A.H. 126 because he had gone over to the foes of Wattd II.
Later, however, he seems to have gained an influence over them
again, and tt> have brought about a political change of mind amongst
them and persuaded them to the revolt against Marwan. For the
latter, after the taking of Hims, had him seized and put to death in
prison. A negro was made to thrust his head into a bag of lime
which was brought to the boil. At this the Christians whom Abbas*

380 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

corps to Damascus to relieve the town which
was besieged by the Arabs of the country under
Yazld ^b. EMlid alQasrl. The besiegers were
scattered, Yazid slain, the Kalbites* nest, Mizza,
burnt down. Then an advance was made
against the capital of the Urdunn, — Tiberias.
Th&bit b. Nuaim, who besieged it, was repulsed,
then defeated once again in Filistin, and finally
taken prisoner.1 He and his sons were executed,
after having their hands and feet cut off, and
the mutilated bodies were exposed in Damascus.
At last came the turn of the only place still
rebellious, Tadmor, the headquarters of the
Kalbites. Marwan marched thither himself,
but Abrash managed to avert the worst and
negotiate a peace. The chiefs of the town
waited upon Marw&n ; some few only who did
not trust him fled into the desert.

Marw&n had homage paid to his two sons in
Damascus, and married them to daughters of
Hish&m, assembling the whole house of Umaiya
to the wedding. It was an act of statesmanship;
he thought he could even now reconcile and ally

a zealous Muslim, had incited against Mmpelf, rejoiced. They were
at that time stilt numerous in Him*, aud tnny have taken their share
in the surrender of the town to Marwan, who was far removed from
the fanaticism of Islam. Cf. Theoph., A. M. 6236; his exact accounts
are to be preferred to those of the summary in Tab., 3, 43.

1 Ace. to Waqidt in Tab., 1942, not till Shauwal, 128. That Nuaim
b. Thabit is none other than Thabit b. Nuaim is plain from the
gentilio alJudhami.

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 381

the family with himself. He called up the
Syrians also to the campaign which he had on
hand against Iraq, which had not jet submitted
to him. He raised 10,000 men from them,
equipped them with arms and horses, and
ordered them to join forces with the 20,000
Mesopotamians and Qinnesrites already on the
march down the Euphrates under (Yazid) Ihn
(Umar b/} Hubaira at the beginning of 128
(autumn, 745). As these 10,000 were passing
Ilus&fa, they persuaded Sulaiman b. Hish&m,
who was living there in his father's residence,
to put himself at their head jis Khalifa. Although
he had been very mercifully treated by Marw&n,
and had good reason to keep faith with him,
still the restless, war-loving man could not
withstand the temptation which came in his
way. He took possession of the town Qinnesrin,
which was destitute of troops. From all sides
the Syrians poured in thither to him, so that in
the end he is said to have had 70,000 men under
his standard. Marwan now left a minor portion
of the troops which were on the way to Kufa
under the command of Ibn Hubaira near
DArin, and led the greater portion in person
back against the i^ebel who had arisen in his
rear. He attacked Sulaim&n in his camp
near Khuf&f,not far from Qinnesrin, and utterly
defeated him. To the captured Arabs he showed
no mercy ; they had to suffer death Unless they

382 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

passed themselves off as slaves, and as such were
spared. Tabari tells of 30,000 prisoners who
were slain, but Theophanes only mentions 7,000
who fell altogether. Sulaim&n with the rem-
nant of his army made for Hims, but fled
thence, on the approach of the enemy, to Tadmor
and then on to Kufa. The army remained in
Hims under the command of his brother Said.
This town was now besieged for the second
time by Marwan, and this time was only forced
to surrender after 4 months and 22 days.1 Mar-
wan executed a few of his deadliest foes ; Said
b. HishDim and his sons he threw into prison.2
When he arrested and imprisoned Abu Muham-
mad asSufy&ni is not mentioned, but the fact
in itself is confirmed by Tabari, 3,43, and is
interesting because it shows that even this
Umaiyid was carried away by the general
current. The walls of Hims were rased to the
ground ; likewise those of Baalbekk, Damascus,
Jerusalem and other prominent Syrian towns ;

1 Thus Elias; cf. Theoph, 6287. Tab., 1912 gives ten mouths, but
there is no room for that ; that may possibly be the duration of the
whole campaign of the year 128.

* Ace. to Theoph. ho put to death all Hisham's relatives and
clients, but that is incorrect, cf. Tab., 3,43 with 2,1912. The slaying
of the Saksakt celebrated as champion of the Syrians is in Tab., 2,1912
twice related in different ways by the same narrator. Muawia
alSaksaki and Abu Ilaqa alSaksaki are, where possible, to be distin-
guished from each other. The latter is also called alQudai, though
the Saksak had only allied themselves with the Qudaa and did not
actually belong to them.

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 38S

but not those of Antiochia, where the population
was mostly Christian. [ Accordingly, Marw&n
seems to have unexpectedly met opposition in
these places even then.2 In the summer of 128
(746) he had finished with Syria ; it lay in
fragments at his feet.

2. Meanwhile in the east of the kingdom
everything had gone topsy-turvy. In Iraq
Yazld III had, in Ramadan or Shauw&l, 126
(July, 744), made a son of the pious Khalifa
Umar II stattholder, in place of the Kalbite
Mansur b. Jumhfir, who nevertheless retained an
influential position in Kuf a. Hira was and remain-
ed the seat of government and the headquar-
ters of the Syrian soldiers. It was to a certain
extent the fortress of Kufa. Besides, the capit-
al was held in check by the citadel, where the
town-prefect had a Shurta (body of police)
at his disposal. Naturally the Kufaites were
not on friendly terms with the foreign military.
Ibn Umar sought to gain their good-will.
Possibly the continual changing of town-
prefects which he went in for (Tab., 1902) was
intended partly to serve this end, but his chief
method was money. He gave back to the Arab
troops the pension which was withdrawn from
them, because they, in point of fact, performed

1 Theoph., 6»37, 6241.

* Thus Waqidt may not bo wrong in making the imprisonment and
punishment of Thabit b. Nuaim not happen till this time.

384 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

no war service and took up arms chiefly to
raise rebellions. After th« death of Yazld III,
on the accession of Ibrahim, he raised the
amount still more. The Syrians murmured
at it, — " Thou dividest our Fai (booty) amongst
these folk, who, forsooth, are our foes." But the
Kufaites saw only the weakness of the apparent
kindness, and when Yazld III died, they con-
sidered his position so insecure that they tried
to instigate a rebellion against him.

At that time there was sojourning among
them a m-m who could be reckoned as belonging
to the family of the Prophet, Abdullah Ibn
Mu&wia b. Abdill&h b. Ja'far, a great-grand-
son of All's brother Ja'far. He had come with
his brothers as suppliants to Ibn Umar, and
then remained in Kufa and married into a
distinguished family. His descent seemed to
warrant his fitness to be a pretender, and he
was ready to let himself be put forward as such.
The Zaidlya, i.e. the Shiites who a few years
before had rebelled under Zaid b. All against
the government of Hish&m, formed his princi-
pal adherents. They led him into the citadel
and drove the prefect out. There were many
Maw&ll among them, but the rest of the Kufa-
ites also did homage to Ibn Mu&wia. They
then marched with him into Hira against Ibn
Umar. The latter was anything but energetic,
he simply would let nothing disturb his peace

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 385

of mind. If the waters would not subside, he
then swam with the stream, and found that it
was possible to get on that way too ; so while
he himself ate and drank he left it to his Syrian
soldiers to meet the attack. It was not a serious
matter. The Kufaites ran away when it came
to fighting, in Muharram, 127 (Oct.-Nov. 744).
The Zaidiya alone fought bravely, and continued
the struggle for some days more in the citadel
and in the streets of Kufa, until security to
them and a free retreat to Ibn Mu&wia were
granted.

The latter now betook himself to Media via
Mad&in. He was not yet played out ; instead
of diminishing, his adherents increased. Many
people from Kufa and other places flocked to
him, notably Maw&li and retainers, i.e. Iranians.
He first settled in Ispahan, but in A.H. 128
(745-746) went to Istakhr in E&rs. Large
tracts of Media, Ahw&z, F&rs and Karm&n
submitted to him, as he seemed from his descent
to be called to the ruling power. Other up-
starts who appeared simultaneously in the same
region recognised him, so as to get their own
claims legitimised by him, — such as Muh&rib b.
Mfts£ and Sulaim&n b. Hablb.1 Umaiyids and
Abb&sids who did not feel secure at home took
shelter under his wing in the hope of obtaining

1 Doubtless this is not the Qadi of the same name who held office
under WalSd I, Sulaiman and Hi&Lam in Syria.
49

386 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

from him office or reward. Shiitism, by means
of which he had arisen, was afterwards to him
nothing but a thing of secondary importance;
the most motley company gathered about him,
and so arose in the masterless East an ephem-
eral kingdom of wide extent, — a characteristic
sign of the times.

Ibn Umar had happily got rid of Ibn Mu&-
wia (Muharram, 127) ; Marwftn II (Safar, 127)
he did not recognise. Indeed, after the earlier
rule in Syria was overthrown, he continued it in
Iraq, but still without setting himself up as
Khalifa. His supporters were the Syrian Yemen-
ites (Qud&a and Kalb), who of course stuck
to him only for lack of a better. They had al-
ready for a considera ble time, as chief compo-
nent of the government troops, formed a sort
of colony in Kufa and Hira, but came more
into prominence now since their own home
was made disagreeable or was closed to them.
They were reinforced by emigrants who could
not, or would not, make peace with Marw£n,
by brothers and sons of Kh&lid alQasrl, by Kal-
bite officers of the stamp of Mansftr b. Jumhftr,
and by other chiefs of the subjugated party in
Syria, who naturally also brought their people
with them. By the Cl Yemenites5' who in Tabarl
play a part in the war-currents of this time, are
generally to be understood the Syrian Yemenites
of Kufa,

MARWAN AND THfi THIRD CIVIL WAR 387

Marw&n at the outset could do nothing more
against Ibn Umar than set up in opposition to
him one of the latter's chief men, Nadr b.
Said alHarashl. This man was a Qaisite, the
son of a prominent officer and official of the
school of Hajj&j, and he managed to win over
to himself the Mudarites in the Syrian army.
But the Yemenites, and above all the Kalbites,
who were in the majority and to whom also the
supreme leader belonged, namely, Asbagh b.
Dhu&la, one of the murderers of Walld II,
remained faithful to the old stattholder, and
he was able to hold his own in Hira, whilst
Ibn Harashl established himself in Dair Hind.
Then for four months the two rivals fought
battles between Hira and Kufa, which indeed
are said to have hardly ever reached the stage
of a proper bloody engagement, and then a
common danger forced them to come to an
agreement.

For now the Khaw&rij came upon the scene
and for a time occupied the foreground. On
former occasions they were always very small in
numbers, and so had been compelled to limit
themselves to petty warfare. They had indeed
by this means given much trouble to a
stattholder like Hajj&j, though they themselves
had not seriously aspired to the government, but
had pursued a quite unpolitical policy, with the
idea of saving their soul, and not of gaining the

388 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

Islamic world, with which, on the contrary, they
did not wish to have the slightest thing in com-
mon. Now their little bands swelled to powerful
masses ; they abandoned their rude exclusiveness
and accepted every help that offered. Certainly
they still exacted from those who came over to
them the confession of their creed, but they
did not turn away any allies who were willing
to fight on their side. The truth was the goal
they were striving towards was no longer
Paradise, but the earthly kingdom. They joined
in the scrimmage for the ruling power, for
which there was a general scramble, with the
same methods as the others, and they came
very near to winning it. Then, indeed, they
would have remained KMrijites no longer.

The movement began in Mesopotamia,
Marw&n's native province, not indeed among
the Qais in the south but among the Rabta in
the north. The Rabla always held themselves
a little aloof from the rest of the Muslim Arabs,
especially from their old rivals, the Mudar, who
had compelled them to evacuate their former
district and to whom they grudged the Prophetic
office and the Khalifate. The Shaib&n of Bakr,
who had settled in the region of Mosul on both
sides of the Tigris, since the days of Shabib were
the special champions of Kh&rijitism. From
amongst them, after the murder of Waltd II,
Said b. Bahdal arose as Khalifa of the

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 389

Khaw&rij. After removing a rival at home he
set out for Kufa, where better prospocts attracted
him than in the territory of Marw&n. When
he died on the way, another Shaih&nite took
his place, Dahhak b. Qais, from the distin-
guished tribe Murra, to which Shablb had also
belonged. The KHaw&rij of Shahraz&r, Armenia
and Adlmrbaij&n joined him, and with several
thousand men under his standard he advanced
upon Kufa. The two stattholders there, who
were always quarrelling, united against him
but could not withstand him, and in Rajab, 127
(April, 745) they were so decisively defeated
that they had to quit Kufa. Ibn Harashl
betook himself to Marw&n in Syria ; Ibn Umar
made for Wasit,1 whither part of his Kalbites
had already preceded him. In Sha'bfrn, 127
(May, 745) Dahh&k b. Qais followed him there
and besieged him. In the struggle against the
Khaw&rij Mans&r b. Jumhftr distinguished
himself, but all the same he was the first to go

1 Thus ace. to Tab., 1899. Ace. to Abu Ubaida (Tab , 1902) both
fled to Wasit, not only Ibn Umar but Ibn Harashi as well, there
renewed their old quarrel, and were only just reconciled when the
Khawarij appeared. But even ace. to AbA Ubaida Ibn Harash'
neither took part with the Khawarij in the fight nor in the surrender.
80 he must then have soon disappeared and gone from Wasit to Syria
(Tab., 1913). On this occasion he might have slain the Kharijite
stattholder of Kufa, as Abu Ubaida in Tab., 1903, 1914 reports. But
aco. to Tab., 1899f., 1938 it was the Taghlibite Abu Attya who did so
when he broke through with 70 or 80 men from Wasit via Knfa to
Syria.

390 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

over to them and pass their religious test b;
promising to embrace Islam * and obey the wor<
of God. After some delay, at the end o
Shauw&l, li'7 (beginning of August, 745) Ibi
TJmar also capitulated and did homage t<
Dahh&k b. Qais. " See'st thou not that Go<
bestows the victory on His religion, and tha
the Quraish pray behind Bakr b. W&il ! " L
poet thus expresses his astonishment that th<
Umaiyid recognised the Kharijite of Shaib&n a
his Imam, for the political transition was at th»
same time a religious one. The sudden chang<
was indeed astonishing, and, what is more, Ibi
Umar did not disdain to stay in Wasit a
Kharijite stattholder, over Kaskar, Mesene
Ahwaz and Fars, in which position he fell ou
with his neighbour on the east, Ibn Mu&wia.

Dahh&k himself turned back to Kufa an<
from there governed the western half of hi
kingdom. After an absence of probably 2(
months,2 certainly not before the middle of 12?
(spring, 746), he was recalled to his Mesopotamia!
home, at a time when Mar*v£n had his hand

1 The Khawarij laid claim to the name Muslims for themselvi
alone, and called the Catholic Muslims heathen.

2 Thus Tab., 1938. Ace. to Abu Ubaida (Tab., 1914) Dahhc
withdrew as early as Dhulqa'da, 127 (Aug.-Sopr., 745) to Mesopotamii
and likewise in Dhulqa'da, 127, according to him (Tab., 1913), Marws
was finished with Hims and had a free hand to deal with Dahhft
The two datinga are connecte d ; in both the year is wrong ; in tl
second the month is probably right.

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 391

full in Syria. He came and took possession of
the town of Mosul, from which he drove out
the government official. All flocked to him,
especially as he gave high pay. His army is
said to have amounted to 120,000 men. The
number, of course, rests upon popular estimate,
but even Theophanes says Dahh&k had a
tremendous armed force. The Kalbite emigrants
and adventurers were with him, and with them
may also be reckoned the Umaiyid Sulaim£n b.
Hish&m, who had saved his regiment, the
Dhakwaniya, from the debacle of Khuf&f, and
had hurried to meet the Khaw&rij with 4,000
men.

Whilst Marw&n was reducing Syria he
came into danger of losing Mesopotamia, the
pillar of his strength. However, he did not
give up the siege of Hims with which he was
just then occupied, but provisionally commis-
sioned his son Abdullah, whom he had left be-
hind in the residence at Harr&n, to advance
«

against Dahhkk and from Mosul impede him
in his further advance. Abdullah came to
Nisibis. There after an unsuccessful encounter
he had to halt, and withdrew behind the walls
of the town, where he was besieged. An
attempt of Dahh&k to take possession of the cross-
ing of the Euphrates near Raqqa by a forward
push, miscarried. Meantime Marwan had at
last subdued Hims and now advanced in person

392 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

vid llaqqa against the Khaw&rij. The armies
met at Kafartut&. Dahh&k, who was accustomed
to expose himself recklessly, fell in a skirmish.
His successor, Khaibart, after an interval renewed
the attack, and forced his way into the enemy
camp, but in so doing was outflanked and beaten
to death with cudgels by the baggage servants
in the camp. This took place towards the end
of the year 128, about September, 746.1

But it was not till the following year
(A. M. 6239 in Theophanes, A. H. 129) that
the Khaw&rij were subdued. They were still
40,000 strong, and chose as their Khalifa the
Yashkurite Shaibfoi b. Abdiiaziz (AbA Dulaf).
Upon Sulaiman's advice the latter led them
back to the eastern bank of the Tigris, opposite
to Mosul, but they kept the town in their power
and had communication with it by a bridge
of boats. Marw&n encamped opposite on the
right bank. Thus he spent long months of the
year 129 (746-7*7) without gaining a decisive
victory. It was only after Iraq was meantime
wrested from their power that the Khaw&rij
could no longer hold out on the Tigris either.
They did not manage to cut off the army which
now was able to hasten from Kufa to Marw£n's

1 Theophanes agrees in essentials with the account of the chief
report) in Tab. (Abdulwahhab). Ace. to him Dahhak made his rising
in A.H. 127 (A. M. 6236) in Persia, i.e., in Iraq ; in A.M. 128 he appeared
in Mesopotamia. Marwan first sent his son to encounter him,
bat after the taking of Hiins he came in person and slew the rebel.

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 898

help, and in order not to be between two fires
they evacuated their position near Mosul about
the end of 129 (August, 747) and marched
through the mountains towards the east.

The general of Marw&n, who snatched Iraq
from the Kh&rijites, and so made Iheir position
on the Tigris untenable, was the Qaisite Yazid
b. Umar Ibn Hubaira from Qinnesrin, whose
father, under Yazid II, had held the stattholder-
ship of Kufa. In the beginning of 125 he
had set out on the march thither, but had
to remain stationary a considerable time on
the boundary at Qarqisi&, and could not attack
till the end of the year or the beginning of
129. After several successful fights with the
Khforijite stattholder Muthannft, b. Imr&n,
under whom Mansiir b. Jumhftr fought, he
managed, in Ramad&n, 129 (May or June, 747),
to enter Kufa.1 He then took the town of
W&sit and made Ibn Umar prisoner. MansAr
b. Jumhftr fled with his Kalbites to the pro-
vince of Ibn Mu&wia, whither the Khawferij also,
who till then had fought on the Tigris with
Marw&n, withdrew. Ibn Mu&wia, in himself

1 Thus ace. to Abu Mikhimf (Tab., 1946) who certainly was not*
a scholarly chronologist like Waqidi, but in this case was bound to
have e xaot information, because he was then still living, an old man,
in Kufa. Abu Ubaida (Tab., 1914 ff.) gives other dates, but is not to
be trusted. He knows interesting details and narrates them ex-
cellently well, but as a historian is not to be compared with Abu
Mikhnaf.

50

394 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

very insignificant, was for a short space raised
to a great eminence by the circumstances ; he
would certainly never have dreamed beforehand
that such a thing could happen. Shlites, Kh&ri-
jites, Kalbites, Abb&sids, TTrnaiyids, were all
united under him. All differences seemed to
be adjusted in the fanatical enmity to Marw&n,
but it was not long until the remnants that
necessity had swept together ceased to agree.

Marwftn turned back to his residence in
Harr&n. He needed to get some rest.1 The
most important provinces of the kingdom,
Mesopotamia, Iraq, Syria and Egypt were now
subject to him. In Arabia, too, the Khaw&rij
of Hadramaut, who had conquered Sanc&, Mecca
and Medina, were annihilated in the year 130
(748). For three years he had been almost
constantly in the field, and had performed mar-
vellous feats in the struggle against a world of
foes. He excelled all his predecessors by his
personal capability for carrying things through.

He left the war in the East against the
Khawarij and Ibn Mu&wia to his Iraq statt-
holder, Ibn Hubaira. The army which the
latter had sent to his help against the Khaw&rij
when they were still on the Tigris, was

1 Whether this was his idea is indeed doubtful. The Romans
had taken advantage of the Arabian civil war to extend their bound-
ary eastwards. He may now have wanted to go against them.
From Egypt he caused Cyprus to be attacked, but in vain.

MARWAN AND THE THIRD CIVIL WAR 395

commanded by 'Amir Ibn Dub&ra. The latter
was now commissioned to pursue them and pressed
forward into the province of Ibn Mu&wia ;
there he was joined by another military leader
of Ibn Hubaira, Nubata b. Hanzala. Ibn
Muawia was overcome in the battle against Ibn
Dub&ra near Marwash Shadhan in the year 130,
left his kingdom to its fate, and fled from his
foes to Khurasan, where he was put to death by
his friends. The Kharijite leader, Shaiban b.
Abdilaztz alYashkuri, went to the east coast of
Arabia, and at last fell in battle with the princes
of Uman, the old-established Banu Jalandd,, in
the year 134. l Sulaiman b. Hish&m and Man-
s&r b. Jumhur betook themselves over the sea
to Sind.a

Now, however, when Ibn Hubaira's generals
had scattered this curious coalition and were in
a fair way to subject western Iran completely
to Marw^n's sway, new and sinister opponents
appeared before them, — the Klmr&s&nites under
the black flag of the Abbasids. In vain had
Nasr b. Saiyar, the old man who had now been
many years statth older of the Umaiyids on the

1 Thus ace. fco Tab,, 3, 78. Cf. 2, 1945. • 1949. 1979. Abu
Mikhnaf in Tab., 2, 1948 says Shaiban b. Abdilaziz had already
fallen in A.H. 130 and that in S.'tjitttHu. He probably conftiaea him
with the Hararito Shaiban b. Salama who at the aarne time played
a part in Khurasan and actually foil in A.H. 130, not indeed in Sajistan,
but in Sarakhs.

* For their end see Agh,', 4, 90. Yaqubi, 2, 430. Tab., 3, 72. 80.

396 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

north-eastern boundary, warned them of the
danger imminent from that quarter, and urgent-
ly begged for help to suppress it. Marw&n had
too much to do in the centre and was thankful
to be able to maintain his position triumphantly
there. Then, at the height of his success, the
black spectre which he had not heeded suddenly
appeared before him in the flesh. The Khura-
sanites rendered his toilsome labour vain, just
as he seemed to have attained his goal. With
Abfi. Muslim there came upon him a mightier
than he.

CHAPTER VIII.
THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN.

The final ruin of the Umaiyids was brought
about by a rising of the Shiite Iranians in
Khur£s&n, but the way was paved for this rising
already by the preceding history of the province,
particularly by the tribal feud of the Arabs of
that quarter, which in its turn had its starting-
point in Basra, for Khurasan was a colony of
Basra. In order therefore to understand the
situation in Khurasan we must hark back to the
earlier state or trend of conditions in Basra.

In Kufa at the beginning of the Umaiyid
epoch the jealousy of the tribes towards each
other certainly led to strained relations but did
not get the length of violent outbreaks. There
it was the political parties who came to logger-
heads with each other. On the other hand in
Basra the situation at first appeared very much
as it was in pre-Islamic times. Both latently
and openly the tribal feud retained its power,
only its action was not so much between the
single tribes as between the tribal groups. The
most notable group consisted of the Tamlm
and the Rib&b ; the Persian As&wira had joined
them, and the Indian Zutt and Sai&bija also

398 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

sought their protection, just because they were
the most powerful.1 Since remote times the
Rabia had been unfriendly to Tamim. In
Basra the Bakr were joined by the Abdulqais,
who were but sparsely represented in Kufa.
The Yemen were represented by the Azd, while
in Kufa the more prominent and more thorough-
ly Arab Madhhij, Hamd&n and Kinda predomi-
nated/4

The Azd first became powerful in Basra
by a supplementary immigration which took
place towards the latter part of Muawia's rule
and under Yazid I (Tab., 450, Baladh., 373).
It was not considered right that these new-
comers who had taken no part in the great
conquests in tho time of Umar and Uthm&n
should now claim the same rights as the old tribes
(Tab., 779). They at once upset the balance
of power hitherto existing, though it was only
through Muhallab and his sons that they attain-
ed to their full eminence. At the beginning
the Tamim had the idea of winning them over

1 Baladh., 372 ff. Kamil, 82, 16f .

a In Basra ar,d Khurasan, the Akhmas, namely (1) bakr, (2)
Abdulqais. (3) Tamim, (4) Azd and (5) Ahl alAlia ( = Ahl alMadina,
mostly Qaisites, Tab., 461, 21. 1382) correspond to the Arba of Kufa.
In Kufa the Arba form actual fourths and in Basra tho Akhmas actual
fifths, but thesfl expressions are alao used, the samo as our quarter or
ward, for other divisions, the denominator of which is not necessarily
Jour or five. To the large tribes after whom the Akhmas were called
were joined broken fragments of smaller onus, e. </. the Kinda and the
Taiyi were taken in with the Bakr in Basra.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHUBAsAN 399

to their side and entering into a league with
them, but refrained from taking the first step
because their wisest and most influential coun-
sellor, Ahnaf, said that whoever made the first
move would play second fiddle in the alliance.
So the Rabla anticipated them and on their
part made a solemn alliance with Azd (Tab.,
450. 1497). As the Tamim held close to the
Ahl alA.lia, i.e. the Qais, there now came about
a division into two sides, in which the united
Azd (Yemen) and Rabla stood opposed to the
Mudar (Tamtm and Qais). It must not be
thought, however, that all the Azd had come to
Basra only in the year 60. There were already
Azdites there before that, and these certainly
belonged, just as much as those in Kuf a, to
the western branch which had its home on
Mount Sar&t, — to the Daus mostly. But they
were of small consequence until they were
strengthened by the later addition which was
far greater in numbers, and streamed in from
the east- Arabian coast-district of TJm&n. The
Azd Um&n, to distinguish them from the Azd
Sar&t, were called the Mazftn, but disliked the
name as it apparently contains a pun upon their
mixed origin. In Um&n there lived many who
were not Arabs. They were also jeered at
because of their old industry, namely fishing,
just as the western Azdites were for their
weaving.

400 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

In the year 38 or 39 Mu&wia sent Ibn Had-
raml to Basra to stir up there, with the help of
the Tamim, a rising against the rule of All, and
he must have succeeded in gaining to his side a
great part of the Tamim. The deputy statt-
holder of Basra, young Zi£d b. Ablhi, asked
the Bakr for protection but they could not come
to terms. He then turned to the Azd (Sar&t)
and found a secure shelter for himself and the
state-treasure with their chief, Sabira b. Shai-
m&n alHudd&nl (of Daus). All, however, made
attempts to entice the Basrian Tamlm away
from Ibn Hadrami by means of Tamimites who
were devoted to him. The first emissary whom
he sent was murdered, but the second, J&ria
b. Qud&ma, was successful. Ibn Hadraml was
abandoned by the Tamim, besieged by J&ria in
the D&r Sunbll and burnt to death with his fol-
lowers. Satirical verses by the Azdite 'Arandas
concerning the event are preserved to us and
for long the disgrace stuck to the Tamlm (Mad-
Mnlin Tab., 1, 3414ff.).

This is the beginning of the friendship of the
Azd with Zi&d and his family. Zi&d always
remained grateful to them (Tab., 2, 80), and
told his sons also to apply to them if they
should at any time be in need (2,440). In
relation to the rival Tamlm and Bakr they were
originally a neutral element and therefore suited
to be a prop of the government.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 401

The actual outbreak of the tribal feud in
Basra did not take place till after the immigra-
tion of the Azd Umfm and after the death of the
Khalifa Yaztd I, through whom the Umaiyid rule
came to be everywhere in a tottering condition.
The report of it in Tab., 2, 43311; is very detailed
but somewhat strange. It is worth while to
undo the knot and separate the single threads,
and all the more so since elsewhere we find
hardly any statement at all and nowhere a
correct one about these events which had such
important consequences. Tabari's chief author-
ity is Abu Ubaida, the great collector of Arab
tribe tales. His narrative certainly is not in
existence in toto, but the gaps can be filled in,
and in the essentials Wahb b. Jarir agrees writh
him.

Abu U/jaida, 435, 17. 436, lo.1 Ubaid-
ull&h b. Zi'ctd, the stattholder of Iraq, was at
variance with Yazid I, who considered that
the slaying of Husain had brought him no
advantage, but only harm. One evening the
standing messenger whom he kept at the court
at Damascus came riding to Basra with news
of the sudden death of the Khalifa. He at
once called a general meeting in the mosque,
announced the event, reviled the dead man and
made clear what were his own deserts from

1 Parallel, Wahb, 433, 12.
51

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Basra. He said that on his first coming there
had been registered in the Diw&n 70,000 regular
soldiers (Arabs) and 90,000 tradesmen (Hawaii);
now there were 80,000 regulars and 150,000
tradesmen. All suspicious persons — by this he
meant specially the Khaw&rij — were under lock
and key. "You are the most powerful; the
Syrians are at variance. Therefore choose an
Emir for yourselves, and if the Syrians have
agreed upon a Khalifa, then either join with
them or not as you will, for you can dispense
with the others, but they cannot do without you.35
His idea was to put himself forward as interim
Emir, since by the death of the Khalifa the duty
of obedience to the government, which was
conceived to be an absolutely personal matter,
did not hold any longer.

The Basrians also chose him and paid hom-
age to him by striking hands, but when they
were outside they cleansed their hands and
wiped off their homage upon the doors and walls,
and scoffingly said that he thought they would
follow him in times of quarrels and uncertainty
the same as they did in times of unity and order,
and very soon he found that no one obeyed him
any longer.1

1 He gained popularity at the beginning by making his officers of
finance distribute the state-moneys, — Tab., 439 says 8 millions and
443 says 19 millions— day and night to the tribes and warriors to
whom the revenues of the conquests (Fai) actually belonged, and which

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 403

Abu Ubaida, 437, 15. The signal for
open rebellion was given by the Tamimite Sal-
ama b. Dhuaib. He appeared one day on
horseback in the camel-market, in complete
armour, carrying a banner, and demanded recog-
nition of Ibn Zubair as Khalifa.1 Thereupon
UbaiduMh collected the Basrians and pointed
out to them that they had really chosen him as
Emir of their own accord, but they were novv
hampering his instruments in the execution of
his commands, and were passively conniving at
the insurrection being proclaimed. Ahnaf, the
chief of the Tamim, promised to bring in Salama,
but his following was already too strong, and
Ahnaf did not return,

Abu Ubaida, 439, 10* Ubaidullah was
in evil case. Even the police-troops s would
not interfere on his orders, but only on the or-
ders of their officers. His brothers said to him, —

the government collected and hoarded up after deducting the pensions.
But when they became refractory he stopped this, and upon his flight
he took the rest of the treasure with him. Later on tho jewels were
still in the possession of his family. Abti. Ubaida, 439, 10.

1 Brunnow, on his own account, makes him the emissary of Ibn
Zubair, and A. Muller even makas him his confidant. Tradition *ays
nothing ot this, and we c3nnot ignorantly adorn tradition. It was
matter of course that the opposition turned to Ibn Zubair. Also} a
recruiting officer does not appear on horse- back in the market-place
carrying a standard. Cf. 452, 15 j 465, 2.

2 Parallel, Wahb, 441, 20.

In Tab., 443 they are called the Bukh&rians (c/. 464, and especj
ally Baladh., 441), elsewhere khd8$atu*s Sult&n, i.e. the private troops
of the government as opposed to the militia, or general army.

404 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

"It is no Khalifa for whom you light, and who
will support you; we are in danger of losing
our property in Basra and our lives to boot."
He then determined, in accordance with the
advice and example of his father to resort to
the protection of the Azd against the mutinous
Tamtm. At nightfall he set out with his trea-
sures to Mas'ud 1>. Amr al'Atakl, the leader of
the Azd, whom they all followed.1 He did not
venture by clay ; even by night he ran the risk
of being shot down by the watches who were
posted against the Khawarij ; an arrow stuck
in his turban. When at last he had got safely
to Mas'ud, the latter was afraid ; he did not
want, for his part, to plunge into a feud with
the rest of the Basrians. Nevertheless they
managed to allay his fears. They said that
nothing was required of him but to receive the
Emir temporarily, and then speed him to a
secure place outwith Basra.2

AM Ubaida, 446, 3.3 The Basrians
now commissioned two trusty men to submit
proposals to them for a new Emir. One of the
two Quraishites who were nominated was re-
commended by his relationship to the Prophet
and to Mu&wia, and appointed. He was called

1 'Attk is the most distinguished family of the Azd Uman, whose
[old headquarteis were Daba. Muhallab also belonged to 'Atik.

2 Variants of AbA Ubaida, 445, 7ff. Ace. to Wahb, 44-1, lOff

ready immediately.
Wahb, 444, 6 ; 444, 17-

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURAsAN 405

AbduMh b. H&rith b. Abdilmuttalib, with
the nickname "Babba." Ho entered the cita-
del on 1st Jum&da II, 65 (25th January, 684).

Abu Ubaida, 447, 12. 449, 20. The next
occurrence was that a Bakrite boasted in the
mosque that a tribesman of his had given a pro-
minent Quraishite a box on the ear and that
the latter had borne it quietly. Dabbites (of
Tamim) who were present, and who sided with
Quraish as belonging to Mudar, beat him almost
to death for this. Thereupon the whole of the
Bakr were enraged and prepared to march against
the Tamim, headed by Malik b. Misma' in
place of Ashyam b. Shaqiq who would not go.1
In view of the attack on the Tamim he renewed
an old alliance with the Azd, in which Ubaidul-
l&h b. Zi&d strongly supported him with his
money.2 It was regarded as due to the Azd
that their chief Mas'M b. Amr should have the
supreme command. The latter then said to
Ubaidullah, " Come with us and we will take
you back to the citadel/' But he remained
stationary in front of Mas'iid's house, had his
camels saddled and loaded before him and every
moment had information brought him of the
state of affairs. Mas'ud went into the mosque

1 The same paralysing dualism of the leaders has been alreaay
seen in 1,3414. Cf. 2,448. Ace. to 455, 5ff. it was the other way
about, Ashyam was leader, and not Malik.

a One of the two documents was deposited with Salt b. Huraith
alHsnaft (Tab., 449, 17. Cf. Kimil, 627, 10).

406 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

and entered the pulpit, and Babba was content
to let him do so. Malik marched about for a
while in some of the quarters of the Tamlm — till
he heard that Mas'ftd was killed.

Abu TTbaida, 452, 6. The Tamlm announced
to Ahnaf, " The Rabia and the Yemen have
penetrated into the mosque." After a while
they added, " Now they have pressed into the
citadel." He was not disturbed ; only the " wolves
of Tamim " under Salama b. Dhuaib started out
along with a few hundred Maw&li under M&h
Afridftn. When worse and worse tidings kept
arriving Ahnaf at last considered he might use
force and the cry resounded : " The philanderer
has made a move at last ! " He bound the
standard to Abs b. Talq, since AbMd b. Husain
was not on the spot. The latter came soon after,
but turned back again with his 60 horsemen
because he would not fight under Abs.

Ishdq b. Smvaid, 454, 6.1 On the side of the
Tamim there fought most zealously M&h Af rldfin
with his people, each one of whom shot five
arrows at the same time. Before such a rain of

A Abu Ubaicln'e account of the encounter is lacking in Tabart,
which only tells us of an ironical speech of Hasan alBasri (455, 9) :
" Mas'ud preached the Snnna and forbade the Fitna ; does not the
Sunna say ' thou shalt withhold thy hand from violence ' ? But it
was not long till they dragged him down from the pulpit and slew
him." Ishaq b. Suwaid supplies the gap, fitting in essentials (even
in the dates), and differing in small points j e.g., he makes not Malik,
but Ashyam the leader of the Bakr,

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURAsAN 407

darts the opponents could not keep their ground.
The Tamim thronged into the mosque, dragged
Mas'ftd from the pulpit and slew him. Ashyam
b. Shaqiq of Bakr escaped. This happened at
the beginning of Shauwal, 64. Abu Ubaida
gives the same date (455, 16) for the flighlTof
Ubaidull&h, which, according to him (439, 10),
follov/ed upon the death of Mas'ud.

Abii Ubaida in the Rdmil, 81.1 Revenge for
Mas'ud was undertaken by his brother Ziad b.
Amr al'Ataki, still a young man. He marched
the next day to the Mirbad (the chief square of
Basra) and there marshalled his army, the Bakr
on the right, the Abdulqais on the left, the Azd
in the middle. Ahnaf arranged the Tamim ;
opposite the Azd were the Sa'd and the Ribab
under Abs b. Talq; opposite the Bakr were
the Hanzala under H&ritha b. Badr ; facing the
Abdulqais stood the Amr b. Tamim. But it did
not come to an encounter, for Ahnaf caused the
Azd and Rabia to be addressed in this wise : —
" You are fellow-citizens of Basra, dearer to us
than our Tamimite tribal brothers in Kufa ;
yesterday it was you who began, broke the
domestic peace and kindled the flame, — we only
defended ourselves, but all the same would
be glad now to try every means to find a

1 Neither is this concluding piece of Abii Ubaida preserved in Tab.
He puts in place of it a variant of 'Aw&na (461, 18).

408 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

settlement." Ziad offered three peace proposals
to choose from, and then the armies separated.
Next morning Ahnaf decided to accept the pro-
posal that the Tamlm should leave out of con-
sideration their own spilt blood, but on the
other hand should expiate that of the Azd and
liabia, and should pay an exceptionally high fine
for Mas'ud. Until the payment was completed
the Tamlm gave hostages who came forward of
their own accord. Lines from Farazdaq and
Jarir confirm this. Ahnaf, as on other occasions,
so notably on this one, performed in an unpre-
cedented manner the chief office of the Arab
Saiyid, namely the preservation of peace.1 Along
with him the wealthy Tamimite Yas b. Qat&da
gained a great reputation by taking upon him-
self the chief share of the debt of atonement
(Anon. Ahlw., 187).

In a few points Abft Ubaida is to be cor-
rected by fragments given by other narrators.
The flight of TJbaidullah did not immediately
follow upon the murder of Mas'M, in Shauw&l,
64 (455, 18). It rather appears from the verse
463, 5 that it was Mas'M himself who had him
taken to Syria. Wahb b. Jarir (456) says this
also, and likewise 'Awana (461), who even makes
UbaiduMh go to Syria in the middle of Jum&da

1 The merit of Ahnaf is really somewhat exaggerated, Ace. to
MadainJ (465, 5. 6) it was two Quraishites who were the mediators
for peace.

THE ARAB THIBET IN KHUftAsAN

II, 64,— 90 days after the death of Yazid. So
he was then not a silent spectator of the bloody
events, but was not there at all. And it was not
while he was still present that the choice of a
new Emir was made, — indeed an agreement
would hardly have lasted so long, — but only as
the result of the treaty of peace of the tribes
after the threatened rupture. Thus 'Aw&na, 463
says : "After the death of Mas'ftd and the settle-
ment of the dispute, the Basrians united and
first of all made Abdulmalik b. Abdill&h b.
'Amir, and then Babba, Emir, until Ibn Zubair
three months after appointed a stattholder for
them.0 It is thus also explained why Babba
in AbA Ubaida remains quite passive in face
of the intrusion of the Azd into the mosque and
the citadel, — just because he was not yet there
as Emir.

'Aw&na further says (461) that Ubaid-
ull&h, upon his flight, left Mas'M behind in
Basra as his representative. In any case tho
rise of Mas'ud took- place during the interregnum
after the flight of Ubaidull&h. He wanted to
usurp the vacant post of Emir (456, 16). He
did not march against the Tamim, but into the
citadel and the mosque, and ostentatiously took
the place of Emir in the pulpit, and from the
pulpit he was dragged down. The Tamlm had
driven away Ubaidull&h. The Azd would not
let them have the upper hand, but wanted to
53

100 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

have the say and thus the struggle arose. .From
this it is at once plain that Mas'ud acted on his
own initiative and in his own interest, and was
not brought to the step by the Rabia. The
tale of the box on the ear is quite a secondary
matter.

From *Awana the moral of the whole is
plain, — the attempt of one tribe and its head,
authorised perhaps by the late Emir, to put
itself at the head of the whole, was completely
ship-wrecked upon the opposition of the rival
tribe. Only the Quraish standing outside the
tribal system were eligible as Emirs. But
'Aw&na is wrong (461) in asserting that it was
some of the Khaw&rij, united with the Tamim
who dragged Mas'ud from the pulpit and slew
him. According to the others it was Persians
under M&h Afridun, more strictly the Asawira
(465) who for long had been allies of the Tamim.
TheKhawarij were the common foe to all the
tribes of Basra and the Tamim also, and it was
this danger more than anything that induced
them not to follow out the feud and to agree
upon an Emir. And the chosen Emir was
bound to resign soon just for the very reason
that he did not fulfil the end he was chosen for,
and did not seriously attack the Khaw&rij.
The account of Mad&ini is decisive (465).
According to it the Khaw&rij are smuggled in
by a historical forgery of the Azd. The Asd

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN

did not want to lie under the disgrace of having
had their prince destroyed hy the Tamim and of
having renounced revenge for a money-payment.
The remark of 'Awana (461, 10) that the Kha-
warij by whom Mas'M was killed dwelt on the
canal of the Asawira, betrays a bad conscience.

2. Thus the enmity between Azd and Tamim,
Yemen and Mudar sprang from a circumstance
fixed and datable, as is plain from the story just
related, a story which is important for that very
reason. The peace pact did not abolish the
variance. Two years after it was ready to break
out again when Mukhtar tried to make a rising
in Basra (Tab., 680ff.). But in the struggles
against the Khaw&rij, which had a salutary
effect, it changed into emulation ; the Tamim
would not be inferior to the Azd under
Muhallab. But if the tribal-feud abated in
Basra itself, it grew all the more dangerous in
Khuras&n, whither the tribe-relations of Basra
were transferred because its conquest was
achieved from there. The Khurasan Arabs were
Iraqites, mostly Basrians, and divided, like the
latter, for military purposes into five divisions.
The stallholder was, as a rule, dependent upon
the Iraq stattholder, but was frequently ap-
pointed by the Khalifa himself and occasionally
even placed immediately under the latter.

Khurasan was the storm-quarter of the
kingdom, reacting upon the centre far more

412 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

significantly than, say, Africa or Spain. It was a
province that was never pacified and never had
fixed boundaries. Here the Arabs were con-
stantly disputing with the Turks and Iranians,
but they employed the intervals to rend each
other. Exposed as they were, they still behaved
with exactly the sarno lack of policy as before
in their old home. They felt free and untram-
melled in the vast aud, to a great extent, desert
land, even although they had not come to it
altogether of their own accord. The external
danger did not unite them, but excited them
and made them savage, and even Islam only
increased the factors of discord and tumult.
Khur&s&n became a second Arabia, with this
difference, that it lay in enemy territory, had
vast and complicated connections, and permitted
anarchical tendencies to be more regardlessly
and unrestrainedly expressed. The narratives
of Mad&ini, which Tabari almost exclusively
follows in regard to affairs of Khuras&n, are in
places reminiscent of the epic narrative of the
past ages of Arabia which are familiar from the
Kitdb al-Aghdni. He often only gives a loose
tissue of tribal traditions, a collection of " Days "
(1516, 16), the chief interest lying in the heroic
or the rapacious. The Khur&s&n Arabs, and
especially the Tamim, stuck proudly to their
nationality and in the far East continued the
old tribal life and the old songs and sagas about

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 413

their own doings and experiences. But there is a
lack of the close and sober realism with which the
remains of the genuine old Arabism is stamped.
The conquest of the Iranian East, from
Basra, took place under the stattholdership of
the Umaiyid AbdullA.ii b. 'Amir in the time of
the Khalifa Uthm&n. It was a series of simulta-
neous att icks at different points. They were
not successful at one attompt and in one year;
generally pacts were made by which the Persian
Marzb&ns retained their old position with some
alterations and limitations. Side by side with
the greater campaigns under appointed leaders,
by whom the first blows were struck, there went
on an anonymous petty warfare in which the
tribes acted for themselves, so as to establish
themselves where they could. In the west,
where Abarshar (Nais&bftr) was the chief town,
the Qais were predominant, especially in the
later period (Tab., 1929). In the east the lands
of the Bakrites and the Tamimites were mixed
up; both tribes laid claim to some districts by
right of first possession, and they were competi-
tors not only in Khur&s&n but in Sajist&n as well.
These two neighbouring provinces belonged
together though they were frequently adminis-
tered separately, and the centre of gravity which
at first lay in Sajist&n was later on transferred
to Khur&s&n. The capital of Sajist£n was
Zarang ; that of Khur&sA,n Marw,

414 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

According to old custom, the army-leaders
were rewarded with the command of the districts
whose conquest they had successfully effected.
Ahnaf at that time also played a brilliant part in
military affairs, but did not long remain as
governor in the conquered territory. As tribal
prince of the Tamim of Basra, he was perhaps
too proud for that. The oldest stattholders of
Khur&s&n (or of parts of the land) of whom we
hear were Qais b. Haitham and Abdullah b.
Khazim, both of Sulaim, a Qaisite tribe. The
disorders after the murder of the Khalifa Uthman
found their echo even in the extreme cast of the
kingdom. The Marzb&n M&huya of Marw, the
betrayer of the last Shahanshfih, obtained from
All the right of making the Dihkans pay tribute
to him first of all, but in spite of this concession
he did not uphold the authority of All.1 How
the Arabian rule was re-established we do not
gather (of. Baladh., 409). Under Muawia, Qais
b. Haitham became stattholder again, and then
his rival Abdullah b. Khazim.2 When Ziad b.
Abihi came to Basra in A. H. 45, Khur&s&n and
Sajist&n also fell under his government, so that
he had to appoint the officials there. He

1 Simultaneously the Arabian Khabatat, who pretended to be
followers of Uthm&n (i.e. neutral), took possession of the capital of
Sajistan. They were only lubclued two years after by Alt's officer,
Husain b. Malik, after whom the famous Fcroz Husain, his Maula,
is named,

8 With Baladh., 408 cf. Tab,, 2, 65f.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 415

divided Khuras&n into four independent districts,
Marw, Abarshahr (Nais&bur), Marwrudh (with
Fariab and Taliqan) and Herat (with Badhaghis
Qadis and Bushang), but united them in A. H. 47
under Hakam b. Amr al-Ghifari, who died in
A. H. 50. He was succeeded by Rabi b. Ziad al-
Harithi, a tall, ruddy, wide-mouthed man, the
conqueror of Sajistan, who after a battle before
the gates of Zarang, had received the Marzb&ns
on the battlefield to make terms of capitulation,
he and his Arabs sitting at their ease upon the
bodies of the fallen. He was a pious Muslim and
grief over the execution of Hujr b. Adi is said to
have broken his heart. At that time there were
25,000 Basrians and 25,000 Kufaites settled in
Khurasan, probably not of the most peaceable type.
After Ziad's death (A. H. 53) the East seemed to
become an institution for the maintenance of his
sons. In the latter part of Muawia's time and
under Yazid I, Ubaidullah b. Ziad was governor
in Khur&s&n ; then, after an interval, Abdur-
rahm&n b. Ziad, and lastly Salm b. Ziad. In
Sajistan Abb&d b. Zi&d and Yazid b. Ziftd held
the government. These were all very young men,
and meanwhile the business was attended to by
the old officers and officials well versed in the
ways of the land, like Qais b. Haitham as Sulami,
Aslam b. Zur'a al-Kil&bi and others, who as a
matter of fact bore each other a grudge and
abused each other whenever they had the power,

416 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

With the death of Yazid the trihal disorders
began here also. Zunbll of K&bul rose up, slew
the stattholder Yazld b, Zi&d of Sajist&n and
took his brother Abft Ubaida prisoner. Talha
atTalah&t, the wealthy Khuz&ite, then took
Yazid's plaoe, concluded a peace with Zunbll
and ransomed the imprisoned Abfl. Ubaida for a
large sum. But he soon died and the Tamlm
would not submit to the Bakrite whom he left
as his successor, but turned him out, whereupon
the feud between the Mudar and Rabla broke
out and Zunbll took advantage of it (BAthlr, 4,
84. Bal&dh, 397). This reacted upon Khur&s&n.
Salm b. Zi&d, the governor there, attempted to
keep secret the deatli of the Khalifa and the
misfortune of his brothers (in Sajist&n and
Basra), and when this did not work any longer
he invited the Arabs to pay homage to him as
provisional Emir in the interregnum. They
did so, but soon renounced him and he took
to flight, leaving behind as his vice-gerent
the Azdite Muhallab, whom he had brought
with him from Basra. But the petty Arab
chiefs were not content with this. The
Bakrite Sulaim^n b. Marthad defied him
and obtained for himself the government of
MarwrMh, while he had to bestow Her&t upon
another Bakrite, Aus b. Tha'laba b. Zufar, and
when he did manage to depart for NaisftMr,
and there met Abdullah b. Kh&zim asSulami,

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 417

the latter called him to account for dividing up
Khurasan amongst the Bakr and Mazun (i.e.
Azd Um&n) and forced him to grant him a
patent as stattholder of the whole of Khur&s&n.
Muhallab retired from Murw as he had no tribe
to support him, for at that time the Azd were
not numerous in Khurasan. He left as his
representative a Tamimite, who certainly op-
posed Ibn Kh&zim in self-defence, but was
worsted in the struggle and died of his wounds
(Tab., 488-90).

The Tamim in general supported Ibn KM-
zim, who after all did not really belong to them
but to Mudar, and was hostile to the Bakr,1
and with them he now began the struggle
against the Bakr. He first of all marched from
Marw to Marwrudh against Sulaimfm b. Mar-
thad and killed him ; then against the latter's
brother Amr in Taliq&n and slew him as well.
The fugitives went to Herat to Aus b. Tha'laba.
Greatly incensed at the loss of Her&t, the
Bakrites in general now flocked to him and
wanted to expel all the Mudar from Khur&san,
Negotiations to which Ibn Khazim was forced
by the Tamim fell through, as he had foreseen :
"Habia always rages against God, since He has
raised up the Prophet from Mudar.53 The
battles before Her&t are said to have continued

Ace. to Bal&dh., 414 he was confirmed by Ibn Zubair.

53

418 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

over a year.1 The Bakr had the support of the
town behind them and in front were protected
by a ditch. They thus defied all the attacks of
Ibn KMzim,till he touched them on their honour,
calling to them, — " Ye want to have all Khurasan
to yourselves. Perhaps you think this ditch is all
Khurasan?'3 Moved by this they left their
strong position, were overcome in the open field
and suffered heavy losses. All the prisoners
amongst them who were brought in till sunset
had to pay the extreme penalty. Aus b. Tha'laba
escaped to Sajist&n which was then in the hands
of Zunbil, but died there of his wounds. This
tribal feud between Bakr and Tamim in the east
was contemporaneous with that between Kalb
and Qais in the west and took place in the year
61 or 65 (Tab., 490-96) ; the result of it was a
permanent weakening of the Bakr.

Ibn Khtizirn had subdued Herat with the
help of the Tamim, but all the same he did not
want them now to establish themselves there
as conquerors. He made over the town to his
young son Muhammad, appointed as his assist-
ant Bukair b. Wishah2 to be commander of

1 The episode in Tab., 493, 6—494, 17 (by Sulaiman b. Mujftlid,
a contemporary of Abu Mikhnaf, who is often quoted by him), does
not belong to this place, but to a much later period. On the other
hand, the tradition of AbulHasan alKhurasaul, 494, 18 - 495, 7, fills
in a blank in the main narrative of Madaini.

* He was likewise a Tamhnite and a Sa'dite at that. His being
called athThaqafi in Tab,, 495, 7 is an oversight. C/. 860, lOff, 1022, 1,
1030, 13. 20f. 1047, 18.

THEARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 119

the standing government troops, and charged
the latter not to admit the Tamim. Bukair
offered them a good sum of money to withdraw,
but this attempt to get rid of them had only
the effect of irritating them, They forced an
entrance into the town, bound Muhammad,
abused him and caroused the whole night, and
in the morning killed him. This was the
fashion in which they showed their friendship
to his father. Then they went to Marw, were
reinforced by tribal companions there arid made
Harish b. Hilal alQurai'i their supreme leader
in the feud against Ibn Khazim. For it was a
feud in the old style; battles were not fought,
but single champions, each one of whom was
of more value than a squadron, made sudden
attacks and encountered adventures. Zuhair b.
Dhuaib alAdawi (of Tamim) slew every one
whom he met on a tawny steed because his
brother Ash'ath was slain by an unknown rider
on a tawny steed, and consequently the colour
was disliked. This was characteristic of the
events of the war. When it became tedious the
Tamim dispersed and so lost their strength.
Shammas b. Dith&r alUt&ridi withdrew to Sajis-
tan (Tab., 546. 1026), Harish b. Hilal went to
MarwrMh and there for a while asserted
himself,1 but in the end had to retire from

1 In Tab., 598, 3 he says he slept for two years with a stone for
a pillow, and his hand under his head. It does not necessarily follow

420 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Khurasan (Tab., 593-98). Other Tamimites
under Zuhair b. Dhuaib betook themselves to
the caste of Eartami, not far from Marwrudh.
There they wore besieged by Ibn Khazim, forced
to surrender and executed without mercy (Tab.,
696-700). Peace then seems to have reigned
in Marw for a space, but a few years after he
had to fight against a new Tamimite rising in
Abarshahr, headed by Bahir b. Warqa as Sarimi
(596, 9). He entrusted Marw to Bukair b.
Wishah, but did not leave his son Mus& in the
capital for fear of the Tamimites there, but
ordered him to cross the Oxus with his valu-
ables and seek refuge in a fortress or with a
king. He then advanced against Abarshahr.
Whilst fighting there wiih Bahir, there reached
him, at the end of 72,1 a letter from Abdulmalik
promising to grant to him for a term of 7 years
the stattholdership of Khurasan, if he would
recognise him as Khalifa. This he merely re-
garded as an insult, since he wanted to rule
independently, and he made the messenger eat
the letter. Thereupon the Umaiyid offered the
stattholdership to the representative in Marw,
Bukair b. WishMi, who accepted it. Now Ibn

(695, 14) from this that he fought two years against Ibn KhSzim 5 he
may also have included the war against the Bakr, for even in A. II. 66
we find him outside of Khurasan. Cf. Chawarig, p. 34. He fell in
A. H. 82 (1066, 15).

1 ;A later date, Tab., 834f,

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN

Khazim could not withstand Bukair and Bahir
together, so he tried to reach his son Musa at
Tirmidh, but was overtaken by Bahir and fell
after an obstinate resistance, and as he died
spat in the face of Waki' Ibn adDauraqiya1
who despatched him. The stattholder Bukair
forcibly possessed himself of his severed head
and sent it to Abdulmalik, giving out that it was
himself who had overcome and slain the tyrant.
The real conqueror, Bahir, he ill-treated and
for a time thre^v into prison (Tab., 831-35).

This was the opportunity for a brothers'
feud among the Tarnlm themselves, especially
among the Sa'd Tamim who in Khurasan and
particularly in Marw preponderated still more
than in Basra, and to whom Bukair as well as
Bahir belonged. The Muqa'is and Butun took
the side of Bahir, the Aus and Abnii that of
Bukair, but as it became evident at last to the
Khurasan Arabs that they must lose the lord-
ship over the land, if it were not rescued from
their dispute for superiority and legitimised by
a higher authority, they begged Abdulmalik of
their own accord, in A. H. 74, for a Quraishite
as stattholder, who should stand above the
hatred and envy of the tribes. He sent a scion
of his house, Umaiya b. AbdiMh b. Kh&lid b.
Asld, a genial and liberal-minded man. When

1 So called after his mother, a prisoner of war, who came from
Dauraq in Khftzistan.

422 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the latter came to Abarshahr, Bahir received
him and tried to prejudice him against Bukair,
but did not succeed. TJmaiya confirmed the
appointment of all the officials of Bukair, and
offered to himself the chief command of the
standing government troops, and it was only
when the latter refused this post, which includ-
ed the representation of the stattholder5 that he
bestowed it upon his opponent (Tab., 859-62).

Bukair was angry at having to give way to
the Quraishite, and when the latter was absent
upon a campaign he used the opportunity to raise a
rebellion in Marw behind his back.1 The families
of the troops which were on service were in his
hands, and for that reason Umaiya, who marched
back in a hurry, entered upon friendly nego-
tiations with him. He paid his debts and gave
him 40 days' space of security to withdraw, if
he chose, into any town in Khurasan, but Bukair
remained in Marw and continued to stir up
strife. Umaiya took no account of the com-
plaints laid against him by Bahir until they were
confirmed from another quarter. He was then
arrested and in spite of his denial found guilty,
since the witnesses seemed incorruptible. He
was executed on a Friday with his own sword,
and the executioner must have been Bahir, since
there was no other who could say as he did it, —

* This could hardly be before A. H. 77, the last year of Umaiya.
With Tab., 1023 c/. 1028, 4f. as well as Battdh,, 416.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 423

" One of us two must die, if the Banft Sa'd is
to be at rest " (Tab., 1022-31).

1 he last act of the feud among the Banu
Sa'd did not come to an end, however, till A. H.
81. Seventeen men of the Abn&, the family of
Bukair, had conspired against Bahir, but they
did not act in concert, but each for his own
hand. One of them succeeded in an attempt
upon the life of Sa'sa'a b. Harb. He obtained
from Bahir '& relatives in Sajist&n a recom-
mendation to him, wormed himself into his
confidence, and then stabbed him with a dagger
tempered in asses* milk, in public before the
people, as was proper, with the exclamation, —
" This is the revenge for Bukair ! " He was
arrested and cheerfully suffered death. The
Abn&, who had come to him in prison to kiss
his head, made a great uproar at his execution
since he had only done his duty and exacted
legitimate revenge, but when the blood-money
for the executed man was paid to them, they
allowed themselves to be appeased after it had
long seemed as if the dispute between them and
the Butun were about to break out anew (Tab.
1047-51).

There was one remnant of the rebellion of
the Qaisite Abdull&h b. Kh&zim still unsup-
presscd ; a scion of his rule still held out for
12 years after his fall. His son MAs£, '* the
bearjlless," had escaped from Marw in the nick

424 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS ^

of time and had crossed the Oxus with a few
hundred men. Various attempts to find some-
where a place to settle were of no avail, and
at last he established himself in Tirmidh,
a little way from Balkh on the other bank of
the Oxus, actually in the citadel which stood on
a rocky promontory. The Qaisites gathered
round him till he had about 1,100 men as his
following. "With these he made raids in all
directions and the neighbours were filled with
deadly fear of him and his mounted devils. An
expedition which the stattholder Umaiya sent
against him failed, while his successor Muhallab
and his son Yazid left him unmolested. By the
addition of the scattered remnant of Ibn
Ash'ath's army his troops increased to 8,000
men and he began to make more extensive
expeditions, in which he was also supported
by two Iranian officers, who with their
following had come over to him from the
Arabian army, — Huraith b. Qutba and his
brother Thabit. They had previously had
relations with the native dynasties of the land,
especially with the Tarkhun of Samarkand,
and by their help got ready an army to
fight along with Mus& against the ruling
Arabs. But Mus& did not want to assist,
in an attack upon Tazld in Khurasan, but only
to drive out his officials from Transoxiana, and
they were thoroughly successful in purging

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 425

Transoxiana of all that was left of the Arab
sway, but it was Huraith and Th&bit who
distinguished themselves most in the business
and were in consequence so powerful that M&S&
was jealous of them. Then followed an in-
cursion of the Turks, with the Haital and
Tubbat, into Transoxiana. Mfts& had once
before successfully withstood an attack by them
and on this occasion also he powerfully drove
them back from Tirmidh, and then himself took
the offensive and inflicted a defeat upon them
near Kafi&n, which scattered them. On this
occasion Huraith b. Qutbi, fell, but that did
not distress Mus;\; he would willingly have
been rid of the other brother, Th&bit, as well.
A plot to assassinate him was, however, betrayed
to Th&bit by a spy and he fled to Khushwar&gh,1
where many Arabs and Iranians gathered
round him and the Tarkhun of Samarqarid came
to his aid with a great army. With united
forces the two now advanced before Tirmidh
and pressed Mfts£ desperately hard, but an Arab
Zopyrus contrived to sneak up to Th&bit and
murder him. Mus& then ventured upon a night
attack upon the enemy's camp and made them
retire, but not long after Mufaddal, Yazid's
brother and his successor as statt holder of
Khurasan, made an alliance with the Tarkhun

1 To be read thus ; c/. Tab., 1594, 9,

64

426 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

of the Soghd and the Sabal of the Khuttal
against him. In face of this coalition he could
not hold out and he was slain as he attempted
to escape. Tirmidh capitulated and the
captured warriors were executed. This took
place in the year 85.

3. During the time that the strength of
the Arabs of Khurasan was being spent in bloody
discord, the earlier conquests in Transoxiana1
were completely lost. The Turks, turning the
tables, dared to invade Khurasan, extending
their raiding excursions as far as Nais&b&r
(Bal., 415), and even after the return of peace
and order the old attacks were renewed. The
stattholder Umaiya was, after a long interval,
the first to march again across the Oxus, but
he was no warrior. By his shameful flight from
the Kharijite Abft Pudaik he had spoilt his
position in Iraq and he did not regain it in
Khurasan. After successes to begin with (Bal.,
426, lOf.) he at last suffered a decisive defeat,
was hard put to it to get himself and his army
safely over the Oxus, and drew upon himself
the sarcastic line, " Whoever named him ' the
little girl ' (Umaiya) hit the mark ! " The result
was that he had to resign in A. H. 78. Hajj&j

1 Expeditions across the Oxus were undertaken before this under
Ibn 'Amir. They were repeated by Ubaidullah b. Ziad who brought a.
band of Bukharite prisoners with him to Basra ; also by his successor,
Said b, Uthman, who was murdered by his Soghdian servants, and
by Salm b. Ziad, whose wife bore him a son in Samarqancl.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 427

appointed in his place the Azdite Muhallab, after
Khurasan and Sajistan had been put under him
in addition to Iraq. The latter had subdued the
Khawarij in Karm&n in the middle of 78, but
did riot come in person to Marw till A.H. 79. In
Transoxiana he did not follow in the steps of
his predecessor. In his last year he besieged
the town of Kish, but in vain/ and he was glad
to accept the inhabitants' pledge of a money
payment on consideration of his withdrawal.
On the way home he died in Z&ghul, near
Marwrudh, in Dhulhijja, 82 (Jan., 702). He
did not add to his renown in war in Khurasan,
but in spite of this his coming there was of
great importance. He brought with him his
tribe, which till then had fought under him
against the Khawarij.2 The Azd also made
alliances in Khurasan with the Bakr and Rabia,3

1 Madaini twice tells of the siege of Kish in the same circum-
stances, under A. H. 80 and A, H. 82 (Tab., 1040 ff. and 1077 ff.). Tho
chronological difference may be coiiKidered adjusted from the fact
that tho siege is said to have lasted two years (from the middle of 80
till 82).

* The poets Thabit Qutna and Ka'b alAshqari, both of Azd,
came to Khurasan from Fars and Karrnan, the scene of the wars
against the Khawari'j. To be sure individual Azditcs might well
have settled there earlier, but it was through Muhallab that the tribe
first reached eminence there. In the earlier feud between Tamim
and Bakr we do not see any trace of the alliance of the Azd and
Bakr.

3 Concerning the numerical proportion of the divisions (Akhrnas)
see Tab,, 1291. The Tamim gave 10,000 men to the army, the Azd
10,000, the Qais (Ahl alAlia) 9,000, the Bakr 7,000, the Abdulqais

428 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

and thus the Mudar (Tamlm and Qais) lost their
superiority, so long, at least, as the stallholder
at the same time threw the weight of his
official position on the other side.

As head of his mixed family and his pro-
visional successor in office, Muhallab named his
son Yazid, who was confirmed by Hajj&j.
Yazid fought in Farghana and Khw&rizm, and
also on this side of the Oxus in Badhaghis, but
without any success, or at least any that lasted.
He was certainly enterprising, in spite of his
luxury and corpulence, but ambitious and
imperious rather than capable of execution.
He felt his dependence upon Hajjftj all the
more painfully since he was the head of the
Azd and the latter parvenu was a Qaisite.
He was very unwilling to mete out the
fitting punishment to the Irnqite rebels, who,
after the defeat of Ibn Ash'ath, fled into
his province. Of the ringleaders who fell into
his hands he let the Yemenites go and only
delivered up the Mudar. Hajjaj was not
deceived about his sentiments, aad in Rabi II,
85 (April, 701) he deposed him and put in his
place Mufaddal b. Muhammad, who was plotting
against his half-brother Yazid. He would in
reality have preferred to withdraw the province

4,000. The total in round numbers is 40,000 men capable of bearing
arms ; so the total number of the Arabs in Khurasan can hardly hare
amounted to more than 200,000.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 429

altogether from the rule of the Muhallabids and
the Azd, but he dared not, so long as M&S& b.
Ibn Kh&zim still held his position in Tirmidh
andTransoxiana — at least people assumed so, and
not without reason. Muhallab and Yazid were
convinced that a Qaisite stattholder was not
desirable in opposition to M&S&, since M&s£
himself was a Qaisito and had the sympathies
of the Qais on his side, so they spared him as a
useful foe, so as not to make themselves super-
fluous by his removal. But Mufaddal swerved
from this domestic policy and used severity
against MAs&, and thus, in fact, sawed off the
branch he sat on. For as soon as he had got
the better of Mftsft he was removed from his
post, after being in possession of it nine months.
Habib b. Muhallab and Abdulmalik b. Muhallab,
too, were dismissed from their offices and Yazid
himself put in prison. As stattholder of Khura-
san Qutaiba was now (A.H. 85 or 86) appointed ;
he was a son of Muslim b. Amr of Basra, who
was faithfully devoted to the Umaiyid rule. Thus
the preponderance in Khurasan of the Azd-Eabia,
who a poliori were called the Yemen, was
broken ; the Arabs at the time of Qutaiba were
called simply the Mudar (Tab., 1185, 5). He
himself belonged to the scattered and unimport-
ant tribe B&hila, which stood outside the large
groups and occupied a low place in the ethnic
genealogy, but in the circumstances allied

430 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FAtL

himself with the Qais.1 Hajjaj was glad that
Qutaiba had not a powerful house at his back
and had to rely on the government for support.

Before Qutaiba b. Muslim the districts which
lay beyond Khurasan to the north and east had
been only partially taken in and subdued only
in a very cursory fashion, as we recognise from
the story of Mus& b. Ibn Kh&zim. He was at
least the first to set on foot a real conquest.
For a better comprehension of his campaigns
we may here find space for a few brief geogra-
phical and ethnological remarks concerning the
Thaghran, i.e. the two boundaries of Khurasan.

The one was Tukharist&n, the old Bactria.
It is, properly speaking, the mountainous coun-
try on both sides of the middle Oxus as far as
Badakhsh&n. Tab., 1180, 7 includes also Shftman
and Akhrun, but usually only the country south
of the Oxus is understood under this name.
The Arabs reckoned it virtually in the territory
of MarwrMh, their most easterly army town, for
their occupation of Balkh (Baktra) had not been
of long duration, though Balkh was, never-
theless, the capital of the country. In the zone
of Balkh were situated, further east, Khulm,
T&liq&n, E&ri&b and other towns. Further
south, and higher up the Paropamisus (Ghftr)
lay the districts of JAzj&n or JAzistan and

1 So also in Mesopotamia, cf. Tab., 1300, BAthir, 4,256 ff., and
above, p. 201, n. 1.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 431

Gharshistan or Gharjist&n (with B&mi&n com-
manding the pass). Further west was Bfrdha-

O - ' • A /

ghis between the valleys of the Marghab and
the Harirftdh ; to the south-east were Ghaznin
and W&lisht&n, which belonged rather to
K&bulist&n and Sajistan.

The other and far more important boundary
of Khurasan was M&war&nahr, i.e., Transoxiaria.
Taken in its broader sense it includes as its
eastern part, Khuttal&n, the mountainous region
of the Khuttal (Salzgebirg 1596), stretching
westwards from Badakhsh&n to the river (Wakh-
sh&b1). Then comes SagMni&n, the land of the
Sagh&n ; 2 further west, between Tirmidh on the
Oxus and Samarqand on the Polytimetus are
the towns of Shftman and AkhrAn, and then
Kish and Nasaf . The last two are, in Maqdisl,
267, 282 ff., included with Sagh&nian, but are
usually .regarded as belonging to Sogdiana.
Sogdiana is the land of the Soghdon both sides
of the lower Polytimetus, " the river of the
Soghd," which disappears in the oasis of Bukh&~
r&, without quite reaching the Oxus.3 The old
capital is Samarqand, and by the Soghd are

1 Now Surghab. In Wakhsh-ab is preserved the name Oxus,
which is no longer used of the main stream.

2 The king is called Saghan-khudah, Tab. 1596. 1600 ff. - ,

3 Now called Zarafshan. The name Polytimetus is incompre-
hensible j Polytmetus would be more suitable, since the river is cut
up .into mere canals. The ancient irrigation-system of this country
is equal to any in magnificence and fame. •

432 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

chiefly understood the inhabitants of the town
and district of Samarqand. To the east of
Scgdiana, on the one side lies the mountainous
UshrAsana, on the narrow upper course of the
Poly time! us; on the other side, to the north of
the mountains, lie Sh£sh and Fargh&na on the
Jaxartes at the crossing into the territory of
the Turks. The lower course of the Oxus, from
where it bends towards the north, goes through
deserts till it at last forms the oasis of Khwft-
rizm. The main crossing on this stretch is at
Amul, on a bridge of boats.

The population, the language and the
industry1 in this fairly extensive region was
Iranian. In politics there was a great amount
of division, which cannot only have set in since
the fall of the Sasanid kingdom. Under the
aristocracy of the Dihq&ns the ruling dynasties
soared above the simple nobility, landed proprie-
tors and bailiffs in the villages. Everywhere in
the isolated districts and larger towns we find
hereditary princes with their own peculiar titles.2
The titles are partly Aryan, but non- Aryan titles
are to be found as well. For the much scattered

1 Besides the culture of the ground which wag established upon
a rational management of the water, trade (in skins, silk, water
(weapons ?), slaves) was very important ou the road to Sina,

8 Frequently Khudah ; in Khwarizm, Shah ; in Balkh, Ispadbadh ;
in Farghana, Ikhshed ; in Gharshistan, Shor. On the other hand,
Ikhrtd and Wik in Kish, Ashkand in Nasaf, Afahln in Uahrusana aro
actual proper names.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 433

Iranians had not remained purely Iranian and
unsubdued ; in Paratacene the Khuttal settled
over their heads. Their king is called the Sabal,1
and they are apparently identical with the old
Hephthalites, the Haital. The latter had once
been supreme in all Transoxiana, which Maqdisi
therefore simply calls " the land of the Haital."
At the time with which we are concerned they
had, however, fallen back behind the Turks.
The Turks had their real seat east of the Jaxartes,
but by means of raids which they made
from there to very great distances, they had
gained a footing in many of the Iranian towns
round about, and there founded dynasties and
levied tribute from the district. The Turkish
title Tarkhtin or Tarkh&n is found on the far side
as well as on the near side of the Oxus, and
denotes a prince who is under the protection of
the Khaq&n.2

In Transoxiana and Tukh&rist&n the real
rulers at that time were the Turks. It was
really with them that the Arabs had to fight, at
least in the last resort. They drove them back
out of Khurasan and put a stop to their raiding
expeditions. In Transoxiana and Tukh&rist&n,

1 If it is not a proper name, c/. Jaish (Hanash) b. Sabal.

2 Tab. 3,647: the Khaqan and his Tarkhans, cf. the RtibkhAn
of Rub, the Tfaik (Tarsal) of Fariab, the Sahrak (Sahrab) of Taliqan,
the Shadh—a,\\ in Tukhftristan. The overlord of the Turks is always
called the Khaqan, as if there were only one.

434 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

in the matter of the lordship over the
Iranian population, they competed successfully
with them, but even they were content with a
superficial subjection. They everywhere left
the local authorities in power and demanded
only one tribute, which bore the distinctive
name of "Fidya," i.e. the ransom paid to escape
a declaration of war and pillage. If the tribute
were withheld, — which might easily happen, the
hostilities then began anew, and as a matter of
fact the Arabs were not always sorry to have
once more the opportunity for plundering ex-
cursions.

Even through Qutaiba there did not come
about any systematic change, but for all that he
extended the Arab power over the boundaries far
more effectively than had hitherto been the case.
Year after year he undertook expeditions ; every
spring the contingents from Abarshahr, Abiward
and Sarakhs, from Her&t and Marwrftdh, came
voluntarily to the campaign. In A.H. 86 he led an
expedition, already set on foot by his predecessor
(after the conquest of Tirmidh), against Akhrtin
and Shftm&n. The king agreed to the payment
of tribute. In the following years he turned his
attention to the towns of the oasis of Bukh£r&. In
A.H. 87 and 88 he conquered Baikand, Tumush-
kath and R&mlthana. In Baikand, an industri-
al town with large warehouses,1 he seized a rich

* JJUas Nis, (under A.H. 87) must mean this town,

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURisAN 435

supply of weapons and with it fitted out his
Arabs, who till then were poorly armed, possess-
ing altogether only 300 shirts of mail (1180,
15). In A.H, 89 and 90 he reduced Bukhara
itself, under the pressure of Hajj&j, who had
himself furnished a map of the district and
sketched out the plan of campaign. In A.H. 91
he had his work cut out for him in Tukh&ristan
suppressing a widespread rebellion, the moving
spirit of which was the Tarkhan Naizak. He
lured him out of the fortress near Iskemisht '
to which he had betaken himself, and treacher-
ously put him to death with other Tarkhans and
Dihqans. Then he crossed the Oxus and
conquered the town of Shuman whose king had
likewise taken part in the Tukharian rebellion,
continued his march through the Iron Gate,2
reduced Kish and Nasaf,3 arid set up a new
government in Bukhara under pretext of neces-
sary executions. In A.H. 92 he was in Sajistan
and is said to have forced Zunbil of Kabul to
pay tribute. In A.H. 93 he invaded Khwarizm
quite unexpectedly, being invited to do so
privately by the Shah himself, and at first took

1 Istakhri, 275. The town is situated a little north of Lat. 36,
and slightly east of Long. 69, and on English maps is called Ishkemish.
Cf. Marquart, Eranshahr (1901), p. 219.

2 This is the name of a famous narrow pass on an arm of the riyer
now called Kashka, described in Reclus, 6,502,

8 By Fariab in Tab., 1229, 3 Firiab is meant ; cf. 1566, 3,

436 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the side of the latter against his younger brother,
but later on drove him out and established an
Arab regime in the land. From Khwarizm he
marched to Samarqand, keeping his troops as
long as possible in the dark as to their goal.
The Tarkhun of that place had purchased peace
from him in A.H. 91, but because of this humilia-
tion he was overthrown by his own subjects
and driven to suicide, and IkhshM Ghiizak had
succeeded him. This afforded Qutaiba a wel-
come opportunity to interfere, and after a long-
drawn-out siege a capitulation was made.
Ghftzak pledged himself to pay tribute ; Qutaiba
was to march into Samarqand and hold divine
service in a newly-erected mosque and then
evacuate the town immediately. But after he
was once in he did not evacuate it, but
turned it into an Arab garrison town and a
point of vantage for his further conquests.
From there, in the last three years of his statt-
holdership (A.H. 94-96) he penetrated into the
upper Zarafshan valley as well as into Sh&sh
and Fargh&na ; he is actually said to have got
as far as Kashgar and to have come into contact
with the Chinese.1 The accounts of Mad&ini in
Tabari and Bal&dhurl agree in essentials, except
that the latter says nothing about Sajistan and

1 Cf. the verses in Tab., 1279f. 1302, 8, and the account of Bal.,
426, 18.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 437

Kashgar. They are also repeatedly confirmed
by contemporary songs.1

As a rule Qutaiba also left the native dynas-
ties in power on payment of tribute, only
manifold Arab inspectors or bailiffs were set
over them. But a few very important places
were still, — if we may express it in a Roman
fashion — colonised, i. e. selected as seats of
Arabism and Islam, even though the former
inhabitants were not driven out, and here even
retained a certain self-government under the
old authorities, who in particular had the allot-
ment and collection of the taxes. Scimarqand
in particular was intended to become an Arab
headquarters. A strong garrison entered with
war-gear of every kind, the fire-houses and
idols' temples were destroyed ; it is alleged that
no heathen dared remain over-night in the
town. Similar, but apparently not quite so
drastic, measures were taken in Khwarizm and
in Bukhara. In Bukhara also heathendom was
suppressed, for to the statement that there was

1 The most important poets of Khurasan aro Thahit Qutna alAzdt
(Agh., 13, 49ft'.), Ka'b alAshqart alAzdi (Agh., KJ, 56ff.)i Ntihar b.
Tausi'a alBakri (Agh,, 14, 115), Y/md alA'jatn Alaula of the Abdulqais
(Agh., 14, 102ff.), Mughira 1>. Ilabna at Tanitml (Agh., 11, lG2ff.).
Several others, otherwise unknown, are mentioned in Tab. only.
Farazdaq, Kumaifc and Tirrirnfih also occasionally touch upon Khurasan
affairs. The poets always take the side of their clans, and their in-
terest and judgment are influenced accordingly, in spite of Nah&r b.
Tausi'a in the Kami], 538, 15. They are therefore to be used with
caution, though they are valuable enough witnesses for the bare facts.

438 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

a fire-house there and also a sanctuary, in which
peacocks were kept, it should be added that for
the future these establishments vanished.1
These towns were to become for their surround-
ings what the Arab army-towns Naisabur,
Marw, Marwrudh and Herat were for Khurasan,
and their colonisation was doubtless a great
step beyond anything attempted and carried
through in that district before. The permanent
result of it was that Bukhara, Samarqand and
even Khwarizm became important nurseries of
Islam and of Arabian learning.

The enthusiasm of the Arabs over their
successes, as it finds expression in numerous
songs, was not unjustified. The struggle was not
made an easy one for them. They were deficient
in numbers and at the beginning badly armed.
The long distances, the difficulty of the ground
and the climatic conditions put great impedi-
ments in their path. They had to take with
them stores and warm clothing, and could only
carry on the campaign in the better season
of the year. The enemy were not contemp-
tible. In most cases great armies, often from
long distances, came to the help of those
who were besieged. These armies were led
by Turks and to a large extent were composed

1 We must bear in mind that the conversion of the Iranian sub-
jects to Islam was in general not demanded, but that they were freely
allowed to continue their own cult.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 439

of Turks. In fact the Arabs were fighting
with the Turks for the hegemony in these
regions, and wrested it from them. That was
a feat indeed, and a just title to their lordship
over the Iranians, who had not been able to
defend themselves against the Turks. A great
share of the merit is probably to be ascribed to
the leader, Qutaiba, who far excelled his pre-
decessors, and the great men of Iran had far
more respect for him than for Muhallab and
Yazid. In war he certainly behaved cruelly
and treacherously ; for the sake of God, i. e. for
the benefit of Islam, he did not shrink from
treachery, and pretty often it was his unscru-
pulousness which he had to thank for his suc-
cesses, but in this he was not very different from
the general run of Arab commanders.

The fall of Qutaiba took place when he was
at the height of his fame and power, and the
event made a great stir in the Islamic world.
Mad&ini, in his detailed account of it, has also
borrowed pieces of a narrative of Abu Mikhnaf.
The Khalifa Waltd I died in the middle of Jumftd&
II, 96, (end of Feb., 715). His successor
Sulaim&n hated Hajj&j and his adherents, who
had wanted to exclude him from the succession.
Death removed Hajjaj from his vengeance,
but he was able to wreak it upon Qutaiba,
against whom he was specially incited by Yazid
b. Muhallab and Abdullah b. Ahtam. Qutaiba

440 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

received the tidings of the change of govern-
ment when he was in the field with the army
in Fargh&na. He knew that deposition and
worse were threatening him and did not mean
to suffer quietly anything that might happen to
him, but it was some time before he made a
decision what to do.1 The plan to return to
Samarqand, establish himself there and only
keep with him those warriors who offered them-
selves voluntarily, he rejected, and decided to
carry the whole army with him in the rising
against the Khalifa. In the mosque of
Fargh&na he explained to the representatives of
the army who he was and who Sulaim&n and
Yazld were, and invited them to side with
him. They were at the end of that year's
campaign 2 and longing for wife and children,
and did not show much zest for an undertaking
which looked so far in advance and was so
dangerous, so they made no response at all.
Qutaiba had not expected this, and at once lost

1 He is said to have sent three letters to Sulaiman, but did not
wait for an answer. Sulaiman's messenger was only at Hulwan
when he heard the news of his insurrection. Of the two letters of
Sulaiman mentionpd in Weil, 1, 555f.» there is ro mention in Tab.;
Qutaiba is falsely represented in these as still present in Marw, and
under orders to set out for Fargbana. The Bahilites who appear here
in Madaini rather frequently as representatives of a special tradition,
try to whitewash their tribal companion, Qotaiba ; e.g. Tab., 1311.

a The news of Wai? el's death could hardly reach FarghSna before
July, and then some more time passed before Qutaiba came forward
with his scheme.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 441

his equanimity. Still standing in the pulpit,
he broke out into abusive reproaches against the
different tribes and recalled every shameful
thing that was said of them, not sparing a
single one, and even when he had descended
from the pulpit he would not be appeased by
his relatives, but repeated the insults in the
most violent manner.

He thus gave offence to one and all of the
Arabs in the army, who were accustomed to
wipe out such a disgrace by bloodshed. They
secretly set on foot negotiations to mutiny
against the arch-traitor. The Azd, who hated
him from the beginning as the supplanter of the
Muhallabids, and were most deeply insulted by
him, made an agreement with their allies the
Rabia and offered the leadership to the Bakrite
Hudain b. Mundhir, but he was afraid of
competing with the powerful Tamlm : Cl They
will, inspite of everything, stick to Qutaiba, if
the rising against him emanates from us." Thus
the first step was left to the Tamlm. They were
angry with Qutaiba because of his behaviour
towards the BanA Ahtam, who belonged to them.
He had, indeed, years before, during his cam-
paign against Bukhara, left Abdull&h b. Ahtam
behind as his substitute in Marw. The latter
had seized the opportunity to intrigue with
Eajj&j against him, but had fared badly and
had been compelled to flee to Syria to Sulaimftn,
56

442 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

who at that time was still the prospective heir-
apparent. Qutaiba had then made his brothers
and cousins pay the penalty in his stead, there-
by calling down the revenge of the Tamim upon
himself.1 He had, besides, personally insulted
their leader Wakl b. Hass&n b. Abl SAd,8 by
ascribing to his own brother in an official report
the honour of gaining a great victory over the
Turks, an honour due to the former, and again
by taking away from him the command of the
Tamlin division and giving it to a Dabbite.
Wakl headed the mutiny. The Iranian Haiy&n
anNabatl8 supported him, a man who, for
obvious reasons, nursed a deep hatred of
Qutaiba (Tab., 1 253). He was a dangerous man
in an influential central position, and through
the Iranian servants had connections on all sides
with the Arab masters so that he learned and
knew everything, and was versed in conspiracy
in a fashion quite different from the Arabs.
He was particularly important as the leader of
the Maw&ll, i.e. the Iranians who had embraced
Islam, who served in a corps of their own in the
Arab army. They were personally devoted to
Qutaiba, but Haiy£n managed to alienate- them

1 Bal., 425f. Agh., 13, 01. Tab., 817, 1309f., 1312.

• He must not be confused with the man of the same name, the
murderer of Ibn Khflzim, who, to bo sure, was also a Taraimite, but
cf another family.

* He was called a Nabataean only on account of his imperfect
pronunciation of the Arabic (Tab., 1201).

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURlSlN 44S

from him by making it clear to them that the
internal dispute of the Arabs was no concern of
theirs since it was not waged for Islam.

Qutaiba at first regarded the warnings he
received as envious calumnies, but at last it
struck him that Wakl was never showing face
in his presence, and he summoned him to come
before him. When the latter feigned illness,
painted his foot red and bound a cord with
amulets round his calf, he ordered him to be
fetched by force. But when the order was to
be carried out, Waki cut off the magic cord and
sprang as he was from his sick-bed into the
saddle. He rode off all alone, but in a very
short time had enough men about him to be
able to attack Qutaiba. The latter was only
joined by his brothers, his few tribal cousins
from Bi\hila, and some other trusty men. The
Iranians under Haiy&n, upon whom he thought
he could rely, went over to the aggressors.
Again Qutaiba changed from defiance to despair ;
he was as if paralysed. His horse reared and
would not let him mount. Sitting on a chair in
front of the fortress of Fargh&na, he awaited in
the evening the certain issue of the struggle
with resignation. His brothers and helpers fell
and even he himself was slaughtered; an Azdite
cut off his head. He had been deceived in the
expectation that he could carry the army with
him. If he had had a tribe or a powerful

444 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

family at his back it would perhaps have
fallen out differently (1659, 4ff.), but that was
not the case. The B&hila were too weak, and
the Qais whom he had held by abandoned him
just as did the Iranians. Even the power of an
over-mastering idea availed him nothing; he
only wanted to make himself and his position
secure. To stand by a man, however capable,
who was only officially connected with them,
against the authority which sanctioned his
position, was a course that the Arabs would not
easily follow, as Ubaidull&h b. Zi&d in Basra
had already experienced. Where they miscal-
culated was in thinking they could carry pn the
government in their provinces independently of
the Khalifate. A stattholder, who was not head
of a tribe as well, could do nothing without, and
nothing against, the Khalifa ; personal prowess
was not sufficient. The Iranian princes, indeed,
could not understand the conduct of the Arabs
towards Qutaiba ; they regarded it as suicide,
and they were so far right, for by his fall the
rule of the Arabs over the boundaries which he
had founded was severely shaken.

According to Tabarl, the catastrophe took
place in A.BL 96; B. Qutaiba makes it not till
the beginning of 97. Waki, recognised by the
tribes as the provisional successor of Qutaiba,
demanded his head, and when the Azdite who
had it, at the instigation of his tribe refused to

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHUKAsAN 4*5

hand it over, he pointed to a pole and said, —
" The horse there (i.e. the gallows) wants to
have a rider." This was effective, and he then
sent the bloody trophy to the Khalifa, but not
through Tamimites, — they were too much on his
side for that. His inaugural address in the
mosque 1 consisted only of a few drastic pro-
verbs and verses, which, however, served to
express his meaning. In conclusion he said, —
" The Marzb&n has raised the price of corn ; to-
morrow in the market the bushel costs 4
dirhams — not more, on penalty of death." By
the Marzb&n he appparently indicated Qutaiba
as an alien grandee after the Iranian fashion.2
He himself turned out an Arab of the old stamp.
He was strict with Islam, but hated the punish-
ment of flogging, which the Qoran allots to
certain transgressions, and preferred to sentence
a drunkard to death at once. He also executed
an Arab who had robbed the body of one of the
Bahilites who fell with Qutaiba, and expressly
forbade such deeds. His actions were done
en grand seigneur. The Khalifa Sulaiman con-
firmed his position at first, but 9 or 10 months
after Yazid b. Muhallab took his place without,
however, having to resign his former province,
Iraq. Unlike Qutaiba, Yazid had a tribe behind

1 But of Marv, not of Fargh&ua.

' There was, indeed, a proper Maizban in Marw, who probably
controlled the policing of the market.

446 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

him, a fact which was borne in mind. With
him the Azd returned to the leadership and the
emoluments, the Tamlm were repressed, and
Wakl abused. Moreover he also brought with
him Syrian government troops, and so intro-
duced them into Khurasan, from which Hajj&j
had designedly kept them away (1257) by
employing them exclusively in India. As usual
he filled up all the posts with his sons and
relatives. He was at home in Khurasan, felt
freer there than in Iraq and had better oppor-
tunities for theft and extortion. He required the
money for his expensive necessaries, e.g. for
beautiful maidens, and he kept up a great
display.

Before this, whenever there had been any
mention before Sulaim&n of the great deeds of
Qutaiba, Yazid is said to have always objected
that Jurj£n was still untouched, although it
barred the way to Khurasan. Indeed the moun-
tainous country to the south-east of the Caspian
Sea obtruded somewhat inconveniently upon
the Muslim territory. Yazid, however, was
induced to attack it not so much as a duty which
honour demanded, as because of an opportunity
which offered. In Jurj£n a dispute for the
throne was in progress. The prince Feroz had
fled from his cousin, the Marzb&n, who was in
alliance with the Turk Sftl in Dahist&n, and
came to Yazid and asked his help. In the spring

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 44?

of the year 98 ! the latter set out with an ex-
ceptionally large army, the smaller proportion
of which were Khurasanites and the greater
Iraqites and Syrians. Without striking a hlow,
he re-instated Peroz in Jurj&n, and after he was
received, lured Sftl with his Turks from the
mountains into the marshland where he got him
into his power, and he is said to have slain
14,000 prisoners and gained uncountable spoil.
After the subjection of Dahistftn and Baifts&n
he advanced upon the Ispahbadh of Tabarist&n,
whose peace proposals he rejected thinking he
would gain more by a forcible conquest. But
he suffered a severe defeat, and at the same time
found himself threatened in the rear by a rising
in Jurj&n. Haiy&n an Nabati then made his
appearance as mediator. He represented him-
self to be a compatriot of the Ispahbadh and
induced him to forego his momentary advantage
in favour of a far-sighted policy, to suspend
the struggle and pledge himself to the payment
of the sum which he had before offered for peace.

1 The year 08 is given. That the campaign was begun in spring,
which fell in the second half of the year, is a matter of course. It
cannot have lasted beyond the autumn, and in autumn there was the
change of Khalifate which resulted in the fall of Yazid. If this
is so, then the siege of Sul cannot have lasted six months, and that of
the Mar z ban cannot have taken seven. On the other hand it is pro*
bably correct that Yazid marched out three cr four months after his
arrival in Khurasan. This then happened in the year 98, the first half
pf the year, but he had sent his son Muhallab on in advance.

448 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Relieved from his predicament, Yazld now turn-
ed back to Jurj&n where the Marzb&n had
again arisen, and after a lengthy siege took
possession of the mountain fastness in which the
latter was defending himself. To fulfil an oath
of vengeance he caused the blood of the ex-
ecuted prisoners to flow into a brook, and ate
bread made from the flour of the mill driven
by this water. Then he triumphantly reported
to Sulaim&n his success, which in reality was
anything but brilliant, and in any case quite
ephemeral, and declared the fifth of the spoil,
which was to be handed over to the Khalifa, at
4 or 6 million dirhams, thus preparing for him-
self the fate he deserved, for when Sulaim&n
died in Saf ar, 99, in the same summer l in which
the campaign took place, his successor Urnar II
recalled the perverse fellow and cast him into
a debtors' prison, since he was unable to pay
the specified amount of the fifth.

4. In Khurasan the Azd had come into pro-
minence with the Muhallabids, and with them
they fell again into obscurity, retiring into the
background and the opposition. Indeed, the
reaction made by Umar II against the partial-
ity of his predecessor was only that of complete
neutrality towards the tribes, and he showed
himself not unfriendly to the Azd although he

1 Sepr., 717. The change of the year from A.H. 98 to A. H. 99 was
in the middle of August, 7l7.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 449

put an end to their hegemony by deposing their
leader. But with his successor there set in a
party reaction against the party-government of
Sulaim&n, particularly after the suppression of
the great rebellion which the Muhallabids had
stirred up in Iraq. Yazid II made vengeance upon
the Muhallabids and their following the chief
motive of his reign, and the Azdites of Khurasan
were also made to feel it although they had not
taken part in that rebellion at all. They were
expelled from all offices, their chiefs were abused,
and the Bahilites were allowed to take revenge
for Qutaiba upon them. The Mudar again got
the supremacy, with the Tamtm at their head,
but for all that the stattholder was never chosen
from the Tamim, though frequently his assist-
ant, the commander of the standing government
forces, was. But the stattholders belonged al-
most always to the Qais, who, since Hajj&j,
played the rulers. The Qaisite stattholders,
however, were not prevented by their tribal and
party community from enmity and ill-will to-
wards each other. The general rule was that
the successor abused his predecessor and extort-
ed money from him under the pretext of requir-
ing a statement of accounts, and he behaved
similarly to the latter's subordinate officials as
well. That was the Arab form of ministerial res-
ponsibility. The constant, abrupt, and absolute
change of government hindered any continuity.

57

450 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

The government was a purely personal thing
and was equivalent to robbery, which was
to benefit its possessor as speedily as possible
or, as it was expressed, to be <c devoured/' In-
deed this was the case not only in Khurasan,
but it was there that it went on most shame-
lessly, and there it was most dangerous, because
in this exposed province more than anywhere,
a firmly established goverment was necessary.
Under these circumstances, the conquests of
Qutaiba very soon became insecure and had to
be constantly repeated. Certainly the strong
buttresses of Arabism and Islam in Sogdiana
which the latter had founded, especially Samar-
qand and Bukhara, were maintained, and the
process of Islamisation continued there, but from
that very fact there unexpectedly appeared for
the rule of the Arabs a new mischief which grew
and consumed everything around it.

The stattholder sent to Khurasan by Umar II
in place of Yazid, namely Jarr&h b. Abdillah
alHakaml, was a man of Hajjaj's school.
He undertook an expedition against the Khutt&l
in Paratacene, who so far had scarcely been
attacked at all, and seat a report of it to the
Khalifa. Among the messengers was the pious
Ab& Saida adDabbi, who although an Arab1
felt impelled, from religious reasons, to put in

1 He understood no Persian (1507). The fact that he was a
Maula does not make him an Iranian.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURAsAN 451

a good word for the Iranians who had embraced
Islam. He said they were represented in great
numbers in the army and yet received no pen-
sion ; they were zealous Muslims and yet had
to pay the subject-tax. Umar ordered a change
to be effected here, and when Jarr&h attempted
to stem the rush to Islam which now resulted l
by requiring circumcision, he deposed him after
he had put in nearly a year and a half of his term
of office, in Ramadan 100 (April, 719). In his
place he appointed the gentle Abdurrahm&n b.
Nuaim alGh&midi, who was certainly an Azdite,
though he did not belong to the Azd Uman, i.e.
to the Azdite party in Khurasan, and chose to
assist him as tax-supervisor a Qaisite, the ener-
getic Abdurrahman b. Abdillah alQushairi.
Ibn Nuaim still remained in office for
a while after Umar's death, but in A. B . 102
was replaced by Said Khudhaina,2 an Umaiyid
prince, who, commissioned by the Khalifa
Yazid II, brought pressure to bear upon the Azd
and treated them as enemies. Towards the
Iranians he behaved with indulgence, at least
in the conduct of war with the Soghdians, who
at that time had risen against the Arabs in the
district of Samarqand, though riot in the capi-
tal itself, and had formed an alliance with the
Turks, who were again gaining ground. On

1 Many kings in Transoxiana accepted Islam (Bal., 426).
» Tab., 1357. 1421. 1867. Bal*dh., 427. Agh., 13, 52.

452 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

account of this very mildness, which the Arabs
thought misplaced, he was soon recalled and in
his place in A.H. 103 there came the Qaisite Said
alHarashi.1 He was severe with the insuhordi-
nates, who from fear of him decided to migrate
to Fargh&na where the Arabs were then no
longer in power. These were chiefly the inhabi-
tants of the towns of Qi, Ishtikhan, Bai&rkath,
Bunjikath and Buzm&jan,2 with their princes
headed by Karzanj of Qi, who, like many other
Soghdian dynasts, was really a Turk.3 The
emigrants mostly4 betook themselves to the
town of Khujanda (Khokend) on the Jaxartes,
but Said marched against them and shut them
up in Khujanda. Disappointed in their hope of
the support of the Turkish king, they surren-
dered and promised to pay the tribute again
and return to their home. They soon had cause
to regret this, for Said made a pretext to compass
the execution of the prince of Ishtikhan.
As K&rzanj perceived the same fate in store

1 Gentilic of Harish b. 'Amir.

* Ishtikhan and Bazmajan lay not far from Satnarqand, arid so by
BunjJkath it is not the town in Ushrftsana that we are to understand,
but the town of the same name near Samarqand. Qi also (1422,16. 41,4)
lay near Samarqand on a canal of Zarafshan. For Baiarkath cf. the
personHl name Baiar, 1446, 10. Kath is the usual ending of town names.

3 In the verse 1281, 5, which is there placed too early, Kazarank
is written in mistake for Karazank ; cf. 1446, 10. AGO. to Tab., 1423 ;
1425, the king of Qt, who is there given the title Turlckh&q&n, was
originally friendly to the Arabs.

4 On the other hand see 1441, 7. 1446 ff. Cf. 1418, 1.

THE ARAB TEIBES IN KHURASAN 453

for himself, he said to the Arab in whose prison
he was, — " It is not becoming that I should meet
death in worn-out breeches; send word to my
nephew Jalanj to let me have some new ones."
This was the sign agreed on that the latter
(who had stayed at home or lived in another
place in Farghana) should come to his aid. Jalanj
came and tried to invade the Muslim camp,
but in vain. Said then ordered the whole of the
Soghdian warriors to be slaughtered, the princes
with their following, and though they defended
themselves with clubs, it was of no avail.
The next day a few thousand more peasants
were put to death and only 400 merchants
spared. Still there remained many Soghdians
in Farghana, since they had not all settled in
Khujanda (16x31 1717). On the way back
Said subdued several more rebel towns, chiefly
by capitulation, but if it seemed to him advan-
tageous he did not abide by the capitulation in
the case of the princes, but executed them as
well. His superior, the Iraqite stattholder
Umar b. Hubaira alFazari, used this as an
opportunity ^o vent his wrath against him,
which in reality was caused by other reasons.
Said had, in fact, several times ignored him and
had not carried out his command to extort money
from some Arabs of Muhallabid leanings in
Khurasan, and also had a prefect of Herat,
appointed direct by Ibn Hubaira, shaved and

454 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

flogged for defying him. He was therefore
deposed, taken in chains from Marw to Kuf a, and
there tortured to the point of death. It was a
domestic feud of the Qaisites who under Yazid II
were absolutely supreme, — for Said as well as
his opponent, and above all Ibn Hubaira himself
were Qaisites, — and an edifying example of how
they let all consideration towards each other
go down before the desire for office and money,
but for all this they stuck together against the
non- Qaisites,

Said alHarashi was succeeded by Muslim b.
Said alKilabi, a pupil of Hajjaj. He collected
from wealthy Iranians the sums which Ibn
Hubaira would have assigned to certain Arabs;
after all, it was all the same to him whence the
money came, if only he got it. He continued
the struggle against the Soghdians and Turks,
and in the spring of the year 105 (724) equipped
an expedition against Parghana.1 But the Azd
and Rabia in Tukh&ristan mutinied and refused
to serve. Their leader was Amr b. Muslim al-
B&hili, a brother of Qutaiba.2 Muslim sent
against them his assistant Nasr b. Saiy&r alKin&ni

1 It is not clear whether he conquered Afshina on this occasion
or earlier. This is a town belonging to the district of Samarqand
(1462, 9.63, 1.1517, 8), but Baladh. (428, 3) puts instead the proper
personal name Afshtn.

a The Bahilites changed their position towards the tribal groups
always just according to the circumstances, as tkey did not belong to
any of them naturally.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 455

who vanquished them near B&ruq&n, the fixed
quarters of the Arab garrison of Balkh, which
?lso contributed to widen the breach between
Mudar and Yemen. Muslim then set out.
When he was in the neighbourhood of Bukhara
news came that the Khalifa Hisham, who had
succeeded Yazid II in Sha'ban, 105 (Jany., 724),
had placed over Iraq the Qasrite (of Bajila)
Khalid b. Abdillah in place of the Qaisite Ibn
Hubaira. Thereupon many of his fighting men
deserted ; nevertheless he continued his march
and advanced beyond Khujanda into the land
of the Turks, but there he was surprised and
overcome, and with difficulty managed to get
back across the Jaxartes l to Khujanda, where he
was met by tidings of his deposition (A.H. 106,
summer or autumn, 724). His successor was
Asad b. Abdiilah, brother of the Iraqite statt-
holder, a mere youth.

Asad's inclination, like that of his brother,
was towards the Yemenites, although by his
tribe he did not exactly belong to them, for
the Bajila, like the Bahila, stood outside the
great groups. He had a number of Khurasan
Arabs in high positions scourged. The Bakrite

1 In an anticipatory short report in Tab., 1462 (which is really
identical with Tab., 1477ff.)> the river which here can only be the
Jaxartes is made the Oxus. The Arabs often only say " the river " and
leave it to the geographical sense of the reader to distinguish which
river is meant,

456 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Bakhtarl b. AM Dirham (of Hftrith b. Ub&d)
was content to suffer the chastisement because
Nasr b. Saiy&r underwent it at the same time,
— a man whom he hated because of the affair
of B&rftq&n.1 The officials he appointed were
some of them Azdites, but the exultation of
the Azd over the fact that they had once more
emerged from the shadow into the sunlight
was not of long duration, for at the instance of
the Khalifa Asad was recalled in A.H. 109. The
Dihq&ns of Khurasan to whom he had been
friendly disposed, gave him a convoy to Iraq,2

His successor, Ashras b. Abdillah asSulamt
was again a Qaisite. He tried to appease the
ever restless Soghd by the method taken by
Umar II, at the suggestion, it is said, of his
Iranian scribe Umaira. He sought out the
man who is said to have before induced that
Khalifa to make the Iranians equal to the Arabs
if they embraced Islam, Abu Saida S&lih b.
Tartf adDabbi, and charged him to invite the
Soghdians to accept Islam, guaranteeing that
the subject-tax should be remitted to the

1 Of. besides Tab., 1530.

9 Later on he came back again to Khurasan. The two periods
during which he held office are identified by Balidh. and also confused
by Madam! in Tab. from their contents. The removal of the residence
to Balkh certainly falls into the period of his second atattholdership,
— for afterwards Marw is again the residence without any mention of
a removal back there, — and also possibly the scourging of Nasr. There
is not much known about the first term of office.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 457

converts. Accompanied by some Arabs of a like
mind with himself Abu Saida betook himself
to Samarqand. The prefect there, Ibn Abl
'Amarrata alKindi, a son of that Shiite of Kufa
who had first drawn the sword for Hujr b.
Adi, lent him his aid, and his propaganda had
a great success. Many new mosques arose and
the heathen came over to Islam in great crowds,
but the native princes, who were not interfered
with by the Arab government, were exceedingly
displeased at this. The fact was, they were
responsible for the tribute, and could with diffi-
culty produce the fixed amount of the pre-
scribed sums if so many who were hitherto liable
for tribute got clear of paying their share. For
this reason they complained to Ashras that
everyone had either become " Arab " or was
about to do so. The Dihqans of Bukhara are
mentioned, and in particular Ghuzak, the Ikh-
shed of Samarqand, whom we came across al-
ready in Qutaiba's time. Ashras now tried to
get rid of the spirits he had called up. He
first of all limited the entrance to Islam by
demanding circumcision and some religious
knowledge, and when that did not suffice he
put other officials in place of Ibn Abi 'Amarrata
with instructions to levy the tax again to the
old extent upon all those whom they must have
already declared exempt. Several thousand
converts then left Samarqand and moved to
58

458 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

a camp some distance from the town, being
incited and accompanied by AbA Said& and his
like-minded friends from different Arab tribes
(Tamim, Azd and Bakr) including Thabit
Qutna, Abft Mtima and Bishr b. JurmAz.
However, partly by force and partly by persua-
sion, these Arabs were diverted from the cause
which they had taken up, and so the seceders of
Samarqand lost their support and were brought
back to the old state of subjectdom. The taxes
were exacted with severity and the Iranian
nobility treated with contempt.

But this was not the end of the matter. The
revoking of the conciliatory measure resulted
in the utmost wrath and bitterness of the Sogh-
dians throughout the whole land. In order to
"free themselves from the Arabs they made an
alliance with the Turks. A descendant of
Yazdejard, the last Sassanid, is said to have been
concerned in this. The centre-point of the
rising was the oasis of Bukhara, whither the
Kh&q&n arrived with a great army of Turks and
Iranians. In A.H. 110, probably at the end of
the year,1 i.e. in spring, 729, Ashras set out with
the Arab army from Marw to cope with the
danger, but ne&r Amul the Turks barred his
way at the crossing of the Oxus, and it was
only after a lengthy sojourn that he managed to

1 Asad did not leave till near the end of 109 (in Ramadan), and
the mission of Abu Said a and its results also take up some time.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 459

get as far as Baikand, where he pitched his
camp. The Turks then cut off the water from
him, 700 of his fighting men died and the rest
were too weak to go on. At last, by the sacri-
fice of some volunteers, notably Harith b. Suraij,
they succeeded in leading back the water again.
It was then that Thabit Qutna fell. The Arabs
now continued their march and after a hot
contest in which Ghuzak of Samarqand went
over to the Turks, reached Bukhara where they
encamped and whence they undertook expedi-
tions (e.g. to Khwarizm). Several divisions,
however, were scattered. One of these had
made for Kamarja (near Baikand), and the
Khaqan then turned against it with his whole
strength and shut it within Kamarja, but the
besieged defended themselves so well that at
last he granted them a free egress, only they
were not allowed to join the main army in
Bukhara, but had to retire to Dabusia.

The Khaqan now had a free hand against
Ashras in Bukhara. The latter could not gain
a footing and apparently was hardly able to
move any further, so the Khalifa appointed a
successor who was to displace him. This was
Junaid b. Abdirrahman alMurri,1 who till then
had been in India, from which he brought with
him 500 Syrians. Immediately after his arrival 2

1 AlMuzani is a slip of the pen which is frequently met with.

2 lu A.H. Ill, but hardly before the end of the year, for the road
from Bukhara to Syria, from Syria to India and from India to

460 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

he hurried to Ashras' aid, and after some
difficulties joined him in Bukhara. He succeeded
in defeating the Turks near Zarman, and in
relieving Samarqand which they were besieging,
and then led the army safely back to Khurasan,
— which was, perhaps, the main thing.

At the end of the year 112, in spring, 731,1
Junaid had despatched the Arab troops upon
different expeditions, particularly in Tukharistan,
when a cry for help reached him from the
Tamimite Saura b. Hurr of Samarqand, who was
attacked by the Khaqfin and the princes of the
Iranians who were his allies. Although he had
not a sufficient force at hand he set out at once
and advanced over the Oxus as far as Kish.
From there two roads led to Samarqand. He
avoided the one through the steppe because it
was already summer and he was afraid the
enemy might set fire to the grass and the bushes,
and chose the road through the mountains. But
in a ravine not far from Samarqand he was sur-
prised, and if it had not been for Nasr b. Saiyar
and the especial bravery of the Iranian slaves
in the Arab army-baggage, who cut themselves
clubs and hewed a way with them, he would have

Khurasan was long and tedious. Ashras probably held on in Bukhara
in the winter, A.IT. 111.

1 Spring, 112 may be taken either as the beginning or as the end
of the year, but from the circumstances the end is more probable here.
The dates in what follows vary by a year between 112 and 113 ; 113
and 114; I think the higher numbers correct.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 461

been annihilated. But he was still in a danger-
ous plight. In order to extricate himself from
it he summoned Saura to come to his help from
Samarqand. Saura and the Arab garrison
perished in making the attempt, but Junaid
managed to escape and enter Samarqand. The
Khaqan now turned against Bukhara where a son
of Qutaiba was in command, and besieged the
town. Junaid followed by the shortest route,
defeatod him near Tawawis in the month of
Ramadan, made his entry into Bukhara on
the feast of Mihri^fin,1 and pleased at having
made sure work of Bukhara and Samarqand,
turned back before winter should set in. The
new troops sent him by llisham from Basra
and Kufa, which joined him on the way in
Saghfmian, he sont to Samarqand, For the
years 114 and 115 nothing is reported about
him, and at the beginning of 116 (spring, 734),
he was deposed and succeeded by ' Asim b.
Abdillah alHilal). To be sure this was also a
Qaisite like himself, but his foe, and chosen as

' Certainly not A.H. 112, as is given, but not till 113 (Nov., 731).
The toast of Mihrigsin. (1552, 7 ; cf. 1550, 13f.) must thus have boon
celebrated at that time lator than about tho time of the autumnal
equinox ; also the New Year's festival, ace. to 1846, 16, fell far beyond
the spring equinox. Tho account in 1635, 18, must, on the other hand,
be false. Under the Abbasids the calendar of festivals was apparently
adjusted. In A.H. 239 the New Year's festival coincided with Palm
Sunday (Tab., 3, 1420), and in A.H. 245 it was put back still further
(Tab., 3, 1448). Cf. also Tab. 3, 2024. 2143f. 2163,

46* ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

his successor on that very account, in order to
torment him, for Hisham was angry with him
because he had married a daughter of the arch-
rebel Yazid b. Muhallab (of. 1633). Luckily,
however, Junaid died of dropsy before 'Asim
arrived at Marw and the latter could only
torture his relations and officials,

5. The Arab rule in Transoxiana was seri-
ously affected by its unprincipled vacillation
between indulgence and force. Umar II tried
to fuse the Iranian subjects with the Arabs by
means of Islam, by granting equal political
rights to the converts to Islam and removing
the subject-tax, but under his successors this
measure seems to have been immediately re-
voked. Although not expressly stated, still it
follows from this that immediately after his
death force must have been used towards the
Soghdians to compel them to pay the tribute
which they evidently refused as being now
Muslims, and that in order to avoid it many of
them left the country under their princes and
betook themselves to the protection of the
Turks. It is to be noted at the same time that
though the command of Umar is said to have
been binding upon all, the Muslim Iranians in
Khurasan nevertheless did not rebel when it
was set aside. During long years they had
grown accustomed to their political subordina-
tion and had become identified with the Arabs

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 463

through the common interest in Islam, and
indeed could not so much as lift a finger, — which
is true also of the towns of Samarqand and
Bukhara where the position of the Arabs was
too strong. The insurgents were rather the
Soghdians outwith the chief towns, who had
been but imperfectly subdued and only recently,
and merely because of the material advantages
had embraced Islam, following their princes'
example. There is no doubt that they forth-
with defected from Islam, which had not yet
struck root amongst them. But the ineffective-
ness of Umar's attempt appears far more clearly
from the fact that Ashras made it a second
time, and thus the whole thing was repeated.
Abft Saida and those who shared his ideas, who
had already inspired Umar, were also the workers
of the reform under Ashras. Once again it
came to grief for financial reasons, which no
doubt had been the deciding element the first
time as well. And again it was not the Iranians
of Khurasan but those of Sogdiana who rebelled
on account of it. Under Ashras the offer of
relief from the subject-tax actually does not
appear to have been made to the Mawali at all,
not even to those in Khurasan, but only to the
new converts in Sogdiana. But the revolt of
the Soghdians in his time was far more wide-
spread and dangerous than the one after the
death of Umar II, especially because the Turks

464 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

came into the country and assumed the leader-
ship. The Arabs could alone maintain their
position in the chief towns and at some other
strong points; the movement in Samarqand
itself was suppressed without trouble.1

A third attempt to procure for the Iranian
Muslims full citizens' rights in the theocracy
emanated not from above but from below, namely
from the Tamimite Hurith b. Suraij from
Dabftsia,2 whom we have already met with as a
doughty warrior. In earlier times, as a pious
revolutionary, he would have been called a
Kh&rijite, but he was not pledged to the extreme
consequences to which the Khawfirij pinned
their faith ; he neither had homage paid to
himself as Khalifa nor did he run any other for
the office. He made his appearance as a
Murjiite, his scribe, Jahm b. Safwan, being the
best-known theologian of this sect, and he also
took part himself in speeches and discussions
concerning their principles. In practice Murji-
itism amounted to a policy of collectivism. The
questions of discussion, especially the ever-
lastingly insoluble one regarding the only right-
ful Imam, were set aside and left to the decision
of God, and therefore stress was laid upon the

i Qfm with this and what follows G. van Vloten, Recherches sur la
domination arabe, in the Verhandlungcn der Amstcrdamer Akademie,
1894, Letterkunde, I, 3.

* 1923, 3,27,12; cf. too, 1890, 7.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 405

points upon which the different trends of the
pious opposition could be agreed. This was the
protest for the theocracy against the existing
tyranny, for holy law against injustice4 and force.
In Khurasan the Qaisite stattholders had stripped
the TJmaiyid rule of all credit both in the eyes
of friend and foe, and their conduct towards
the Soghd in particular had conjured up not
only a grave external danger but had also left
in its wake a deep moral indignation which
spread over the circles most nearly concerned.
Now this was the point at which H&rith came
in. He incited the Maw£ll by declaring he
would bring to realisation the freedom from the
subject-tax and the participation in the military
pension which were their due and which had
been promised them, and the Dihqans and the
people of the villages gathered under his black
standard. He thus followed in the footsteps of
Abti. Said&, and those of his opiniun, -\s many
as were still alive, were to be found in his
company, e.g. Abu F&tima al ly&dl (of Azd)
and Bishr b. JurmAz adDabbl (of Tamim).
The leaders of the movement for the bestowing
of equal rights upon the Iranians who had
embraced Islam in the theocracy were again
Arabs, but besides these, numerous Arabs of
Tamlm and Azd also took part in the rising
against the ruling body, and not merely Murjiites,
H£rith accepted any help he could get,
59

466 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

The ground he started upon was the " Two
Marches/5 At first he unfurled the black
standard in Transoxiana, no doubt in the latter
years of Junaid, from which nothing is reported,
and upon 'Asim's arrival he spread out his forces
over Tukharistan also. From Nakhudh via
Firi&b he went to Balkh after forcing by a
victorious fight a crossing over the Oxus. The
stattholders of Balkh, Marwrudh and Her&t
could not hold out against him ; all Tukharistan
fell into his hands and even the Arabs them-
selves, who mostly consisted of Azdites and
Bakrites. JabghiMa, the Turkish Viceroy in
upper Tukharistan, and the prince of the Khuttal
made common cause with him.

Marw and Abarshahr (Naisabur), the two
westerly districts of Khurasan, were the only
parts still in the undisputed possession of the
Umaiyid rule (1582). After his successes in
Tukharistan, Harith's army swelled tremen-
dously; Arab horsemen and Iranian infantry
were united in it. With a great force he
now advanced against Marw, where he had
connections with the Tamim, for he came from
there originally (1890). 'Asim was going to
retire before him to Abarshahr into the
Qaisite district, and was only with difficulty
prevailed upon to stand his ground. He beat
back a first attack of H&rith, but when he
learned that he was to be deposed he wanted to

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 467

go over to his side. Yahya b. Hudain al Bakrl
kept him from doing so, and under the leader-
ship of this- sensible man, the Bakr, who till
then had stood with the Azd in the opposition,
wheeled round, because they perceived that the
whole national interest of the Arabs was at stake.
They beyond all others distinguished themselves
in the struggle against Hiirith. The latter was
beaten once more, and now re -crossed the Oxus
and there besieged the important town of
Tirmidh.

According to the reports, Khurasan at that
time was directly under the Khalifa in Syria.
*Asim is made out to have brought upon himself
his deposition, which took place in the beginning
of 117 (735), by asking to be again placed under
the stattholder of Iraq as he had need of bis
support, and Kh&lid alQasri is said to have used
this opportunity to get his brother into office.
But it was high time that the Qaisite adminis-
tration in Khurasan should cease. Another
account has it that Hish&m himself ordered
Kh&lid to put his brother in ' Asim's place. Asad
might well count it an honour to be sent for
the second time to Khurasan under such
difficult circumstances, and he justified the trust
reposed in him. As his assistant he appointed
an Azdite, Judai' alKarm£ni, but without selling
himself to the party interest of the Yemenite^
and he liberated Junaid's officials who had been

468 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

imprisoned by 'Asim, notwithstanding that, as
Qaisites, they were his foes (1581, 15).

He began activities against H&rith in Trans-
oxiana and there either with clemency or
severity subdued several towns which had sided
with H&rith, including, perhaps, even Samar-
qand.1 Against H&rith himself, who was en-
camped before Tirmidb, he actually effected
nothing, but the citizens of the town, all hough
Iranians, defended themselves so bravely that
the latter found it advisable to retire to Tukhar-
istan, and his allies and adherents melted
away.

Thereupon Asad also faced about to Tukhar-
istan. To be sure, this district was subdued by
Qutaiba, but with the exception of Marwrftdh,
only the capital, Balkh, was to any extent a
firm seat of the Arab power. Asad retired into
Balkh and removed his residence from Marw
thither, which proved how important he thought
Tukharistan. He also quartered there the Arab
garrison, which till then had been settled in
the neighbouring place, B&rftqan, and did not

1 It is not actually said that Samarqand had defected to Haritb, nor
that Asad won it back a«:ain, but onl. that he marched thither and cut
off the water from tho town, but the latter action can hardly be under-
stood otherwise than as a hostile measure. The water came from Waragh-
ear ; the centre of the canal-system was there. Waragh means " sluice "
(Schott, for which 1 know n > High German equivalent, corresponds
better to it), and " Sar" (like the Semitic " PA*") means the outlet of
the division of water through the sluicos.

THE ARAii TRIBES IN KHURAsAN 46&

mix with the Iranian citizens. But he did not
make the members of the different tribes live
separate, but all together, so as to prevent their
" 'Asabiya," i.e. their parties and petty jealousies.
To every fighting man he allotted as much
landed property in Balkh as he had possessed in
Baruqan, and he kept up a warm friendship
with the Dihqans, with whom he was popular
before, in order, through them, to have an
influence upon their humbler compatriots. The
rebuilding of Balkh undertaken by him had to
be completed by the Iranian subjects, but in
such a way that the value of the work was
credited in their tax. The survey was entrusted
to the Dihqan Barmak of Naw Bah&r, the
ancestor of the Barmakid family, who later
became so famous, and within reasonable limits he
did all he could to effect a general reconciliation
and blending together of the hostile elements.

H&rith b. Suraij had fled to upper Tukhari-
stan to his relatives in the fortress of Tabftshk&ri,
but they were not willing to be sacrificed for him,
drove him and his following away, and entered
into negotiations with Asad. But as the latter
learned from the mediators that the fortress was
badly provided with arms and scarcely capable of
defending itself, he sent the Karmani to attack it.
Thirst compelled the garrison to surrender, and
the captive warriors had to suffer death (1928),
while their wives and children, although of

476 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Arab blood, were sold by auction in the market-
place of Balkh.

In A.H. 118 (736) Asad undertook an expedi-
tion against the still unsubdued Khuttal, to the
north of the Oxus, opposite Balkh, who had
been allies of Harith. Their prince, who
resided in Nawakith, turned to the Khaqan of
the Turks for help, but when the latter came
advancing from Suy&t md Khushwaragh he sent
word to Asad to warn him, for (he said) he did
not wish the victory of the Turks but a balance
between them and the Arabs. After some delay
Asad took it as a hint to turn back, and just
when he had got across the Oxus the enemies
appeared on the other bank. Amidst the
beating of drums and neighing of steeds they
plunged into the stream and crossed it, but they
did not attack the chief body under Asad him-
self, but a division which he had sent on in
advance with the baggage and captured animals,
further down the Oxus. The baggage fell into
their hands ; the men Asad was just able to
save. This was on the last day of Ramadan,
118.1 He had to be content with getting
back to Balkh with a whole skin, and the
children sang sarcastic ditties about him.

1 llth Oct., 736. The dates here vary about a year. For the " day
of the baggage" the year 119 is given. Reckoning backwards, however,
shows that the correct date is 118,

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 471

But the Khaqan gave him no peace. He
made for JabghMa alKharlukhi l in eastern
Tukharistan, nominally summoned by H&rith b.
Suraij who lived there, and from there in the
middle of winter he departed with his vassals
and allies towards the west. On the 10th
Dhulhijja, 118 (19th Dec., 736) Asad got news
of this. He gave warning to the country
people by beacons to escape to Balkh, left his
assistant alKarm&ni behind in the town, and
himself marched at once against the Khaqan
with the garrison troops, which were all he had
at his disposal, for he had let the rest go away
to their homes at the beginning of winter. The
Khaqan was encamped not far from the capital
of Juzj&n. He had sent out expeditions
on all sides and had only 4,000 men with him
when Asad attacked him.2 By means of a
division led by the prince of Juzj&n along by-
paths, he at the same time caught him in the

1 Kharlukh is a Turkish tribe (Ibn Khordadhbeh, 31). Jabghuia
1*8, even in Qutaiba's time, named as overlord of the Shadh and of fche
Tarkhan Naizak appointed with or under him. Of. the report on the
Khalifa Hisham in Tab., 1615.

2 Asad's right wing consisted of Azdites, Tamimites, Jnzjanites
and the Syrians of Filistin and Qinnosrtn ; the left of Rabiites and the
Syrians of Hims and Urdumi ; the vanguard (the centre ? ) of the
Syrians of Damascus and of the Shurta, the bodyguards and the
vassals of Asad. The Syrian troops evidently remained constantly
with the stattholder, and did not, like the Arabs of Khurasan, go
home in winter. With the Khaqan were li&rith b. Suraij with his
following (Soghdians and Bablya), also the king of Soghd, the prince
of Shitsh, Kharabughra of UshrOsana (the great.^rand father of the

472 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

rear, and so forced him to a hasty flight,
abandoning his wife, whose eunuch saved her
from shame by killing he?. In the conquered
camp where the kettles were still boiling, the
Muslim prisoners who were found were set free.
Many Turkish women, as well as a huge amount
of booty in the shape of cattle, fell into the
victor's hand, and Asad made presents of
them to the Dihqans of Khurasan l who were
well-disposed to him. The Turkish expedition-
ary bands, one of which had pressed on to the
church of Marwrudh, were captured.

Any further pursuit of the Khaqan was
rendered impossible by the winter. He
remained for a while longer in Tukharistan,
near Jabghftia, and then made his way back
md Ushrusana into his own land, accompanied
by H&rith b. Suraij. Soon after he was slain
by one of his chief men, the frequently mention-
ed Kursftl alTurqashi,2 and as a result the
Turks fell into discord with each other and
left the Arabs for a time in peace.

Asad ordered a fast in Balkh to ^ive thanks
to God for the victory. When tidings of the

famous Afshfn b. Kawus), and Jabghuia. The king of Soghd is
perhaps the lord of Ishtlkhan who with the Ashkand of Nasaf followed
the Kh&qan's army to Khuttalan, while the Saghankhudfih foughfc
for Asad. Iranians fought on both sidfts. According to 1613, 2f, it
seems, moreover, as if Kharabughra had stayed at home in Ushrusnna ;
he was at heart hostile to the Khaqan.

1 Van Vloten misinterprets this simple note (Tab., 1611), O.t
p. 25, n. ?. * Cf. Ibn Khordftdhbeh, 31,

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 473

astonishing event reached Syria, Hisht\m, back-
ed up by the Qaisites at his court, would not
believe it. Hitherto he had received nothing
but bad news from Khurasan, but Asad's mess-*-
enger, Muqfitii b. Haiy&n an-Nabati, dispelled
all doubt by his authentic report.

In summer 119 (737) Asad again resumed
the war against the Khuttal. The Turks could
help them no longer, and apparently there
was dissension amongst themselves. A usurper
from Bami&n, BadartarkhAu, had seized the
power (cf. 1694). By a shameful breach of
faith Asad got the latter into his power and
delivered him up for execution to an Azdite
who had revenge for bloodshed to carry out
against him.1 In spite of this he did not effect
much, but contented himself with raids into
the valley of the Khuttal. The following winter,
at the beginning of the year 120, sudden death
overtook him and saved him from being involved
in the fall of his brother Kh&lid.2 The Arab and

1 Asad had promised him the protection of God, the Prophet, the
Khalifa and the Muslims, but now when he did not keep his word,
Badartarkhan throw a stone into the air saying, — " That is God's
protection J" Then he threw three more stones with the words, —
"There is the protection of Muhammad, the prince of the Believers,
the Muslims ! "

2 Khalid was deposed in Jumada I, 120 (May, 738), but was still
in office when he heard of his brother's death (1650, 12). In Rajab,
120 Nasr succeeded Asad after an interval of four months (1G38).
Aead thus died in Safar, 120 (February, 738). The account that it
happened on the feast of Mihrigan is untenable, for that fell in autumn,
and neither autumn, 119 nor autumn, 120 is a possible date.

60

174 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Iranian chiefs were in the act of waiting upon
him to bring him costly gifts, and Khur&s&n,
the Dihq&n of Herat, made a speech exalting
him to the seventh heaven, Asad graciously
threw him an apple which he held in his hand,
when an internal abscess burst and he died.
This is the narrative, but the occasion specified,
namely, the feast of Mihrigan, is incorrect, and
throws doubt upon the matter, which has a
somewhat legendary savour at any rate.

6. The fall of Khalid alQasri, who had been
for many years stattholder in Iraq, ushered in
the last fatal period of the Umaiyid rule. His
successor was a thorough-going Qaisite partisan
from the family of Haj j&j, YAsuf b. Umar.
He would have brought a Qaisite into Khurasan
as well if Hisharn had not interfered and
appointed as Asad's successor old Nasr b.
Saiy&r, one of the very few old men who appear-
ed in the history of that time. His age did not
aft'ect the freshness of the mind, as is testified
not merely by his deeds, but also by the songs
in which he gave expression to his feelings
to the very end of his life. He had been bred in
the district itself and grown grey in the service,
and was also recommended to the Khalifa
by the fact that he had no family influence at
his back and was bound to rely on him for
support. For he did not belong to any of
the great tribes in Khurasan, but to the Kin&na,

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 475

which was there but weakly represented. As
a Kinanite indeed ho had leanings towards the
Tamim, who together with the Kinana, were
descended from Khindif. Ho changed the
officials of his ousted predecessor, without, how-
ever, ill-treating them and replaced them by
Khindifites, i. e.9 Tamirnites mostly. The seats
of Government were then, with the exception
of the four old ones in Khurasan, still Balkh,
Khwarizm and Samarkand (1664). He moved
the residence from Balkh back to Marvv, from
the periphery to the centre of the Arab rule.

At the beginning of his term of office ho
carried on war against the Turks and really
weakened them. Ho marched through the Iron
Gate via Waraghsar to Samarqand. There
two captive Dihqans were brought before him,
who had opposed the Arab and the native rule
in Bukhara because thoy thought themselves
unjustly treated. When he condemned them
they tore themselves free, the one wounding the
Arab prefect of Bukhara, who in return cleft
his skull, while the other stabbed the Bukhara-
khud&h and was himself slain by the prince of
Juzjan, It is probable that the injustice of
which both had to complain consisted in their in-
clusion in the subject-tax, for they were Muslims.
Nasr marched from Samarqand, reinforced by
Iranian auxiliary troops, to Ushrusana and on to
Sh&sh, where at that time was the murderer of

476 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the Khaqan, Kurs&l, the prince of a horde of 4,000
tents. In a fight he fell into the Arabs' hands and
was crucified. Harith b. Suraij also fought with
the Turks against the Arabs, but was unwilling
to fire the two catapults which he brought with
him against his own particular tribal brethren,
the Tamirn. The upshot was that Nasr granted
peace to the Shash on condition that they
turned out Harith. He then marched to
Farghana but there also contented himself with
a peace treaty and then, without pressing on
over the Jaxartes, turned back. The undertak-
ing may have taken more than one year, but
Madaini breaks it up in a senseless manner l
and differentiates mere variants, gathering
together all the chaff he can get hold of, and
making episodes and anecdotes the main interest.
Baladhuri mentions only one expedition of Nasr
to Ushrusana, which came to grief.2 The
brilliant feats ascribed to him by A. Muller,
1, 412, freely following Weil 1, 632, Nasr
certainly never performed, but nevertheless he
made the Turks in Shash renounce the sedition-
ist H&rith b. Suraij, even if they did not deliver
him up, and he withdrew to Farab and kept
the peace till the civil war broke out after the

1 According to him Nasr marched (a) to the Iron Gate and turned,
(b) to Samurqand and turned, (c) to the Jaxartes. But (rb) and (b) are
onjy stages for (c).

" The date lf at the time of Marwan II " is more 4han unlikely.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 477

death of Walid II. Nasr also allowed the
emigrant Soghdians, who in the turmoil after
the murder of the Khaqan no longer felt secure
in Shash and Farghana, to return to their old
home, and to this the Arabs of Khurasan
compelled the Khalifa Hishfun to give his
consent.

Some light is thrown upon Nasr's internal
policy hy his tax-reform, about which Madaini
gives a report in Tab., 1688f. He is said to have
declared his programme for this in a speech in
the mosque of Marw ; " Bahr&msis favoured the
Magians, relieved them of their burdens and
imposed them upon the Muslims. Ishudad
the son of Gregor l in like manner favoured the
Christians, and Aqiba the Jews ; 1 will stand
up for the Muslims, remove their burdens and
impose them upon the unbelievers, only the
Kharaj must be paid fully in accordance with
the written tenet which is fixed for once and
all.2 As overseer of taxes I appoint Mansur
b. Umar ; to him complaints are to be brought
if a Muslim has to pay the poll-tax or excessive
land-tax, and if an unbeliever has failed to
assume the corresponding burdens." There-
upon, before the end of the week, it is said,

1 This Christian name, hardly recognisable in the Arab writing, is
to bo understood.

2 The proper reading is to be found in the note (•>•) to Tab., 1688
(tauffr),

478 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

30,000 Muslims came forward who had had to
pay the poll-tax, and 80,000 unbelievers appear-
ed who had not paid it, and the incongruity
was put right. The land-tax was then re-
adjusted and there was a re-allotment of the
shares which those assessed had to furnish
towards the total sum already stipulated. Prom
Mar w, at the time of the Umaiyids, J 00,000
dirherns were raised, not taking into considera-
tion the land-tax.

The religious communities and the tax-
paying communities were thus identical. The
chief rabbi collected the tax from the Jews,
the bishop from the Christians, the Marzb&n l
from the Magians or Zoroastrians. Naturally
the last were by far in the majority, though
the number of the Christians must have
been pretty considerable.2 But how could the
heads of communities roll the tax off the
Magians, Christians and Jews, and on to the
Muslims under the very eyes of the Arab
powers? The reports, such as they are, in

1 In this case not the chief Magiiin. Of. 14G2, 13.

- The Syrian Nostorians, as is well known, had spread far towards
the cast. The Metropolitan of Marw interred the body of Yazdejard,
the last Sasanid, in a sarcophagus (naus) (Tab. 1, 28?4f. 2881, 2883 j
cf. 2, 1448, 5; 1543, 1). Monks' dwellings and a place St, Sergius near
Marw are mentioned 2, 1572, 2. 1025, 13, 1957, 14 j a church there 1569,
14, and a church near Marwrftdh, 1H12, 11. In the village of Nasranlya
(-Christian village) Nasr left behind his wife Marzbana upon his
flight from Marw (1995, 10, cf. 1889, 0). An important place in Tukha-
ristan was called Yahudtya, the town of the Jews.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURAsAN 479

Madaini are unintelligible. It is quite incre-
dible that 80,000 men liable to taxation were
relieved from it, and 30,000 who were not liable,
had to make good in their stead. The state of
affairs, probably, by all analogies, amounts to
this, that the conversion of the non-Arab subjects
to Islam did not free them from their connec-
tion with their tax-paying community. The
subject-tax was a tribute irrevocably fixed in
its amount by the historical act of capitulation,
and if the numerous converts had no longer
contributed to it, then the rest would have had
to pay for them with the result that it would
have been no longer possible to raise the amount.
The duty of contributing thus descended from
fathers to sons as a burden assumed by them at
the capitulation even though the latter after-
wards embraced Islam. According to this
practice the native authorities acted with the
approval of the Arab government, for the
attempt first made by Umar II to bring about a
radical change proved impossible. But still it
did not seem right for the new citizens of the
theocracy to remain under the same burdens as
the non-citizens who were merely there on
sufferance. There had to be a difference made
between the two classes, but made in such a
way that the amount of the fixed sum of
tribute-money should not decrease. Nasr solved
this problem in the same way as it was solved

480 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

in former times. Before this the tribute was
raised by taxes of various sorts ; the taxes of
the landed proprietors as well as those of the
colonists went to swell it, and as they all came
under the head of the " tribute," so also people
spoke of only one tax, which was called the
" Kharaj " or " Jizia," — the names had the same
meaning (1507 ff.)- But now the contrivance
was hit upon that the tribute, in the fixed
amount once imposed upon the separate towns
and districts, was raised entirely from the
landed property. The land-tax was correspond-
ingly re-modelled and collected from all landed
proprietors in proportion to their property, no
matter whether they were subjects or Muslims,1
and as it did not affect people but things, it was
not considered a disgrace. Side by side with
this came the complete separation of the land-tax,
now exclusively called " Khar&j," from the
poll-tax, which retained the name "Jizia."
The poll-tax was unnecessary for the fixed
tribute ; its revenue changed, decreasing from
year to year in proportion to the increase of the
conversions to Islam, for it was removed alto-
gether from the Muslims and continued to be

1 The pieces of ground came into Muslim ownership nofc only
through the conversion of the old owners but also through purchase
and acquisition on the part of the Arabs. Ace. to Tub,, 1029, 6 it appears
that [even before Nasr such Arabs as had acquired the landed property
had to pay a tax upon it and that to the Persian magistrate, which
they certainly did not do willingly.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 481

exacted only from the non-Muslims, and in fact,
from all of these, precisely with the intention of
making it a disparaging burden upon their less
worthy persons. In contrast to the procedure
considered legitimate in earlier times, whereby
the Muslims were relieved from the land-tax
also, the judiciousness of the new organisation
established by Nasr in Khurasan is apparent.
The difference in the treatment of Muslims and
non-Muslims persisted. On the other hand, the
Muslims, whether Arabs or Mawall, came, in
principle, to be upon equal footing,1 and thus,
indeed, a decrease in the fixed state-revenue
was avoided, since the variation and gradual
decline of the inconsiderable poll-tax did not
matter so much. It is very probable that
Nasr's regulations were made not merely for the
government district of Marw, but for the whole
province on both banks of the Oxus, for there
was really no thing peculiar about them, and they
extended everywhere in the Islamic kingdom
where the conditions were similar. They
represented the binding law which the juridical
systematise rs since then presupposed to be in
existence from the very beginning, while in
reality it on ly evolved itself gradually. This is

1 In point of fact the Iranians had really to pay far more because
the landed property mostly belonged to them, especially to the Din-
qans, who on their part fleeced the peasants. But that was not an in-
justice,

61

482 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the reason why Mad&ini, confused by the later
suppositions, does not understand in the slightest
what Nasr was faced with, and what he
abolished, and gets very astonishing notions of
the illegal misusages which prevailed. But he
states correctly the positive fact, — that the fixed
amount of the Khar&j was re-allotted amongst
all the landed proprietors, even the Muslims, but
the Jizia, on the other hand, was taken off the
Muslims, and imposed only upon the non-
Muslims.

Upon this basis of equal rights in Islam
there might have been established a permanent
balance between Arabs and Iranians, but the
time for that was past. The self-destruction of
the Arabs in Khurasan began anew. This time
it was incited by the revolution in Syria, which
set in under Walid II as a counter-blow of the
opposition against the dissolute Qaisite rule.
Walid II succeeded Hish&m at the beginning of
Rabi II, 125 (Feb., 743). He at first confirmed
Nasr in his office, but, under the influence of
the Qaisite leader, the Iraqite stattholder Yusuf
b. Umar,1 he recalled him some time later and
summoned him to the court by the message
that he was to bring with him all sorts of
musical instruments and other fine things.
Nasr intentionally took a good while making

1 He had already in Hisham's time intrigued with the Qaisites
against Nasr (A.H. 123), but to 110 purpose.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHUllAslN 483

preparations for this and so it fell out that he
was still in Khurasan when the news of the
murder of the Khalifa reached him on New-
year's day, 126.1 He did not acknowledge the
insurgent, Yazid III, nor his stattholder in Iraq,
at least not actually, but persuaded the tribes
rather to pay homage to himself as interim Emir
of Khurasan, till the civil war should be ove3r
and there should be again a generally acknow-
ledged Khalifa. Even the Azd and Rabia, who
hitherto had not been on good terms with him,
fell in with this, and he now no longer neglected
them as formerly at the filling up of posts. His
aim was to make the Arabs of Khurasan act in
concert, so that they should regard the govern-
ment as their common affair and no longer as a
bone of contention. The neutral and non-party
position which he tried to assume was made
easier for him by the fact that, being a Kinanite
he belonged to none of the large groups. Of
course, the government was his own concern as
well, since he was at the head of it, and a poet
who was devoted to him makes him boastingly
say, — " We balance Qais with Rabia, and Tamim

1 Walid II was murdered about the end of Jumada II, 126 (middle
of April, 744). Nasr received private information of it through a post-
master ten days before the official confirmation, for tho Sikka, 1845,
21 (1849,10), is doubtless the Sikkat alBarid (1709 5, Lisan 4,53).
But the tidings can hardly have reached him in less than a month's
time, so the New Year at that time did not fall before the middle
May ; c/., p. 461, n. 1.

484 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

with Azd, and so the decision lies with Kinana."
He was much annoyed about this absolute
spoiler of all political concord, who fetched
water to his opponents' mills.

But even so it was not long till the Azd and
the B/abia with them, opposed him again,
recalling the fact that they after all, as
Yemenites, really belonged to the side of Yazld
III and the Kalbites who were allied with him.
When Nasr was going to pay them the wages
not in ready money but in the gold and silver
vessels which he had collected for Walid II,
they mutinied openly. The Azdite Judai' al-
Karmani took the lead and called for vengeance
for the Banft Muhallab (1858, 11) who were
mercilessly persecuted by the Umaiyids, giving
utterance to a saying that found an echo in the
hearts of all the Azdites, — " Under Muhallab
and his son Yazid they had been allowed to
c devour5 Khurasan, but since then they had
never again had their turn, and even under
Asad not so much as they wished." Nasr
certainly seized the person of alKarm&nl, arrest-
ing him in the Quhandiz of Marw, at the end
of Ramadan, 126 (the middle of July, 744), but
a month after he escaped from prison, and made
for a place in the district of Marw, where an
army of Azd and Rabla gathered round him.
Nasr marched against him. To be sure, no
battle was fought, for both sides hesitated to

THE ARAB TKlBES IN KHURASAN 485

begin, but neither did the peace-negotiations
which they entered upon attain the desired end.
AlKarm&ni cherished deep hatred against
Nasr and would not make up his difference
with him.

Most unfortunately, too, H&rith b. Suraij
now emerged from his Turkish exile once more.
It may have been even before the end of 126,
for Yazid III,1 who is said to have moved him
to do so, died at the end of 126. As he was an
enemy of alKarm&ni, Nasr invited him to come
to Marw from Samarkand, where he had at
first settled, and he made his appearance there
at the end of Ramadan, 127 (beginning of July,
745). But he did not suffer himself to be
attached to Nasr by the honours and gifts with
which the latter loaded him. He upheld against
him the demands of Murjiitism, as practically
understood by him, and was joined by about
3,000 of his Tamimite tribesmen. Nasr went
a good way in compliance with the dangerous
competitor with whom he had saddled himself.
He agreed to grant to the Iranians in the
marches, to whom H&rith had always been
devoted, a written constitution in accordance
with the Murjiite ideas of law and justice, to
appoint there officials well-pleasing to God, and
to bestow the stattholdership upon H&rith

1 Yaztd III was the son of a Soghdian princess (1874) and so may
have had leanings towards the Sogbdians.

486 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

himself. But this availed him nothing. Harith
was not sure of him, did not confide to him
the decided enmity to the Umaiyid rule with
which he and the followers of his black flag
were animated, and, probably from egotism,
would not even suffer his presence near him.
Nasr, on his part, would not submit to the sen-
tence of an arbitration court acknowledged by
the other anent his deposition, and so it came to
an open rupture. H&rith encamped before Mar vv
and from there made an attempt to surprise the
town at the end of Jumada II, 128 (end of March,
746). This attempt, indeed, failed, but Jahm b.
Safwan, the Murjiite recruiting-officer and the
author of a book upon H&rith and his programme,
which he used to read aloud, was taken
prisoner and executed. Then, however, Harith
made an alliance with alKarmani, of whom
we now hear again for the first time after a
year and a half, and the latter threw himself
into the dispute and gave it a different aspect.
After a battle of several days Nasr thought it
advisable to retire to Naisabur, the chief
position of the Qaisites, and to leave Marw to
the rebels.

The understanding between the insurgents,
however, soon fell through. The Tamim under
Harith still grieved that they had helped the
Azd to the victory over their brothers in Marw,
who fought for Nasr, and also they could not

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 487

forget that under Asad's stattholdership, after the
taking of the fortress of Tabushkan, alKarm&ni
had caused some hundreds of the relatives and
adherents of Hurith to be executed, and some
of them to be hideously mutilated. Bishr b.
Jurmuz, Harith's most important partisan, was
the first to renounce the unnatural alliance,
and several thousands followed him. In the
struggle which then arose, Harith went over to
him as well and broke with alKarmani, but the
Azd and their allies conquered the Tamim and
the Mudar at the end of Rajab, 128 (April, 746),
drove them out of Marw, and demolished their
quarters. H&rith himself fell, and his body was
nailed to a cross. He received the meet reward
of his deeds, be his sentiments what they might.
In the struggle for Islam against Arabism, for
the oppressed against the oppressors, he allied
himself with death and Satan against the exist-
ing power, and moved heaven and earth against
the Umaiyid government. On his first appear-
ance he led the Turks into the field against the
Arabs, and when that venture failed, he found
a refuge with them for many years. At his
second appearance he disunited the Tamim, upon
whose steadfastness at that time the stability
of the Arab rule in Khurasan greatly depended,
and thus he contrived that the Yemen not
merely overthrew the government but also
offered violence to the Mudar. He was rightly

488 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

considered a man of ill omen, the most active
precursor of AM Muslim.1

At this critical time Nasr was taken up by
the Qaisites in Naisabur, who before this were
not friendly to him, and the Mudarites who
were driven out of Marw rallied round him.
Before this, it is alleged, he had already tried
to gain support again for the Khalifate, but so
long as Iraq and the Iranian districts belonging
to it were in the power of the Khaw&rij and the
Ja'farid Ibn Mu&wia, he was cut off from con-
nection with the seat of the Umaiyid rule. It
was not till the year 129 that this was changed,
when Iraq was subjected to the rule of Marw&u
by Yazid b. Umar b. Hubaira. Nasr recog-
nised him as his immediate superior.2 He never
had the intention of renouncing the Umaiyids
in general, but only held back till the turmoil
of dynasties in Syria had settled, and indeed
probably declared for Marw&n soon after the
latter's succession. Still, the alliance with Ibn
Hubaira availed him little. It was upon his
own initiative that he set about the task of
winning back Marw in the year 129. After

1 His black flags are at 1919, 2f. explained in this sense although
formally it is a mistake. In contemporary songs ho is strikingly charac-
terised as the disuniter of the Mndar (1935, f.) and as the ally of the
heathen against the Arabs (1575f.) ; "Your Murjiitism has united you
with the idolators : your religion is no better than polytheism."

8 The account that Ibn Hubaira made an alliance with him as early
as the beginning of A.H. 127 (Tab., 1917) is a glaring anachronism-

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 489

vain attempts of his officers to make the attack,
the man of 80 came advancing in person with
his whole force and alKarmani came forth to
meet him. Both sides encamped outside of the
town in the "two trenches" which were shewn
long afterwards. Erom there they were in a
state of conflict for a long time, without getting
to a decisive battle. Urgent appeals for help
sent by Nasr to Marwan and to Ibn Hubaira,1
together with a moving description of the
danger, were of no avail, but the fear of a
common foe seemed to bring the Arabs once
again to reason and to a common agreement.
Before their eyes the Abbasid Shiites, mostly
Iranians, had gathered under Abu Muslim's
black standard and erected a strong camp not
far from Marw. The llabia, who, though
hitherto allies of the Azd, still naturally took
a middle place, entered the chasm between the
Yemen and the Mudar. Yahyii b. Hudain, the
most esteemed leader of the Bakr, joined Nasr,
seeing in a combination with the government
the only salvation of the Arab tribes.2 Matters
got as far as negotiations between Nasr and
Judai' alKarm&ni, but they were interrupted
by the fact that a son of Harith b. Suraij, who
was with Nasr, thought it a good opportunity

1 The famous verses in Tab., 1973 are composed upon this situation.

2 Cf. the poetical appeal of Nasr to the Rabia in NiHdeke's Delectus,
p. 88.

490 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

to wreak vengeance upon his father's murderer,
and assassinated the Karm&nl.1 Still they did not
fall through on this account. The defection of
the important town of Herat to AM Muslim
made a strong impression upon the Arabs and
opened the eyes of the blind as well. AlKar-
m&nl's place was taken by a partisan of his
whom we have met with before, the Kharijite
Shaib&n b. Salama,2 who on the instigation of
Yahy& b. Hudain concluded with Nasr a year's
truce, in consequence of which he was able to
enter Marw at the end of 129 (Aug., 747).
Not only the Azd acceded to the truce, but also
the son of their murdered leader, All Ibn
alKarm&ni. It was a critical turn of affairs
for Ab& Muslim, but he was wise enough to
explain to Ibn alKarm&ni that the murder of

1 The tradition 'certainly shews Nasr too as an accomplice in the mur-
der of alKarm&ni, by asserting that he had his dead body nailed to the
cross and beside it a fish, the contemptuous emblem of the Azd. But
he took a leading part in the negotiations in all seriousness, and not
merely with the purpose of compassing an assassination which threat-
ened to be their undoing. The crucifixion of their chief, and especi-
ally the episode of the fish, would have put an end for ever to any good
feeling from the Azd towards him. And if the son of the murdered
man made peace with Nasr immediately after, he was at that time not
convinced of the latter's complicity in the murder. Probably Abu
Muslim first put the idea into his head. No 'such objective proof of
Nasr's approval of the crime can have been given as a public exhibi-
tion by his orders of alKarmani's body with the fish attached would
have been. That would have brought other consequences, and would
have been directly opposed to the conciliatory policy of Nasr. The
principle is fecit cui prodest is wrongly applied here,

» Of, note I on p. 395.

THE ARAB TRIBES IN KHURASAN 491

his father had been caused by Nasr himself,
in order to get him upon his side (beginning of
130, Sepr., 747), and Ibn alKarm&ni and the
Azd who followed him now took up arms
against Nasr again. The struggle was carried
on in the suburbs and streets of Marw, apparent-
ly lasting a considerable time, and it made Abti.
Muslim master of the situation. When he
thought fit, he came into the midst of it and
decided it without striking a blow, in Rabi II,
130, i.e. Dec., 748,1 and the next morning Nasr
fled vid Sarakhs and Tus to Naisabur. It was
the end of the Arab rule in Khurasan and the
beginning of the end of the Arab rule al-
together.

1 The following chapter will enter further into the details and
dates.

CHAPTER IX.
THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM.

What has been said in the foregoing chapter
about the relationship between Arabs and Irani-
ans refers essentially to the two Marches, and
indeed more to Soghdia than to Tukharistan.
There the two parties were still in a state of
conflict with each other, and while Islam had
gained some firm positions, it had not completely
prevailed. On the other hand, in Khurasan
proper the powers had already formed a balance ;
a modus vivendi had been evolved. The proce-
dure which we see still prevalent in Transoxiana
was here by this time played out, and we know
nothing about it since we have not sufficient
information about the early period after the first
conquest. But the result is well worth some
degree of review, — the situation, say, in the
period from A.H. 100-130.1

Arabs and Iranians were not externally sepa-
rated by different dwelling-places. The old
native population still remained in the Arab
army towns. Naisabur (Blward, Sarachs, NasA),
Marw, Marwrudh and Herat, though the citadels

1 Cf. O. van Vloten, Recherches sur la domination arabe, Verhande*
lingen dcr K. Akademie te Amsterdam, Afd. Letterlc. 1, 3. Amst., 1894.

FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 49$

were, of course, occupied by the conquerors.
Neither did the Arabs keep themselves shut in
together at some few points, nor did they confine
themselves to the towns which they had selected
as military colonies. They had estates, with
bondmen, in the country, and some of them even
dwelt there, especially in the oasis of Marw
where the town formed the centre-point of numer-
ous villages in one irrigation -system. They had
Iranian servants and married Iranian wives, and
the influence was bound to be noticeable in the
children, even in the second generation. But
repeated additions from Iraq did not strengthen
the Arab element to such a degree that it could
ever have measured itself in numbers with the
Iranian element, particularly as it was severely
decimated by the continual warfare. Incidental
accounts make out that there were some 50,000
Arab military in Khurasan, and as the compulsory
service was much extended and included quite
half of the male sex, the Arab population pro-
bably amounted to not much more than 200,000
souls. The Arabs grew accustomed to being
Khurasanites ; in the common province they
felt at one with the people of the country.
They wore trousers like the Iranians (Tab., 2,
1530), drank wine, celebrated the festivals of
New Year and Mihrigan, and the prominent ones
among them assumed the airs of the Marzbans.

o

Business in general brought with it the necessity

494 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS P

of an understanding with the Iranians. Even
in Kufa and Basra the speech of the market
was, to say the least, just as much Persian
as Arabic. It seems to be an exception that
Abu Saida only spoke Arabic and so was not a
suitable apostle of the Soghdians who knew only
Persian. In Abu Muslim's army even the Arabs
spoke mostly Persian.1

Neither did the Iranians in Khurasan on
their side, take up a stand compactly hostile and
repellent towards the Arabs. Tke blending pro-
cess had laid hold of them as well. Their posi-
tion was in general little changed by the
conquest, and that scarcely for the worse. The
Arabs managed the defence against outside
attacks, i.e., against the Turks, more successfully
than had been done under the Sasanid regime?
They did not interfere much with the internal
conditions, but left the government to the
Marzbans and Dihqans and only through them
came in contact with the subjected population.
In the army and government towns, too, the
native authorities remained side by side with the
Arab, having, in fact, to collect the taxes, and
being responsible to the conquerors for their
correct payment in the proper amount. But
the miser a contribuens plebs had certainly had to

1 Tab. 3, 61, 4, 64, 18, 65, 14, 16.

2 It was only during the tribal feud of the Tamim that the Turks
extended their incursions as far as Naisabur (Bal., 415).

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 495

pay just as much under the Sasanids. Neither
were the Iranians disturbed in their religion ; in
the tribute- treaties it is everywhere taken for
granted that they retained it. Even in the
towns, where the Arabs lived, they were allowed
to remain heathen, although perhaps the out-
ward signs and tokens of heathendom had there
to be kept somewhat out of sight. But they do
not appear to have had any serious connection
with Zoroastrianism. The most one could say is
that the serene, happy Cult, which had its cul-
minating points in the New Year and Mihrigan
festivals had become endeared to them, and they
could go on observing it even when they em-
braced Islam, for even the Arabs joined in the
religion of the country, in so far as it was
pleasure. Islam at first attracted the Iranians
not so much for itself as for the advantages it
offered. They employed it as a means to get
closer to the ruling class and participate in its
privileges, and to arabianise themselves, and
then assumed Arab names and were incorporated
with an Arab tribe.1 Ambitious individuals
ingratiated themselves with the Arabs and

1 Of. Bal. 441 : The princes were converted to Islam and took Arab
names. Muslim Iranians with Iranian names are not generally to be
found at that time. The use of the Kunya is exceedingly frequent
among them : Abu Daud, Abu Aun, Abu Muslim, Abu Nasr, etc.
With the Arabs in Khurasan the Kunya is sometimes a nom de guerre
(in the strictest sense). Tab. 2, 1289, 15, 1430, 3, 1593, 16, 1627, 4
J631, 15. Another nom de guerre, 1538, 7.

496 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

played an ambiguous part as mediators between
the nationalities. They were termed the Nusah&,
" the good friends." The best-known of them are
Sulaim and Haiy&n an Nabati.

Military service in the events of war of that
time and district offered the most favourable
opportunity of joining Islam. Following the
example of the distinguished Iranians, the Arab
gentlemen took with them into the field a
personal following of servants (Sh&kiriya).
These servants also took part in the fighting and
sometimes decided the struggle. There were
besides special Iranian regiments commanded by
Iranian colonels, examples of whom are Huraith
b. Qutba and his brother Thabit in earlier
times, and Haiy&n anNabatl and his son Muq&til
later.1 The Hawaii, — here, as elsewhere, this
signifies the non-Arabs who had embraced Islam
and been received into the Arab tribes, — fought
with the Arabs against their old national foes,
the Turks. But they also fought for Islam
against their Soghdian tribesmen, in so far as
the latter were foes of Islam and allies of
the Turks. Islam, which they had originally
accepted more for external reasons, even
took root in their hearts and was taken more

1 There are in addition the contingents of vassal princes who had
to render military service, but these were, to a great extent at least,
still heathen,

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 497

seriously by them than by the Arabs them-
selves.1

But the Hawaii were not fully recognised by
the Arabs. If they served in the army they
fought on foot and not on horseback, and if they
distinguished themselves they were regarded
with distrust. True, they certainly received pay
and a share in the spoil, but not a regular
pension ; they did not appear in the Diwan, i.e., the
military pension-list. Although received into
the Arab tribes they were still " People of the
villages " as distinguished from " People of the
tribes," and although Muslims they were never-
theless not relieved of the subject-tax. The tax
to which even the Arab landowners had to con-
tribute, certainly seems not to have been such a
burden for the Khurasanites as for the Transoxi-
anans, who had embraced Islam only with the
view of being freed from it. Still the discontent
of the Soghdians doubtless infected the Khurasa-
nites as well ; Harith b. Suraij and others saw
to that.

If the Arabs had treated the converted
Iranians as equals, perhaps a blending of the
two nationalities would have been possible, but
as things were, they reared foes for themselves
in their very midst. Instead of smoothing
out the difference, Islam accentuated it. It

1 Tab. 2, 1291, 9: The Iranians did nofc join in unless the fighting
was for the religion.

63

498 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

regenerated the Iranians, gave them backbone,
and put into their hands a weapon against their
masters. For the fall of the Arab power was
brought about not by the Transoxianans who
had remained Iranian and hostile to the Arabs,
but by the Islamised Khurasanites. Islam it-
self was the ground upon which they began
the struggle against the former. It was Islam
that united them with those Arabs who, follow-
ing theocratic principles, opposed the Umaiyid
government. It was Arabs who first roused and
organised the Mawali.

Conservative Islam placed the Jam&a (Catho-
licity) above everything, and enjoined agree-
ment with the government and obedience to it.
Revolutionary Islam set the idea of the theo-
cracy against the existing organisation, and in-
vited men to fight for God against the Umaiya
and their officials, for law and justice against
wrong and force. There is little mention of the
Khaw&rij in the far East ; but all the same even
there they were of more significance than the
scanty information about them allows us to
suppose. The Harftrite Shaib&n b. Salama,
with his considerable following, cannot have so
suddenly sprung from nowhere as he seems to
us to have done. The Murjiites, indeed, are
more important, and under the leadership of
H&rith b. Suraij had a very considerable effect
upon the history. The Khaw&rij, as well as

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 439

the Murjiites, in principle, acknowledged no
difference in Tslam between Arabs and Hawaii,
but in the end both of them went completely
into the background before the Shiites who
early spread into Khurasan and became the
deciding factor.

The Shia, like the theocratic opposition in
general, had their seat in Iraq, but it was
from Iraq that the Iranian East was conquered
and peopled, and even later the connection was
always actively kept up. Prom Iraq a new in-
flux kept constantly coming into the Oxus dis-
tricts, not consisting of the most peaceful of
men. The Umaiyid stattholders in Iraq, especi-
ally Zi&d and Hajj&j, appear to have moved
on the dangerous elements from Kufa and
Basra to Khurasan, in order to frustrate their
desire for action in the holy war. It is signi-
ficant that Hajj&j kept the Syrians away from
it lest they should be infected by the evil spirit.
As can be understood, we have no very exact
information about the rise of the Shia in Khura-
san ; the seed flew through the air and sowed
itself. But how wide-spread the Shiite sympa-
thies there were can be perceived from the fact
that after the ill-fated attempt at a rebellion
by Zaid b. All in Kufa, his son Yahyfr re-
ceived the advice to make for Khurasan, and
followed it, too. True he fell in battle against
government troops, but his martyrdom evoked

500 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

a general uproar, and all the boys who were
born in that year in Khurasan are said to have
been named after him (Mas' Adi, 6, 3). Abft
Muslim knew what he was about when he
played the avenger of Yahy&. By so doing, he
struck a note that found an echo everywhere
(Tab., 2, 1985. 3,5061). Even Ibn Muftwia b.

Ja'far thought he would find a sure abode in

c*

Khurasan. He certainly was mistaken in Abft
Muslim, who had less use for a living Alid than
for a dead one, and had him secretly murdered.
But even Ibn Mu&wia was long honoured in
Khurasan as a martyr, and his grave much
visited as a shrine.

If the Arabs in Khurasan had held together
amongst themselves and with the government
the Shia would certainly not have been able to
pierce the joints, but as they would not share
the power with the Mawali, so they did not
bestow it upon each other. The offices and
benefices which the government had to dispose
of were the source and cause of passionate jea-
lousy between the tribes. The so-called 'Asabfya
was a chronic malady of the Arabs, and finally
when the throne of the Umaiyids began to
totter, it became, as we have seen, exceedingly
acute. This state of things was taken advan-
tage of by the special Shia with which the
Abbasids were in league, since they had separa-
ted from the Alids and withdrawn from Medina

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 501

where they could not compete with them, to
Humaima in the mountainous region between
Syria and Arabia (ashShar&t).1

Among the Shiites there were two main
divisions, which, to be sure, were riot every-
where distinctly defined : a moderate one, which
was distinguished from the ordinary Islam only
by the political principle that the Khalifate be-
longed to the house of the Prophet, and an
extreme one with a peculiar dogma which was
quite foreign to the original Islam. The ex-
tremists went by different names which express-
ed only insignificant shades of meaning; at
first they were called the Saba'iya. According
to Saif b. TJmar these SaM'iya were from the
beginning the root of all the evil and mischief in
the history of the theocracy, the murderers of

1 The ancestor of the Abbasids was the pions manufacturer of
tradition Abdullah Ibn Abb&s, a full cousin of Muhammad and Alt.
As after All's death he had allowed himself to bo bought over by
Muawia, he remained upon good terms with tho Umaiyids, only
grinding his teeth in secret. His equally pious son Ali b. Abdillab,
nicknamed asSajjad or Dhul Thafiimt, did the same. Under Abdul-
nmlik he went to Damascus to settle, but after the lattor's death ho
was ill-treated by Walid I and in A. II. 95, under compulsion, it is
said, moved his abode to Humaima, near Adhruh, on the Syrian pilgrim-
way, whero ho died in A. H. 118 at a great age. (Tab., 2, 1592.) Even
in his life-time his son Muhammad b. Ali was of far more account. He
first made his appearance by claiming the Jmamate of the Shia and was
tho instigator of the secret propaganda of the Abbasids, whom he
left to do his work in Kufa and Khurasan whilst he himself kept in his
refuge in Humaima. He died in Dhulqa'da, 125 (Tab., 2, 1769), and
then his son Ibrahim b. Muhammad, born in A. H. 82, succeeded him as
second Abbasid Imam.

502 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

TJthm&n and the openers of the Janus-gate of
the civil war, the founders of: the Kharijite
revolutionary party, and the originators of the
self-destruction of Islam. They really first
attained their historical significance through
Mukht&r, although they were in existence
earlier than that.1 Their home was Kufa and the
neighbourhood of Kufa. They consisted not
merely of Arabs, but really mostly of Mawali, and
they believed in the teaching of Ibn Saba con-
cerning the return of the same spirit in different
bodies, especially the spirit of the Prophet in
his heirs. These are their three chief charac-
teristics. They were rejected by the distin-
guished Alids, the descendants of Fafcima, the
Prophet's daughter, who held to the basis of
the old Islam and Arabism, so they attached
themselves to a son of All by a second marriage
who was called Ibn Hanafiya after his mother,
and he allowed them to make him the idol
which, according to their doctrine, they required.
It did not matter that he remained passive in
the background, in fact, for their purpose he
was just as good dead as alive. For a while
it was said that he had not died but lived in se-
clusion in the mountain Radwa, near Medina,
ready to appear at the right moment, but after-
wards his son Abdullah Abft H&shim, who was

1 For Mukhtar c/. my treatise upon the Shia (Gottingen, 1901), pp.
74 ff.

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 508

just as insignificant as himself, was regarded
as his heir in the Imamship. The extremists of
Kufa did not get what they counted upon with
Zaid b. Ali b. Husain. Then Abu H&shim
moved his residence to Humaima and there got
in league with the Abbasids.1 When he died in
A. H. 98 he is said to have made over the office
of Imam by express declaration in his will to
the Abbasid Muhammad b. Ali.

Van Vloten has emphatically referred to the
importance of this latter statement.2 To be sure,
in this form it is probably fictitious3 but it must
be early, for it has plenty of witnesses,4 and the
later Abbasids would have been wary about
establishing their claim upon such a basis. It
is also intrinsically true, for AM. Hashini ac-
tually was the predecessor of Muhammad b.
Ali even though he may not formally have
named him as his successor. He had a party
of his own ; his adherents were called the
Hashimiya,5 after him, and after his death they
went over to Muhammad b. Ali (Tab., 3,2500).
In Khurasan, according to Tab., 2,1589, there

1 He may have been there earlier than the Abbasids, and they may
have joined him (A. H. 95), but not he them.

8 Opkomst der Albasiden (Leiden, 1890), pp. 18 f. 148.

8 Ace. to Shahrastani, 112, 19, Abu Hashim made a will in favour
of the Kindite Abdullah b. Amr b. Harb.

4 Madainl in Tab. 3, 24. Ibn Sa'd in Wustenfeld's Register, p. 19,
310 and in Vloton's Opkomst, p. 148.

8 Shahrastani, 112 f. In Tab. the name Hashim!ya appears
plainly as the designation of the sect only, in 2, 1589. 1987. 89. It is

504 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

was at their head Khidash, one of the most suc-
cessful Sliiite recruiting officers, with whom
Mubammad h. All originally had an under-
standing. There is thus some degree of correct-
ness in the account of that will. The Ahbasids
joined Abu H&shim so as to win over the
Hashimiya to themselves.

But this also shows their connection with the
Sab&'iya of Mukht&r, for from these worshippers
of Ibn Hanafiya are descended the worshippers
of his son, the Hashimiya. The Sab&'iya in
Kufa had not become extinct with Mukhtar ;
they still existed in the lower circles. The
esoteric doctrine of the Hashimiya, as it is
represented in Shabrast&ni, is in no way different
from that of Ibn Saba. The Abbasid conspiracy
is exactly similar to the Sabaite, as Saif describes
it.1 Its headquarters were likewise Kufa ;
from there the propaganda was spread into
Khurasan. In short, the movement in both
cases was supported by the Iranian Mawali,
and was directed against the Arabism in Islam.
The conformity thus extends to all the points
of importance, to the doctrine and to the
manner of recruiting, to the locality, and to the

generally usod in another sense, as a derivative from Hashim, not from
Abft Hashim ; just the same as Hashirnlyun. The ambiguity may have
been acceptable rather than otherwise to the Abbasids. The Hashi-
mtyat of Kumait are poems upon the Fatimids.

1 Skizzen 6, 124. The originally Jewish Mal&him-books play a part
both cases.

THE FALL OP THE ARAB KINGDOM 505

composition of the party. Two more details may
be added. The wooden club was the national
weapon of the lower Iranian population, and
it was already called the " club of the heretics" l
from the Khashabiya of Mukht&r, and did not
first get the name from those of Abft Muslim.
The Hawaii of his estate in Khutarnia near
Kufa formed Mukht&r's oldest adherents, and
according to Tab., 2,1960 (Mas'Ml, 6, 59) it was
from Khutarnia that Abft Muslim also originally
came. Should the correctness of these two
statements be doubted, they still do not lose
their significance, for invention must have its
motive and the motive is all that we require.
That the Abbasids later on denied the Shiites,
by means of whom they had risen, and shook
them off, is not surprising (Tab. 3,29,17). They
were inconvenient to them and might go after
they had served their purpose.

All this would seem to show that there
exists a close connection between the unsuc-
cessful revolution of Mukht&r and the successful
one of Abft, Muslim. Notwithstanding that
the fire in the year 67 seemed to be extinguished
by blood, it still glowed on under its ashes and
spread from Kufa to Khurasan. This place
offered more favourable conditions, because the
Mawali there were more compact, and the Arabs

1 Tab., 2, 694.
A4

506 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

opposed to them were much weaker than in
Kufa. Mukhtftr was one of the greatest men
of Islamic history; he anticipated the future.
If the doctrine of Kaj'a is correct, then the
Arab of Khutarnia came to life again in the
Maula of Khutarnia.

2. In the year 100 Muhammad b. Alt
sent Maisara to Kufa, and he l sent the Kufaites
Muhammad b. Khunais and Abft 'Jkrima the
saddler, also called AbA Muhammad asS&diq,
and Haiy&n the grocer, the uncle of Ibr&him b.
Salima, to Khurasan, with the commission to
recruit for him and his house. They returned
to Maisara with letters from Khurasanites whom
they had won over, and he sent these letters to
Muhammad b. Ali. Abft Muhammad asS&diq
selected in Khurasan twelve chiefs (Nuqab&) and
70 other men, and Muhammad b, All gave them
directions in writing. So runs Tab., 2,1358.
The completion of tho hundred years (Tab.,
3,24), the 12 apostles and the 70 followers excite
suspicion8 ; the reports from later years concur
to prove that the affair was not set agoing so
designedly. These records are mostly anony-
mous, only in three of them is Mad&int named
as a guarantor. I herewith append their contents.

1 The subject, ace. to Tab., 2, 1358, should have been Muhammad,
but is actually, ace. to 2, 1434, Maisara.

8 Aco. to Tab., 2, 1988, Muhammad b. Alt, in the year 102 or 103,
sent his messenger (singular) to Khurasan j after 70 men were won

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 507

Tab. ,2, 1434. In the year 102 Maisara s*nt
his messengers from Iraq to Khurasan, and there
the Abbasid recruiting began. A distinguished
Tamimite drew the attention of the statt-
holder of Yazid II to the doings of these
unknown men, who gave themselves out to be
merchants. They were arrested, but soon re-
leased again as some Khurasanites, mostly of the
Rabia and Yemen, became security for them.

Tab. 2, 1467. In the year 105 Bukair b.
MSMn, till then Junaid's interpreter l in Sind,
came to Kufa and brought with him four bars
of silver and one of gold. He fell into the
hands of the Abbasid recruiting-officers, Ab&
'Ikrirna as-S&diq, Maisara, Muhammad b.
Khunais, Salim alA'yau, and Abu Yahy&, was
won over by them, and gave up his money for
Muhammad b. All, with whom he also entered
into personal relations. After Maisara's death he
was put in his place, as leader of the recruiting.

Tab., 2, 1488. In the year 107 recruiters
were sent to Khurasan by Ibn M&h&n, viz. Abft
'Ikrima, Abu Muhammad as-S&diq,2 Muham-
mad b. Khunais, Amrn&r allbadi and others.

over, he chose 12 chiefs from amongst them. The names of the
twelve are given somewhat differently than in Tab. 2, l?58, and in
isolated cases variants are cited. Even the order in the list is not sure.
In the Mal&him-books the number 100 may have played a part.

1 Ace. to 1726, 10 " hcribe."

2 Ace. to 1358, 4 (1467, 7) Abu Ikrima is identical with Abu
Muhammad.

508 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

A Kindite complained of them to the statt-
holder Asad, and he had them crucified after
their hands and feet had heen sawn off. Amm&r
alone escaped to Kufa. "When Muhammad b.
Ali heard the news, he said, "There will be
more of you killed yet."

In Tab., 2, 1492 the same story is repeated
under A. H. 108, with the variation that Amm&r
alone is executed and the others escape.

Tab., 2, 1501, under A. H. 109, according to
Mad&ini. During the first stattholdership of
Asad there came to Khurasan in the company
of other Kufaites the first Abbasid recruiter,
Abft Muhammad Zi&d, Maula of the Hamd&n,
who before that had stayed for a while in
Damascus. Muhammad b. All had directed
him to take up his abode among the Yemen, to
treat the Mudar with consideration, and to
keep clear of a certain Gh£lib in Abarshahr
(Naisabur), who was devoted to the Fatimids.
Others, however, mention Harb b. Uthm&n of
Balkh, Maula of the Qais b. Tha'laba, as the
first Abbasid recruiter in Khurasan authorised
by a letter of Muhammad b. All. AbA Muham-
mad Zi&d stayed for a time in Marw (1501 5 17),
entertained the people, and recruited for the
BanA Abb&s by means of invectives against the
Umaiyids. Yahy& b. Uqail alKhuz&i and
Ibr&hlm b. Khatt&b alAdawl visited him fre-
quently ; Gh&lib, who came from Abarshahr to

THE FALL OF THE AKAB KINGDOM 509

Marw. separated from him after a quarrel. Upon
the accusation of the tax-official of Marw, Abu
Muhammad Zi&d was banished from Khurasan
by Asad, although he gave himself out to be a
harmless merchant, but as he still remained
there he was executed four days before the
festival (1503,6), and his Kufaite companions
with him, with the exception of two who were
spared because they were too young, or because
they renounced the \bbasids. After that
another Kufaite came to Marw, Kathlr, who
took a lodging with Abfi Najm and recruited
for the Abbasids. He carried on his work for
a year or two, but wa>s uneducated and was
replaced by Khadd&sh, so-named because he
tore to shreds the Abbasid religion ; but his real
name was Um&ra.1

Tab., 2, 1560. In the year 113, under the
s tat th older ship of Junaid several Abbasid re-
cruiters made their appearance. He executed
one of them and outlawed the rest.

Tab., 2, 1586 f. In the year 117 Asad,
during his second stattholdership, took prisoner
several Abbasid recruiters, among them the
Khuz&ites Sulaim&n b. Kathlr, M&lik b. Haith-
am, Talha b. Ruzaiq, the Bakrite Kh&lid b.
Ibrahim, th« Tamimites Mfts& b. Ka'b and
L&hiz b. Quraiz. Sulaim&n b. Kathir said they

1 Aco. to 1588, 9 Amin&r b. Yazld. He is generally called not
Khaddash but Khid&sh ; Khadd&sh should have the article.

510 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

were slandered as belonging to the Azd-Rabta
by the Mudarites, who could not forgive them
for their determined stand against Qutaiba. He
reminded them that the Mudarites also were
opponents of the stattholder. This was effec-
tive, and Asad liberated the Khuz&ites and the
Bakrite, but punished the two Tamimites. He
had MAs& b. Ka'b's teeth broken out with the
bridle of an ass, and 300 stripes given to
L&hiz.1

Tab., 2,1588. In the year 118 Ibn M^han
sent Amm&r b. Yazid to Khurasan as leader of
the Abbasid propaganda. He changed his name
to Khid&sh, took a lodging in Marw, and was
very successful. But he turned aside to false-
hood, preached libertinism (Din al-Khurramiya)
and permitted community of wives. Asad
arrested him and, as he used very contumacious
speech towards him, had one of his hands cut off,
his tongue torn out and one eye blinded.

In addition to this Madainl in Tab., 2, 1589,
has,— When Asad in the year 118 was in Amul,
Khid&sh, the head (of the sect) of the H&shimiya
was brought before him. He made his doctor
Qur'a cut off his tongue and blind him of an
eye, and then handed him over to the justiciary
of Amul, who^ executed him and nailed him to a
cross.

1 He dared not execute the Khurasanite Arabs ns he did the
Knfaite Mawali.

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 511

Tab., 2, 1639f. In the year 120 Sulaimftn b.
Kathlr went from Khurasan to Muhammad b.
All, no doubt for the following reason.
Muhammad was angry with his adherents in
Khurasan because they had believed Khid&sh
and his lies in preference to him, and broke off
correspondence with them. In order to get into
communication with him again they sent to him
Sulaiman b. Kathir. Muhammad explained to
him the reason of his displeasure and gave him
a letter in which, however, there was nothing.
But following this, he sent Ibn M&h&n from
Kufa as the bearer of a second letter, in which
he gave vent to his plain sentiments regarding
Khid&sh. But the Khurasanites distrusted Ibn
M&h&n and had him sent off. Muhammad then
sent sticks tipped, some with iron and some with
brass, and Ibn Mah&n distributed them amongst
the party-chiefs (Nuqabft). They then perceived
that they had acted contrary to his principles
and mended their ways.1

Tab., 2, 1726, under A. H. 124, according to
M&dainl. It leaked out that the Abbasid Shiites
in Kufa held meetings in a particular house.
Consequently their head, Ibn M&Mn, was arrest-
ed. In prison he won over to his cause YAnas

Abft 'Asim and the Ijlite ls& b. Ma'qil. From
the latter, when they were soon after released,

1 They must have nnderstood the meaning of the sticks better
than 1. They could not have been mere credentials for Ibn MAhftn.

514 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

he bought his servant Abft Muslim for 400
dirhems, and presented him to the son of
Muhammad b. All, Ibr&htm, who handed him
over to the saddler MAsfi,. Initiated by him
into the Abbasid doctrine, he made frequent
journeys to Khurasan.1

In addition there are the anonymous variants,
Tab., 2, I726f. 1769. In the year 124 the
Khurasanite party-leaders Sulaim&n b. Kathlr,
M&lik b. Haitham, L&hizb. Quraiz and Qahtaba
b. Shabib came, whilst on the pilgrimage, to
Kufa. There they visited in prison 'Asim b.
Y&nas alljli, who was suspected to be a recruiter

A

for the Abbasids, and Is& and Idrie, the two
sons of the Ijlite Ma'qil, who as officials of
KMlid alQasr! were imprisoned by YAsuf b.

A

Umar. Isa and Idrls had with them Abft
Muslim, who always wept when his masters
expressed their political opinions. The Khurasa-
nites won him over. They then went on to
Mecca,8 there met in with Muhammad b. All,
and told him about Abft Muslim. He asked, —
" Is he a freeman, or a bondman ? " They

A

replied, " He himself asserts he is free, but Is&
says he is a bondman. " Thereupon he ordered
him to be bought and freed. They handed over

1 With the somewhat obscure sentence 1726, 17, cf. the continua-
tion in 1949, 14.

• The end of 124. Tabari'a putting the account not till A. H. 125
makes no difference ; the Hajj is between the two years.

THE FALL OP THE ARAB KINGDOM 513

to him 200,000 dirhems and material to the
value of 30,000 dirhems, and he disclosed to
them that this was probably the last time they
would sQe him, and enjoined them to recognise
his son Ibr&hlm after his death. He died on the
1st Dhulqada, 125, aged 68, seven years after the
death of his father.

Tab., 2, 1869. In the year 126 the new
Imam sent Ibn M&h&n to Khurasan with a letter.
He assembled the party-chiefs and recruiters in
Marw, informed them of the death of Muham-
mad, declared Ibrahim as his successor, and gave
them his letter. They recognised him and paid
to him the moneys of the Shia, which he deli-
vered to Ibr&hlm.

Tab., 2, 1916 f. In the year 127 Ibrahim
appointed in place of the deceased Ibn M&h&n,
on the latter's recommendation, the vinegar-
seller Abft Salama Hafs b. Sulaim&n, Maula
of the Sabl, as his general-plenipotentiary, and
wrote to inform the Khurasanites of it. AbA
Salama also presented himself in person to the
Khurasanites and received from them the fifth
and voluntary gifts. He bore the title " Wizier
of the Family of Muhammad " (Tab., 3, 20, 60).

In all these accounts Kufa appears as the
Abbasid breeding-ground and centre. Here
dwell the representatives and plenipotentiaries
of the invisible Imam, — Maisara, Ibn M&h&n,
Abfl. Salama, and likewise their underlings and
65

514 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

co-operators, They are all Hawaii, of Iranian
nationality and shopkeepers and artisans to
trade. Arabs indeed may also have belonged
to the party but they did not occupy any leading
position. Khurasan, i.e., Marw, is worked from
Kufa; long after the year 100 the recruiters
there are still only Kufaites, stranger merchants.
The beginnings of the propaganda are obscure,
and smothered in bloodshed. Khid&sh was the
first to have any success. He is first mentioned
under A. H. 109 ; it is questionable whether he
really began his activity then, but it is just as
improbable that he did not come from Kufa till
A. H. 118, the year in which he was killed. The
people of Marw flocked to him, accepted his
word and followed him. He appears as the real
founder of the Abbasid party in Marw, and he
must also have been its organiser. It is no
wonder, then, that it is in A, H. 117 that we for
the first time find some traces of the native
chiefs who were supposed to be appointed as
early as the yeir 100 by Muhammad b. All him-
self, and that they adhered more to Khid&sh
than to Muhammad. While the mass of the
Shia in Marw consisted of Mawal i, the first
chiefs, — there are six of them named in Tab., 2,
1686f. — were Arabs. The most distinguished
among them, who after Khid&sh's death was his
successor, was Sulaim&n b. Kathir. He belonged
to the tribe Khuz&a, who owned jeer tain villages

THE FALL OP THE ARAB KINGDOM 515

in the oasis of Marw, and with their Iranian
peasants furnished a disproportionately large
contingent to the Abbasid Shia. The Khuz&a
had an old alliance with the house of the Prophet,
and besides they belonged to the Azd, and the
latter almost always were in the opposition
since the fall of the Muhallabids, so that they
were more easily accessible to revolts against
the government than the Mudar. Amongst
the six party-chiefs called to account by Asad
on A. H. 117, there were, moreover, along with
three Khuzaites and one Bakrite two Tamimites
as well, so we must not lay too much stress
upon the difference of tribe. These Shiites,
even the Arabs among them, protested against
the Arab nationalism. It was Islam, and not
Arabdom, according to their principles which
conferred the right of citizenship in the theo-
cracy. Neither were the Hawaii in the party
excluded from leading positions. Among the
twelve chiefs given in Tab., 2, 1358, four Mawali
appear side by side with eight Arabs.

After his death, but not till then, Khid&sh
was denounced by Muhammad b. All. He is
said to have been the evil enemy who sowed
tares in the wheat, the corrupter as well as the
chief of the people, as if he had lighted upon
the party and its organisation all ready-made.
The bait thrown out by him is said to have
been Khurramitism. In reality the sect which

616 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

he headed and extended was the Hasliimiya.
The Khurramites were not a sect, but a general
libertine tendency. They protested against
the Jewry of Islam, as they called it, i.e.,
against its melancholy Puritanism ; they wanted
to preserve their right in the religion of
nature and gladness, so they joined the native
Iranian heathendom, They may have been
influenced by socialist ideas as well, which in-
deed suited excellently with the aims of the
Hawaii. The communism of wives which
Mazdaq had formerly preached is said to have
been revived by the Khurramites and R&wan-
dites. Now it is quite credible that Khid&sh
did not oppose this tendency, but encouraged
jt and profited by it, but we are bound to think
it improbable that this was a stumbling-block
for the Abbasids. At that time they gathered
around them the heretics ; it was not till later,
when they had reached their goal, that they
dropped them and became orthodox. At the
beginning they tried to divert all the streams
of the Shiite opposition to their mill, let them
be of any dye they chose. Their first aim
was the negative one of overthrowing the Umai-
yids. They kept back the positive one of seiz-
ing the Khalif ate for themselves. They generally
showed themselves to their followers not so much
in the guise of pretenders as of instruments of
the revolution desired by God. They did not

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 517

put forward their own persons, but the cause,
the struggle for right against wrong. They
had homage paid, not to themselves and in
their name, but for an anonymous person of
the family of Muhammad to be agreed upon
later. Some even of their founders, who must
be regarded as initiated, only later began to
have a clear vision of their true aim. As far
as they could they did not let it be obvious
that they wanted to dislodge the Fatimids, but
created the impression that they were working
for them, posing in Khurasan and elsewhere as
the avengers of the Fatimid martyrs ; and
still less could they reject and deny the other
branch of the Shia, whose support against the
latter they must have. The Shia might believe
what they, liked and live as they pleased ; that
was to them a secondary consideration. Their
first care was that they should adhere to them.
The libertinism of the Hashimiya left them
cold, but what to them was critical was the in-
dependent organisation of the party in Khurasan,
which was a sequel to their great rising under
the leadership of Khid&sh. In Marw a local
committee was formed, which, as we can easily
understand, would not suffer itself to be kept
in leading-strings by Kufa, without, of course,
detracting from fidelity to Muhammad b. All
himself. But for him there also arose the
danger that the reins in Khurasan might slip

518 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

from his hands, for he held them only through
Kufa. So he used the personal authority which
he still possessed over the Khurasanite chiefs
to induce them to give up their independence
and be subordinate to the Wizier in Kufa, and
at last he succeeded with difficulty in winning
over their leader Sulaimfrn b. Kathlr. Whilst in
A. H. 120 the Khurasanites in Marw rejected
the Abbasid Wizier in Kufa, they gave him a
friendly reception in A. H. 126 and 127, and
also handed over to him the moneys which they
had collected. In other cases they delivered
them directly to the Imam, and in fact visited
him, not in Humaima but in Mecca. The pil-
grimage offered the revolutionaries convenient
and unobtrusive opportunities of meeting each
other. The personal relations with the Imam
assumed a more active and, because of the
money transaction, a more realistic appearance.

3. Ibr&him, the son and successor of
Muhammad b. All, took a decisive step to get
the reins in Khurasan completely into his hands
by despatching thither Abft Muslim. The
latter's origin is obscure and the accounts of
it are uncertain. It is certain that he was not
an Arab, but an Iranian, a slave or a client in
Kufa. While still a mere youth he there
attracted the notice of the Abbasid party, and
Ibr&him was moved to draw him to himself.
He received him into his family, took him into

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 519

his interest and made him his confidant. In
the year 128 AM Muslim was given a perma-
nent position as representative of the holy
family in Khurasan, where through having
frequently visited it before he was well-known,
and appointed leader of the cause. The time had
come. The mutinous Arab tribes had ex-
pelled Nasr from Marw and by risings of every
kind and in every quarter the hands of the
Umaiyid government were tied.1

The adopted Maula offered the Abbasid
better guarantees in Khurasan than the free
Arab who till then had been at the head of
the H&shimiya there. To be sure Sulaim&n b.
Kathir was not to be supplanted straightaway
by AbA Muslim, who on the contrary had orders
to respect him and to go by his advice. But
all the same he found in him a rival who threat-
ened his position. From his antecedents it is
understandable that he did not receive him
with open arms, and consequently Abft Muslim's
position in Marw was a difficult one. It was
no asset to him that he married into the family

1 "As the sons of Umaiya since the murder of Walid were at feud
among themselves, and so were fully occupied, the sons of Hashim
and the sons of All, likewise relations of the Prophet, dwelling, how-
ever, in secure seclusion in Little Arabia, turned this fact to account.
They gathered together under the leadership of Ibrahim and sent Abu
Muslim, their freedman, to Khurasan, to some influential men there
to invite them to take part in the struggle against Marwan," Such is
the account of Theoph,, A.M. 6240,

5*0 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

of one of the chiefs, AM Najm ; he was re-
garded as an interloper, could make no head-
way beside Sulaim&n, and thought it advisable
to quit the field in his favour.

He left Marw and made for Kufa again,
but when he was in QAmis, with one foot already
out of Khurasan, he was induced to turn back.
In Marw a change had come about ; people
now showed themselves ready to render obe-
dience to him as the all-powerful representative
of the heirs of the Prophet, and he now very
successfully took in hand the preparations for
the rising. He seems to have been compelled
to give up this activity because of a journey
to Mecca, which he with a number of his party-
confederates made in Jumada II, 129, in order
to hand over to the Imam there the collected
moneys.1 But when he reached the western boun-
dary of Khurasan, he made the Taite Qahtaba
b. Shabib go on to Mecca and himself set out on
the way back to Marw, The pilgrimage was
for him only a pretext. The truth was, he
wished to visit the scattered Shiites of all
shades of opinion, win them over, and prepare
them for the coming revolt. With the aim of
getting into communication with their leaders,
he went through the whole of western
Khurasan as far as the boundaries of Jurj&n

1 The date given (Tab,, 2, 1962) is rather early for the pilgrimage.

THE PALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 521

and back, making a considerable stay at several
places which were important for the Shiites.
Having got back to Marw, he began to act
openly.

I follow the anonymous account in Tab., 2,
1960S, in distinguishing between the two jour-
neys of AbA Muslim. The first time he left
Marw because he could not keep his position
there. The second time he journeyed through
western Khurasan with the purpose of inciting
to agitation under pretence of making the pil-
grimage. Mad&int (Tab., 1949ff.) only mentions
one journey, the second. He says nothing
about the dangerous variance between Ab&
Muslim and Sulaim&n. But, as Van Vloten
rightly emphasises,1 this variance has every
ground of probability in its favour. Still, we
might, of course, be content with one journey.
We might take it that Abu Muslim, as he could
not gain a footing in Marw, had attempted to
make on his own account a position for himself
in western Khurasan. But the pilgrimage
which he undertook in common with the Mar-
wites does not fit in with this assumption. Above
all, chronological difficulties arise, for the cele-
bration to which they journeyed was the one
which was held at the end of 129; Qahtaba
only returned from Mecca in A.H. 130. But at

1 Cf. the passage cited by him from Maqrizl for the A hi alKafiya,
Recherches, p. 80.

66

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

this time the revolt under AM Muslim in Marw
was already completely in train, for it broke
out immediately after his return from the insur-
rection expedition. His breach with Sulaim&n
and his consequent compulsory departure from
Marw must have taken place earlier, soon after
his first arrival in the year 128. Possibly the
circumstance that Abft Muslim on both journeys
reached the western boundary of Khurasan and
there turned back, tends to confuse them.

Of the revolt in the villages of the Khuz&a
near Marw in the second half of the year 129
(summer, 74/7), Tabarl gives the account of
Mad&inl (1949ff., 1965ff., 1989ff.)f that of Abu'l-
Khatt&b (I953ff., 1967ff., 1984ff.), and still
another one which is anonymous (1960ff., 1970ff.,
1992ff.). These agree in certain characteristics
and also in some striking details, but they
present many differences as well. Neither are
they at one in themselves, and taken all
together are extremely unsatisfactory.

First of all we are most prepossessed in
favour of the account of Abu'lKhattftb, whicli
at the first glance appears the most conclusive.
On Tuesday, 9th Sha'b&n, 129 (Tuesday, 25th
April, 747), having again reached the oasis of
Marw from Khurasan, Abft Muslim first took
a lodging in Fanin, the village of Abft DMd
Kh&lid b. Ibr&hlm al-Bakrl.1) On the 2nd

1 C/, I960. 14 f,

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 523

Eamadan (17th May) he removed from there to
Sikadanj, the village of Sulaim&n b. Kathir
al Khuzai. The 25th Ramadan was kept in
view as the date for open action, and notice of
this given to the members of the party in
Marwrudh, Tukharistan and Khwarizm. On this
day, then, the two black standards sent by the
Imam were actually unfurled in Sikadanj, and
beacon-signals were also made to the inhabi-
tants of the neighbouring villages. Within the
next few days they arrived ; those from Suq&dim
first, on the 27th Ramadan. The camp numbered
2,200 infantry and 56 horsemen. On the festi-
val of the breaking of the fast, Friday, 1st
Shauwal, 129 (15th June, 747), the first service
according to the Abbasid ritual was held in
Sikadanj, conducted by Sulaiman b. Kathir,
following which Abii Muslim held a great ban-
quet. Eighteen days after l his public act of
revolt a troop of horse sent by the stattholder
Nasr advanced against him, but it was repulsed
by Abft Nasr M&lik b. Haitham alKhuzM near
Alln, the wounded and captive leader being
well cared for and then liberated, so that he
might go home and publish the praise of
Abft Muslim. At the beginning of Bhulqa'da,
KMzim b. Khuzaima at Tamlml seized the town
of Marwrudh and killed the Government official
there. Abft Muslim remained 42 days in Sikadanj

1 Months in 1957, 17 is a slip.

524 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

altogether. On Wednesday, 9th Dhulqa'da
(Saturday, 22nd July,) he moved his camp
to M&khu&n, the residence of several Shiites
famous later on, and here he settled down for a
considerable stay. He appointed officials and
fortified the camp. If he had been like
another man hitherto, he now assumed the
airs of a prince. His army rose to 7,000 men
and he had every one registered in a roll accord-
ing to his father's name and that of his village.
The pay amounted to from 3 to 4 dirhems (per
month). The people of Suqadim, 800 strong,
he sent to Jiranj to break off Nasr's commu-
nications with Marwrudh and Tukharistan. He
relegated the servants to a separate camp, and
later on sent them to Biward to MAs& b. Ka'b
at Tamlmi. Four months after he moved from
Makhuan to Alin, as the water there could not
be cut off from him ; for he was apprehensive
of an attack by the Arabs of Marw, who for
this end had made a truce with each other.
In Alin he celebrated the feast on the 10th
Dhulhijja, 129 (22nd August, 747). Govern-
ment troops did actually advance from Marw
to attack him, and committed all sorts of mis-
chief in the villages, until he put a stop to
their doings. Then some wounded prisoners
fell into his hands, and he cared for them, and
when well, set them free. But the unity of the
enemy did not last long, as Ali b. Judai

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 525

alKarmanl was induced by Sulaim&n b. Kathtr
to break the truce, and they now actually made
Abu Muslim arbitrator in their dispute. Depu-
tations from both parties, the Mudar and the
Azd-E/abia, appeared before him and sued for
his favour. In a solemn conclave he, along
with his 70 fellow- judges, decided for the Azd
against the Mudar, for All b. Judai against
Nasr ; the Mudar sorrowfully departed. After
29 days he again left Alin and returned to
Makhuan, ordering his men to provide them-
selves with supplies there for the winter, since
God had removed the danger of enemies. This
took place on Thursday, 15th Safar, 130 (25th
October, 747). He now stayed 90 days more in
Makhuan, till Thursday, 9th Jum&da, when he
marched into Marw.1 The town proper was in
the hands of Nasr, whom All b. Judai, sup-
ported by an officer of Ab& Muslim, now attack-
ed with energy. While the struggle was
raging Abu Muslim made his entrance. Nasr
surrendered to him, but the next morning he
and his faithful followers fled. Twenty-four
distinguished Arabs, among them Salm b.
Ahwaz at Tamlml, Abft Muslim had executed.

1 Aco. to 1986, 18. 1987, 14 it was the first, aco. to 1984, 14, tho
second Jumada. For tho 90 days from the middle of Safar onwards,
the first suits better, but for Thursday ; the second is better ; for the
9th Jum&da I fell upon a Monday, the 9th Jumadfc II upon a
Wednesday. The difference of one day does not matter, as the
beginning of the month frequently varies by a day.

526 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

The exactness and completeness of the
account does not count for much. This is
apparent, for instance, in the duplicate
regarding the repulse of an enemy attack in
Alin and the good treatment of the wounded
captives by Abu Muslim, but particularly
so in the chronological statements. These con-
tain the clumsiest discrepancies; the longer
periods in particular do not fit in at all with
the fixed calendar dates. On the 2nd Ramadan
129 (May 17th, 747) Abu Muslim comes to
Slkadanj and stays there 42 days, i.e., till the
middle of Shauwal (end of June) ; but he does
not go away to Makhuan till the 9th Dhulqada
(22nd July). The duration of the first sojourn
in Makhuan is given as 4 months, but as early
as the beginning of Dhulhijja (the middle of
August), after barely one month, he is in Alin.
He stays in Alin 29 days, i.e., till the beginning
of Muharram, 130 (middle of September), but
he does not return to Makhuan till the middle
of Safar (end of October). The second stay
in Makhuan lasts 90 days, i.e., till the middle
of Jumada I. With this the date of the entry
into Marw almost coincides, if we take the 9th
of the first and not of the second Jumada.

Abu5! Khatt&b, according to Mad&ini, re-
quires correction; the Anonymous Version
keeps a middle course. According to Mad&inl,
AbA Muslim was not in Makhuan twice, but

THE PALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 527

only once. The four months which Abu'l
Khatt&b takes for the first sojourn are really
the extent of the whole stay there. The 8
months (4 months + 29 days+90 days) which
he reckons from the first coming of Abu Muslim
to Makhuan until his definite departure thence,
are curtailed to the half. Certainly Abft Mus-
lim's stay in Makhuan was, even according to
Mad£ini, interrupted, but only by a journey
which he personally made to Marw. On his
return from this journey, he stayed, according
to Mad&ini, 3 months more in Makhuan ; these
correspond to the 90 days in Abu'l Khatt&b.
According to Mad&inl and the one account of
Abu'l Khatt&b, the return took place at the
beginning of the year 130, and if we reckon
3 months or 80 days from then, then Abft
Muslim struck camp in Makhuan at the begin-
ning of Rabi II, and marched into Marw.
M&daint indeed gives the 9th Rabi II for the
entry into Marw, and the anonymous account
agrees with him.1 This date is further con-
firmed by the statement that the days then
were very short (1990, 20) ; the 9th Rabii II,
130 was the 17th Deer., 747 ; the 9th Jum&d&
I or II mentioned instead by Abu'l Khatt&b
(15th January or 14th February, 748) fell more
or less considerably beyond the winter solstice.

1 It is also called the 7th Rabi II, the confusion between 7 and
9 is constantly occurring in Arabic,

528 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

Working backwards we get to the beginning of
Dhulhijja, 129 as the commencement of the
sojourn in Makhuan that covered in all four
months. The encampment in Alin did not inter-
rupt it, but preceded it ; according to Mad&inl,
AbA Muslim was there L in Dlmlqa'da, 129.
Unanimous tradition says he was in Sikadanj in
Shauwal and Eamadan. The 42 days which Abu'l
Khatt&b puts down to Sikadanj, Mad&ini
reckons to Alin, but here Abu'l Khattab is
certainly right. We must also follow his ac-
count in making Panln precede Sikadanj.2

If this scheme holds, we then gather some-
thing like the following idea of the course of
events. The villages of the Khuz&a 3 in which
Abft Muslim shifted his quarters about, lay
near each other in the district of the Kharq&n
Canal. The original centre of the conspiracy
was Sikadanj where the chief head of the
Hashimiya, Sulaim&n b. Kathir, had his seat.
There the black standards which Ibrahim b.
Muhammad had sent, were unfurled, and the
beacon-signals kindled. Thither assembled the
members of the party from the nearer and more
remote surrounding districts. There on the 1st
Shauwal, 129 the first Abbasid service was held

1 Balin (1952, 10) is identical with Allin and Alin ; it may have
arisen from bi-Alin (in Alin).

8 Cf. Van Vloten, Opkomst der Albasiden, p. 79,

3 They are so called a potiori, for Fan!n and Makhuan were not
specifically Khuzaite,

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 529

at which Sulaiman b. Kathir acted as Imam.
That he only did so upon the command of AbA
Muslim is incredible. At that time in Sikadanj
he was not exactly the person to be dislodged
from the first place ; he kept up the appear-
ance, at least, of the primacy, even though the
leadership of the movement had already slipped
from his hands. AbA Muslim felt hampered by
him, so after 42 days he left Sikadanj, went first
to Alin, and from there about the end of the
year 129, to Makhuan. He made his appear-
ance in Makhuan as lord and ruler, his army
increased, and through it, his power and conse-
quence as well. It was then, too, that he first
aroused the apprehension of the Arabs, who
were beating each other's brains out in Marw,
and this was increased by the successes gained
by the Shiite movement simultaneously at other
points, in Biward, in Marwrudh, and especially
in Herat (Tab., 2, 1966). Moved by the Bak-
rites who served under him, Shaibaii al Haruri
first of all made his peace with Nasr, and All
b. Judai alKarmani seems to have followed his
example. It looked as if the Arabs had at
last comprehended the danger that threatened
them, and wanted to meet it together. But,
full of distrust of one another, they did nothing
serious; against Abft Muslim. The most they
did was to undertake one raid into the district
un&er his power, which was repulsed byhim
67

530 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

without trouble,1 and after a short time he
managed to break up the alliance of the
hostile brethren. He betook himself in person
from Makhuan to Marw and contrived to make
All b. Judai withdraw from the truce with the
Azd and again enter into hostile relations with
Nasr and the Mudar. At the beginning of 130
he returned to Makhuan. He was now abso-
lutely secure from the Arabs and could quietly
leave them to themselves till it seemed to him
about time to bring home the fruits of their
suicidal work. His relationship with the Mudar
by no means suffered by his having won over
the Azd. On the contrary, they are said to have
attempted to attract him from the latter to their
side, so that he was courted by both. In any
case, they no longer dared to treat him as an
enemy, and so it could come about that he
entered Marw as judge, and by his intervention
put an end to the fierce dispute in which the
Arab tribes were dissipating their strength. He
decided, — so at least it seemed at first, — to side
with the Azd against the Mudar. Of this
actual event, the^cene reported by Abu Jl Khat-
t&b, how the delegates of the Azd and the
Mudar appear in the camp of Makhuan before

1 It has been already pointed out that Abu ' I Khatt&b gives two
versions (1958f. 1970) of the same affair (at Alin). Both end in Abu
Muslim treating the wounded prisoners well so as to gain credit to him-
self. Both are very much padded ; ace. to Tab. 1970 the hostilities
amounted to the theft and slaughter of the peasants' cattle and poultry.

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 531

AM Muslim to submit their quarrel to him for
decision, and how he with his 70 assessors gives
sentence, is an anticipation. Neither did he as
yet make negotiations with Judai al Karm&ni,
but only with his son All, at the end of 129 or
beginning of 130, in which he took the initia-
tive. He was the suer, not the sued, as Van
Vloten rightly remarks. Erom a later point of
view he did not show to advantage in this situa-
tion. He contradicted the ideas people had
formed of him by lowering himself in this way.
People were inclined to put at an earlier time
the peculiarly authoritative position which he
finally attained, but this makes it incomprehen-
sible why he waited so long before finally laying
hold of it. At the beginning he was not so
strong all at once that he could openly oppose
the Arabs, so he acted with diplomacy, keeping
them in suspense and throwing dust in their
eyes. Even with the Mudar he did not spoil
things so completely that they counted him
their declared enemy. His incitation of a rising
against the Umaiyid Government was at that
time in the order of things and disturbed
nobody, and beyond that he did not show his
hand. According to Mad&ini (Tab., 2, 1965),
the pious scholars of Marw came to him to find
out who he was and what he wanted, but he
did not have anything to do with them, saying
he had more urgent business on handi

£32 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

The majority of his adherents consisted of
Iranian peasants and of the Hawaii of the
villages of Marw, but there were Arabs among
them also who mostly occupied leading posi-
tions. The connecting element was the religion,
the sect. The nucleus of the Khurasanian army,
the " Jund " of the Abbasids, consisted of the
Hashimiya, as is expressly stated in Tab., 2,
1987. It was at the head of the Hashimiya
that Abft Muslim entered Marw, and after the
entry homage was received from them, Abft
Mansftr Talha b. Ruzaiq alKhuzM administer-
ing the oath. The formula of the oath ran :
"I hold you bound to the Book of God and the
Sunna of the Prophet, and to obedience to him
of the family of the Messenger of God who
may be agreed upon, and not to demand from
your officers either maintenance or money, but
to wait till they give you something of their
own accord;1 and no one is to do any hurt to his
personal enemy when he has him in his power,
except upon the command of a superior." It is
remarkable that Abft Mansftr, who, as it is
reported, was thoroughly initiated into the
principles and arguments of the sect, lets no-
thing of these be known as far as the troops
were concerned, but confines himself to genera-
lities. Nor does he yet let the person of the

2 Cf. also the Ahl alKafiya (or alKifaya?) in Vlotcn, Recherches,
pp. 66, 80.

THE PALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 533

Abbasid Imam get outside of the circle of *the
Prophet's family. The troops were, before
everything, bound to absolute obedience to
their officers ; even with these revolutionaries
a military turn was given to the religion. The
common people were not obliged to know the
secrets of their superiors ; the black standard
was sufficient as their creed. There had long
been standards of all colours1 among the Islamic
parties, but nowhere does the standard, its colour
and significance, stand out so strikingly as with
the Shiites of Khurasan. They even wore the
black flag on their bodies. Theophanes calls them

the XovpaoravLoi 2 ^avpo(f)opoL "the wearers of
black," and in the Continuator Isidori Hispan. (ed.
Mommsen, par. 134), they are called Persarum
pullata demonia, " the black devils." The stan-
dard of the Prophet is said to have been black,
and hence to have been also that of the
Abbasids. In the Apocalyptic books there was

1 Red with the Khawarij, Agh., 20, 112, 31, Black, ibid, and 99, 9 ;
of. Tab., 2, 1981. 2007. Lisan 11, 329. The opponents of the Abbasids
chose white, not only the Syrians of Umaiyid tendency, but the Alids
as well (Tab., 3, 223. 271. 295. 298. 361. 508.) Certain rebels (Khurra-
mitee ?) in Media carried red flags and were therefore called the
Muhammira (Tab. 3, 493 f. 645f. 1236). One of the Hasanids carried
a yellow flag with the picture of a serpent (Tab., 3, 237). Prominent
persons had their private colour, which their clients assumed also
(Tab., 3, 516). In Arab olden times black was the colour of revenge,
Agh., 8, 75, 20.

2 x°Paaai/ or xovPaorav is the correct writing (for Theophanes,
like the Syrians, uses the ov short) ; x<0Paffav again, is wrong. Both a
are long.

534 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

mention of the man of the black standards who
would bring in tha new era, but H&rith b.
Suraij, who for the first time set the Hawaii
in the saddle in the name of Islam, had also
black standards, and Abft Muslim may then
have borrowed them from him because they
were popular among the Mawali.

In verses preserved in Dinawari, 360, Nasr
b. Saiy&r, the Umaiyid stattholder of Marw,
addresses the Arabs as follows, — " Why do ye
always rekindle the feud between yourselves,
acting as if there were no sensible men among
you, and letting the foe who stand at the door
work their will ! They are a mob of men with-
out religion and without consequence, no Arabs
of ours, for us to know, and no Mawali of any
standing. They have a religion which comes
not from the Messenger of God nor is it to be
found in the holy books ; it amounts, in truth,
to this, that the Arabs are to be killed." Ac-
cording to Tab., 2, 1937, 1974. 3,25 the Imam
Ibr&hlm b. Muhammad himself is said to have
expressly directed AbA Muslim to leave no Arab
alive in Khurasan. According to Theophanes,
A. M. 6240 the slaves in Khurasan, set on by
Abft Muslim, slew their masters in one night
and equipped themselves with their weapons,
horses and money. In the historical account of
Tabarl of the taking of Marw nothing is
said about this ; only Abft Muslim ha I 24

THE PALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 5S5

distinguished followers of Nasr executed, after the
latter's flight, but he enjoined upon his soldiers
the strictest discipline and forbade any arbitrary
killing. Now it is possible that here, as in
other cases, there exists a moderation in the
Abbasid interest. The Mawali may quite likely
have indulged their fury more bitterly than
appears to be the case according to Tahari, but
still their national feeling of hostility to the
Arabs must not be too much accentuated. The
movement did not originate with the Iranian
nation, but with a sect of a fairly circumscribed
locality from which the Arabs were not ex-
cluded. It had religious motives of a political
and social sort which were to be found in Islam.
It threatened, in principle, not the aliens but
the heretics, — hence the name heretic-clubs for
the weapons of the Hawaii.1 Abft Muslim's
most intimate confidants, Abu Nasr, Abft
D&ftd and others, were Arabs, and it was not
the Arabs per se, but the ruling Arabs that
were to be fought against, and that by virtue
of Islam, because they rule unjustly and un-
lawfully, supported the godless Umaiyid regime
arid did not recognise the equal rights of the other
Muslims in the theocracy. The Arab opposition-
party, on the other hand, e.g., the Iraqites and
the Yemen in Khurasan, were first recognised
as confederates. Actually, indeed, the struggle

1 Agh., 4, 93 ; Dlnaw,, 360. Tabarl mentions only the KfcfirkAbat
among the Khashablya of Mukhtar, 2,694.

536 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

against Arabism in Islam amounted to this, that
now Iranianism got j, the upper hand, and the
Arabs, even as a nation, were subdued, since
their rule had ceased .with the Umaiyid rule. Nasr
b. Saiy&r foresaw this. It lay in the nature of
things, but not in the original purpose. The
nationality; of the .conquerors asserted its ascen-
dancy over Islam,* in^the s wadding-clothes of
which it had grown up. Still, originally it was
Islam, and not the idea of nationality that was
the moving force in the revolt of the Khurasa-
nites, — just as formerly it had been the moving
force in the revoit^of^the Arabs themselves. A
new Islam united with a new nation.

4. Abft Muslim sent to Tukharistan his
devoted AbA DMdJ alBakr! who had already
been active there before;(1960, 14f.). -After he
had succeeded Jn driving out of Balkh the
Umaiyid official Zi&d b. Abdirrahm&n al-
Qushairl, he was recalled, and Yahy& b. Nu'aim
alBakri put in his Iplace. But the latter en-
tered upon negotiations i with Zi&d, who was
securely established Jin Tirmidhvnot very far
from Balkh. ,, The result was an alliance of all
the Arab tribes of that district, the Mudar,
Yemen and Rabla against the Shia of Khurasan.
Even the Iranians rof:!that:[quarter joined in,
their leader ^Muq^til; b. ;HaiySbn receiving the
chief command*so] that', the "Arabs should' not
quarrel over it. The coalition of Arabs and

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 537

Iranians against the Shia may serve to correct
wrong ideas. This too, deserves notice, that
part of the allies carried black standards, — no
doubt those of H&rith b. Suraij. Abu Daftd
was now again sent into the field against this
alliance. The enemy, after a battle on the
Sarjan&n, evacuated Balkh again and went
back to Tirmidh, and for the second time Ab&
Baud was recalled and the Azdite TJthm&n b.
Judai alKarmani, All's brother, set over Balkh.
But he was unable to keep his position there,
for the Mudar of Tirmidh under Muslim b.
Abdirrahm&n alBahili, a nephew of the cele-
brated Qutaiba expelled him from Balkh. Then
Abii Daud had to come for the third time ; he
was indispensable there. So runs the account in
Tabaii 2, 1997 ff., and there ia nothing better to
substitute for it. 1

In Khurasan proper Abii Muslim was master
of the three easterly regions of the government,
Marw, Marwrudh and Herat, but of the western
district, Naisabur, only the towns of Nas& and
Biward. In the town of Naisabur the statt-
holder Nasr b. Saiyar was established. In
Sarakhs there was Shaiban alHarftrl, who soon
after Nasr's flight had likewise evacuated Marw,
as he could not accommodate himself to the new

1 For later risings in Soghd against AbA Muslim, cf. Tab,, 3, 74.
79f . ; the Abbasids had a hand in the game too. It was only through
Abu Muslim and the Abbasids that Transoxiana was completely sub*
jected to the rule of Islam.

68

538 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

circumstances. Ab& Muslim had him attacked
there, and he was overcome and slain. His
troops, mostly Bakrites, fled to Naisabur and
joined Nasr. Now began the fight against Nasr,
and from that arose the great war in which the
kingdom of the Umaiyids fell to pieces before
the black devils of Khurasan. Abft Muslim
did not himself ktake the lead in this, but the
leader was Qahtaba b. Shablb, an Arab of the
Taiyi tribe.1 Qahtaba had been absent during
the revolt ; it was only after the taking of Marw
that he returned from Mecca, whither he had
gone to meet with the Imam Ibrahim b.
Muhammad at the Hajj. Ibrahim had appoint-
ed him as his field-marshal by presenting him
with a standard, and AbA Muslim confirmed
this and gave him the supreme command.
Under or alongside of him were Abu Aun
Abdulmalik b. Yazld al Azdi, Khazim b. Khuzaima
at Tamimi, the Iranian Kh&lid b. Barmak of
Balkh, and others. 2 Nasr sent his son Tamim
against the advancing army of the Shia, and
after the latter was beaten and slain near Tds,
he quitted Naisabur at the end of Shauwal, 130,
Le.> the end of June, 748 (Tab., 2, 2016). Some
time after Atofr Muslim transferred his residence
from Marw thither. 3 He took with him his

1 Cf. Hamasa, p. 303ff.

2 In Theoph. A.M. 6240 Qahtaba is placed beside AbA Muslim a*
pretty much of equal account.

3 Tab,, 3, 3. C/,, however, 3, 59.

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 539

ally Ali b. Judai alKarm&nt, but on the way
managed to get rid of him for good. At the
same time also his brother Uthman b. Judai in
Tukharistan was got out of the way by AbA
DMd (Tab., 2, 1999f.). The alliance of the Azd
with the Shia, by which the taking of Marw
was effected, had served its purpose, and by the
assassination of the Azd ite leader an inconvenient
competition was avoided, for he seems to have
continued to hold an independent and equally
legitimate position side by side with Abu Muslim.
N"asr had gone from Naisabur to Qumis on
the boundary of Jurjan, and with him the
Arabs of Tamim, Bakr and Qais, who had fled
out of Khurasan. On the order of the Khalifa
the Iraqite stattholder Ibn Hubaira sent Nub&ta
b. Hanzala alKilabl to Jurjan, but the latter
did not co-operate with Nasr, and weakened
him further by enticing to himself the Qaisites
in Nasr's army. Qahtaba first turned against
Nubata. After advancing into Jurjan in
Dhulqada, 130, he fought a battle with him on
Friday, 1st Dhulhijja (Thursday, 1st August,
748) in which he was defeated and slain.
Meanwhile Nasr seems to have successfully held
out against Hasan, the son of Qahtaba, who was
sent to attack him, and one of the Shiite officers,
Ab& K&mil, went over to him. But after
Nub&ta's fall Qumis was no longer a place for
him, and he fled across Media to Hamadan,

540 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

without anywhere finding support from the
Umaiyid officials. l In one of the first months
of the year 131, Qahtaba joined his son in
Quinis, and thence made for the west, sending
his son on in advance. Rai and Hamadan
capitulated, but the Syrian troops of the statt-
holder there which had fled from Hamadan, and
the Khurasanite ones of Nasr b. Saiy&r rallied
again in Nihawand and offered a determined
resistance to Hasan b. Qahtaba when he besieged
them there. 'Amir b. Dubara alMurrl was
commanded to relieve the town, and with a
great and well-equipped Syrian army he took
the field in Karman after compelling the
Ja'farid Ibn Mu&wia to floe. But on the march
to Nihawand he was himself attacked by Qah-
taba, overcome and slain. 2 The severe and
bloody encounter took place near J&balq in
the district of Ispahan, on Saturday, 23rd Eajab,
131 (Tuesday, 18th March, 74<9-^<?). Qahtaba
then joined forces with his son before Nihawand.
After several months, apparently, according to
Tab., 37, 18, in Dhulqada, 131 (June-July, 749),
the Syrians in the besieged town decided upon
a surrender on their own account, without the
knowledge of, or reference to their Khurasanite

1 He died in Sawa near Hamadan on 12th Rabi I, 131 (9th Nov.,
748), aged 85.

2 For Ifrrfapa in Theophanes A.M. 6240 there must be read
IpLvtiaftapa ace. to AnastasiuR, for it is Ibn Dubara that is meant, and
not Nubata, as Reiske (Abulfeda I, adn. 238) wrongly conjectures.

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM

comrades. The latter were put to death with-
out mercy.

The road to Iraq was now clear for Qahtaba.
He again sent his son Hasan on in front, and
himself followed him from Nihawand via
Qarm&sin to Hulw&n and Khaniqin. Cleverly
circumventing the stallholder Tbn Hubaira,
who had advanced against him across the Tigris
with a strong army, and was encamped in
Jalula, he crossed the Tigris and marched upon
Kufa. In the neighbourhood of Anbar on the
Euphrates he made a preliminary halt. Ibn
Hubaira hastened after him and encamped some
distance aside, on the left bank of the Euphrates,
near Earn Eur&t B&daqlit, in the upper Falhija,
where the canal to Kufa branched off ; he sent
a division in advance to Kufa, under Hauthara
b. Suhail alBahili. Qahtaba, however, crossed
the Euphrates near Dimimma, and inarched
along the right bank to H&ira, a place which lay
opposite the camping-ground of Ibn Hubaira.
During the night of Wednesday, 8th Muharram,
132 (Wed., 27th Aug., 749) he passed the ford
with a little band and surprised the enemy
camp. ] Ibn Hubaira was taken unawares, and
retired first to Earn au-Nil, but did not make a
stand there, but withdrew along the Canal an-Nll
into the strong government town of Wasit.

1 Everything is exactly the same as in the activities of Maslama
b. Abdilmalik against Yazid b. Mohallab in A.H, 101 or 102.

542 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

When he heard this, Hauthara, who had reached
Qasr Ibn Hubaira, now did not venture to
advance into Kufa, but united with the statt-
holder in Wasit. Qahtaba's success was com-
plete, but it cost him his life, for he met his
death mysteriously in the confusion by night.
From a military stand-point there is no doubt
that he accomplished the most for the Abbasids.
He brought victory to the black standards, and
founded the reputation of their invincibility.
Hasan, who had remained stationary on the right
bank, took command in his stead, and was able
to enter Kufa without striking a blow. There
Muhammad, the son of KMlid alQasrl, martyred
by the Umaiyid government, had with the
Yemenites attempted a rising in favour of the
Abbasids and taken possession of the citadel ;
after Hauthara's departure no one troubled him
any longer. Upon his advice Hasan made his
entrance into the town on Tuesday, 14th
Muharram (2nd Sept., 749). On the other hand,
in Basra the attempt of the Muhallabid Sufy&n
b. Mu&wia to overthrow the Umaiyid govern-
ment with the help of the Azd and Rabia, fell
through. The Mudar and the Syrians who
backed up the stattholder Salm b. Qutaiba
alB&hilt, defeated the Azd. Everywhere the
Yemen (and Eabia) joined the revolution, while
the Mudar fought for the ruling Arabism. l

1 I have followed the report of old AbA Mikhnaf, whose words
appear here for the last time in Tab. 3, 10. 14. 18-20. So he was

THE FALL OP THE ARAB KINGDOM 543

The Abbasid authority, hitherto hidden, now
came into the open. Abu Salama, the Wezlr
of the Prophet's family, emerged from his retire-
ment and took the government in hand ; he
resided in Hamm&m A'yan, where the Khurasa-
nites were encamped. But the time had come
for the Abbasids themselves to leave their lurk-
ing-place and come out into the fore-ground.
Ibr&hlm b. Muhammad, hitherto their head, had
been arrested upon the command of the Khalifa
Marw&n and taken away from Humaima to
Harr&n, upon which he is said to have command-
ed them to go to Kufa and to acknowledge his
brother Abu JlAbb&s as his successor. His
imprisonment must therefore have taken place
not long before the Khurasanites entered Kufa,
for the Abbasids only reached there one month
after this event in Safar, 132. There were
fourteen of them, of different generations.
First, sons of All b. AbdiMh b. Abbfts : DAM,
Isft, S£lih, Ismail, Abdullah and Abdussamad,
besides Mfts&, the son of D&M ; then sons of
Muhammad b. All b. AbdilM b. Abb&s : Abu'l-
Abb&s, Abft Ja'far and Yahy& ; then grand-
sons of Muhammad b. All : Abdulwahh&b b.
Ibrahim b. Muhammad and his brother Muham-
mad, along with Isa b. MAs& b. Muhammad ;

still living after the catastrophe, but must then have been a very old
man. Madaint, the chief narrator in Tabarf, differs in one or two
* unessential points, and gives some 'more exact definitions. Gf. Masud?,
6, 73, Yaqubi, 2, 412. Hamasa, 403f.

5U ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

and finally, from a collateral line, Yahy& b.
Ja'far b. Tamm&m b, Abb&s. l

The Abbasids were not received in Kufa
with open arms. The wezir, Ab& Salama, did
not consider as a matter of course their claim
to the succession of Ibr&hlm b. Muhammad,
whom he had personally acknowledged as Imam,
Their presence was inconvenient to him, and
for some time he tried to conceal the fact of
their residence from the Khurasanites, saying
that their time was not yet come because Wasit
had not yet been conquered. But a confidant
of AbA Muslim, Abu Jahm, came secretly and
informed them. Then there rode into Kufa
twelve Khurasanite chiefs from the camp of
Hamm&m A'yan, made for the quarter of the
Abbasids and did homage to Abu 'lAbbas, and
consequently Abft Salama also was obliged to
comply. 2 On Friday, 12th Eabill, 132 (Friday,
28th Nov., 749) public homage to Abu JlAbb&s
and the new dynasty was paid in the chief

1 Daud b. All and his son Musa had not come from Humaima but
had only joined those taking the field on the way in Duma, and at the
beginning advised them against going on to Kufa. The family did not
always unanimously gather round the Imam, Ibrahim b. Muhammad.
Isa and Abdullah, Ali's sons, and also Ibrahim's brother, Abu Ja'far,
had for a time attached themselves to the Ja'farid Ibn Muawia (Tab.,
2, 1977). Not only Daud b. Alt but Sulaiman b. All also, who is not
mentioned amongst the 14, appear not to have lived in Humaima, but
in Iraq. Cf. Yaqubt, 2, 419.

9 Thus Madaint in Tab., 3, 28ff. diverging somewhat from the
parallel report, 34ff. Cf. Masudt, 6, 92f. Taqubi 2, 413.

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 545

mosque of Kufa. Abu 'lAbb&s mounted the
pulpit and spoke till the fever from which he
was suffering compelled him to sit down, and
then his uncle, D&tid b. All, who stood three
steps below him, got up and continued. The
speeches are not authentically handed down to
us, but their contents in general suit the situa-
tion. The right of the Abbasids to the ruling
power is proved from the Word of God, and
there is also a polemical aside directed at those
Shiites l who assert that the Alids have the
prior claim, but special emphasis is laid upon
the community of the interest of the Abbasids
and the Iraqites. 2 While the Abbasids by
their Khurasanite body-guard overthrew the
Umaiyids, they at the same time also freed the
Iraqites from the Syrian yoke. The 100 years'
struggle, up till then a vain one, between Iraq
and Syria, now ended with the victory of Iraq ;
the seat of government again came to Kufa,
where it was in former days under All. " Every
dynasty has its centre- point ; you are our centre-
point.0 This was, of course, to entice the
Kufaites, But the centre of gravity of the
kingdom was now really transferred from
Damascus to Kufa and Iraq, and that was an
event of deep significance. 3

1 The contemptuous term U8abaites " included them, 29, 17.
8 C/. already Tab., 2, 1816, 7 : ^^] ^ \f
3 Theoph. A.M. 6241.

546 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Moreover, Abu 'lAbb&s was not so very sure
of the Kuf aites. He did not set up his residence
in their town of Kufa, but among the Khura-
sanites in Hamm&m A'yan. Some time after he
transferred it to Hira and then to H&shimlya,
we may suppose in order to separate himself
from Abft Salama, who also lived in Hamm&m
A'yan. Relations between the two continued
strained ; Abft Salama sympathised with the Alids
and expressed his sympathies so openly as to give
grounds for the suspicion that he was not alone
in his sentiments, particularly as up till then
the reins of the party-leadership had been in
his hands. The Khalifa dared not proceed
against him ; being himself without power and
the creature of his alleged instruments, the
king-makers, who in addition were well aware
of his dubious legitimacy, he was absolutely
given over to the good pleasure of others far
more influential than himself. He sent his
brother Abu Ja'far to Khurasan to ascertain the
sentiments of Abu Muslim whose influence
over the Khurasanite army was very great. Abii
Muslim fortunately had nothing in common
with Ab& Salama and did the Abbasids the good
turn of having him murdered, at the same time
causing his old rival in Khurasan, Sulaim&n b.
Kathlr, the leader of the NuqaM, to be put to
death, using the pretext that the latter acted
in concert with Abft Salama as a ground for

THE FALL OP THE ARAB KINGDOM 547

venting upon him his personal hatred. His
confidant, AM Jahm, controlled and directed
the Khalifa Abu 'lAbb&s.1

While these things were being enacted in
the east, the west was simultaneously the scene
of convulsing events/2 After the fall of Niha-
wand, in Dhulqada, 131, Qahtaba sent Abu Aun
Abdulmalik b. Yazld alAzdi to Shahrazur.
After a decisive battle on the 20th Dhulhijja,
131 (10th Aug., 749), he drove out thence the
Syrian troops and established himself in the
district belonging to Mosul, to the north of the
Tigris. After tho taking of Kufa, he got rein-
forcements from there but had to give up the
chief command to the Abbasid Abdullah b. All.
The Khalifa, with the Mesopotamian and Syrian
Arabs, advanced from Hirr&n across the Tigris
against the Khurasanites, and the battle was
joined on the left bank of the Great Zub. It
began on the 2nd Jumada II, 132 and ended on
Saturday, llth Jumada (Sunday, 25th Jany.),
with the complete defeat of Marwfm. Theo-
phanes gives his army at 300,000 men; he says
that thousands fled from one thousand, and tens
of thousands from two. This unequal propor-
tion also appears at other times, and can be
understood from the axiom that the victory
depends upon God, who scatters the infidel

1 Yaqftbi, 2, 433. Tab., 3, 67, 88.

* Tab., 3, 9f. 38ff., mainly ace. to Madaiiil.

548 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

horde before the faithful few. According to an
account in Mad&ini (Tab., 3, 47) Marwan had
at his disposal only 12,000 men. At first he
had the advantage. The bad ending was partly
caused by the Qais not being willing to do
any more than the Qud&a. Besides, there is
of course no doubt that the will to win
and the confidence of victory were with the
Khurasanites. The Arabs had lost confidence
and did not want to be sacrificed, Marw&n
produced money with the promise that they
should share it if they fought bravely, but
they fell at once upon the money and made
off with it. Many of the fugitives were
drowned in the Zab for the bridge was
cut down.

Marw&n retired across the Tigris to Harran
and there remained some time. It redounds to
his credit that he now set free the political
prisoners whom he found still in the prison,
while those who had attempted to break out
before his arrival were slain by his devoted
Harranites. From Harran he went via Qinnes-
rin and Hims to Damascus, and on to the strong-
hold AbA Futrus near Jaffa, where he sought
protection with a man of the Judbamite royal
family of the Banft Bauh b. Zinb£', since the
power in that district was no longer in the hand
of the Umaiyid government. From Abft Futrus
he fled to the Egyptian sea-port Farm£, when

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 549

his pursuers came threateningly close. Abdull&h
b. All with the Khurasanites followed him,
reinforced on the way by his brothers Abdus-
samad and Salih, and marched via Mosul,
Harran, Mambij, Qinnesrin, Baalbekk and A in
alJarr to Mizza near Damascus, where he pitch-
ed his camp. The Syrian towns surrendered to
him without a struggle, having, as can be
understood, no attachment to Marw&n (MasMi,
6, 84f.). Only the capital of the kingdom,
Damascus, had to be besieged. Marw&n's son-
in-law, Walid b. Muawia b. Marw&n I was in
command there, but the citizens did not back
him up with their united strength, and in
the end murdered him and opened the gates
of the town to Abdullah b. All on the 14th
Ramadan, 132 (26th April, 750). A fortnight
later he marched on to Abu Eutrus, whence
he sent his brother Salih with Abft Aun to
Egypt, in pursuit of Marwan, arid he departed
thither in Dhulqada, 132 (June, 750). Marw&n
fled from him from place to place till
he got to B&sir (Busiris) near Raud& in the
Upper Kgyptian province of Ushmftnain. There
he took his stand ; after a fierce struggle his
faithful followers scattered (Theoph.) and he
himself fell. A Khurasanite Arab of the Ye-
menite Balh&rith attacked him with his men,
calling to them in Persian : " Strike hard, boys ! "
and killed him. This was at the end of 132, the

550 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

beginning of August, 750.1 His head, and
according to Masftdi, also the insignia of the
Khalifate were sent to Abu 'lAbb&s. His tongue,
according to a verse quoted by BAthir, is said to
have been devoured by a cat. Abu Aun remain-
ed in Egypt. He was, of course, the actual
leader of the campaign.

Wasit, the fortified citadel of Iraq founded
by Hajj&j in the marshy district of the Tigris,
was still unsubdued. After the unfortunate
encounter with Qahtaba at Babylon Ibn Hubai-
ra had betaken himself thither with the Syrians,
and some Khurasanite Arabs also gathered about
him, chiefly Bakrites under Yahy& b. Nuaim.2
Hasan b. Qahtaba pursued and besieged him,
and after some time Abft Ja'far, the brother of
the Khalifa Abu 'lAbb&s joined him as his sub-
ordinate, but in reality he held the command.
As a matter of fact he was dependent not on
the Khalifa but on Abu Muslim, and the latter
sent Abti. Nasr M&lik b. Haitham alKhuzM with
a division of Khurasanites to his support. There
was no unity among the besieged ; the Yemen
quarrelled with the Niz&r (i.e., Mudar and
Rabia). Still the town held out eleven months,
and it was not till the news of Marw&n's death,
i.e., in one of the first months of the year 133

1 Cf. Agh., 4, 92. Masudt, 6, 76f. Tanbih 328. BAthtr 5, 326ff.
Yaqubi, 2, 414. YAqut, 4, 760. The day of the month (27th Dhulhijja)
does not suit the givea day of the week, Sunday or Monday.

a To be distinguished from Yahya b. Hudain.

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 551

(Autumn, 760), that Ibn Hubaira commenced
negotiations. It took 40 days before the
jurists had arranged the capitulation so that
both sides were satisfied. Abu 5lAbb&s confirmed
it, but in spite of that it was not kept. The
captive officers, who as token of their office
wore a ring, were executed if they belonged to
Niz&r and not to Yemen, and finally Ibn Hu-
baira himself suffered the same fate, after he
had given up his body-guard and handed over
the state-moneys which he had in his keeping.1

This instance of treacherous cruelty is also
related by Tabarl. For the rest he chooses to
be silent regarding the bloody orgies with which
the Abbasids celebrated their victory.2 They
had been treated by the Umaiyids with incon-
ceivable forbearance and they requited this by
outlawing them and seizing their estates. They
had no human consideration, but carried to its
utmost limit the divine wrath and their legiti-
mate revenge. As they had not much to take
revenge for, they borrowed from the Alids and
acted as their avengers, This gave them at
the same time a handle to suppress the latter

1 Laments over the death of Tbn Hubaira in Tab,, 3, 70. Hamasa,
372f. Agh., 16, 83ff.

8 The accounts of it are to be found in Yaqubt, Masudl, Ibn
Athir and in Aghant. The contemporaneous poem of an Ablite or a
Mania of the Abalat is also very important, large fragments of which
are preserved in Yaqftt, 4, 239, 336. 831, and Agh., 4, 91. 10, 105. The
A-balat were a lateral branch of the Umaiya.

552 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

themselves, as it was not the right of revenge but
its fulfilment that paved the way to the ruling
power, and even procured a legal title to it.
Their precise motive was, of course, a political
one. They wished to render the fallen dynasty
absolutely harmless. The whole affair reminds
us of the extermination of the house of Omri
effected by the prophets.

The chief scene of the outrages committed
upon the Umaiyids was Syria, where Abdullah
b. All had the supreme command. They arc
not chargeable to the Khurasanites, as Agh., 4,
94. 96 asserts, for they were strictly disciplin-
ed and did nothing without orders. The out-
rages were rather committed by command of the
Abbasids (Yaqftbt, 2,427), and it is to be noted
that even the dead did not escape chastisement.
The graves of the Khalifas and other Umaiyids
in Damascus, in D&biq and Rus&fa, in Qinnes-
rin and other places were broken open and their
contents violated, when any remains were to be
found. Umar II, however, and, which is re-
markable, even Mu&wia were spared. Very
vehemently was the hatred expressed against
Hish&m, who had given some reason for it and
whose death was but recent. His body, only
the nose of which was no longer intact, was
scourged and crucified, and then burned and
the astess scattered to the winds (Masftdl, 5,
47 If.). Upon the living Abdullah b. All's

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 553

worst acts were committed in AM Futrus,
where he stayed for a while after driving away
Marw&n. The story goes that he enticed thi-
ther more than 80 Umaiyids with fair promises,
inviting them to a meal, exactly as if he had
taken Jehu for this pattern. Then, apparently
aroused suddenly to revenge hy verses which
were repeated to him, he had them all felled
with cluhs, leathern covers spread over them,
and on these covers the dinner set, at which
the death-rattle of the dying men supplied
the music.1 These touches, the rendering of a
song as a signal for a sudden outburst of rage,
the duping of the victims by an invitation to
dinner, to be sure crop up again on other occa-
sions also, when Abu 'lAbbfts or MM b. All
are mentioned in place of Abdull&h b. All,2 and
may be doubted, but the fact of the great
slaughter itself is quite authentic. To the Syrian
Arabs it was just as memorable as was the sea
of blood in which the dynasty of Omri perished
to the ancient Israelites, and the day of AbA
Futrus laid its seal upon the Abbasids' foreheads
just as did the day of Jezreel upon the house of
Jehu. MasAdi, 6, 76 dates the dreadful event
the 15th Dhulqada, 132 (25th June, 750). Theo-
phanes wrongly puts it two years later, but his

1 K&milf 707. BAthir, 6. 32£f. Otherwise Yaqflbt, 2, 425f. Agh., 4,
160f.

a Agh., 4, 94. The murder of the enemy at the feaai is everywhere
a common met if.

70

554 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

brief and hitherto overlooked account is impor-
tant because it clearly shows that Ab& Putrus
is the old Antipatris.1

In Medina and Mecca the executioner of
the Umaiyids 2 was DMd b. All ; in Basra it
was Sulaim&n b. Ali. In Hira Abu 'lAbHs
himself had those put to death who were brought
before him or besought his mercy, amongst
them even Sulaim&n b. Hish&m, who, as Mu-
&wia's fiercest foe, deemed himself secure. Even
when the persecution was at last discontinued,
the survivors did not trust themselves abroad.
They kept in hiding, dragging out their exist-
ence in mean positions and ever in terror of
becoming outlaws if they were recognised. Only
one grandson of the Khalifa Hish&m escaped
to Spain and there attained to sovereignty.

Now, however, the Syrians, who so far had
adopted a fairly passive course, were at last
enraged by the terrible extirpation of their old
dynasty, the Qaisites no less than the Kalbities.
The Qaisites rose chiefly in Qinnesrin ; at their

1 " lu A. M. 6243 the new rulers killed moat of the (Christians as)
kindred of the previous dynasty, treacherously massacring them at
Antipatris in Palestine." The identity of Abu Fatrus and Antipatris
is established by the name (Futrus=»Patris) and by the fact ; Anti-
patris or Kapharsaba (Josephus Ant., 16, 142, 18, 309) lay just at the
spot In Wadi'l ' Aaju ' w where the fortress of Abu Futrus, aco. to tho
description ef the Arabs, is to be lookedf or. Only we do not under-
stand how the Umaiyids can be described as Christians ; there is evi-
dently an error or an interpolation.

9 Murder scenes in Kufa, Agh., 4, 91f. Yaqut, 4, 244.

THE PALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 555

head was their most distinguished man, Abu'l
Ward Majzaa b. Kauthar, a grandson of Zufar
b. Harith, and the Kalbites of Tadmor and the
Arabs of Hims joined them. They had adopted
Abii Muhammad, the Sufyanid freed by Mar-
w&n, and he was also acknowledged by Abu'l
Ward as the lawful heir to the Khalifate. But
the insurgents were defeated near Marj al-
Akhram in the neighbourhood of Qinnesrin by
Abdullah b. All and dispersed at the end of the
year 133,1 i.e., the end of July, 751, and Abu'l
Ward fell along with 500 men of his house.
The Sufyanid fled with his Kalbites first to
Tadmor, then wandered about a fugitive in the
Hijaz, and at last, under the second Abbasid,
Abu Ja'far Mansftr, was seized and put to death.
It is remarkable how the Syrians turned from
the reigning Marwanids to the fallen Sufyanids ;
for it was not his personal qualities that Abft
Muhammad had to thank for the position he
attained to immediately after the murder of
Walld II, but rather the circumstance that he
was descended, not from Marw&n I and Abdul-
malik, but from MuStwia and Yazid I. Neither
was he known under his own name but under
that of his house, being called merely as-Sufy&nl.
His significance did not fade away at his death ;

1 Ace. to Tab., 3, 55 on the last day of the year, but that was not
a Tuesday, as is stated, but a Thursday. Theoph. A.M. 6242 makes the
scene not Quinnesrin but Hims ; there may have been fighting there
also.

556 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

it even increased. He became first the Messias
of the Syrians, to whose second coming they
attached their political hopes, and finally, as
their opponents kept the field, the precursor of
the Antichrist. As a spectre in Islamic eschato-
logy, the house of Umaiya outlived his fall.1

5. The Abbasids called their government
the " Daula," i.e., the new era.2 The revolution
effected at this time was indeed prodigious.

With the Umaiyids the Syrians made their
exit also. They had abandoned to his fate the
hated Marw&n II, and had not taken action at
the right time against the Abbasids, after which
they were no longer able to alter the position of
things : black had won and white lost the king.
To be sure, they retained their sympathy for
their old dynasty,3 and also manifested it in a
practical way, but their efforts were in vain
since they lacked organisation. Too late their
eyes were opened to the fact that it was really a
question of their own cause and that it was

1 Snouck Hurgronje, Malidi, p. 11, and DMZ, 1901, p. 690f.

2 Tab., 3, 86, 16. 96, 19. 115, 9. Abn& adDaulaare the Khurasanites
in the service of the Abbasids ; Kitab adDaula (497, 1) is the name of a
prophetic book about the future of the Abbasids. Later Daula means
dynasty or kingdom in general. A similar transition is found in Nauba
and Uqba (Hudh., 74, 38). But the original meaning has also been
preserved, e.g., in the phrase $dra 'I m&lu daulatan " the estate passed
into other hands."

8 The information in Tab,, 3, 2163ff. is interesting. Their recollec-
tions centred chiefly around Muawia We have seen that his grave was
a shrine visited for centuries after his death,

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 55?

themselves who were the sufferers. The seat of
government was transferred from Damascus to
Kufa and later to Baghdad. Syria lost by the
hegemony. Iraq was freed from the yoke of
foreign rule which it had strained at in vain for a
hundred years, and seemed again to attain to the
hegemony which it had once possessed at the
time of All. The Abbasids showed their politi-
cal tendency to be positively Iraqite and anti-
Syrian.

But at the same time it was decidedly all
over with the rule of the Arabs, whose support-
ers tlie TJmaiyids and the Syrians had been,
The old home of the Arabs became so thorough-
ly savage that the pilgrimage could no longer be
made witn safety. The Arab tribes were no
longer the setting of the theocracy ; they lost
their privilege entirely. The Hawaii were
emancipated ; the distinction between Arab and
non-Arab Muslims vanished. Dislodged from
its exclusive position which rested originally
upon martial law, Arabism now withdrew into
a peaceable and civil sphere and became an
international cult in which all Muslims partici-
pated. The fundamental part of the cult was
the religion, and the Arab religion did not fall to
pieces with the Arab nation, but went on gain-
ing strength. The Arab tongue remained the
speech of Islam and absorbed the languages of
the most important Christian nations in further

558 A&AB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Asia and Africa. In use by writers and scholars
it seemed even to penetrate to the Iranians,
but the poetry preserved the native idiom and
restored it to the place of honour.

The Hawaii did not actually preponderate
over the Arabs as a general thing, but only at
one point. The Khurasanites had helped the
Abbasids to the victory and with them got a
share in the spoil, becoming, in a certain sense,
the heirs of the Syrians, though they stood in a
different relation to the government from the
latter. They were called the Shia (party), the
Ans&r (helpers), or the Abn& (sons) of the
Daula.1 With them lay the external power :
they were organised in a military fashion. They
held the chief commands, their officers (Quwfrd)
were allowed to play the part of great lords.
They formed the standing army of the Khalifa,
and he lived among this his guard. Baghdad
was really established not as the capital of an
empire, but as the camp of the Khurasanites in
which the Khalifa wished to reside, far from
Kufa. But in the camp they kept up commu-
nication with their home, and the party and army
preponderance which they had won in the
service of the Abbasids was passed on to their
people and province, to the Iranian East.
Under the guise of the international Islam,
Iranianism triumphed over the Arabs.

1 Matth. 17, 25.

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 559

With the change of dynasty, the internal
mode of government also changed. Whether
Persian influence had a particular effect upon it
may or may not be the case, but it; certainly
became quite un-Arab. By the conquest the
Arabs had become a ruling nobility as distin-
guished from the vanquished. The genealogical
net of their tribal system extended superficially
over the provinces of their kingdom. Under the
TJmaiyids this primitive system still persisted in
its fundamentals, though it soon showed itself
to be no longer tenable, but under the Abbasids
it disappeared along with the difference of the
conditions which it presupposed. The Abbasids
were not elevated, like the Umaiyids, over
a wide-spread aristocracy, to which they them-
selves belonged : the Khurasanites, by whom
they were supported, were not their blood, but
only their instrument. The whole body of the
Muslims stood in the same relation to them,
without natural gradations of political right ;
they alone had the divine right to rule as heirs of
the Prophet. From a technical point of view,
no obstacles stood in the way of their fashioning
the government as seemed in conformity with
the interest of the cause and their own interest.
They brought greater order into the government,
especially into the taxation- system and the
administration of justice, and they showed them-
selves zealous in opposing and redressing the

560 AR\B KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

grievances of those who applied to them as the
supreme court of appeal. But they suppressed
the general living interest in politics which in
earlier times was part of the religion to a far
greater extent than the Umaiyids had contrived
to do. The Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs,
were simply subjects and were no longer allowed
to take part in public affairs. They were rele-
gated to the realm of trade or agriculture, and
at the most might conspire in secret. The state
shrank into the court. The Khalifa was surround-
ed first by a vast, gay company of both sexes,
and next by his likewise very numerous
family connections, the H&shimids. But the
army, too, belonged to the court, the nucleus of
it being always concentrated in the Khalifa's
residence. In that way Baghdad was far different
not only from Medina but also from Damascus.
To the court there further belonged a crowd of
civil officials who no longer coincided with the
officers, but were mostly creatures and favour-
ites of the ruler. Preedmen were in the major-
ity among them. In earlier times they had
indeed enjoyed an influential intimacy, but now
they attained to the highest public posts. Raised
from the dust, they were again overthrown into
the dust. Catastrophes and intrigues leading to
such things were at the court the order of the
day, and distinguished men who even without
office were of consideration, were unwillingly

THE FALL OP THE ARAB KINGDOM 561

drawn into them. Not even in their wives did
the Abbasids any longer set value upon descent;
it was riot birth that made people, but the
Khalifa. He clothed them with rank and honour
by means of uniforms and marks of distinction
(tir&z) ; the tailor and the lace-maker had plenty
to do. In place of the aristocracy there came
into being a fawning hierarchy of officials,
openly divided into ranks and controlled through
one another. At the head stood the Wezlr,
who had control of the exchequer, and in later
times became the visible alter ego of the invisi-
ble Khalifa, so that the latter then only appeared
occasionally as an actor upon the stage, or burst
like a thunderstorm out of his pall of clouds.
The custom also spread more and more of the
stattholders having the provinces in their
charge administered by representatives, and
themselves staying at the court, especially when
they had the prerogative of being princes of the
blood. The under-officials of the government
office were for the most part Christians and Jews,
who easily drew down upon themselves the heat
and envy of the Muslim crowd. Excepting the
Wezlr, the executioner was perhaps the most
outstanding figure among the official personnel.
The Arabs knew no executioner, and the Umai-
yids kept none; with the Abbasids he was
indispensable. The leathern carpet beside the
throne which served as a scaffold was part of

71

562 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

the insignia of the Khalifate ; sudden executions
as well as deliberate barbarities enhanced the
awe of majesty. The pattern was taken from
the Iranians whose Shah exercised the right of
life and death over his subjects. Prom the Ira-
nians also was taken the office of court-astrologer,
who was consulted on all important undertak-
ings, and actually accompanied the army upon
expeditions. Finally the postmasters are to be
remarked as characteristic of the Abbasid
regime. They were the feelers of the court of
Baghdad stretched out into the provinces, chosen
persons of trust who had to keep secret watch
even over the stattholders. The post was useful
for espionage; the information -service in the
wide kingdom was organised to the highest
degree. Tabart latterly dates not only the
events, but also the arrival at the court of the
information about them.

The new era was essentially distinguishable
from the old by its relation to the religion. The
Abbasids prided themselves upon the fact that
they brought into power Islam, which had been
suppressed by the Umaiyids. They wanted to
resuscitate the vanished tradition of the Prophet,
as they put it. They encouraged those versed
in the divine law to come to them at Baghdad
from Medina, their former seat, and always
gained their approbation by getting them
to deal even with the political questions

THE FALL OP THE ARAB KINGDOM 56S

designedly in legal form, and decide them
according to the Qoran and Sunna. But in
reality they were only making Islam serve their
own ends. They cowed the scholars at their
court and got even their most objectionable
measures justified by them. They rendered
the pious opposition harmless by placing it in
power; with the fall of the Umaiyids it had
reached its goal and was content. Political
affairs were in good hands; the Muslims needed
to trouble about them no longer. The theo-
cracy was realised and was bound to cease to
be the principle of revolution against the exist-
ing power. In this direction the Abbasids
guided public opinion fairly successfully, and
in that epoch the need of peace after such a
series of revolutions and struggles was in their
favour. The Arabs had spent their rage and
bled to death.

One would think that the Abbasids would
have favoured the Shia, with which they had
originally been allied, but they changed when
they had attained to the chief power, turning
rather as enemies against the Alids with whom
they had formerly been identified, in order to
put aside their claims. Even their special ad-
herents, that is to say the extreme Shiites
(Rawandites) represented in Iran, were re-
nounced by them. In religion they turned
towards the Arabs and away from the Persians.

564 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

They denied their origin from the perimeter
after they had reached the centre and had the
power of the whole in their hands. They con-
formed to the current Islam of the Jam&a, which
formed no special ideas for itself, took religion
as a custom, and was content with the tradition
which through the worship of God and the law
uniformly ruled everyone's practical life. In
spite of apparently being opposite, they in this
respect took the same course as the Umaiyids,
only they stood far more emphatically than the
latter for Catholicism, and followed far more
decidedly the deviating ways which endangered
religious and political unity. As heirs of the
Prophet they made better use of the fact that
they had not merely the wielding of the tempor-
al power but of the spiritual as well, namely,
the Imamate. While the Umaiyids had essen-
tially rested upon a nationality, they supported
their government upon a guard and upon
the religion. Their Khaliphate may be
described as a Caesareopapy. They appointed
an inquisitor and set up an inquisition, first
against the so-called Zendlqs, who seem to
have been shoots of the extreme Persian
Shiites.

Even the Khurasanites afterwards became
inconvenient to the Abbasids. Mansur shook
off the tutelage of Abti. Muslim when he did
not need him any longer. In his great qualities

THE FALL OF THE ARAB KINGDOM 565

he was far from being a match for him,
but could outdo him in devilry, and compassed
his assassination. But more than anything
else the Khurasanites were still indispensable
in military affairs, arid even later were not to
be simply abolished or set aside. An attempt
in this direction set on foot after H&run's death
only made for the establishing and strengthening
of their power. No more did the Abbasid
Khalifas succeed in making themselves independ-
ent by buying up in great numbers Berbers,
Slavs, Soghdians and Turks, and equipping
them and organising them, in order to play them
off against the Khurasanites. The only result
was that they now came also under the tyranny
of these Marnlftks, especially the Turkish ones,
and in the end were absolutely powerless, and
their kingdom was in pieces.

Eor one or two centuries the Iranians main-
tained their dominating position, but they
could not count upon its continuing in their
own house. In Transoxiana, Tukharistan and
Khurasan they were unable to check the advance
of the Turks, which for a while was fended off
by the Arabs. And thus in the end the Turks
fell heirs to the Islamic kingdom into which
they had earlier insinuated themselves as Mam-
luks. In a broader sense we may even reckon
among them the Mongols, who, however, did

566 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

not actually become properly at home in Islam
but rather passed over it like a devastating
storm, without really leaving any but negative
traces behind.

GENERAL INDEX

Abattt: 173, 551

Aban b. 'Uqba b. Abi Mu'ait : 191
Abarqubadh : 116
Abarshahr (Naisabur) : 413, 415,

420, 422, 434, 466, 508
Abazqubadh : 116
'Abbad b. Husain : 235, 406

b. Ziad : 415
'Abbas : 111

b. Walid (I) b. 'Abdilmalik:

362,364,364-5, 379
'Abbasid : 73, 107-8, 138, 220, 254,
327, 349, 350, 385, 394-5, 461,
489,500-1,503-5, 507-516, 518-9,
523, 528, 532-3, 535, 637, 542-6,
551-3, 555-9, 561-5
'Abd Manaf : 41
'Abdrabbih : 244, 285
•Ahdulaztz (b. Hajjaj b. 'Abdil-
malik) : 363-4
b. Marw&n : 148, 183, 207,

221-3, 267, 319
b. Walid (I) : 265
'Abdulljamid b. 'Abdirrahman,

alQuraishi : 269, 270, 302
'Abdullah Abu H&shim : 502-4

b. 'Abbas : 105, 107-111,

501
b. 'Abdilmalik (b. Marwan)

237

b. Ahtam : 439, 441
b. 'AH, 'Abbasid : 543-4,

547, 549, 552-3, 555
b. lA.mir, Umaiyid : 118,

119, 413, 426

b. 'Amr b. Ghaildn : 130
b. 'Amr b. Harb, Kindite:

503
b. Han?ala, Ansarito: 153,

' 155-6

b. Harith (b. Naufal b.
Harith) b. 'Abdflmutta-
lib, " Babba, " : 118, 405-
6,409

b. Jarud : 244-5
b. Kauwa', alYashkurl : 84
b. Khabbab b. Aratt : 85

b. Khalid b. Astd : 130
b. Khtmm. asSuIami, Qaiaito
: 69, 4J4, 416-421, 423;
442

b. Marwan (LI) : 391
b. MasVda. alFtizPrt : 100
b. Mu'awiab. 'Abdillah b,
Ja'far : 384-6. 390, 393-5,
488, 500, 540, 544
b. 'Umar : 142, 146
b. 'Umar (II) : 369
b. Wahb, arRasibt, Azdifcf3 :

84
(b. Yazld b. Mu'awia I) :

172

b. Zubair : 70, 90, 142-3,
146-152, 154, 162, 164,
166-7, 170-6, 178-181,
184-5, 195, 198-201,
204, 211-2, 403, 409,
417
'Abdulumlik b. 'Abdillah b. 'Imir :

409

b. Hajjaj b. YAsuf : 355
b. Marwan : 99, 113, 135,
148, 155, ISO, 183-4,
186- 193, 195-7, 199, 201,
203-8, 210-220, 222-3,
226-8, 234-5, 237, 251,
254, 257, 260, 264-5,
267-8, 271, 289, 299,
306, 312, 348, 361, 371,
374, 376, 378, 420-1,
501, 555
b. Marwan b. Muhammad :

374

b. Muhallab : 429
b. Qatan : 342
'Abdnlmnrain b. Shabath b, Rib't,

of Tamtm : 246

'Abdulqais : 87, 398, 407, 427, 437
'Abdulwahhab (b. Ibrahim) ; 392
b. Ibrahim b. Muhammad :

543

•Abd Umaiya : 173
'Abdurrahm&n b 'Abbas, al Hash imi
Quraishite: 236, 239, 240,

246
b. 'Abdillih : 841-2

568

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

b. 'Abdiliah, alQushairt :

451

b. Ablbakr : 142
b. Hakam, Umajyid : 122
b. Khalid b. Walid, Makh-

zumid : 137

b. Muhammad b. Ash'ath,
of Kinda : 232-248, 250,
252, 259, 286, 302, 321,
424, 428
b. Nu'aim,alGhamidt, Azdite

: 451
b. Umm Hakam, athTha-

qaft : 130
b. Ziad : 415
'Abduasamad : 350

"b. 'Ali : 543, 549
'Abdwudd: 206
Ablward : 434
'Ablite : 651
Abna' : 421,423

ad Daula : 556, 558
Abraham : 19 .
al Abraq : 351
al Abrash, Kalbite : 335-6, 348, 355,

364, 380

'Abs : 261, 354, 360 I

b. TaJq : 406-7 j

'Absite :" 334 j

Abu 'Atiya, Taghlibite : 389 !

'Aun 'Abdnlmalik b. Yaz!d, al- \

Azdi : 538, 547, 549, 550 \

Bakr : 34-5, 41, 51, 67, 83, 94, ;

140, 271, 275 I

Bakra: 120

Biiai : 127

Da'ud Khalid b. Ibrahim, !
alRakrt: 522,535-7,539 !
Fatima, allyadt : 458, 465
Fudaik, Kharijite : 426 i

Futrus i 518-9, 553-4
Ghassan : 228 i

Hashim-see 'Abdullah i

'Ikrima, Abu Muhammad ]
a§Sadiq, Kufaite : 506-7 \
'Ilaqa, asSaksakl, alQuda'i : |
382 \

Ja'far Man^ur b. Muhammad I
b. 'Alt : 543-4, 546, 550, 555
Jabm : 544, 547
Jan&b, alKalbt : 90
Kamil: 539
Khirftsh: 5^ '-

Abu T Abbas b. Muhammad b, 'All :
543.7,550-1, 553-4
'As: 173
Aswad, adDu'iit : 99, 103

A'war : 98

Darda* : 81

FidV : 253, 319, 540

Hasan, alKlmrasant : 418

KhattAb : 522, 526-8, 530

Ward Majzaa b. Kauthar :

555

Abu LuMu»a : 116

Manffur Tal^ia b. Ruzaiq— see

Talfca

Ma'shar : 89, 100, 108, 130,

139,148, 167. 228
Miklmaf : 75, 77-9, 81. 3, 85,
87-90, 92-3, 95-8, 108, 117,
126, J39, 145, 147, 150-3,
155-7, 165-7, 175-9, 185. 192,
228, 231, 233, 240-2, 246-8,
262-3, 313, 317, 393, 395, 418,
439, 542

Muhammad, Sufyanid t 555
Muhammad asSadiq — see Abu

'Ikrima : 506-7

Muhammad Ziad, Maula: 508-9
Muhammad Ziad b.'Abdillfih
b. Yazld, asSufyani: 362,

365-6, 376, 382
Miisa, alAsh'arJ : 79, 90-3,

108, 329

Muslim, Maul& : 339, 396, 488-
491, 494, 500, 505, 512, 518-9,
521-3, 525-532, 534-9, &£,
546, 650, 564 •

Najm : 509, 520
Na§r Malik b. Haitham,al-

Khuz&'l ; 523, 535, 550
Qatifa : 161
Ruba : 317

Saida'Sttlihb.Tarff, adDabb! :
' 450, 456*8, 463, 465, 494^
Salnma Haf? b, Sulaimar,

Mauld : 513, 543-4, 546
Sufyan : 17 20-1, 41, 121,

160

'Ubaida. 92, HO, 232,
311,328, 389,390,393,401,
4039

'Ubaidab. Ziad : 416
Yabya : 507
Ziiiad : 270, 347
account-keeper (army) : 120
adh&n (ten call to prayer) : 19
Adharbaijan: 99, 104, 116, 230,

371, 374, 389
Adhrafc .• 89, 90, 501
'Adi b. Art-tat, a 1 Fa z Art ; 269, 313,
818

INDEX

569

Aela : 301

Africa : 26, 216, 222, 248, 269, 293.
300, 323, 343, 349, 412, 558

African : 160, 344

Afihin : 432, 454

Afshtri b. Kawus: 472

Afshina : 454

AghAnt, Kit. : 75, 100, 114, 118, 137
140, 149, 151-3, 159, 161, 166,
168, 170, 173-4, 188, 190-2, 194-6,
201-2, 204-5, 207, 211, 214, 247,
253, 260, 263, 310, 321, 323-4,
328, 332, 351-3, 356-7, 395, 412,
437, 442, 451, 533, 535, 550-4

Aghdaf : 351, 363

'Ah; 206

ahl al'Alia ( = ahl alMadhia) : 398-
9, 427

alKaftya, 521, 532
ar ridda (see ridda) : 162

A hi ward t — seo also Anonymous
WorJc : 134, 193-4, 223, 228-0,
233, 242, 245, 408

ahma' (s. hima) . 44

Ahnaf, Tamimite, of Basra, : 138,
" 142, 209, 399, 403, 44)6-8, 414

Ahwaz : 86-7, ,9,9, 116, 231, 249,
315, 385, 390

A' in (fcoll) : 303

'Am alJarp : 375, 549

Tamr : 100, 237, 292

Warda ( = Resaina, q. v.) : 189

'Aisha — see 'Ayesha

Aiyftbb. Sulaiman : 264

AkhmA* : 398, 427

Akhrun : 430-1, 434

Akhtal : 204, 207-8, 216

'Akk': 249

Akroinus : 340

Alexandria : 349

* Ali (b. Abt Talib) : 39, 40, 42, 45-7,
49, 51-3, 55.9, 63. 66-7, 75.112,
76-9.81-88,90-106, 108, 110-1,
116-7, 120, 124, 275, 2-92, 298,
310, 317-8, 384, 400, 414, 501-2,
519, 545, 557

b. Abdill&h, asSajjad, Dhu'l

Thafinat : 501, 543
b. Judai', alKarmanf : 490-1,
524-5, 529-531, 557, 539

'Alid : 39, 264, 297, 309, 337, 500,
502, 533, 545-6, 551, 563

Alin : 523-6, 528-530

Allah : 7-11, 18-9, 23-4, 35, 44, 61,
72, 159, 218, 272, 294, 307

'Alqama, Nakha'ifce : 83

Arnanus : 187

n •

'Amir : 181, 201-2, 205, 360

b. Dubsira, alMurri : 395,

540
ashSha'bi— see ashSha'bl,

Qatfi : 270
'Amman : 352, 354
'Am mar al'Ib&d! : 507-8

b. Yasir : 81, 83, 116
b. Yazld : 509, 510
Amos : 2, 209
'Amr : 285

b. 'A§ : 46-7, 76-7, 79, 90-3,

95, 97-9, 103, 135, 137
b- Hazm : 264
b. Hnraith : 124
b. Mart hud : 417
b. Muslim, alB&hilt : 269,

544

b. Sa'id b. 'As : 146-8, 150-
1, 154, 173-5, 177, 183.
185, 188-190, 221
b. Tamim : 407
b. Yazid b. Hakam : 172
b. Zubair : 150-1
Amul : 432, 458, 510
Anabis : 173
Anastasius : 540
Anbar : 100, 316, 541
'Anbasa : 341
Annales (Eutychins : od. Pococke) :

213

Anonymous Work — ed. Ahlwardt
(q. u.) : 78, 176. 183, 185, 189,
191-196, 1,98-9, 211, 215-6 219,
221-6, 228-9, 231-6, 242, 245-7,
255, 286, 371
Anoshravan : 252
Anxab, Kit. : 89

An*ar : 11-2, 17, 20-i, 36-40, 45,
49, 50, 52, 93, 113, 137, 144, 149,
150, 152-3, 160-2, 164, 558
Ansarite : 149, 154, 156, 264
Antilibanus : 375
Antiochia : 347, 383
Antipatris : 554
apostacy : 272
(Aqtba : 477
'Aqil : 82

'Aqr : 316,319,322
Arab : pansim

Arabia : 6, 18, 21-3, 27, 38, 53-4,
160, 162, 200, 205, 209, 275, 297,
301, 394-5: 412,501,519
Arabian : 10, 18, 23, 27-9, 32-3,
38, 55, 68, 72-4, 99, 124, 210,
214, 219, 224, 278, 343, 361, 363.
372, 394, 399, 414, 424, 438

570

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Arabic : 19, 48, 219, 220, 225, 255,

262, 287, 442, 494, 527
Arabisation of Islam : 18
Arabism : 19, 24, 69, 133, 216, 246,

413, 437, 450, 487, 502, 504,

536, 542, 557
'Arafa : 198, 241
Aramaean : 378
Aramaic : 44 132
'Arandas, Azdito : 400
ArW : 398
Arbad : 325
arbitration-court : 57, 59, 84-90,

92-3,97,108, 115, 486
ardab : 218
'Arim (prison) : 151
'Arfsh : 95-6
Armenia : 217, 222, 317, 369, 371,

374, 389
Armenian : 6

army-list, — icgister : 25, 287
Army of Peacocks — see Peacock-

army

Aryan : 432
al-'A§ : 173
'nsabiya : 469, 500
Asad b. 'Abdill&h, alQasrl : 455-6,

458, 467-474, 484, 4S7. 508-510,

515

Asfiwira : 397, 410-1
A§bagh b. Dhuala : 387
A 'aha, of Hamdan : 247
Ash'ab : 161
Ashajj : 247
Ash'ar : 149, 249
Ash'ath : 86, 104, 247, 319

b. Dhu'aib al'Adawi : 419
Ashja' : 167, 320
Ashja'ite : 155
Ashkand : 432, 472
alAsJvAf, Kit : 193
Ashras b. 'Abdillob. asSulami :

456-460, 463
Ash tar— see Malik
'Ashura', Fast : 19
Asbyam b. Shaqlq, of Bakr : 405-7
Asia : 558

Asia Minor : 217, 317, 335, 344
'A§im b. Abdillah, alHilal! : 461-2,
466-8

b. Yunas, al'Ijlf : 512
Aslam b. Zur'a, alKilabt : 415
"Ass," The— see Marwan II
astrologer — see courts—

'«(* (P^) : 298» [36?> 497]

'Atlk : 404

•Atika, daughter of Yazld I : 222, 312

('Attya, ath Thalabt— we Abfl

;At!ya)

Atlantic Ocean : 74
atonemont-money — see blocd- : 208,

408

'Attab b. Warqa' : 197
Attic owl : 217

Aucupa — see 'Uqba b. Hajj&j : 343
Aus : 6, 17, 37, 421

b. Tha'laba b, Zufar, Bakrite :
416-8
4Awana : 75, 100-1, 105, 107-9, 144,

156-7, H55-7, 169, 171, 174, 176-

8, 185, 189, 407-411
A'yiig : 173

'Ayesha : 42, 52-3, 56, 98
Azariqa : 227,229,231
Azd : 70, 100, 120, 126, 181, 209,

210, 234, 250, 314, 316, 820, 329,

398-400, 404-5, 407-411, 417,

427-9, 441, 446, 448, 451, 454,

456, 458, 465, 467, 483-4, 486-7

489-491, 510, 515, 525, 530, 539,

542

Azd Sfirat : 132,399, 400
Azd 'Uman : 3,9,70-1, 209, 250, 313,

399, 401, 404, 417, 451
Azditc : 119, 259, 318, 399, 427,

443-4, 449,451, 456, 466, 47J,

473, 484. 539
: 357

Ba'albekk : 225, 363, 375, 382, 549

Babba— see 'Abdullah b. Harith

Babel- see Babylon

BabJya : 471

Babylon : 316, 550

Bactria : 430

Badakhshan : 430-1

Badha^his : 415, 428, 431

Badr (Battle) : 11, 16, 17, 41, 137

• Tarlch&n : 473
Baghdad": 557-8, T60, 562
Bahila : 201, 260, 429, 443-4,

455

: 440, 445, 449, 454
. Warqa', a§Sarlml : 420-3
Bahlul b. Bishr, Kharijite : 328,

330

Bahrain : 86-7, 99
Bahramsis : 477
Bahr&nite : 360, 364
Baian : 327

I&DEX

Baiar : 452

Baiarkath : 452

Baiasan : 44.7

Baikand : 434, 459

Bajila : 328, 455

Bajilite : 329

Bajumairu, Bajumairat : 188, 190-2,

195

BakhnV : 363
Bakhtari b. Abi Dirham, Rnkiite :

456

Bakka'i : 100-1, 105
Bakr : 70-1, 84, 190, 207, 230, 216,
388, 398,400,405-7, 4 if- 8,
420. 427, 458, 467, 489, 539
b. Wa'il : 390
Bakrite : 328, 405, 413, 416-7, 466,

510, 515, 529, 538, 550
Baladhurt : 77, 89, 95, 99. 109,
110, 125, 169, 188, 193, 217-2^0,
225, 231, 252-3, 200-1, 277, 285-
6, 291, 294-5, 297-302, 323, 339,
344,398, 403, 414, 416-7, 422,
426, 436, 442, 451, 454, 456, 476,
494-5

Balharith, Yemenite : 549
Bait" : 49
Ballkh : 204
Baltn— see Alin : 528
Balis : 77
Balj : 345

Balkh (Baktra) : 251, 338, 424, 430,
432, 455*6, 466, 468-472, 475,
508, 536-8
Balqa' : 368
Balqain : 35i
Bamiaii : 431, 473
Banftt Qain : 206-7
Banft 'Abbas : 508
Ahtam : 441
Haritha : 156
Jalanda : 395

Mnhallab— fee Muhallabid :
484

Qa'q&' : 354, 360
Rauh b. Zinba'— sec Raul? :
548

Sa'd— see Sa'd : 423
Shaiban : 229
Umaiya — see Uniaiya
barA'a : 22

Barbalission, Bnrbalissus : 77
Barhebraeus : 192
Barmak, Dihqan : 469
Barmakid : 469
Barf-h : 71, 204, 321
Barftqan : 455-6, 468-9

Basra : 26, 39, 53, 55-6, 69-71,
"84-5, 92, 99, 100, 108, 110-1, 113,
115-6, 118-124, 127, 129-131,
141, 144, 169, 171, 175, 190, 195,
209, 210, 222, 226-230, 234-6,
238, 241, 243-6, 248-250, 256,
269, 270, 278, 282, 285-6, 297-8,
313-5, 318-9, 329, 337, 368,
397-402, 404, 407, 4u9- 411, 413-
4, 416, 421. 426, 429, 444, 461,
494, 499, 542, 554
Bas.raite : 77, 125 *

Basrian : 99, 210, 231-2, 236, 245t
313, 318, 400, 402-4, 409, 411,
415

alBattal : 340
beacon : 471, 523, 528
Beduin : 3, 25, 38, 131, 149, 188,

321
Berber : 295, 306, 323, 341, 343,

345, 565

Biblical names : 264
Rijdragc tot de gesch. dor Ziyeuncrs :

253

bishop : 28, 478
Bishr (place) : 208
Bishr : 325

b. Jurmu/, adDabbt : 458,

465, 4S7

b. Marwan : 207 222, 227-8
Bistum b. Masqala b. «Hubaira, of

Bakr : 246

Btward : 492, 524, 529. 537
blood-feud : 6, 15, 22, 203

—money : 12,14,411, 423
— relationship : 3, 4, 6, 7,

10-1, 14, 36, 39, 129
—revenge— see revenge
—shed : 13, 51, 80, 127, 147,
206, 208, 408, 441, 448, 473
Boniface : 300
Boucher : 232
Brockelmann : 193-4
Brunnow : 403
buffalo : 225, 252
Bukair b. Mahan : 507, 510-1, 513
b. Wishafc, Tamhnite, Sa'd-

ite : 418-423

Bukhara : 413, 434-5, 437-8, 441,
450,455,457-461,463, 475
— khudah : 475
Bukhari : 82
Bukharians: 403
Bukharite: 426
Buivjtkath: 452
Buraiq, Hudhailite : 54
Bushang, Bflshanj : 415

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FAL!

Buslr (Busiris) : 549 \

Busrb. AbiArtat: 100-1,109, 111, \
118, 120 I

Bust : 234, 239 !

Butnan Hebib: 188-190
Butun: 421, 423
Buwaib : 77
•Buzmajan : 452
Byzantines . 140

Cacsariurn , 77

Caliph, Caliphate-see Khalifa,

Khalifate

call to prayer — see adhAn : 22 \

camel : 3, 44, 403, 405 |

Camel, Bat. of : 53, 56, 86 I

canal,— system : 31, 84, 252, 292, •

332, 349, 366, 431, 452, 468, I

541
capitulation : 20-1,29, 31, 300, 415,

426, 436. 453, 479, 551
Caspian,- Sea : 269, 340, 446
Catholicus : 192, 197, 300
cattle-tax : 205
Caucasian : 371, 374
Caucasus : 377
9euta : 345
Charles Martel : 342
Chawarig : 25, 117, 124, 131, 154,

165, 185, 195, 200, 227, 229,

231, 248, 420
Chinese : 436
Christian : 6, 18-9, 24, 133-5, 137,

203-4, 213, 216-7 220, 225,

283, 286, 288, 299-301, 325,

330, 334, 340, 342, 347, 355,

379, 383, 477-8, 554, 557, 561
Christian church : .9, 132, 134, 324,

330
Christianity : 5, 18, 87, 99, 208,

216
Church of St. John (Damascus) :

216, 225, 300
Cilicia : 252
Cilician Sebasto : 216
Circesium : 191
civil war : 51, 59, 483, 502
—First : 75-112
—Second : 113.200 187
—Third : 370-96, 394
clan,— system : 3, 6, 10, 12-3, 27,

70, 128-130, 140, 246-7, 254, 259,

297, 313, 320,437

— parties — .see tribal dualipm,

tribal groups
clerk : 32, 219, 235
client : 13, 48, 72, 244, 246, 382,

533

clientship : 13

coin, coinage : 217-8, 255, 264
community (of Islam) : 1, 2, 4. 7

10-13/16, 61, 65, 129
Companion : 7, 35-6, 38-40, 42, 45,

49, 51, 54, 137, 142, 164, 287-8,

290, 307
compensation — see blood-money :

206, 209

Constantino, Emperor : 47, 99
Constantinople : 168, 224, 263-4,

268, 305, 339
Continuatio of Isidore oi! Hispalis :

.95, 102, 1679, 177, 182, 184,

222, 260, 295, 310, 325, 340,

343, 349, 350, 369, 533
Copt : 249
Coptic : 220

Cosmographer of Ravenna : 77
court-astrologer : 562
Cms-.s\ the : 217-8
crown -lands : 29, 252, 291
11 Cudgel-bearers : " 192
Gultiirgeschichte des Orients : 244,

273, 287
Culturgeschichtlichc Streifzuge : 244.

287

Cunningham, 231
cursing of 'Alt : 91, 106, 310
Cyprians : 356
Cyprus : 301, 349, 394

Daba : 404

Dabbite : 405, 442

Dabiq : 263-4, 265 6, 552

Dabusia : 459, 464

Dahhak b. Qajs, al Fihrt : 100, 130,
142, 144, 171-6, 178-9, 181
b. Qais, ash Shaib&iit,
Kharijite : 372, 389-392

Dahistan : 446-7

Dahlak : 355

Dailamite : 314

Dair Hind : 387

Jamajim : 237, 241, 246, $43,

291
Qurra : 237

dam : 252

INDEX

673

Damascene : 218, 363 |

Damascus : 60, 75, 7,9, 89, 95, 102, i
122, 124, 131, 133-4, '136, 139, j
141-2, 144, 151, 154, 164, 167,
169-178, 182, 189, 190, 204, 207,
211, 216-7, 219, 220, 222-3, 225,
267, 287, 300, 311, 319, 326,
332, 335-6. 338-9, 344, 353-5.
359-366, 368, 375-378, 380, 382,

401, 471, 501, 508, 545, 548-9,
552, 557, 560

d&r : 48-9, 51

al Hijra : 26

allsl&m : 26

Sunbtl : 400
Darabjard : 106
Daflkara : 86
Da'M b. 'Alt : 543-5, 55*-4

b. Snlainutn : 264
daula : 3. 556
Danla, Kit. : 556
Danraq : 421
Dans : 399, 400
David : 169
Day, Days (of the Arabs) : 202-3,

206. 412

of the Baggage : 470

of Jairun — see Jairun
Delectus (of N61deke) : 489
DhakwAntya : 372, 375, 391
dhimma : 288
Dhubian : 181
Diehl : 300

Dihkan : 28, 252, 304, 414
Dihqan : 432, 435, 456-7, 465, 469,

472, 475, 481, 494
Dimhnma : 541
Din, Din Alldh : 63

alKhurramiya — sec Khurra-

mitisrn : 510
dinar : 217-8
Dinawari : 75-6, 7,9-81, 83-4, 87,

96, 99, 107, 137, 148, 534-5
dirham : 218
diw&n : 116, 278, 282, 291, 348,

402, 497

D. M. 7,. = Z(>itschriftd. Dent. Morg.

Getell. : 82,89, 96, 99, 109, 110,

114, 168-9, 315, 375, 556
Dome of the Rock : 213, 216
Dordogne : 342
Doughty : 3
Dozy : '158-60, 163, 180, 182, 207,

226, 259, 260, 262, 296, 304
drachm : 218
Drock-Harburg : 188
DujaiL: 231,235, 238-9

Duma. : 84, 89-91, 108, 115, 544
Dftrin : 381

duly : 303

earthquake (in Syria) : 134, ?99

Edcsaa : 375

Edessaitcs : 134

Edom : 8,9

Egypt : 26, 46-7, 59, 76, 89, 93-5,

97-9, 108, 137, 185, 207, 217-8,

220, 222-3, 267, 271, 305, 319,

369. 394, 549, 550
Egyptian : 30, 40-8, 52, 76, 548 9
Eliafl *i8ibemis : 111, 139, 167, 184,

187-9, 192, 199, 223, 226, 263,

36'5, 369, 376, 379, 382, 434
Emesaa— see Hhns : 134-5, 137, 171,

173, 176, 184, 192, 325, 375, 379
Emessaite : 176

Emigrant— soo Muh&jira : 7, 14,9
Emir : 26, 35, 101, 132, 140, 150,
173, 195, 341, 410, 416, 483
of the Believers or Faithful :
35, 213
rn Gara : 375
Enjrer : 274

Emntckahr : 116, 232, 435
Eudo : 341-2
Euphrates : 56, 77, 83, 147, 170,

1S4-5, 188, 202-3, 205, 230, 237,

252, 316-7, 375, 381, 391, 541
Europe : 340, 342
Eutychius : 213, 216, 225
exchequer — see treasury : 31, 131,

219, 262, 277, 279, 282, 303,

305, 319, 348, 561
executioner : 5b'l
Exile (Jewish) : 9

Fadak : 297

fai' : 31, 43-4, 62, 293-4, 298, 337,

384, 402
Failkan : 116
Fairuz Hu§ain, Mania: 247, 257,

414
Faith : 7, 10-1, 15-6, 22, 24, 34, 36,

61, 72, 163, 292, 294
faithful, tin : 11, 14-5, 55-6, 62,

272

574

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Fakhita : 183

Falallj : 237

Falluja : 541

Fam Furat Badaqla : 541

Fam anNll : 541

famine (in Syria) : 187

Fantn : 522, 528

Farab : 476

Farazdaq : 129, 232, 234, 245, 247,

257, 320, ^108, 437
Farghana : 428, 432, 436, 440, 443,

445, 452-4, 476-7
Fariab : 415, 430, 433, 436
F-kifc : 316
Farma' : 548
Fars : 99, 108, 120-1, 128, 234,

315-6, 385, 390, 427
Fartana : 420
"Farthing-face" (Wajh alFals) :

365

Farwa b. Naufal : 86
" Father of the Kings " : 223
Fatima : 502
Fatimid : 504, 508, 5 17
Faz'ara : 205-6, 320, 351, 354
fellAMn: 304

Feroz, prince of Jurjan : 446-7
Feroz Hua.ain — see Fairilz
feud — see blood-feud, tribal-feud :

13-6, 22, 201-3, 205, 207, 209,

210, 354, 410, 416, 419, 423,

427, 454, 519, 534
ftdya : 434

fifth : 29, 253, 269, 296, 448, 513
Filisttn : 377, 379, 380, 471
fire- temple : 273
Firiab : 435, 466
./Una : 51, 61, 200, 406
flag, black ('Abbaaid)— sec standard
fleet, Arabian : 47
Flight— see hijra : 25, 36
Franks : 341-3
Freytag : 205
Friday : 18, 26, 48, 50
Fiiqahtf : 62
Fustat : 26

G

Garis : 375

Garonne : 342

garrison-town : 25, 54, 297, 436

Gaul : 343

Gelder, van : 185

Geschichte des I slams : 273

Gethsomane : 101 , 214

Ghalib : 508

Ghan! : 201

ghantma : 31, 43

Gharjistan, Gharshistan : 431-2

gharqad-bush : 158-160

Ghnssan : 173, 181, 363

Ghassanid : 55

Ghatafan : 156-7, 159, 181, 320

Ghataf aniie : 169

Ghaznin : 431

Ghor : 203

Ghuzak, IJchsMd : 436, 457, 459

Gibbon : 342

Gibraltar : 343

Gtds (Indian) : 275

Gildemeister : 213

Goeje, de : 109, 186, 253, 277

gold (coins) : 217-8, 264

Gnldziher : 180

Golgotha : 101, 134, 214, 237

Gospel : 2, 19

Goth : 343

Gottinger Nachnchten : 100, 113,

168,187, 189, 216, 237, 257,

274
Graeco-,Greek : 6, 32, 55, 132, 217,

219, 220

Gregor, Pope : 300
ground-tax : 219, 273, 287
" Guard," branding of : 323

Hababa : 324

Habib b. Muhallab : 429

Hadramaut : 394

hdfiz (of Qoran) : 215

Ha'ira : 541

Haital : 425, 433

Haitham : 341

b. ' Adi : 198

Haiyan : 506

an Nabati : 442-3, 447,
496

Hajar : 330

hajj-see pilgrimage : 46, 51, 108,
117, 151-2,538

Hajjaj, son of Ummu'lHajjaj :

312

b. Yusuf b. Hakam, Thaqifite
113, 159, 166,' 185, 193, 198-9,
206, 208, 217-9, 221, 224-6, 228-
240, 242-5, 247-254, 257-262,
264, 267-9, 271, 279-282, 284-6,

INDEX

575

291, 297, 301, 306-7, 312-3,
321-2, 326-7, 331, $23, 355,
387, 426, 428, 430, 356, 439,
441, 446, 449, 450,454, 474,
499, 550
Hajjajids : 359
Hakam b, Aiyiib, athThaqafi : 285

b, 'Amr,al Ghifart : 415
hakam&n : 93
Halab : 319
Hamadan : 539-54O
Hawdsfl, Kit. : 25, 132, 166-6, 170,
172, 177, 180-1, 189, 199, 202,
205, 211, 226, 230, 538, 543,
551
Bamdan : 39, 82, 84, 236, 246-8,

398, 508

Hammam A'yan : 543-4, 546
Hanash : 77
Hanash b. Sabal : 433
Hanzala : 407

al Harashl — s#e Sa'id b. 'Amr
Harb b. 'Uthman, Maula : 508
Harirudh : 431
Harish b. '5.mir : 452

b. Hilal, al Qurai'i : 419
Harith b. Suraij, Tamirnite : 459,
464-472, 476, 485-7, 489,
497-8, 534, 537
b. 'nbfid : 456
Haritha b. Badr, Tarnimite : 129,

407

Harra: 38, 15 '-6, 161, 165
Harran : 170, 374, 377-8, 391, 394,

543, 547-9
Harranites : 548
Hartinar Rashid : 565
Harura : 58, 83, 86
Harurites : 58, 84
Hasan b. 'Ali b. >bf Tftlib : 59,
104, 106-111
al Basil : 61, 270, 286,
315, 406

b. Qahfcaba : 539-542, 550
Hasan id : 533
Hashak : 204
liashim : 2,41, 519
b. 'Utba : 81
Hashimid : 560
flashi mid ell : 274
HAshimiya : 503-4, 510, 516-7,

519, 528, 532
Hashimiya (city) : 546
HAthimiyAt : 504
HAshimtyftn : 504
Hasmonaeans : 63
Hassan b. Malik b. Bahdal, al

Kalbi : 170-5, 177, 179-
181, 183, 212
an Nabati : 252, 331, 333
Hauran : 96
Hauthara b. Suhnil, al Bahili :

541-2

Hawazin : 21, 181
Hebrews : 359
Hephthalites : 433
Herat : 240, 242, 250. 320, 415-8,

434, 438, 453,* 466, 474, 490.

492, 529, 537
hierarchy : 9
Hijaz : 100, 118, 142, 144-5, 162,

167, 193, 198-9, 251, 256, 267,

555, 555
hijjat alwadfc : 22
hijra : 4, 11, 25-6, 54-5, 64, 187,

280-1
Himian b. 'Adi, as Sadust, Bak-

rite : 232
Hirns (Emessa) : 325, 354, 360,

363-5, 375, 377, 379, 380, 38 '2,

390-2. 471, 548,555

Himliya : 316*

H!ra : 330, 334, 338, 359, 368,

383-4, 386-7, 546, 554
Hishani b. ' Abdilmalik : 140, 252,
265, 290, 35:5, 327, 329,
331-6, 339-341, 343-6,
350-8, 361, 371, 373, 375,
380, 382, .384-5, 455,
461-2, 467, 471, 473-4,
477, 482, 552, 554
b. Isrna'tl, Makhzurnite :

215, 224. 325,
Histoire d'Afrique : 300
Histoire dex Musulmans d'Espagne :

158, 259

History of Damascus : 287
Hit : 100
Holy Stone — sea Stone

War-see jihAd : 23, 46-7, 64,
216, 314, 499
honsehold troops : 69
Hudain b. Mundhir, Bakrite :441
Hudhaifa : 96

of Mada'in : 83
Hndhail b. Zufar b. Harith: 191,

211,321
Hujr b. * Adi, of Kinda : 117, 124-

5, 415, 457
Hulwan : 440, 541
Humaid b. Huraith b. Bahdal,

Kalbite : 202-3, 205, 207
Humaima: 501, 503, 518, 543-4

576

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Humran b. Aban : 118
hunting-hounds : 152
Huraith b. Bahdal : 205

b. Qutba : 424-5, 406
al Hurr, Emir : 341
Husain b. « Ali; b. Abi Talib : 106,
142, 146-8, 150, 155, 158, 164,
168, 401
Hugain b. Mfilik: 414

b. Numair, as Sakun ,

Syrian : 150, 157-8,

165- 7,174, 176, J85-6

b. Tarnim, at Tamimi,

Kufaite : 158
Hutai'a : 140
Huwarin: 167-8

Ibn * Abbas— see 'Abdullah and
1 Ubaidullah : 81, 90-1,99, 100,
105-6, 119, 144, 146
'Abbas, al Hashhni-see ' Abdur-

raljman

Abi 'Amarrata, al KindS : 457
Abl Hudhaifa-see Muhammad
Abi Nims, Gbassanid : 173
Abi Rabi'a : 330
Abi Sarh : 46, 93, 95
Abi Waqqa? : 42, 90
4 &m\r-see * Abdullah

• Arada : 169

• Asakir : 287, 290-1
Ash'ath — sec ' Abdurrahman b.
Muhammad

Ath'ir : 87. 103, 141, 143.4,
183, 190-6, 201-2, 204-5, 207,
218. 245, 323-4, 344, 354,
416, 430, 550-1, 553

' Anf : 42, 51

Bahdal — set Hassan b. Malik

Budail : 81

Dnbara — see ' Amir

Duraid : 126

Habib : 205-6

Hadrami : 100, 400

Hanafiya : 502, 504

Hanzaln — see * Abdullah

al Harashi — see Nadr b. Sa'id

Hisham : 31, 41, 81, 85, 96,
101,120

Hubab~8^ 'Umair

Hubaira — see 'Umar and Yazid
b. 'Umar

Hudaij— see Mu'awia

4 Idah : 148-9
Ishaq : 101
! JarAd— see ' Abdullah
Kalbi : 96-8, 168, 102
al Karmiini — see ' Ali b. Judai*
Khabal : 285
Kb-dzim—eee 'Abdullah
Khnrdadhbeh : 252-3, 471-2
Mahari — *ee Bukair
Maiyas : 103

Mu'awia b. Ja'far— see ' Ab-
dullah

Mufarrigh : 122
Muhallab— see Yazid
Mulhtammad (b. 'Abdillah) : 501
Muhammad (b. Aah'ath) — see

' Abdurrahman
Muljam : 103-4
Nti 'aim — see 'Abdurrahman
Qutaiba : 185, 262, 444
Saba, of Yemen, Jew : 68, 502,

504

Sa'd : 503
Sa'id — see ' Amr
4 Ubiida : 94
' Udais, Egyptian : 49
1 Umar : 90
'Umar II: 383-4, 386-7, 389,

390, 393
Zabyiin — see ' Ubaidnllah b.

Zfad

Zi^d — see { Ubaidulhih
Zubair — see ' Abdullah
Ibrahim b. al Ashtar : 186, 196

b. Khattab al'Adawi : 508
Makhzuinite : 354
b. Muhammad b. ' Ali,
Imam : 501, 512-3,
518-.9, 528, 534, 538,
543-4

b. Salima : 506
b. Walid I : 369, 374, 376,

378, 384

Idris b. Ma'qil, ' Ijlite : 512
y'dra : 13, 15
Ikhrid : 432
IMished : 432
Iklil (Day of) : 202
Imam: 10-1,15, 26, 51, 64, 167,
317, 368, 390, 464, 501, 503, 513,
518, 520, 523, 529, 533, 544
imam a to, imfimship: 501, 503, 564
India - 249, 253, 269, 293, 296, 446,

459
Indian : 225, 252-3, 397

Ocean : 74
Indus-land : 253, 258, 294

INDEX

577

insignia (of Khilafat) : 325, 352,
550, 562

Iqd alFartd : 244, 285

Iran : 3135, 439, 503

Irfmian : 71-3, 99, 123, 220, 232,
278, 283, 327, 385, 397, 412.3,
424-6, 432-4, 438-9, 442-5, 450-1,
454, 456, 458, 460, 462-6, 468-9,
472, 474-5, 481-2, 485, 488-9,
492-9, 504-5, 514-6, 518, 532,
535-7, 558, 562, 565

Iraiiiauism : 536, 558

'Iraq : 26, 32, 53. £6, 58-60, 63, 66,
7fl, 78-9, 81, 98,- 104, I07-S, 113,
lb7-8, 128, 130-1, 133, 139, 170,
l^j-G, 188, 191, 193, 195, 198,
28l, 2()3, 218, 226-233, 249-251,
2°4-6,262,267, 275, 278, 287, 292,
256, 299, 301, 307, 313, 316-7,
3^9, 320, 326, 328, 333, 336,
31.3-4, 346, 355, 359, 367, 369,
3^1, 383, 386, 392-4,401,411,
486-7, 445-6, 449, 455-6, 467,
424, 483, 488, 493, 499, 507, 541,
574-5, 550, 557

'Iraq4te : 79, 82 3, 93, 100, 108, 131,
162, 187, 103, 214, 235.240, 244,
246, 248-9, 260-1, 264, 309, 318,
336, 369, 411, 428, 447, 453,
45 5, 482, 535, 539, 545, 557

Jrori Gate (a pnss) : 435, 475-6

irrigation -system : 431, 493

Isa b. 'All : 543-4

b Ma'qil, 'Ijlite : 511-2
b Musa b. Muhammad : 543

Ishaq.(b. Muhamnind b. alAsh'ath):

233
b. Suwaid : 406

Tsbbosheth : 169

Ishkemisb : 435

Ishttkhan : 452, 472

Ishudad, son of Gregor : 477

Isidore Hispalerisis (of Seville) —

see Continuatio
Iske*mish : 435
Islam, Dvr : 121

Islam : 1, 2, 4, 9, 11, 13, 16, 18-25,
36, 38-9, 42, 46, 51, 54-6, 60-1,
64-5, 67-8, 71-4, 84, 90-1, 113-5,
120, 122, 128, 131-5, 137, 140-1,
153, 155, 158, 163-4, 180, 208,
210, 215-6, 224, 226, 238, 24&,
245, 264, 268, 271, 275-282,
286-7, 292-5, 297, 299-302, 305,
307-310, 314-5, 317, 323-5, 328,
330, 345, 347, 356, 360, 380,
390, 412, 487-9, 442-3, 445,

78

| 450-1, 456-7, 462-3, 465, 479,
482, 487, 492, 495-9, 501-2, 504,
515-6, 534-7, 557-8, 562-4, 566

Islamic : 22 34, 38-9, 50, 54, 90,
95, 131, 145, 149, 162, 164, 184,
218, 280, 283, 308, 319, 361,
388, 439, 481, 506, 533, 556,
565

Islamisation : 308, 450

Isroa'll b. 'Abdillah : 269
b. 'Alt : 543

Ispahan : 84, 196, 385, 540

Ispuhbadh : 432, 447

Israelites : 553

Tsraelitish : 10

Issus, Bay of : 225

Istfikhr : 120, 385

Isfcakhri : 435

Iyu-8 b. Qatada, Tnmimito : 408

Izqubadh : 116, 238

Jabala : 248

Jubala b. Mnsruq : 98

Jabnlq : 540

Jabbul : 328

Jabghtiia alKharlnkln : 466, 471-2

Jabia : 172-4, 177-180, 182-3, 189

Jacobites : 134

alJa'di — sec Marwan II

Ja'far (b. Abi Tfilib) : 381

Ja'farid : 488/540, 544

Jaffa : 5-1-8

Jahhaf b Tfukaim, Sulaimite : 207-8

Jahiz : 244'

Jahm b. Safwfin : 464, 486

Jairun, Day of : 172, 174, 177

Gate of : 172
Jaish b. Snbal : 433
Jalanj : 453
JalfiUV : 541
jamA'a : 51, 56, 64, 111, 200, 206t

317, 498, 564
Jama jim — sec Dair
Jaria'b. Qiiduma : 101, 400
jortb : 274
Jartr : 257, 31,9, 408

(b 'Abdillah, alBajali) : 75
b. b. Sa'id b Qa.is, o/ Ham-
dan : 246-7
Jarrah b. 'Abdillah, alHakami: 269,

319, 450-1

b. Sinan (alias b. Qabisa)
alAsadl : 107

578

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Jaulan : 180

Jaxartes : 432-3, 452, 455, 476

Jehu : 553

Jeremiah : 315

Jerusalem : 19, 92, 101-2, 134, 213-

4, 216, 225, 326, 382
Jew : 6, 8, 11-2, 16-9, 36, 213,

283, 324-5, 330, 477-8, 501
Jewish : 9, 19, 50, 301, 604
Jezreel : 553
jthAd—aee Holy War : 23, 25, 268,

294, 343
Jiranj : 524

jizi* : 276-7, 282, 290, 480, 482
John, Church of St. — see Church
Jordan : 325, 356, 368
Josephus : 554
Judaean : 63
Judai', alKarmani, Azdite : 467,

469, 471, 484-7, 489, 490, 531
Judaic : 18
Judaism : 5, 18, 20
judge — see q&dt
Jndh&mite : 548
Jufilya : 190
Jukha : 84, 230
Junaid b. 'Abdirrahnmn, alMurri :

459-462, 466-7, 507, 509
jund : 532

Jurjan : 26;-J, 446-8, 520, 539
Jueti : 232

Justinian IT : 216, 218
Juynboll : 275

Juzjan, Juzistan : 430, 471, 475
Juzjanite : 471

Kauba : 203

Ka'b, alAshqari, alAzdi : 427, 437
b. Ju'ail : 83

Ka'ba : 19, 158, 165-6, £14-5, 331

Kabul : 231, 239, 416, 435

Kabulistan : 431

Kafartuta : 392

Kafian : 425

Kafirkubat : 535

Kalb : 39, 70-1, 132-3, 163, 170-3,
175, 178-182, 189, 192, 201-3,
205-6, 211, 226, 249,361,378,
386, 418

Kalbite : 133, 164, 170, 174, 202,
205-6, 211, 322, 359-361, 363-4,
366-370, 375-6, 379, 380, 386-7,
389, 391, 393-4, 484, 554-5

Kamarja : 459

K6.mil, Kit.: 75, 78,87, 103.4, 228,

254, 398, 405, 407, 437
Kapharsaba : 554
kar&dts : 373
Karazank : 452
Karbala : 147, 155, 316
Karman : 231-2, 239, 315, 319,

385, 427, 540
alKarmani — see Judai'
Karzanj : 452
Kashghar : 436-7
Kashka : 436
Kaekar : 252, 390
Kathir, Kufaite : 509

Kauthar b. Zufar b. Harith : 211,

321

Kazarank — see Karazank
Khabatat : 414
Khabor, Khaborns : 203-4
Khaddash, * Umfira — ace Khidash :

509

Khadra' (prison) : 366, 368
Khaibarl : 392

Khalid, grea' -grandson of Asid,

Umaiyid : 222, 227

b. Aeid — see preceding : 227

b. ' Abdillah, al Qasrt, of

Bajila : 214, 258, 260, 321,

326-8, 330, 333-6, 344,

346, 349, 357-362, 365,

386, 455, 467, 473-4, 512

b. Barmak, Iranian : 538

b. Ibrahim, Bakiite : 509

[510-5]
b. Jarir b. ' Abdillah , al-

Qasri : 251
b. Yazid (b. Mu'awia) : 172-

3, 175, 183, 205, 222
Khalifa : 32, 35~6, 40, 42, 46-53,
56, 58, 62, 64, 67, 73, 84, 88,
91-2, 101, 13M3, 138, 157, 159,
166, 169, 172, 174, *09, 214,
221,223.5,265, 270,284,289,
291, 322, 357, 362-3, 374, 381,

386, 388, 392, 402-4, 411, 420,
440, 444, 448, 464, 467, 473,
483, 552, 558, 560-1,565

Khalifate (Khil&fat) : 41, 53-5, 57,
69, 70, 73-4, 76, 90, 94, 102,
145-6, 161, 164, 168, 189, 200,
203, 207, 212, 221, 226, 271,
310, 350, 370, 376, 388, 444,
447, 488, 501, 516,550, 555,
564

Khaniqin : 541

Khdqdn : 433, 458.461 , 470.2, 476-7

INDEX

579

Kharabuffhra : 471-2
Kkar&j, Kit : 25, 218, 255, 275
khar&j : 272, 276-7, 279, 282,
285-7, 289, 290, 292, 297-8,
303, 477, 480, 482

—land : 31, 279-281, 286,

289-292, 303
Kharbita : 94

Kharijite-eee Khaw&rij : 92, 103,
186, 231, 311, 317, H27, 343-4,
388.390, 393-4, 464, 502
Kharijitism : 388
Kharlukh : 471
Kharqan Canal : 528
KhaxhaWya : 505, 535
kh&88atu'i< Sult&n : 403
Khath'amite : 96

Khaio&rij— xee KbjAirijite : 25, 39,
58, 63-7, 72, 74, 84-8, 98, 103,
117, 124, 127, 131, 165, 195,
227, 229, 230, 232, 309, 310,
317,328,372, 387, 389,390-4,
402,404,410-1,427, 464,488,
498, 533
Khazim b. Khuzaima, at Tamimi :

523, 538

Khazir : 175, 186, 196, 203
Khazraj : 6, 17, 37
Khidash— .see Kbaddash : 504, ,009-

511, 514-7
Khindif : 475
Khindifite : 475
Khirash b. Jabir, 'Ijlite : 285
Khirrit b. Kaahid, of Najia : 86-8,

92, 99

Khitat : 220
Khokend — Bee Khujanda
Khud&h : 432
Khutaf : 381, 391
Khujanda (Khokend) : 452-3,

455

Khulm : 430

Khunaaira ; 311

Khuraiba : 235

Khurasan, Dihqan : 474

Khurasan : 39, 69-71, 73.4, 99,

125, 169, 184, 197, 210, 212,

231, 235, 241-2, 249, 250, 253,

258, 260, 262, 269, 277, 283,

294, 297-9, 314-5, 318-320, 338,

346,355, 358, 369, 395, 397-

491, 398, 411-8, 420-2, 424-

431,433,437-8, 446-451, 453,

455-6, 460, 462-3, 465-7, 471-5

477, 481-4, 487, 491-5, 499-

501, 503-514, 517-522, 533-9,

546, 565

Khuraaanite : 73, 240, 395-6, 44-7,

493, 497-8, 506-7, 510-3, 518,

532, 536, 540, 543-550, 552.

556, 558-9, 564-5
Khurramite : 516, 533
Khurramitisni— sec Din al Khur-

ramiya : 515
Khushwaragh : 425, 470
Khutarnia : 505-6
Khuttal : 426, 431, 433, 450, 466,

470, 473,
Khuttalfin : 431, 472
Khuza'a : 514-5, 522, 528
Khuza'ite : 510, 515, 528
Khtizistan : 421
Kbwarizm : 428, 432, 435-8, 459,

475, 523
Kikanite (QlqAntya) : 338
Kinana : 474-5, 484

b. Bishr, at Tujibi : 50,

97-8

Kinanite : 475, 483
Kinda : 39, 181, 232, 246-8, 363,

398

Kindito : 508

Kish : 427, 431-2, 435, 460
Krerner, Alfred von : 243-4, 256,

270-1, 273. 287-8, 306, 349
Kdfa : 26-7, 3,9, 46, 53, 55, 57-9,

60-8, 71-3,77-8, 83-4, 86, 88-9,

,93-4. 96, 104, 106-8, 110-4, 116-

7, 119, 121-2, 124-6, 128-131,
141, 147, 158, 185-6, 193, 196-7,
205, 207, 217, 219, 220, 222,
226-231,234, 236-8, 241,243,
245-6, 248-9, 253, 255.6, 269,
270, 278, 282, 286. 298, 301-2,
316, 318-9, 327, 330, 334, 337-

8, 354, 358, 368, 381-7, 389,
390, 392.3, 397-9, 407, 454,
457,461,494,499, 501-8, 511-
4, 517-8, 520, 541-7, 554, 557-8

Kufaite : 86, 88, 99, 100, 104-5,
107, 116-8, 124-5, 146-8, 196,
227, 229, 230, 232, 236, 245,
313,316, 334,337, 383-5,415,
T08-510, 514, 545-6

Kufan : 230

Kuhail : 204, 328

Kulthum b. ' lyad, al Qanri : 335,
344-5

Kmnait : 140, 327, 437, 504

Kum Sharik : .98

kunya : 495

Kurk : 253

at Turqashi : 472,
476

.580

A&AB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Lahiz b. Quraiz, Tainimito : 509,

510, 512, [515]
Lakhm : 3G3
land-tax : 278, 280, 283, 290, 477-

8, 480-1

Laodicca, Phoenician : 324
Lasfif : 230
Lent : 19

Leo, Emperor : 299, 324-5
Lito : 375
Loire : 342
Liineburg : 188, 303
Lycian coast : 47

Mada'in : 84, 106-7, 236, 249, 385

Mada'ini : 75, 100, 108-111, 119,
127, 143-4, 153, 166, 174, 176,
178, 188, 191-3, 202, 205, 207,
223, 228, 240, 400, 408, 410,
412, 418, 427, 436, 439, 440,
450, 476-7, 479, 482, 503 1 506,
508,510-1, 521-2, 526-8, 531.
543-4, 547-8

Madhar : 86

Madhhij : 39, 82, 248, 398

Magiari : 477-8

Mah AfridAn : 406, 110,

Mahaliba— .see Muhallabid : 313

Mahanoah : 232

Nnhdi : 556

Mahftya Marzban : 414

Maisfin : 116

Maisara, (d&'t) : 506-7, 513

Maisara, Sufrite : 343

Maiuma : 356

Makhuan : 524-530

Makhzftm : 41, 136-7, 162

Makis, Makisin : 204

m&l All&h : 44

al Muslimtn : 44

Mai ahim -books : 504-507

Malik al Ashtar, Yemenite : 40, 53,
78, 80-1,95, 97, 99. 319, 344
b. Haitham, KhuziVite : 509,

512, [515]

b. Hubaira, Sakftnite : 174
b. Misma' : 405-6

Mambij : 185, 549

Mamluk : 565

Ma'mAn, 'Abbasid : 213

Manichaean : 300

Mansur, 'Abbasid : 104, 290, 310,
348, 564

b. Jnmhur, Kalbite : 361.
367-8, 383, 386, 389.
393, 31)5
b. 'Umar : 477
Maqdisi : 93, 431, 433
Ma'qil b. Qais, at Tamlml : 86-7
b. Sinfin, Ashja'ite : 156
b. ' Urwa, Qaisito : 320
Maqrizi : 98, 220, 621
Marches, two — see thaghr&n
Murdait.es : 187

Mnrdanshah b. ZadanfarrAkli : 219
Mai-jrhab : 431
M?rj alAkhram : 555

K4hit. : 171-3, 175-7, 180-2, 184,

20l

Maronites : 134
Mnrqawrt : 116, 232, 435
marsh-land : 252, 274, 291, 331
Martel — see Charlea
Marw : 413-5, 417, 419-423, 427,
438, 440-1, 445, 454,456,458,
462, 466, 468, 475, 477-8, 481,
484-493, 508-510, 513-5, 517-
522, 524-7, 529-532, 534, 537-9.
Marwan (.1) b. al Hakam : 41, 48,
97,' 122, 136, 142,
146, 148, 154, 156,
167, 169, 173-185,
213, 222, 555

(II) b. Muhammad b. Mar-
wan, al Ja'di, the
"Ass" : 340, 369,
370-396, 871, 373-
383, 386-396, 476,
488-9,510,543,547-
550, 553, 555-6.

Marwanids : 169, 183, 361-2, 555
First : 201-266
Later : 312-369
Marwush Shadhan : 395
Marwite : 521

Marwrudh : 415-7, 419, 420, 427,
430, 434, 438, 466, 468, 472,
478, 492, 523-4, 529,537
Mary, grave of St. : 101 134, 214
Marzban : 413, 415, 445-8, 478,

493-4
Marzbana : 478
Mas'ada : 148
Maskin : 104, 106, 188, 192, 195,

238, 241

Maslama b. * Abdilrnalik : 252,
312t 316-9, 322, 324,
340, 351, 371, 541

INDEX

58 i

b. Hisham : 351, 353
b. Mnkhallad.al Ansart :
94, 97

Masrnqa : 1Q2

Masiaua : 355

Mas'ud b. ' Amr (b. c Adi), al'Ata-
ki,of Azd : 209,404-411

Mas'udi : 80-1, 98-9, 140, 144, 187,
191-2, 198, 252,500,505,543-
4, 549-553

ma* atom (infallible) : 68

Matar b. Najia, at Tamimi : 230

Mania, Maw&lt : 72, 226, 243-7,
249, 256-7, 262, (.267-311, 278,
280, 282, 285-6, 294,298, 308-9, J
315, 327, 384-5, 402, 406, 442,
450, 463, 465, 481, 496-500,
502, 504-6, 510, 514-6, 532,
534-5, 557-8

Mawaranahr : 431

Mdwardt : 274

Muzdaq : 516

Mazun : 399, 417

measure (s) : 218, 255

Mecca : 1-7, 10, 13, 15, 18-22, 36-
7, 41, 46, 52-3, 91, 103, 113,
136, 142, 140-8, 150-1, 155, 157,
160, 165-7, 176, .7,93, 198-9,
208, 212-4, 226, 251,256,258,
297, 299, 326, 330, 353, 372,
394, 51?, 518, 620-1, 538, 554

Moccan : 34, 36

Media : 116, 385, 533, 539

Medina : 4-7, 11-18, 21-3,26,32,
34, 36-42, 45-8, 51-4, 6*1, 74,
89, 93-6, 102, 108 1 113-4, 116,
136, 141-3, 145-165, 167, l7l,
174-5, 177, 179, 182-3,185, 199,
205-6, 214, 218, 222, 224-0, 251,
258, 263-4, 267-8, 280, 297, 323,
330, 337-8, 'J53-4, 372, 394, 500,
502, 554, 560, 562

Melchitei : 347

Melitene : 840

Mesene : 285-6, 390

Mesopotamia : 24, 59, 70, 77, 95,
104, 170, 185, 188, 191, 201,
205, 207, 217, 222, 230, 269,
319, 321, 369 371, 374, 377,
388, 390-2, 394, 430

Mesopotarniati : 207-8, 260, 374,
378, 381, 390, 547

metempsychosis : 67

Metropolitan : 3^5, 478

Middle Ages : 246

Mihrigan-festival : 303, 461, 473-
4, 493, 495

Mirbad (of Basra) : 407
MiH'ur b. Fadaki, of Tamim : 85
wi.?r-pl. mil stir : 26, 275, 285
Mizza : 363, 380, 549
rnodius : 218

Mornmson : 35, 102, 7.6,9, 295, 533
"monarchic prophet" : 8
Monastery of the Catholicus : 192-
3, 197, 198

of Golgotha : 237
Mongols : 56">
monotheism : 1
Morocco : 344

mosque: 10, 26, 4S-9, 75, I2S,
134, 158. 171-2,209,216,225,
265, 330, 562, 401, 405-7,' 4j9,
436, 440, 445, 457, 477
of Jerusalem : 225
of Kufa : 103, 124-5. 338,

545

of Mecca : 143
of Medina : 52, 142, 153,

225
Mosul : 104, 186, 230, 238, 328,

337, 374, 388, 391-3, 547, 549
"Mother of the Faithful"

('Ayeslia)" : 52

Mu'awia(l) b. Abt Snfyan : 26, 41,
55-6, 58-9. 08, 73, 75-9, 82,
89-97, 99-111, 113-4, 116-122,
130-7, 140-0, 152, 177-8, 184,
192, 195, 197, 207, 209, 214,
217-8, 220-1, 230 252, 254,
26S, 271, 289, 299, 301, 348,
398, 400, 404, 414-5,501,552,
554-6'

b. Hisham : 339

b. Hudaij, as Sakuni : 95,

97-8

as Saksaki : 3S2
(II) b. Yaztd(I) : 169-172,

176

Mubarak (estate) : 328
MuchtAr — see Mnkhrar : 185
Mudar : 71, 107, 210-1,234,250,
260, 320, 328-9. 334, 388, 399,
405, 411, 416-7, 428-9,449, 455,
487-9, 50S, 515, 525, 530-1,
536-7, 542, 550
Mudarite : 387,488, 510
"Muddy Bntnfin"— -see Butnan

Habib : 188
Mnfaddal b. Muhnllab : 425, 428-

9 "
Mughira, "the Wizard" : 327

b. Habna', at Tamirnt : 437
b. Shu/ba : 106, 112-4, 118

582 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

-9, 121-2, 124, 126, 141,
143

Muh&jir, Muh&jira, Muh&jirite :

10, 12, 17, 21, 25, 37-9, 149,

152, 157, 161 298

Mnhallab, Azdite : 70, 195, 210,

227-8, 231, 235, 313,398,404,

411, 416-7, 424, 427-9, 439, 484

Muhallabid: 250, 253, 314, 318,

320, 322,429,441, 448-9, 453, 515

Muhammad— see Prophet: 1, 2, 4,

6, 7, 10-1, 13, 15-18, 20-1, 23-4,

29-31, 33-4, 36-7, 4t, 44-5, 47,

51, 54, 56, 62, 67-8, 87, 90, 102-

3, 111, 114, 129,153,160,176,

210, 213, 216, 275, 290, 297, 342,

473, 501, 513, 517

b. ' Abdillah b. Khazim :

418-9
b. Abi Bakr : 47, 50, 94-5,

97-8
b. Abi Hudhaifa : 47, 76,

95-6/98

b. ' Alt, b. ' Abdillah b.
4 Abba«, 'Abbasid:
501,503-4, 506-8, 511-
5, 517-8, 543
b. Ash: ath : 247
b. Hisham : 347
b. Ibrahim b. Muhammad :

543

b. Khalid al Qasri : 542
b. Khunais, Kufaite ; 506-

7

Makhzutnite : 354
b. Marwan : 217, 222, 237,

371
b. Qaaim, ath Thaqafi : 114,

253, 258

b. Sa'd,b.AbiWaqqa9:24£
b. Sa'ib, alKalbi : 247
Mnhammadan : 158, 272
Muhammedanische Studien : 180
Muhammira : 533
Muharib b. Musa : 385
Muiiarram, bloodshed in : 8*)
Mukhallad b. Yazid b. Muhallab ;

447

Mukhtar, Thaqifite, Jew : 68, 1 14,
186-8, 192,196-7,226,234,245,
255, 278, 411, 502, 504-6, 535
mulk : 8, 72

Miiller, August : 121, 141, 153, 158,
160, 163, 183, 238, 243, 260,
270-1, 273, 306-7, 344, 360, 371,
403, 476

Mun&fiq'&n : 16

Munuza, Berber : 341

Muqa'is : 421

Mnqatil b. Haiyan, an Nabati :

473, 496, 536
Muq&tila : 25, 31, 44, 46, 69, 246,

278, 282, 299, 371
Murad : 103
Murjiitc : 317, 367, 464-5, 485-6,

498-9

Murjiitisra : 464, 485, 488
Mnrra : 389.

Musa, " the saddler" : 512
b. 'Abdillah : 251
b. ' Abdillah b. Khazim, " tho
Beardless " : 420- 1, 423-5,
429, 430

b. Da'ud b. ' Ali : 543-4
b. Nus.air : 260
b. Ka'b, at Tarairai : 509, 510,

524
Mns'ab b. Zuhair : 185-8, 190-2,

194-8, 201, 203-4, 227
Musaiyakh : 202
Mnsannat (dam) : 98
Mushnllal : 157

Muslim : 10, 24, 28-9, 31, 35, 40,
56, 61, 64-5, 71-3, 87, 133-4, 150,
158, 160, 168, 180, 187, 212-3,
218, 243, 268, 270, 272-4, 276-
284, 286-290, 292-3, 296-7, 299,
I 300, 303, 305, 308, 310, 317,
i 330, 334, 340-1, 343, 345-7, 380,
388, 300, 415, 446, 451, 453, 462,
464,472-3, 475, 477-8, 480-2,
4^5, 497, 535, 557, 559-561,563
Muslim b. ' Abdirrahman, al-
Bahili : 537

b. ' Amr : 429

b. ' Aqil : 147

b. Dhakwan ; 372

b. Sa'jd, al Kilabi : 454-5

b. ' Uqba, al Mnrri : 144

154-9, 162, 164, 178
Mnstaurid ; 1 17
musfir — see misr
Muthanna b. * Imran, Kharijifce •

393
Muttalib : 3, 41

N

Nabataean : 249, 442
Nabataei : 138
N&bigha : 11, 134

INDEX

583

Nadr : 371

Na?r b. Sa'ld , al Harashi : 38,7
389 ' *

Naghida, Kalbite : 171
Nahar b. Tansi'a, al Bakri : 437
Nahrawan : 84-6, 88, 103, 110, 230
Nahrawan Bridge : 84
Na'ila, Kalbifco : 50, 75, 133
Naisabur (see Abarshahr) : 413
415-6, 426, 438, 466, 486, 488,
491-2, 494, 508, 537-9
Naizak, Tarkh&n : 435, 471
Najashi :" 81
Najda b. 'Amir, Khariiite : 165,

200

Najia ; 86-7
Najranian : 301, 306
Najraniya : 301
Nakha* : 82
Nakhudh : 466
Namenbuch : 232
An Naqi§— see Yazid III : 367
Narbonne : 269, 341
Nasa : 492, 537
Nasaf : 431-2, 435, 472
Nas.r b. Saiyar, al Kinani : 73, 283,

346, 355, 358, 361, 369, 395,

454, 456, 460, 473-486, 488-491,

519, 523-5, 529, 530, 534-540
Nasraniya : 478
Natil b. Qais, al Judharni : 171,

176, 187

Nauam, river : 345
Nawflz, festival — see New Year :

302

Naw Bahar ; 469
Nawikith : 470
Nestorian : 478
New Year : 303, 461, 483, 493.

495

NigM of Clangour : 78
Nihawand : 79, 116, 540-1, 547
Nil, canal : 252, 316, 541
Nisibis: 95, 192, 391
Nizar: 550-1
Noideke: 96, 101-2, 168-9, 193-4,

218, 316, 489
Non-Arab; 24, 28, 68, 71-2, 86,

133, 243, 273, 277-9 304, 308,

315, 479, 496, 557, 560
Non-Muslim : 276, 282-3, 302, 366,

481-2
Nu'aim b. Thabit=»Thabit b.

Nu'aim, alJudhami (q.v.)i 380
Nubata b. Hanzala, alKilabi : 395,

539-540

! Null b. Darraj, Maula, Qadi: 285-
! 6

I Nukhnila ; 76-7, 85, 88, 197, 316
! Numairitos ; 202
Nu'nian b. Bashir, al An§ari • 75
100, 118, 130, 149, 160, ' 153,
: 171, 176
Nuqabfr : 506,511, 546
: 496

Omri : 552-3

Opened Gate, the : 51

Opkomst tier Ablasidcn ; 109, ,003,

628

" Orthodox," the : 163
Oxford : 342
Oxus : 345, 420, 424, 426, 428,

430-3, 435, 45/5, 458 460, 466-7,

470, 481, 499

Palestine : 93, 95, 134, 170-1,

173, 184-5, 203, 257, 263, 351,
366, 554

palms : 17, 274

Palmyra : 175

Papal States : ,9

paper : 21 7

Paradise : 25, 65, 388

parasang : 274

Parfttacene : 433, 450

Paropamisus (Ghur) : 430

ParwSz : 252

Patriarch : 347

peacocks : 438

Peaoock-Army : 232, 246

pension : 31, 43, 60, 123, 128, 131,

174, 237, 243, 245-6. 248, 274,
278, 281-2, 292, 294, 297-9,
337, 348, 353. 372, 383, 403,
451,465,497

-list : 243, 287, 298, 497

Persia: 115,271

Persian: 23,32,68, 115, 217-220,
235, 252, 291, 302, 397, 410,
413, 450, 480, 494, 533, 549,
559, 563-4

Petrus, Metropolitan : 355

Petrus, of Maiuma : 356

58*

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Pharaoh : 30, 233

Pharisees : 63

Phoenician : 324

Phrygia : 340

Pilate : 326

pilgrimage— see hajj : 19, 208, 213,
^299, 518, 520- 1, 557

plunder: 29

Pococke : 213

Poitiers : 342

politics : 5, 61, 69, 70, 73, 315

poll-tax; 243,271, 273, 276, 278,
280, 282-3, 287, 477-8, 480-1

Polytimetus : 431.2

poor- tax : 22, 28

post : 233, 273, 291, 562
-master : 562

prayer : 2, 19, 22, 25

pre. Islamic : 20,69, 162, 180, 397

prisoner : 12, 31, 71, 278, 318-9,
325, 347, 368, 375, 472,
524, 630, 548

—(female) : 114, 209,
319, 421, [469]

property : 29, 31, 36, 44, 114,
157, 257, 272-5, 279, 283, 288-9,
291, 296-7, 301, 305, 309, 332,
469, 480-1.

Prophet (Muhammad) : 5-11, 15-
19, 21, 23, 33-5, 37-40, 42, 45,
51, 53, 61, 63-4, 66-8, 81, 83, 85,
101, 115-6, 137, 153, 156, 158-9,
161, 164, 214-5, 217-8, 267, 275,
284,286-7,301, 307, 314, 331,
337, 356, 373, 384, 404, 417,
473, 501-2, 515, 519, 520, 532-3,
543, 559, 562, 564

prophet — xee monarchic.

protected kinsmen : 271-2, 288

protection : 13-4, 36, 288, 398

pulpit of Prophet : 214

Pyrenees : 341, 343

Q

Qadarites, Qadariya, : 347, 355,

360, 366, 369, 377
qAdi : 26, 270, 347
Qa'dis : 415
Qadiiiya : 78-9
qafiz (measure) : 218
Qahtaba b. Shabi'n, Ta'ite : 316,

512, 520-1, 538-542, 547, 550
q&'id : 372
Qain : 181

Qairawan : 26, 344-5

Qaia : 69-71, 154, 170, 172-3, 175,
177, 179-182, 184-6, 188-9, 201,
203, 205-6, 208-211,226, 247,
250, 259-261, 269, 314, 320-2,
328, 330, 334, 359, 378, 388,
399, 413, 418, 427-430, 444, 449,
483, 539, 548
father of Sa'id of Hamdan :

247

b. Haitham, as Sulami : 414-5
b, Hani', al'Abst : 367, 377
b. Sa'd b. 'Ubada : 81, 93-6,

99, 104-6
b. Tha'laba : 508

Qaisite : 131, 133, 174, 192, 207-8,
211, 226, 250-1, 259-261, 269,
313, 320-2, 326, 333, 344, 346,
355, 360, 367-8, 374-5, 377, 387,
398, 414, 424, 428-9, 449, -451,
454, 456, 461, 465-8, 473-4, 482,
486, 488, 539, 554

Qandabil (in India) : 319

Qarniasln : 541

Qarqisi-r : 77, 170, 175-6, 184,
186, 189, 191-2, 201-2, 393

Qasr : 328

Qasr: 316'

Tbn Hubaira (town) : 542

qatt? : 275,289,290

Qatam : 103-4

Qatar : 363

qattfa : 174

Qi": 452

qibla : 19, 265

Qinnesrin : 134, 170, 173, 184,
188, 319, 327, 354, 375, 377,
381,393,471,548-9, 552, 551-
5

Qinnesrite : 381

Qor&n (Qur'an) : 1,2,9, 29, 31,
33, 35, 44-5, 50, 56-7, 62-3, 67,
78-9, 130, 132, 215, 217-8, 224,
244,248,271-2,317, 331, 342,
350, 363-4, 445, 563

Qiiatremere : 148

Qaba' : 156

Qub&dh : 252

Qubba—see Dome of the Rock

Quda'a : 7l, 132, 180-2, 192, 202,
211, 249, 322, 378, 382, 386,
548

Qndama : 274

Quhandiz, of Marw : 484

Qnlzum : 95

Qumis : 520, 539-540

Qur'a : 510

INDEX

585

Quraish : 3, 4, 13, 15, 17, 36-7, 39-
42, 71, 114, 136, 154, 161, 164.
1.76, 210-1, 329, 390, 405, 410

Quraishifce : 3, 20-1, 39, 137, 144-5,
149, 154-7, 183, 235, 246,
256, 289, 333, 404-5, 408,
421-2.

Qur'An, see Qor&n

QurrA' — see Reader : 62

Qutaiba b Muslim b. 'Amr, al-
Bahili : 253, 258 260-2, 269,
429, 430, 434, 436-7, 439-416,
449, 450, 451, 457, 401, 468,
471, 510, 537.

QutAmt : 25, 71,204, 321

Qutqutami : 100

quiv&d — see qtVid : 558

Rabbi, Chief : 478

Rabi' b. Ziad, al Harifchi : 415

Rabi'a : 70-1, 107, 190, 195, 209,

210,234,250, 314, 388, 398-9,

406-8, 410, 416-7, 427, 42;),

441, 454, 483-4, 489, 507, 510,

525, 536, 542, 550
Rabi'ite : 317, 471
Radwa : 502
Ua^ftb : 208
Rai : 84, 99, 540
Raja' b. Haiwa, alKiudi : 215, 264

-S

RamadAn : 19
Ramhurmnz : 86, 228-9
R&mtthana : 434
Ramla : 257-8, 263
ransom : 12, 319, 347, 416, 434
Raqqa : 77, 326, 391-2
Rauda : 549
Baulj b. Zinba' : 212
Rawandites : 516, 563
Reader — see QurrV : 78, 81, 83,

244-5,248,286,315
Recherches sur la domination arabe :

08, 243, 296, 464, 492, 521, 532
recompense — see blood — : 14, 206
register : 243-4
Beiske : 253,319, 540
republic : 9
Resaina : 185, 189, 192
Reste arabischen Heidenthums : 45
revenge : 6, 13-4, 76, 90, 95, 103,

135, 182, 20i: 206, 208-9, 423,

633

74

[ revenue : 30, 43-4, 60, 243, 255,
I 261, 272, 280. 283,289,292-3,
l 298, 305, 337, 357, 402, 480- 1
I reviliug of * Ali— see cursing : 106
i Ribab : 397, 407
ridda — see a hi : 113
rizq : 298
Roderick : 343

Roman : 0, 26, 28, 55, 74, 76-7, 99,
113, 132, 134, 138, 168, 187-8,
208, 216-8, 222, 237 1 257, 271,
288, 307, 325, 339, 340, 342,
347,371,375,394,437
RAb : 433
Rusafa : 325, 335, 340, 346, 348,

351-3, 381, 552
Rustaqabad : 229, 235
Uutbil : 231

S

Sabatte : 67-8, 934, 245, 504, 545

Saba'iya : 501, 504

Sabal : 426, 433

Sabat : 107

Sabi1': 513

Sabians : 2

Sabira b. Shaiman al Huddaui :

126, 400
Snbur : 239
Sa'd : 407

Tarn i in : 421
sadaqa : 87
Saghan : 431

Satfhan-khudah : 431, 472
Sa^haniau : 431, 461
Sahari b. Shabib : 328
SaiabiJM : 397
Sa'id : 46

of Hamdan : 247

b. 'Amr, al Harasht, Qai-
site : 320-1, 452-4

b. Bahdal : 388

b. Bahdal, al Kalbi : 170

b. Hisham : 382

b. Khndhaina, Umaiyid :
451

b. al Musaiyab : 61

b. Qais, of Hamdan : 247

b. 'Uthman : 426
Saif b. 'Umar : 75, 80-1, 07, 108,

343, 501, 504
Saint Sergius (place) : 478

58ft

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

saiyid : 138,221,408

Sajistan : 220, 231-2, 234,239-242,

246-7, 261-2, 369, 395, 413-6,

418-9, 423, 427, 431, 435-6
Sakfcsik, Saksak : 173, 181, 382
Sakuu : 173, 181
Bal&ma : 324
Salaina b. TJhn'aib, Tarnfrnite :

403, 406

Salih b. 'Abdirral.iman : 219, 220,
262

b. 'Ali : 543, 549
S&lim al A'yan : 507
Salm b. AIIWHZ, at Tarn i mi : 525
b. Qataiba, al Bahili : 542
b. Ziild : 169,415-6,426
Salt b. Huraith.al Hanafi : 406
Satnaida' : 317-8
Samal : 361
Samarqand : 295, 425-6, 431-2, 436

.8, 440, 450-5, 454, 457-461,

463-4, 468, 475-6, 485
Samawa : 203, 206
Samfc b. Malik, al Khaulfmi,

Yemenite : 269, 295, 341
Samhudt : 156-7
Samuel : 8
ftamura b. Juiubih, nl Faza«i : 127,

1 0

San1 a1 : 394
vSapphe, Sapplim : 77
Saracen : 138, 299
Saragossa : 343
Sarakhs : 395, 434, 491-2, 537
Sarat, Mt. : 399
Sfcrjanati :537
Sarjun b. Manfiur : 134
Sasanid : 140, 432, 458, 478, 494 5
Sa'aa'a b. Harb : 423
Saul : 8, 169

Saura b. Hurr, Tamimite : 460-1
Sawa : 540

Sawad : 31, 104, 274, 2,91, 305
sawaft : 273, 289
ScKia— see Shia
Scribes : 63

Schwenkow, Ludolf : 341
Sebasfce, Sevastopol i** : 216
seisachthy : 22
Seleucid: 139
Seleucid years : 100
Sephe, Sepphe : 77
Sergiufi: 220
Sermon on the Mount : 2
Sbabath b. Rib'l, ar Rial;! : 84, 86
ash Sha'bt, Q&df : 90, 92, U9, 246,

270

Shabib b. Yazid 230-1, 295, 248,

328, 388-9
Shadh : 433, 471
ShAh : 432, 435, 562
Shahanshah : 414
Shahrastatii : 503-4
Shahrazur : 389, 547
Shaiban : 388, 390

b. 'Abdilaziz, Abu Dulaf,
al Yashkuri, Kharijite :
392, 395

b. Salama, al Haruri, Kha-
rijite : 395, 490, 498,
529, 537

Shai ban i tea : 230
sh&kirtya : 496
Shamir : 158
Shammas b Dithar, al 'Dtaridi :

419

ash Sharat : 501

Sharik b. A'war, al Harithi : 127
Shaih : 432, 436, 471, 475-7
8h&r : 432
Shia (by Wellhausen) : 117, 125,

147, 158, 165, 185, 192,226,

502
SM'a : 89, 66-8, 74, 126, 128, 147,

226,499-501,513-15,517, 536-

9, 558, 563
sM'at 'All : 66

Mu'awia : 66
Shiite: 66, 68, 72, 117, 124-27,

185-6, 310, 327-5, 337, 339,

384, 394, 397, 457, 489,499,

501,504-5, 511, 515-6, 520-1,

524, 529* 533, 539, 545, 563-4
Shiitism : 66, 68, 73, 386
Shuman : 430-1, 434-5
sMrd : 40, 42, 91-2, 1 15, 365
Shurail? b. Hani' : 90
shurta : 69, 105-6, 127-8, 383, 471
Sibukht:247
Sickel, W. : 10

: 56-7, 59, 75, 77-9, 83,

85-6, 89, 94-6, 98, 108, 197,

318

Stkadanj : 523, 526, 528-9
silver (coins) : 217-8
Sina : 432
Sind : 369, 395, 507
single combat : 79, 373, 419
Skizzen u. Vorarbeiten : 108, 156,

297, 604
Slav : 565
slave: 2, 11, 71, 116, 247, 818.

330, 361, 379, 882, 482, 480,

634

INDEX

587

Snouok Hurgronje : 556
Sogdiana : 431-2, 450, 463
Sogfad : 426, 431, 456, 465
Soghd, Soghdia : 471-2, 492, 537
Soghdian : 294-5, 323, 345, 362,
426, 451-4, 4-r6, 458, 462-3, i
471. 477, 485, 494. 496-7, 565 ;
Solon : 22 !

Spain : 224, 248, 260, 269, 293, |

295-6, 341, 343-5, 349, 412, 554
Spanish : 339, 342-3, 345
spoil : 25, 29-32, 36. 13, 100, 120, I
253, 263, 268-9, 273, 279, 293-4, |
296, 298, 447-8, 497 |

standard, bkck : -395, 465-6, 48(5,
488-9, 523, 528, 533-4, 537, 542
State : 3, 10-1, 14, 23, 28-9, 31-2,
39, 44, 62 72, 123, 129-132, !
271, 291-2, 298, 308, 349, 350!
-land : 273, 275

sfcattholder : 26, 28, 45-6, fi5, 62,

69, 73, 95, 113, 116-8, 120,

128, 130, 135, 137, 169, 260, J

305, 353, 374, 411, 414, 444, i

449, 465-7, 471, 483, 499, i

561-2 j

stafcth eldership : 42, 55, 73, 84, j

116, 124, 136,185, 222,262,420 !

Stephanus, monk : 347 j

Stone, Holy : 19, 165 ;

subject-tax : 28, 43. 213, 281, j

451, 456, 462-3, 465, 475. 479. j

497 !

?M/d/: 373 i

Sufyan b Abrad, Kalbite : 235, ;

238

b. 'Auf : 100 |

b. Mu'awin. Muhallabid : :

542 i

as Sufyani : 555 i

Sufyanid : 113-200, 164, 169, 173, t

183, 221, 312, 362, 366, 555
Sukaina : 161 \

SAl.Tnrk : 446-7 |

Sulaim : 181, 201-5, 207, 414 !

b, Kaisfin : 360 j

an Naaili : 496

Sulaiman b. 'Abdihnalik : 257-
260, 262-6, 268-9, 311-
2, 32 1, 324, 326, 341,
361, 385, 439-441, 445-
6, 448-9 j

b. 'All : 544, 554
b. Habib : 385 !

b. Hisharn, Umaiyid : 339, |
354* 366, 375-6, 378, i
381-2, 391-2, 395, 554 j

b. Kathir, alKhnza'i : 509-
512, 514, 518-23,525,
528-9, 546
b. Marthad, Bakrite : 416-

7

b. Mujalid : 418
b Sa'id : 219
b. Sulaim, Kalbite : 368
b. Surad : 185

Sulaimite :*203, 207

sultAn : 44, 62, 129, 132, 254

Sumaiya : 120-1

*unna. : 33, 35, 45, 63, 67, 284,
314, 317, 337, 406, 532, 563

nuqadim : 523-4

ultra t of Qor&n : 75, 90, 288

Snrghab : 431

Sus : 239

SAvat : 470

swine, slaughter of : 216

Syria : 26, 38-0, 55.6, 59, 62, 70,
76-7, 79, 9o, 116, 131-5, 137,
154, 167, 169, 170, 176, 180-2,
184, 187-8, 191, 201, 203, 209,
211-4, 216-8, 226, 237, 264,
260-1, 263, 577,287-290,296.
299,301, 314, 319, 322, 325,
353, 356, 359, 363, 368, 370,
374-5, 377-9. 383, 385-6, 389,
391, 394, 408, 441,45.9, 467,
473, 482, 488, 501, 545, 552,557

Svriac : 375

Syrian : 56-HO, 63. 66, 71, 75, 77-
9, 81-6, 88, 91-3, 100-2, 108,
131, 133, 138, 140, 154, 156,
160, 162-4, 165-6, 170, 174,
177, 181, 186, 195, 197-9, 203-
4, 208, 212-3, 225, 227, 230-1,
234-240, 242, 246, 248-9, 254,
256,258, 261-2, 308-9, 313-8,
326, 334, 337-8, 344-5, 359,
367-8, 371-2,374-5, 377, 381-7,
402, 446-7, 459, 471, 478, 499,
501, 533, 540, 542, 545, 547,
549, 550, 553-8

"Syrian", the (of NSldeke— sen
p. 96) : 96, 101-2, 218

Tti bar! :

Tabaristan : 263, 447

TnbAshkan : 469, 487

Tadmor (Palmyra): 175, 177-8,

202, 363-4, 376, 379, 380, 382,

555

588 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

Taghlib : 24, 181, 203-5, 207-8, 216

Toghlibite : 207

Ta'if :3, 4, 113-5, 154, 198

taima' : 100

Taiyi' : 181, 308, 538

Tajub : 103

Takrit : 186, 88, 204, 238

Talfca : 42,45, 49, 51-3, 55, 275, i

297, 310 j

b. Uuzaiq, Khnza'ite : 509, !

[510-515], 532 I

at Talaliat, Khusa'ite : 416

talio : 13-4'

Taliqan : 415, 417, 430, 433

Tamim : 70-1, 84, 1(0, 120, 126,
209, 210, 246, 250, 258, 314,
316, 318, 397-400, 403-412,
414,416-9, 421, 427-*, 441-2,
446, 449, 458, 465-6, 475-6,
483, 486-7, 494, 539

b. Na?r b. Saiyar : 538 !

Tamtmite : 317-8, 329, 400, 407, i
413, 417, 420, 442, 445, 471, !
475, 485, 507, 510, 515 j

Tanbth, Kit. : 135, 186, 316, 365, \

376, 378, 550 \
Tanukh : 181

Tariq b. 'Amr : 199 !

TarlchAn, Tarlchdn : 424-5, 433, !
435-6 " i

Tawawis : 461 I

tax, taxation : 284), 30, 32, 43 86- !
7, 99, 207, 220, 222, 243, 215, !
255,261-2, 270-1, 274, 276-9,
281-4, 286, 292-3, 296-9, 301-3,
306, 3'32, 437, 457-8, 469, 477-
480, 494, 497, 509, 559
— court (dticdn) : 116

Temple do Jerusalem : 213

tenth- see tithe : 276, 289

Thabit b. JNu'aim, nl Judbaint : 374,

377, 379, 380, 383

b. Qutba : 424.5, 496
Quti,a,al AzdJ : 427, 437,

458-9
thaghrAn (Two Marches) : 430,

466, 485, 492
Thainud : 247

Thaqif : 3, 4, 70, 113, 259, 334
Thaqifite:3, 113, 1!9, 121, 231,

235, 247

Tharthar, river : 204
Thaur b. Ma'n as Sulami, Oaisite :

172
theocracy : 5, 8-K,22-5, 33.6, 45,

50-1, 56, 6] .2, 66, 68, 72,

123, 129, 132, 215, 248, 276,

283, 294, H08, 315, 464-5, 4,79,
498,501,515, 535, 557, 563

Theophanea : 77, 82, 99, 131. 134-
5, 138, 180, 184, 187-8, 191,
216, 218, 220, 243, 286, 299,
324, ,935, 344, 347-8, 355, 362,
365,369, 375-380,382-3, 391-
2, 519, 533-4, 538, 540, 545,
547, 549, 553, 555

Thomae, Church of St. : 300

Thora : 19

Tiberias : 157, 380

Tigris : 77, 84, 100, 104, 203-5,
227. 229, 252, 328, 331, 388,
392-4, 541, 547-8, 550

Tirmidh : 251, 421, 424-6, 429,
431, 4P4 467-8, 536-7

Tirrimali (Tirimnmh) : 437

tithe— see tenth : 272. 289, 290,
292, 297, 303

Toulouse : 341

TourH : 342, 345

Transoxanian : 294, 497-8

Transoxiaim : 224, 253, 268, 293,
849,424-7,429,431,433, 451,
462, 466, 468, 492, 537, 565

treasury—we exchequer ; 13, 29,
43.4, 59, 87, 106, 110, 115, 131,
262 £72-3, 279, 283, 289, 292,
297-8, 314, 332, r,68

tribal dualism : 71, 210, 212, 261,

328
—feud : 201, 360, 397, 401,

411,418, 4,94

-groups : 27, 70, 125, 133,
181, 205, 209, 210, [259],
397,410.1, 429, 454, 469,
483

tribe : 3, 4,6, 10, 13, 15, 17, 21,
23, 25, 27-8, 36, 39, 54, 66-9,
71,80, 113, 118, 124, 128.9,
131-2, 140,149, 157, 197, 205,
208,211,372, 397-491, 401-2,
409,410,417,421,441, 443-5,
448,469, 495, 497, 519, 557,
[559]

tribute : 28-9, 31,44, 99, 169, 231,
241, 261, 274, 276-7, 280-3,
286, 291.5, 30J.3, 305, 306-8,
323, 343, 345, 349, 414, 433-7,
452, 457, 462, 479, 480, 495

Tubbat : 426

Tukbarion : 435

Tukharistan : 430, 433, 435, 454,
460, 466, 468-9, 471-2,478, 492,
523-4 536, 530, 5£5

Tumushkath: 434

INDEX

589

turban, black : 139

furk: 232, 314, 340, 345, 371,
374, 412, 425-6, 432-3, 438.9,
442,447,451-2,454-5 458-460
462-3, 470, 472-3, 475-6, 487,
494, 496,565

Turkey : 367

Turkish :3, 232, 433, 452, 466,
471-2, 485, 565

TurkkhAq&n : 452

Tus:491,538

tuetar : 235, 241-2

Tyana : 224

'Ubaid b. Ka'b, un Numairi : 141,

143

'Ubaidullab b. 'Abbas : 106, 1C9-
111

b. 'Abdirrabman, al 'Abd-
shamstf, Quraishite : 238-
9, 246
b. Ablbakra, Basrian : 231-

2
b. Hurr, al Ju'ft, of Kufa :

190

b. Ziad b. Abi Sufyan . 130.
1, 144, 147, J58, 169.
171, 174-5, 177-9, 185-8,
209, 401,403, 405, 407-
9, 415, 426, 444
b. Ziad b. Zabynn, al
Bakrt, of Basra: 190,
194, 197

Ufcud, Mt. : 17. 154
•Ulaimi 206
' Unrnir b. Hubab, as Sulamf : 175,

186 192,' 202-5, 207
'Umaira, Iranian : 456
Umoiya:2lf 39, 40, 42, 71, 114,
132, 1*5-6, 168, 173-4, 177, 181,
183,211, 380, 498,519, £56

b. 4 Abdillah b. Khalid b.

Astd:421-2,424, 426
UmaiY)d:4l, 48, 55, 5962, 66,
68-70, 72-4, 93, 97, 110, 113-4,
116, 12J, 130, 135-7, 151-5,
160-2, 167, 169, 171-5, 177,
179, 182, 211-2, 214, 221-3,
227, 232, 250, 254, 26<r, 264-5,
267, 272, 279, 283, 291, 307-
312, 317, «3i9, 322, 329, 333,
337,339,348,350, 353-4, 360,

366, 370, 382, 385, 390, 394-5,
397, 401, 420, 429, 465-6, 474,
478,484, 486-8, 408*501, 508,
516,519, 531,533-6, 538,540,
542, 645, 548, 551-4, 556-7,
559-564

'Uman : 297, 395, 399
* Umpr (II) b. 4Abdilaziz : 224, 251,
254, 264-6, 267-311,
268.272. 280, 282, 284,
286, 290300, 302-304,
306-7, 809, 310, 313,
315, 320, 323-4, 326,'
341 , 343, 345, 350, 366
369, 383, 448, 450-
1, 456, 462-3, 479,
552

b. Hnbaira, al Fazari,
Quifite : 269, 319.322,
324, 326-8, 453-5
(I) b. alKhattab: 26, 32,
34-5, 38-41, 44-5, 51,
54, 67, 83, 91, 115-6,
120, 214, 267, 269,
271-7, 279, 284, 287-
8, 290-1. 296, 301-2, 308,
348, 398
b. ShHbba, 109, 110, 127,

228
'Uniara— -see Khaddtish

b. Taintrn, alLakhmi : 239,

240

Umm HajjTij : 364
Umvn(i,'Un,mat AllAh : 7, 11-6, 18,

26
'Uqbab. Hajjaj : 343-4

b. Zur'a, Kburasanite : 270
Urdunn : 171, 173-4, 219, 377, 380,

388, 471

Ushmunain : 549

Ushrusana • 432, 452. 471-2, 475-6
'Utbab. Ghnzwan : 115

b. Walid = Walidb. 'Utba:

151

'Utbnian b. 'Affan : 40-2, 45-58,
55-8, 62-3, 66, 75-6, 91, 93-7, 99,
116, 118, 133, 135-6, 160-1, 164,
173, 184, 200, 264, 289, 291,
301, 317, 364, 398, 413-4, 502
b. Haiyan, alMtirrt : 251,

258.
b. Judai', alKarmani,

Azdite : 557, 539
b. Muhammad b. Abi

Sufyan : 152
Uthraanid : 93
'Uyaina, Fazarite : 114

590 ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS FALL

vengeance — see revenue

Vicar — see Khalifa : 35

Vloten, G. van : 98, 109, 243, 256,

317, 464, 472, 492, 503, 521,

528, 631-2
Vogue, de : 213

w

Waddah : 372

Waddafytya : 372

Wadi'TAuja' : 654

Wadi'lqura : 155

Wagner, Hermann ; 274

Wahb b. Jarir : 149, 152, 156-7,

401. 403-4, 408
Wajh olFals : 365
Wakhflhab, river : 431
Wakf b. Hassan b. Abf Sud,
Tamimite : 442-4, 446
Ibn adDanraqiya : 421
uAli : 270, 377

Walid (I) b. 'Abdilmalik : 213-4,
220. 224, 226, 251-3, 257-261,
263-5, 267-9, 299, 300, 361,
371,385, 439, 440,501

b. Muawia b. Marwfin 1 :

549

b. 'Uqba : 76
b. 'Utbab. AbiSnfyan: 118,

145-6 148, 151, 172
II. b. Yazid II : 312, 325,
338, 360-2, 356, 358,
360-8, 370-3, 375-7, 379,
387-8, 477, 482-4, 519,
555

Walishtari : 431
Wnllada : 226

Waqidt : 16, 75, 89, 92, .95-6, 98,
100-1, 103, 109, 111, 118, 130,
139, 146, 148, 150-1, 156-7, 166-
9, 176, 178, 183,185, 189, 190,
192, 194, 198-9, 214, 217, 223,
228, 241, 264-5, 313, 37,9, 380,
383, 393

Waraghsar : 468, 475
Wasit : 240, 242, 249, 251-2, 256, |
258,261-2,313,316, 318, 327,
331, 334, 368, 389, 390, 393,
541-2, 544, 560
water- conduit : 326
watermark : 217
wazir : 129, 513, 543-4, 661
Waztr, as Sakhtiani : 327

Weil : 141, 148, 238, 310, 827,440,

476

wells, of Banat Qain : 206
wezir, wizier — see waztr
Wik : 432
Wn?afa : 327
Wiistenfeld : 223, 263, 503

Yahudtya : 478

Yafcyft b. Adam : 25, 29-31, 218,

255, 275, 277, 2P1-2, 327.

b. Hndain, al Bakri : 467,

489, 490, 550
b. Ja'far b. Tarn mam b.

'Abbas : 544

b. Mulmmmad b. 'Ali : 543
b. Nu'aim, al Bakr! : 536,

560

b. 'Uqail, al Khuza'i : 508
b. Zaid b. 'AH : 338-9, 359,

499, 500
Yamama : 165

Ya'qubt : 81, 87, 100, 102, 104,
106-9, 135, 187, 190, 310, 395,
543-4, 547, 550-3

Yaqut. : 98, 188, 205, 238, 252-3,
550-7, 554
Maula : 348

Yatlirib ( = Medina) : 4, 20
Yazdejard, Sasanid : 458, 478
Yazid (11) b. 'Abdilmalik, Yazid
b. 'Atika : 264-5, 290, 311-2,
322-5, 330, 350, 861, 393, 449,
451, 454-5, 507

b. Abt Muslim : 323

b. Abt Sufyan : 41

b. Harith, Kinfinite : 94

b. Kbalid, al Qa»H : 335,

362, 366, 376, 380
(I) b. Mn'awia b. Abi
Sufyan : 26, 108, 119,
121, 133, 140-5, 147
152-4, 157-162,
166-7, 169, 170,
175, 178-9, 181,
209, 215, 220,
267, 312, 362,
398, 401, 409,

150,
164,
173,
183,
222,
372,

415-6, 555
b. Muballab :

240,

256-9. 261-2, 269,

250,
312-

8, 322, 329,0 424-5, 428-

9, 439, 440, 445-8, 450,
462, 484, 641

INDEX

591

b. Qais, al Arliabl : 84
b. 'Umar b. llubaira, Faza-
rite, Qaisite : 327, 354,
»81, 393-5, 488-9, 539,
541, 550-1

(III) b, Walid b. 'Abdil-
malik. au-Naqi§ : 362-3,
365-6, 369. 372, 374,
377, 383-4, 483-5
b. Ziad : 415-6

Yemen (province) : 98, 100,
109, 118, 297, 301 333
(tribes) : 107, 171, 175,
182, 210, 211, 250 259-
261, 314, 320.2, 328-9,
359, 398-9, 406, 411,
429,455,487,489,507-8,
535-6, 542, 550-1.

Yemenite : 39, 71, 78, 82, 173, 177,
202, 234, 240, 248, 250, 259-261 ,
314, 317, 319, 329, 334, 359, 360,
367, 374, 386-7, 428, 455, 467,
484, 542

Yftnas AbA'Agim : 511
YAauf b. Muhammad b. YAsuf, ath.
Thaqafi : 354
b. 'Umar b. Hubaira : 375
b. 'Umar, Thaqifite : 333-5,
337, 346, 354-5, 357-9,
367, 376, 474, 482, 512

Z

Zab, the Great : 547-8
Zabi, canal : 252
Zabul : 231

Zadanfanukh b. Piri : 219, 235
Zashftl : 427

Ziid b. 'Alt b. JJusain b. 'AH,
'Alid : 337-8, 353, 384, 499, 503

Za'ida b. Qndama, ath Thaqafi, of

Kftta : 197
Zaidtya ' 384-5
Zamzam : 330
Zandiq : 330

Zankbil, Yemenite : 232
Zaraf shaii : 431, 436, 452
Zaraiig or Zaranj : 234, 239, 240,

413,415
Zanuan : 460
Zawia : 235, 241-2. 256
'Aeitsnhrift des Dent. Palastinave-

reins : 213, 216
Zendiqa : 564

Ziad b. Abdillah b. Yazid b.
Mn'awia : 362
b- 'Abdirr;»hman al Qushai-

ri : 536

b. Abihi : 99, 100, 108, 113,
119, 121-2, 124-5, 127,
130, 136, 141, 143-4,
221, 228, 231, 254, 326,
400, 414-5, 499
al A'jam, Maula : 437
b. 'Ami, al'Ataki : 407-8
Ziza1 : 352
Zopyrus : 42o
Zoroastrian : 283, 330, 478
Zoroastrianiam : 495
Zubair : 42, 45, 49, 51-3 55, 275.

b. Bakkar : 194
Zubairite : 162, 170
Zufar b. Harith, mIKilabi : 154,
170, 175-6, 184-5, 189-192,201-5,
211,3^,555
Znhair b. Dhu'nib, al'Adawi : 419,

420
az Zuhrt ; 89, 96, 104, 106-8, 110-1,

148, 168, 347
Zunbil : 231-2, 234, 239, 240, 242,

261, 416, 418, 435
Zutt : 397

592

ARAB KINGDOM AND ITS PALL

T&mendanda

25" : Hijra.

28 *7 : Dihkans.

31ao 3328 790 80« mis—delete §

31*': Kharaj-land.

40'* : willingly.

78 28 : 3327.

8430 : Nahrawan Bridge.

Ill17 : after D. add a note :

only

Ya'qubi, 2, 256 differs.

11613 : Yasir.

13218 : Qoran.

15i«6 : Walid b. 'Utba.

154" :Taif.

180° : TLa\a.L(Trt^T]S ; ^a^affKov

185s 5 : Mikhnaf.

2l32fl : Pococke.

216>0 : ib. for Yahya.

220s • : official for pulpit.

222 19 : p:reat-grandson.

24423 : Culturgeschichtliche Striif.

ztige.

27019 : 'Amir.
300 27 : praetendentes.
310* s : continner of I.
328 28 : former for latter.
835 •* : ashes1
408 l8 : lyas.
4203 : castle.

428 95 : Muhallab/or Muh.
43228 : Ispahbadh.
44,7s l : Mukhaliad/or Muh.
554* «: Ffttrns,
55429: 'Anjft1; fortress.
655 3l : Qinnesrin.

A History of Islamic People.

BY S. KHUDA BUKHSH, M.A., B.C.L.,
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